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The Cinderella Service 
Andrew W. A. Hendrie, BA, ARHistS, ARAes, PhD 
In this thesis I have attempted to show the part played by Coastal 
Command in World War II. I have given emphasis to the two main roles of 
Coastal Command, namely its work in anti-submarine warfare in the Battle of the 
Atlantic, and the Command's anti-shipping operations against both warships and 
merchant vessels. Coastal's other roles, including meteorological flights, Air-Sea-
Rescue, minelaying, and photo-reconnaissance have also been considered. 
By the nature of such work, Coastal Command did not gain the 
recognition it deserved, and was overshadowed by Fighter and Bomber 
Commands which generally were given priority in respect of aircraft and 
equipment. 
As the prime needs of an Air Force in war were aircraft and armament 
I devoted two chapters to those subjects, taking the view that some understandin~ 
of such technical aspects are essential for a proper appreciation of Coastal 
Command's work. 
The thesis is based on the following primary sources; operational records 
of squadrons, the Command's records, and some Cabinet files. Additionally, I 
have corresponded with many Coastal Command veterans in addition to 
interviewing others. The retrospective views of some of those former aircrew 
have been included. 
My 'research' really began on 3
rd A~ril 1939 when I joined the RAP for 
training as aircrew, but my wartime operatIOnal flying with Coastal Command 
began in February 1942 and ended May 1?4? I therefore consider that this thesis 
which I can claim was written from the 'msIde', presents the subject by one wh~ 
was actively involved. 
. Themes have bee~ that although C?~stal.Command was the 'Cinderella' 
m respect of aircraft, eqUlpm~nt .and pubhCI~, It sunnounted those limitations 
and made a considerable contnbutIOn to the AllIes' War effort. 
COASTAL COMMAND 
Dedicated to my wife and my family 
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Illustrations 
Between pages 30-31 
1. The production line of Hudsons of the Lockheed Corporation's works at Burbank. They 
fulfilled their contracts on time, and maintained liaison with No 224 squadron. 
2. The first Hudson (N721O) to be received by No 224 squadron at Leuchars, May 1940. 
3. The wireless operator's view on the Hudson flight deck that had about 100 instruments and 
controls to be considered. Both the wireless operator and navigator could be expected to 
help the pilot in landing at such as Gibraltar in respect of flaps and undercarriage. 
Between pages 38-39 
4. HM King George VI inspecting the pilots who converted the Anson squadrons to Hudsons, 
RAF Thornaby, November 1939. 
5. HM King George VI viewing a No 220 squadron Hudson which lacked a turret. 
Between pages 40-41 
6. A navigator using the basic instruments for DR navigation in Coastal Command; a 
Mercator's chart, parallel rulers, Douglas protractor, dividers, pencil and a computer. 
7. The circular slide rule on the Navigation computer. [I.C.AN.= International Convention of 
Air Navigation.] 
8. Altimeters could be set in millibars or altitude in feet but due to changes in air pressure, 
altitude displays could be false. 
9. A navigational computer that succeeded the CSC in DR navigation. 
10. A Course Setting Calculator (CSC) as was still being used in April 1939 as an aid in Dead 
Reckoning (DR) navigation. 
Between pages 48-49 
11. A Handley-Page Hampden. A successful bomber aircraft that Was used by Coastal 
Command as a torpedo aircraft. 
12. A Sunderland of No 330 (Norsk) squadron armed with front, rear and dorsal turrets. 
Sunderlands of No 10 squadron RAAF became armed with 18 machine guns for operating 
over the Bay of Biscay. 
13. The tail of a Sunderland with a Frazer-Nash turret armed with four 0.303" Brownings. In 
air-to-air combat it was not unknown for the hydraulic leads to these turrets to be cut and 
then to require manual operation. 
Between pages 52-53 
14. Beaufighters of No 404 squadron RCAF armed with eight 60lb head rocket projectiles as 
used in shipping strikes. Alternatives were 25lb solid head projectiles. 
15. The nose ofa Wellington which is fitted with a Frazer-Nash hydraulic turret armed with two 
0.303" Brownings. 
x 
16. Inner view of the fuselage of a Wellington which. when flying low, struck the sea resulting 
in the bottom of the fuselage being tom out. 
17. A bomb-sight as fitted to a Lockheed Hudson in the navigator's compartment. 
18. A Wellington of No 221 squadron which had just released a torpedo. Torpedoes were to be 
oflimited use in shipping strikes when most of the targets were less than 6,000 tons. 
Between pages 79-80 
19. ACHQ Liverpool, May 1993 showing the table where shipping movements were plotted. 
The telephone on the right coloured red, could be 'scrambled' for security. 
20. The SS Kensington Court seen sinking from one of the Sunderlands, N9025 of No 228 
squadron, that rescued the whole of the crew on 18 September 1939, position 50<>Jl'N 
08°26'W. 
21. ACHQ ,(Area Combined Headquarters ),Derby House, Liverpool, c 1942. 
Between pages 94-95 
22. A 'first day cover' marking the Battle of the Atlantic and with the signatures of five Coastal 
Command pilots who all sank U-boats, namely: FltlLt John Cruickshank, VC; SlLdr Tony 
Bulloch, DSO,DFC; A VM W.E.Oulton, CB, CBE, DSO, DFC; SlLdr Peter Cundy, DSO, 
DFC, AFC, TO, and FItJLt Les Baveystock, DSO, DFC, DFM. 
23. A Wellington bomber but modified for maritime use with aerials for detecting vessels on the 
beams and Vagi ASV radar aerials for homing. 
Between pages 106-107 
24. Korvettenkapitan Peter Cremer commanded U-333 and with great success. He 
demonstrated his concern for fonner enemies having shot down a Sunderland that attacked 
him. As he said: 'I had no choice'. 
25. Korvettenkapitan Wolf Stiebler (U-461) was the senior officer of three U-boats sailing in 
convoy on the surface, U-504, U-461 and U-462. All three U-boats were sunk in a 
combined Naval/Coastal operation on 30 July 1943, position 45°40' 10°55 'W. 
26. A rubber dinghy dropped by Sunderland N/228 in position 45004'N OgoI4'W on 13 July 
1943 for survivors ofU-607 who were later taken aboard HMS Wren. 
27. Sunderland W6077 U/461 whose captain FltlLt Dudley Marrows, RAAF, sank U-461, a 
unique incident in WW2. He dropped his own dinghy and thus was the captain ofU-461 
saved. 
Between pages 115-116 
28. FIt'Lt David Hornell, VC (second from right), here at RAF Wick in 1944. Hornell was lost 
with some of his crew after ditching, following his attack on U-1225. 
29. Hornell's Canso No 9754 in which he sank U-1225 in position 63000'N 00050'W. It was due 
to the arrival on the scene of the sinking by a No 333 squadron Catalina, that the event 
became known. 
Xl 
30. The Italian submarine Luigi Torelli 1,191 tons, here entering Bordeaux ex La Specia. It was 
the fIrst enemy submarine to be successfully attacked by Leigh Light. That was on 4 June 
1942, position 44°43'N 06°46'W by a No 172 squadron Wellington captained by 
SlLdr J eaf Greswell. 
Between pages 121-122 
31. U-200 seen from a PBY5A (Catalina amphibian) ofVP84, USN 24 June 1943. U-200 was 
attacked and sunk using DCs and then an acoustic homing torpedo (a 'Mark 24 mine'). This 
was one of the fIrst successful uses of that 'mine'. 
32. U-106 on 2 July 1943 which was sunk in co-ordinated attacks by Sundedands N/228 and 
Ml461. 
33. An attack using rocket projectiles on U-594 by FlO H.C.Bailey in Hudson F/48 on 4 June 
1943 position 35°55'N 0~5'W. It was one ofthe fIrst 'kills' on a U-boat using RPs. 
Between pages 133-134 
34. An attack on U-980 on 11 June 1944 by FlO Sherman of No 162 squadron, RCAF, position 
67°07'N 00026'E. The U-boat was sunk using four 250lb DCs.35. U-461, V-462 and U-504 
in position 45°40'N lOo55'W on 30 July 1943, seen from Sunderland JM679. All three 
U-boats were sunk in a combined operation. 
35. U-461, U-462 and U-504 in position 45°40'N lOo55'W on 30 July 1943, seen from 
Sunderland JM 679. All three U-boats were sunk in a combined operation. 
Between pages 138-139 
36. Coastal Command veterans who were invited by the Flag Officer, Liverpool to the Battle of 
the Atlantic Commemoration in May 1993, namely: W/Cmdr Derek Martin, OBE, BSc., 
FlO John Appleton, FltlLt John Cruickshank, VC and the author. 
37. Part of No lO squadron RCAF records which corresponds to FlO Harper's log, and shows 
that another Liberator, captained by FltlLt R.F.Fisher, while on the same sweep across the 
Atlantic, attacked a submarine U-341 which was one of three sunk, and three damaged in a 
major enemy battle against convoys ON202 and ONS 18. 
38. A page from the logbook of FlO Harper of No 10 squadron RCAF who was one of the pilots 
on a shuttle service of Liberator aircraft between Reykjavik and Gander which closed the 
'Mid-Atlantic Gap' south of Greenland. 
39. A Liberator in maritime camouflage such as was pioneered by Coastal Command, and the 
type flown by FlO Harper and FltlLt Fisher. 
Between pages 139-140 
40. A Coastal Command base in the Azores which was established in October 1943. It was 
important in the Battle of the Atlantic as on 24 May 1943, Admiral Donitz ordered his 
V-boats to that area. 
XlI 
Between pages 178-179 
41. Strike crews of No 404 squadron RCAF at Davidstow Moor in June 1944. The Beaufighter 
in the background shows the single machine gun for the navigator. 
42. A Hudson of No 320 (Dutch) squadron. This unit lost twenty-one aircraft while on shipping 
strikes. 
Between pages 200-201 
43. A Beaufighter at Davidstow Moor anned with rocket projectiles in addition to cannon. In 
the background is a 'trolly ac' used to start engines to save using the aircraft's batteries. 
44. An attack off the French coast on a sperrbrecher by Nos 236 and 404 squadrons on 12 
August 1944. The splashes in the foreground are probably due to cannon fire. 
45. An attack on enemy shipping off the French coast by No 404 squadron in August1944; 
rocket projectiles can be seen fired at the ship. 
Between pages 207-208 
46. F0rde fjord, 61~9'N 05<>J9'E on 9 February 1945 when the Dallachy Strike Wing lost a 
number of aircraft including six out of eleven from No 404 squadron. An enemy ship is in 
the foreground close to the shore. 
47. The memorial to aircrew who were lost from the Dallachy Wing which is located at the site 
of the main gate of the former RAF base. It includes rocks from Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and Ireland and was unveiled on 30 July 1992. 
Between pages 215-216 
48. An artist's impression of the attack on the battle cruiser Scharnhorst by Hudsons of Nos 224 
and 233 squadrons on 21 June 1940 off southern Norway. The painting is authentic apart 
from the enemy fighters being omitted. The attack was led by SlLdr Feeny who was shot 
down in flames. 
49. The Catalina of No 209 squadron which, captained by P/O Dennis Briggs, made the crucial 
sighting of the battleship Bismarck on 26 May 1941. 
Between pages 233-234 
50. A Wellington of No 612 squadron with the housing for the scanner of a later mark of 
ASV/radar visible in the nose. In the latter months of the war No 612 was operating against 
E-boats off the Dutch coast, and additionally was sighting German midget submarines. 
51. German E-boats which operated from the Dutch and also the Norwegian coasts in 
1944-1945. Nos 415, 524 and 612 squadrons were directly involved in countering their 
attacks against British shipping along England's east coast and the English Channel. 
Between pages 242-243 
52. An airborne lifeboat with its sail raised (although it was provided with engine power). 
Airborne lifeboats were flrst designed to be fitted to Hudsons of No 279 squadron. 
53. A Warwick with a lifeboat. Such aircraft were used late in the war to support the strike 
Wings on their sorties 
X111 
Between pages 252-253 
54. A Halifax of No 518 squadron off Tiree in the Inner Hebrides. No 518 was one of the 
meteorological squadrons that was devoted to such work. 
55. A Wellington fitted with coils through which a current of electricity was passed providing a 
magnetic field that was used to detonate German-laid magnetic mines. This was one of the 
tasks allocated to Coastal Command. 
Between pages 257-258 
56. Trondheim naval base where the Germans built V-boat pens, in addition to those at French 
ports. 
57. Bordeaux V-boat base. The Gironde provided bases for both German and Italian 
submarines. 
Between pages 261-262 
58. A memorial to No 269 squadron in Selfoss, Iceland, 1 August 2000. No 269 squadron 
operated Hudsons from Kaldadarnes, Hofil and Reykjavik for much of the war on anti-
submarine operations over the North Atlantic, and also undertook 'ice patrols' to warn 
shipping. Their tasks were hazardous and their conditions most grim. 
59. A memorial to the North Coates Strike Wing erected at Cleethorpes on 25 September 1999. 
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1. The North Atlantic, North Sea and Norwegian Sea areas. xvii 
2. The Atlantic Seaboard from the Gulf ofSt. Lawrence to the River Plate. xviii 






























Glossary and Abbreviations 
Anti -aircraft 
Army Air Corps 
Army Air Force 
Area Combined Headquarters 
Air Commodore 
Air Chief Marshal 
Acting Flight Lieutenant 
Area Headquarters 
XlV 
A lamp used to transmit messages in Morse Code by operating a 
mirror and sighting through a telescopic sight. 
Air Marshal 
Air Ministry 
A chemical explosive used in such as DCs 
Air Officer Commanding 
Anti -submarine 
Air-Sea Rescue 
Aircraft to Surface Vessel; equipment which transmitted electro-
magnetic waves that would be reflected back by vessels 
producing a 'blip' on a cathode ray tube. 
British Expeditionary Force 
The Canadian version of the Catalina amphibian 
Chief Flying Instructor 
Commander-in-Chief 
Creeping Line Ahead; a navigational search method 
Commanding Officer 
Cathode Ray Tube (as used in radar and ASV) 
A navigational patrol method 
Depth Charge 
A bomb designed to be dropped from medium height against 
U-boats 
Direction Finding 
Distinguished Flying Cross 































Estimated Time of Arrival 





Failed to return (from operations) 
Group Captain 
xv 
Code name for a radar type of navigation but used in conjunction 
with a specialised chart; it was suitable for North Sea operations. 
General Officer Commanding in Chief 
High explosive 
Code for sonobuoys used by Coastal Command to detect 
submerged U-boats 
His Majesty's Ship 
Headquarters Coastal Command 
High Speed Launch as used for ASR 
Identification Friend or Foe. An automatic transmitter in aircraft 
for its identification but which could be used to home in other 
aircraft. 
Killed in action 
Magnetic Anomaly Detection 
An RAF term for a lifejacket that could be inflated by mouth or 
by a C02 bottle 
Medium Case bomb 
Mention in Despatches 
Motor Launch 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
































USN code for Catalina aircraft 
Pilot Officer 
Photo-Reconnaissance Unit 
Royal Australian Air Force 
XVI 
An American term applied to equipment such as the British 
A.s.v. 
Royal Air Force 
Royal Canadian Air Force 
Used in conjunction with MAD gear against submerged U-boats 
Royal Netherlands Naval Air Service 
Royal New Zealand Air Force 
Rocket Projectile 
Radio Telephony 




Senior Naval Officer 




An explosive filling for the later type ofDCs 
Unserviceable 
United States Navy 
USN code for a squadron with heavier-than-air patrol planes. 
Wing Commander 
Wireless Operator 
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No official history has been devoted to the part played by Coastal Command in 
World War II although the three small volumes, Royal Air Force 1939-1945 by Denis 
Richards and Hilary St. G. Saunders give references to Coastal Command throughout. 
In their preface Richards and Saunders state a reason for that limitation: 'To have 
given ... subjects the consideration they deserve would have involved writing a history, 
not in three volumes but in thirty.' They continue: ' ... the authors of the full length 
official military history of the war, ... will have more space at their disposal'. 1 
The full length official work History of the Second World War, has, as its general 
editor, Professor 1. R. M. Butler states, was' ... to provide a broad survey of events from 
an inter-Service point of view ... '.2 
One section of the major British official history of World War II where one might 
have hoped for Coastal Command to have gained more coverage, was in The War at 
Sea. Its three volumes were, however, written by a naval officer, Captain S. W.Roskill 
who obviously considered Coastal Command as an adjunct to the Royal Navy, rather 
than as a Service in its own right. As Professor Butler states in his preface: 'Captain 
Roskill is concerned with events as they influenced the decisions at the Admiralty'. 3 
Roskill, in his 'Conclusion and Inquiry' does give a reason for the lack of priority 
to Coastal Command: 'Because our air strategy was concentrated mainly on the 
bombing of Germany ... '.4 Roskill, also in his conclusions, refers to the lack of ' ... an 
effective weapon' in 1939 for Coastal's Sunderlands and Hudsons.5 
The one British official publication devoted to Coastal Command was a booklet 
entitled Coastal Command; published in 1942 and thus limited to Coastal's operations 
up to that time. It was written by Hilary St. G. Saunders (although not so stated), and 
due to wartime security, lacks the details that one would expect in an official history. 
1. Richards D., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1953, Vol. I, p.ix. 
2. Butler, I.R.M., Introduction to S.W.Roskill's The War at Sea 1939-1945 London, 1954 Vol I p xix 
3. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, p.xiv. • ,. ,. . 
4. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1961, Vol. m.2, p.397. 
5. Roskill, S.W., Vol. m.2, p.403. 
3 
Coastal Command was almost certainly intended as wartime propaganda, but, 
nevertheless, was written from the ·inside', and is authentic.6 
America has published official histories for both their Navy and Air Force and 
both refer to Coastal Command~ as units of the United States Navy and United States 
Army Air Corps operated within Coastal Command, albeit, to a limited extent. 
The author of the United States Navy's World War II history, Professor S.E. 
Morison, devotes two of his fifteen volumes to the Battle of the Atlantic. In the first of 
those, he states that the RAP ·was not equipped to fight submarines.' He adds that 
Coastal Command was set up with ' ... 19 squadrons and about 220 planes, practically a 
separate air force.' This, for Morison, was a ' ... typical British compromise ... ' It, 
nevertheless, 'succeeded in driving submarines out of the Western Approaches ... ,.7 In 
his introduction to Volume X, Professor Morison states that Coastal Command ' ... had 
few aircraft suitable for antisubmarine operations'.s Thus, Morison supports the view , 
in his two volumes devoted to the Battle of the Atlantic, that in that battle, Coastal 
Command remained the Cinderella. 
One of the standard American histories is The Army Air Forces in World War II 
that was prepared under W. F. Craven and 1. L. Cate. Three of its seven volumes give 
reference to Coastal Command. They make the same points about the Command as 
other official historians~ of its deficiencies in the Battle of the Bay; ' ... the effort 
suffered from lack of enough long-range aircraft, lack of a "balanced" anti-submarine 
force ... and lack of adequate radar equipment and special weapons,.9 They rightly state 
that' ... the Admiralty's control over the RAP Coastal Command, [was] a jurisdiction 
principally concerned with the mission to be performed'. 10 
Italy's U/ficio Storico Della Marina Militare has published a series on maritime 
operations in World War II: La Marina Italiana Nella Second a Guerra Mondiale. ll The 
volumes on Italy's submarine operations in the Mediterranean are in the form of the 
operational logs of its submarines. They demonstrate, although that could not have been 
the intention, the valuable part played by just a few Sunderlands from Coastal 
b · 12 Command in countering a su manne menace. 
6. Saunders, H. St. G., Coastal Commanti. 1939-1942, London, 1942. 
7. Morison, S.E., The Battle ?/the AtlantIC Sep.1939-May 1943, Boston, 1975, p.12. 
8. Morison, S.E., The Atlantic Battle Won M.ay 1943- May 1945, Boston, 1984, p.4. 
9. Craven, W.F., and Cate, J.L., The Army Air Forces in WWII, Chicago, 1976, Vol. II, p.244. 
10. Craven, W.F., and Cate, lL., Vol. II, p.406. 
11. La Marina ltaliana N~l~a. ~econcm. Guerra Mondiale, Rome, 1968-76, Vols, I-XXI. 
12. Bertini, M., Sommergtbtll mMedlterraneo, Vol. XlII.1, Rome, 1972, Vol. XIII.2, Rome, 1968. 
4 
The official Italian history of their submarines operating in the Atlantic from the 
French Gironde to as far west as the Brazilian coast is notable in giving a detailed 
account of the first successful use of the Leigh Light by Coastal Command. It covers 
also, their voyages round to East Africa and to Singapore. 13 Volume N covers the 
Italian naval surface operations in the Mediterranean from June 1940 to March 1941 
and thus includes the crucial battle of Cape Matapan in which a Sunderland from 
Coastal Command played a key role. 
The Italian historians do not refer to the deficiencies of Coastal Command, rather 
do they report on the attacks and sightings made by Sunderlands, and it is notable that 
the only aircraft illustrated within four volumes of their official history is a 
Sunderland. 14 
Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham in his A Sailor's Odyssey states, as do 
other writers: ' ... Coastal Command was woefully short of aircraft, particularly aircraft 
of very long range' .15 Of Coastal during Operation Torch Cunningham states: 'The 
demands upon Coastal Command of the RAF were heavy ... '.16 and comments on the 
, ... persistent good work .. .' in attacks on U-boats in that Operation.17 Admiral 
Cunningham, in his summing-up of Operation Overlord gives: 'Our comparative 
immunity to submarine attack was principally due to the enthusiastic efficiency of 
Coastal Command'. 18 
Four of Coastal Command's Commanders-in-Chiefhave published books that are 
autobiographical~ the exception is Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip JOUbert's Birds and 
Fishes. He gives as a sub-title The Story of Coastal Command, which, for Joubert, 
begins in 1908. During the 1939-1945 war, Sir Philip was in command from June 194t 
until February 1943, the period when the maximum effort was expected of the 
Command but with very limited resources. 19 Some of Joubert's chapter headings reflect 
the Command's standing as he saw it with: 'Make do and Mend', 'The Dark Days' and 
'A Rough Road'. 'Make do and Mend' outlines the limited resources of the Command 
in 1939. 
13. Ubaldini, V.M., I Sommergibili Ne~li Oceani, Rome, 1976, Vol. XU. 
14. Bertini, M., I So!"mergibili i~M~dlterraneo, Rome, 1972, Vol. XlII.1, p.S8. 
15. Cunningham, VIscount, A Sarlor s Odyssey, London, 1951, p.299. 
16. Cunningham, Viscount, p.482. 
17. Cunningham, Viscount, p.Sl0. 
18. Cunningham, Viscount, p.604. 
19. Joubert, P., Birds and Fishes: The Story o/Coastal Command, London, 1960. 
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In his final chapter, Sir Philip states: ' ... the Cinderella Command once again sits 
forlorn in the ashes ... and, ... the cold hand of the Treasury ... had fallen on Coastal 
Command more heavily than elsewhere,.2o In a chapter on Anti-Submarine-Warfare 
(ASW), Joubert adds: 'For Churchill ... Bomber Command was the favourite child. 
Fighter Command had done its job in the Battle of Britain. Coastal Command was 
merely an adjunct to a defensively minded Navy,.2l The index to his Story o/Coastal 
Command appears almost as a list of the Command's personnel, whether sergeant, flight 
lieutenant or air marshal. History for Sir Philip was truly a humanity, and from records 
it is obvious that he made every attempt to meet men who were in the front line. 
Marshal of the RAP Sir John Slessor's The Central Blue in chapters on Coastal 
Command, states 'I... tried to introduce an impression of the human side of history'. 22 
That, Slessor has achieved. He refers to 'my Coastal crews' and adds: 'The crews of 
Coastal Command certainly did not get their mead of public recognition at the time, nor 
have they since,.23 
Lord Douglas, who succeeded Slessor as Commander-in-Chief, in his 
autobiography, Years of Command, devotes a chapter to Coastal Command, Constant 
Endeavour (the Command's motto). In another chapter, however, Lord Douglas makes 
the same point as other writers: 'During the early part of the war, Coastal Command had 
to make do with aircraft which were both outdated and insufficient on numbers ... '.24 
That aspect is reiterated by A.J.P. Taylor in his English History 1914-1945 with: 
'The Air Ministry, set on bombing Germany, grudged supplying aeroplanes for Coastal 
Command ... Every now and then, during the worst moments of the Shipping war, the 
War Cabinet intervened on the naval side; in no time at all, the Air Ministry pulled 
things back to their standing obsession of the strategic bombing offensive,.25 
The only thesis, so far as is known, concerning Coastal Command, is Dr C. Goulter's A 
Forgotten Offensive, with the sub-title Royal Air Force Coastal Command's Anti-
Shipping Campaign, 1940-1945. 
20. Joubert, P., p.215. 
21. Joubert, P., p.150. 
22. Siessor, 1., The Central Blue, London, 1956, p.xiii. 
23. Siessor, 1., p.468. 
24. Douglas, S., Years of Command, London, 1966, p.486. 
25. Taylor, A.1.P., English History 1914-1945, Hannondsworth, 1970, p.613. 
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Dr Goulter rightly states in her preface: 'The closest Coastal Command came to 
having its own official history was the coverage it received in naval historian Stephen 
Roskill's The War at Sea '.26 Goulter's editor, Sebastian Cox, states, of Goulter's thesis , 
that: 'The work is based on primary sources.' Regretfully, the bibliography in listing 
primary sources, lacks detail, and gives such as 'Air 15 Coastal Command 1936-1965 ' 
of which there are hundreds of 'pieces'; and 'Air 27 Squadron Operations Record 
Books' of which there are thousands of pieces. Nevertheless, Mr Cox advises that it 
, .. .is an important contribution to the history of economic warfare'. 27 Certainly, Dr 
Goulter has given much attention to the economics of Coastal's anti-shipping 
operations, and some emphasis towards the Beaufighter strike wings. 
The prolific author, Chaz Bowyer, in two of his books that were devoted to 
Coastal Command, makes the same point as GouIter, thus: ' ... no full academic history 
of the vital part played ... by RAF Coastal Command has ever been published to 
date'.28. Again: 'The full history ofRAF Coastal Command has still to be written'.29 
John Terraine in his Right of the Line, sub-titled The R.A.F. in the European War 
1939-1945, rightly refers to Coastal as the Cinderella; in fact, gives that description 
three times. Thus: 'The true position in September 1939 ... of the three operational 
Commands, one (Coastal) was an acknowledged Cinderella, weak in numbers and 
almost entirely equipped with obsolescent aircraft ... ' which Terraine bases on its stated 
forces. 3D On the positive side, Terraine gives some of Coastal's aChievements which , 
, '" unaided, included 169 German U-boats out of 326 destroyed by shore-based aircraft 
alone,.31 On that same page, Terraine quotes SIessor, that Coastal crews did not get their 
mead of public recognition. Terraine again quotes Slessor, who considered that this lack 
of recognition of Coastal Command was due to Churchil1.
32 I~;. t 
Probably the most useful publication devoted to Coastal Command's anti-
SUbmarine operations is Norman Franks' Search, Find and Kill. 
26. Goulter, C.1.M., A Forgotten C!.fIensive RAF Coastal Command's Anti-Shipping Campaign 
1940-1945, London, 1995, p.Xll. 
27. Goulter, C.J.M., p.ix. 
28. Bowyer, C., Men ojCoastal Command, London, 1985, p.l1. 
29. Bowyer, C., Coastal Command at War, Shepperton, 1979, p.6. 
30. Terraine, J., Right ojthe Line: The RAF in the European War 1939-1945, London, 1985, 
p.70, FN 223,233. 
31. Terraine, 1., p.456. 
32. Terraine, 1., p.456. 
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It is based on official operational records but includes accounts from former aircrew. 
Franks' invaluable introduction includes the same point made by other authors: 'Its 
aircraft were few and the Command was at least third on the list of any priorities of 
aircraft'. 33 
Professor Richard Overy in his The Air War 1939-1945 states that it is a 'general 
history' and 'to show two things': 'Why the Allies won the air war' and 'how 
important air power was to the achievement of overall victory'" 34 He acknowledges 
that of defence tasks, ' ... the most vital was the Battle of the Atlantic ... ,.35 and that 
although 'The land-based bomber was seen to be the key to sea-power ... they ... became 
so many Cinderellas' . 36 
A conflicting view of Coastal Command is that given in Bomber Offensive by 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris. He rightly refers to some priority 
being given to Coastal Command in respect of radar; and also that some squadrons were 
transferred to Coastal Command. 37 
A German view of Coastal Command in the U-boat war is perhaps best given by 
Fregattenkapitan GUnter Hessler who gained help from Professor Jfugen Rohwer, a 
former Leutnant-zur-see in preparing The U-boat War in the Atlantic. 38 
While obviously written with the bias of a U-boat commander, it indirectly 
displays the positive aspects of Coastal Command, such as driving the U-boats 
westwards, and the obvious respect the enemy had for the Sunderlands and Beaufighters 
with their aircrews. . . 
From the foregoing, it is apparent why no official history of the Coastal Command 
has been published. The Air Ministry gave precedence to Bomber Command, thO 
Admiralty to the Royal Navy, and the indifference on the part of Churdlllt.HM 
I h" . , k 39 Treasury cut short even the official nava Istonans wor . : .. 
. ~ 
.' . . 
33. Franks, N., Search, Find and Kill, London, 1995, p.viii. 
34. Overy, R, The Air War 1939-1945, London, 1980, p.xi. 
35. Overy, R, p.39. 
36. Overy, R, p.8. 
37. Harris, A, Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, pp.90, 99,269. See also' Overy R pp 72 116 
38. Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic 1939-1945, London, 1992. ,.," . 
39. Waters, D.W., LtlCmdr, RN, to the author. 
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How the research was conducted 
I obtained microfilm copies of records from the Public Record Office of 
documents stemming from the Command's headquarters, copies of Cabinet files and 
operational records of many squadrons. 40 These were, however, supplied at exorbitant 
cost, and of956 'pieces' devoted to Coastal Command under 'Air 15', I received a list 
of about two-dozen pieces that were directly available on microfilm.41 Coastal 
Command is the obvious Cinderella in respect of its official records. Regrettably, copies 
of some records are now unobtainable with the advice given on some microfilm that the 
PRO was unable to copy the originals due to their bad condition. 
I was able to obtain copies of records from Canada on free loan, and from the 
USN and AAF in America at nominal cost; likewise for RAAF records from Canberra. 
Squadron intelligence officers and adjutants in Canadian units were responsible 
for keeping records and only Canadian records appear to have been checked at the time. 
With Coastal Command having a series of detachments, away from responsible officers , 
some of those records were written in retrospect and possibly by an office orderly. They 
vary in detail from barely one line to one or two pages, and may not always identify the 
crew of an aircraft. 
In contrast, all Coastal Command's aircrews were required to keep a log that was 
countersigned on the squadrons every month. Many aircrew correspondents sent me 
photocopies of pages from their logbooks. Additionally, some sent photographs of 
attacks on ships and U-boats, or gave an analysis of some operations in conjundion . ,. 
with advice from former enemies. 
~ 
Some aircrew veterans sent also, copies of wartime letters and diaries. SUch 
material was provided in addition to covering letters, written in retr~~Pe~t. ~it tI.-. 
from the latter, that many aircrews had visual memories and recalled/'s.' .:,., 
wrote, even after a lapse of fifty years. To check details of a sortie such as names, •• 
time, serial number of aircraft etc, aircrew may refer to their logbooks. I find tb'fIJ.~ 
that aircrew correspondents are a more reliable source than official recon:ll; IIId 
generally, if there was any doubt, correspondents advised me accordingly. S011le fonaer 
aircrew visited me; I in tum, visited others. 
~- . ' 
40. See Bibliography, 
41. The cost off OUT part-rolls of microfilm (four 'pieces' or documents) _ £1,164.50. 
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Additional sources have been squadron histories written by one or more of 
squadron associations and which mayor not have been published such as those for Nos 
14 (RAF) and 10 (RAAF). 42 As these could be based on aircrew log-books, diaries of 
both groundcrews and aircrews, in addition to official records, I have found them one of 
the most reliable sources, albeit published post-war. I have referred to a number of other 
publications and they are listed in the bibliography. 
The four wartime Commanders-in-Chief of Coastal Command, although generally 
remote from the front line, had direct reports from Groups and liaison officers such as 
Captain Peyton-Ward, RN who debriefed aircrew who attacked U-boats. In the case of 
Sir Philip Joubert, he made a point on occasions, of making direct contact with 
individual aircrew and squadron commanders. The official records of the Commanders_ 
in-Chiefs' conferences closely reflect therefore, operations, and the general situation but 
obviously from their points of view. Their despatches and memoranda from their 
conferences represent an important primary source. 
The form of the thesis 
In the thesis I have given emphasis to the two major roles of Coastal Command , 
namely, anti-submarine operations (ASW), and anti-shipping operations. As Coastal's 
operations were highly technical, I have written chapters on aircraft and armaments that 
were relevant to the Command. Coastal Command had a number of other roles' , 
including Air-Sea-Rescue (ASR), Photographic Reconnaissance, and MeteorolOgical 
Flights. I have therefore included a chapter on those aspects. Veterans of the Co~ 
are conscious of their 'Cinderella' status, and their views are given in retrosiJect ; 
My theme has been twofold; although the Cinderella Command came third· ita 
priority after its two 'sisters' (Bomber and Fighter Commands), ,it ne"'~~ 
achieved much as is confirmed by its record. OJ', ,'. 
Andrew W. A. Hendrie 
Storrington, January 2004 
'''' .. " 
42. Orange, V., and Delamere, R., Winged ~romises: A History of No14 Squadron, Fairford, 1996. 




In this chapter I have considered the various aspects of aircraft that feature in the 
Command's records emanating from the four Commanders-in-Chief Aspects that prevail 
throughout the war were the role of Coastal, the aircraft available, their speed, range and 
endurance, production, procurement and engines. For that reason, I have depended to a 
considerable degree on the memoranda stemming from the meetings of Coastal 
Command's commanders. Armament and equipment are given in Chapter 2. 
Secondary sources that refer to aircraft are seldom concerned specifically with 
Coastal Command's needs, but rather of the RAP as a whole. Thus AJ.P. Taylor refers 
specifically to aircraft production and the 'innovation' of Churchill appointing 
Beaverbrook as Minister of Aircraft Production and the 'battle' that prevailed with Ernest 
Bevin the Minister for Labour. As Taylor states: 'Beaverbrook could produce the goods. 
Only Bevin could produce the labour ... ' A.J.P. Taylor refers to the Air Ministry bein~ ~et 
on bombing Germany and thus grudged supplying aircraft to Coastal Command. l ., " 
, " 
Dr Goulter in her thesis on the strike wings deals with those "ircraft' "";ii. t~ 
, ' . 
Coastal's anti-shipping campaign and rightly gives most attention to the~\ud 
". ~ \ . 
Mosquito with which the strike wings were armed. Dr Goulter dis!"iIIes, ~.\Ite 
Anson and Hudson that initiated attacks by Coastal Command on en~y -.. ~tb.: 
'Neither aircraft was particularly suited to a maritime function'. 2 Th~ ope. records 
demonstrate otherwise. 
• <, -.; ~ '. 
Richard Overy in his The Air War 1939-1945 refers briefly to eight types''OfBritish 
aircraft but they were bombers and fighters. Under 'Aircraft and Sea'power~.liowever, 
Overy acknowledges that land-based aircraft were the key to sea power aml1kat naval 
demands for purpose built aircraft became the Cinderellas. 3 
1. Taylor, A.J.P., English History 1914-1945, Hannondsworth 1970 619 613 628 
a)P- . L d " pp. , , . 2. Goulter, C.J.M., A Forgotten 'JJenslve, on on, 1995, p.76. 
3. Overy, RJ., The Air War 1939-1945, London, 1980, pp.6,8,21,56,113,193,19S,200. 
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Owen Thetford's comprehensive Aircraft of the RAF Since 1918 gives technical 
details of most types of aircraft used by the RAP and may be considered a standard work of 
reference.4 
Denis Richards in the official RAF history states that Coastal Command was initially 
badly equipped due to priority being given to a ' ... fighter force ... and a bomber force ... ' 
and due to the Allies having 'superiority in naval resources', Coastal came third in 
priority.s 
The official naval historian, Captain Roskill, likewise, refers to the deficiencies in 
Coastal Command's aircraft and touches upon the availability, speed and range of its 
aircraft. 6 
It is left to Sir Arthur Harris to complain later in the war, that he was losing aircraft 
from Bomber Command in favour of Coastal, although he had no wish to use the American 
aircraft that went to Coastal. 7 
Despite such an unfavourable beginning in respect of aircraft, it will be seen that 
there was a progressive improvement throughout the war, but never to be completely 
resolved in the operational range of aircraft. 
The Role of Coastal Command 
As early as October 1937, the Senior Air Staff Officer, (SASO) at Coastal 
Command's Headquarters, Air Commodore G. Bromet, in a memo t~ the Air'~ 
Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill, suggested thatit\IWIS~to 
1 ' 
create a modem Defence Organisation in co-operation with the A~ 
Coastal Command could function, adding that both Fighter and Bom~~~ 
, ~ , 
clear roles. #', 
Bromet gave the role of the Command in war against Gem\any tt, giv~ 
warning of air raids approaching the coast; the prevention if ~, ·ef raHIers 
approaching, and to assist in the protection of shipping by escorting ~, anti-
submarine patrols and reconnaissances for surface vessels.8 .•. ' . 
4. Thetford, 0., Aircraftojthe RAF Since 1918, London, 1979. 
5. Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1953, Vol. I, p.57. 
6. RoskilI, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, pp.37-38. 
7. H~s, A., Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, pp.99, 104,265. 
8. ~r 15-3 Coastal Command's War Plans ~ct 1937-Jun.l939, minute 2.12.37. 
Air 15-773 para. 8. Air 15-3 memo to Air Staffc 8. 10.37. 
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On 1 December 1937 the Air Ministry issued a directive that the primary role for 
Coastal Command would be reconnaissance in Home Waters, and co-operation with the 
Royal Navy in convoy protection. Additionally, in defence of British trade, offensive 
operations would be undertaken against surface vessels, submarines and enemy aircraft, as 
part of British trade protection, but the primary role was to remain reconnaissance. Earlier 
in 1937, the Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command, Air Marshal Sir Frederick 
Bowhill, had obviously considered such requirements and had suggested that a paper be 
submitted to the Air Ministry 'on the characteristics we require for our aircraft in General 
Reconnaissance squadrons. ,9 
The characteristics that Sir Frederick specified were: speed, range, good armament 
and good navigational facilities. Additionally he proposed that aircraft might be 
constructed entirely of wood and with engines that could be jettisoned. This so that the 
aircraft would float if ditched. IO 
Throughout 1938 the availability of aircraft, their serviceability, their location and 
the provision of suitable bases were considered. The Admiralty had overall responsibility 
for maritime operations and a discussion was held at the Admiralty on 15 December 1938 
covering the Coastal Command and Naval plans. During that discussion an embryo convoy 
system was considered and the lack of the Navy's escort vessels emphasised. Becauk of 
this lack of vessels, the C-in-C Home Fleet was concerned about protectingrus miidaYer's 
in the Dover Straits, and two squadrons, Nos 500 and 42 were specifiediJr .. ..,1 . 
Although no convoy system had been organised in December 1938ft_~,'ed 
that protection would be required for Norwegian Convoys, in the Mi1lOb ~~'tIast 
Coast, and Dutch convoys. For the Western Approaches convoys, ~~'be 
required in the English, Bristol, and St. George's Channels. It w~~i~*e~ 
Coast and Dutch convoys would require protection against air attac~ AlrMirtllfty 
11 
was to consult Fighter Command for that purpose. 
By the end of June 1939 a memorandum was issued by the Air OfficerCGIt\lNlllmg .. 
in-Chief, Coastal Command outlining its command structure and its du" 
9. Air 15-3 War Plans Oct. 1937- Dec. 1938 memo to SASO 25.11 37 1 
HQCC D· f . ,para.. 10. Air 15-3 memo 22.12.38. to Irec~or 0 Operations & Intelligence. 
11. Air 15-3 War Plans Oct.1937-Dec.1938, resume 15.12.38. 
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At that time there were three operational Groups in the Command with headquarters to 
coincide with those of the Naval Commanders-in-Chief at Plymouth. Rosyth and Nore and 
Coastal Command would be formed that year. The role of the Command was then specified 
as: 
i) To assist the Home Fleet in the detection and prevention of enemy vessels escaping from 
the North Sea to the Atlantic. 
ii) The provision of air patrols in co-operation with anti-submarine surface craft, or air 
escorts to convoys. 
iii) Air searches, when required, over Home Waters. 
iv) Provision of an air striking force for duty, mainly on the East Coast. 
The AOC-in-C, would order any re-adjustment of his forces according to conditions. 
Of the routine North Sea patrols; there was to be a continuous patrol from Montrose to the 
nearest point on the Norwegian coast [Obrestadt] every 45 minutes during daylight hours. 
As the only aircraft available in sufficient numbers, the A vro Anson, lacked the 
range, submarine patrols would be established at the Norwegian end of the line. The 
submarines would be withdrawn when the Anson squadrons were re-equipped with the 
longer-ranged American Lockheed Hudson. 12 
In April 1940 at a conference held at the Air Ministry the operational roles of the 
aircraft then available were given thus: 
~ • ~ f'l; 
'. 
i) General Reconnaissance - the flying boats Sunderland, PBY", (~), sam 
Lerwick and Singapore Mark ills. ; \ 
Reconnaissance was to be by day or night over the sea and coas:s O~I1tury 
to assist Naval, Land and Air Force in the protection of sea communicatilJlls' ... _-
borne attack. Convoy escort by day and anti-submarine co-ope~~ . 
ii) Bombing: high, low and shallow dive-bombing by day of ni@ktdfttt6atioNlWY 
~-. " 
and moving targets. 
Hudsons, Beauforts and Bothas were to be used for reconnais_ by day • .,. in 
addition to bombing requirements. Nos 22 and 42 squadrons with BeaufOrts were to be 
trained for torpedo attacks. 
12. Air 15-4 Employment of Coastal Command in a Continental War, memo 30.6.39. 
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Ansons were to be used for reconnaissance, especially for convoy and anti-submarine 
patrols, but additionally for bombing. 
These extreme measures indicate how desperate the situation was considered. They 
were made just a week after the invasion of Norway. At home, the obsolescent Singapore 
flying boat must have been included of necessity; the Anson was certainly no bomber 
aircraft; and the Botha was to be proved unsuitable for operations. 13 
Prior to the invasion of Norway it had been decided that Sunderlands and PBY s 
[Catalinas] would be mainly employed in the Atlantic and the Arctic I ••• where Particularly 
long endurance is required' 14 Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert succeeded Sir Frederick 
as Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command in June 1941 and was to express the role of the 
Command thus: 
Recent experience shows conclusively that there are two main tasks which have to be 
carried out by this Command ... close escort of convoys up to the limit of endurance of present 
day aircraft and the sweeping an area ... for sighting, attacking or neutralising enemy 
submarines by forcing them to submerge. These two are complementary ... carried out only if 
Coastal Command possesses sufficient aircraft to do the jobs. 
Thus the role of the Command was re-defined. Joubert added that additional tasks were 
shipping reconnaissance, attacks on warships and merchant vessels and reconnaissance 
against possible invasion forces, and further that there was: I ... at present a tender.tcy to ~ 
on to Coastal Command commitments which more properly belong to the ~avy and to 
'" .4:.. " • 
ship-borne aircraft'. 15 .\,- "'.h' ,';., 
Aircraft Available 
At the outbreak of war in September 1939 Air Marshal Sir Fred~ ~~"I~,j~ 
Officer-in-Chief of Coastal Command had forces often Anson ~quadrOns::itACt"'1bur 
. ' ,'; ~\t~ 
Auxiliaries, one Hudson squadron, and two stnke squadrons of Vildebee8tS. The ftyittg~ 
. \, ,'" , 
boat units were two squadrons ofSunderlands, three WIth Saro Londons;anloneequipped 
with Supermarine Stranraers. The Vildebeest strike-aircraft and the LondonandStRtnraer 
flying boats were all obsolescent. . , . 
13. Air 15-46 Aircraft Requirements Jul.193 9-Jun.194 3, memo AM conference 16.4.40. 
14. Air 15-46 Deputy SASO memo 2.4.40. 
15. Air 15-213 Expansion and Re-equipment; Estimated Requirements, Jun. 1940, p. t 18. 
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The Ansons represented the equipment for more than half his total force but with 
insufficient range to undertake the reconnaissance required, and four out of the six flying-
boat squadrons were equipped with obsolescent aircraft. Sir Frederick was thus left with 
just three squadrons with modem aircraft, namely Hudsons and Sunderlands that were 
considered able to operate effectively. 16 
In the early months of 1939 supplies of engines for the Avro Anson aircraft were 
limited and there was a need to restrict the flying of Ansons on that account. It was 
necessary also to conserve even the out-dated Vildebeests as there were only six in store to 
supply both home and abroad. At that time the Command had ten Stranraers, seventeen 
Londons, four Short Singapore flying -boats, and two Sunderlands. Deliveries of the latter 
to the Command were given as only two per month. 
The Director of Organisation at the Air Ministry, then Charles Portal, following the 
Munich crisis, foresaw what was to be a problem in respect of the availability of aircraft 
throughout the war. That was that aircraft could be weather bound for days at various 
places round the coast. Coastal Command was required to operate throughout the 24 hours 
and to do that bases were required for both take-off and to land with some degree of safety. 
This applied particularly to flying boats. The new twin-engined flying boat, the Saro 
Lerwick, had not been expected to be delivered before April 1939 and therefore Was 
unlikely to be operational before the end of the year, but then to be f~~d unsuitable fur 
• i • . \. "':'. ~ I:. i ~ 1 l 
• 17 operatIons. 
There was a need therefore, for land-based aircraft to cover the 'South~~ 
Approaches and significantly, in the same memo of 25 October 1938, Portal refers to 
. 18 ;~" . 'i . 
having Newquay CSt.Eval) laId out to take two squadrons. 
Between December 1939 and August 1940 the following rei __ ~ 
~ .. J~ , , • 
received by Coastal Command: No 10 squadron RAAF Sunderl&nds in~ 1939, 
four Blenheim squadrons on loan from Fighter Command in Febru~~ 1940 (Nos 235, 236, 
248 and 254); in June 1940 Nos 53 and 59 squadrons with BlenheimsonbmftomBomber 
Command, and in August 1940, No 98 squadron's Fairey Battles also on loan from BoMber 
Command the latter to be based in Iceland. , 
16. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches Vol. I, para.10. 
17. Air 15-773 Vol. I, para.10. 
18. Air 15-3 Coastal Command's War Plan, memo 25.10.38. 
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These additions had followed an agreement by the Air Ministry with the Admiralty 
for Coastal Command to have an additional fifteen squadrons by June 1941. By 15 June, 
that had only been achieved by the loan of seven squadrons from other Commands, with 
aircraft unsuited to the maritime role, and with a daily average availability of298 aircraft. 19 
Just a month later, the Command had 612 aircraft with thirty-nine squadrons but by 
then it was estimated that future requirements would be sixty-three and a half squadrons 
with 838 aircraft.2o The 612 aircraft then available included eleven types and that would 
have produced problems in training for aircrew when they converted to a different type of 
aircraft. At Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte 's first staff meeting on 30 June 
as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Coastal Command, the number of aircraft available 
was not stated, but rather that there were only four strike-squadrons.21 
By 1 December 1941 reconnaissance aircraft available to Coastal Command included 
18 Catalina flying boats, 9 Sunderlands, 20 Whitleys and 170 Hudsons. The Command's 
strike aircraft comprised 60 Beaufort torpedo bombers, 20 Beaufort bombers and 40 
Beaufighters. Additionally, Coastal had 60 of the Blenheim fighter version. The total of 
397 aircraft was available to equip 18112 squadrons.22 
The total number of aircraft available to Coastal Command in June 1942 Was 496 , 
and would have included aircraft of four squadrons on loan from Bomber Command, but 
for Sir Philip, there was a shortage of three landplane squadrons, and ten flyiDa,boat 
squadrons; and in his report to the Air Ministry, he added: '1 therefore cannot acoapt Yf\tr 
view that we are comparatively well off, nor do I feel that we have~_tL,._ 
carry out our job.' 23 '.' \.::,~: ,~, ", , ',' 
Although in November 1942, Coastal had 259 Hudsons, Sir Philip wa .... ted 
about their availability due to ten squadrons plus other units still operati ....... ... 
that with the • ... present Hudson commitment. .. continuance of ~ ..... ~ 6f 
squadrons is impossible. I 24 "\', . 
19. Air 15-3 War Plans, 1937-1939, memo to D~AS 25.10.38. 
20. Air 41-73 RAF in the Maritime War, AppendIX 7. 
21. Air 15-213 Expansion and. Re-equipment, Jun. 1940-Jun. 1942, P.137. 
22. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Meetmgs Ju1.1941-Apr.1942, meeting 30.641 
23. Air 15-213 p.l06, letter 19.6.42. Joubert to AM (Plans). " 
24. Air 15-214 p.67. Expansion and Re-equipment JuI.1942-Sep.1943. Letter 7.11.42.1oubert to AM. 
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Sir Philip was still concerned about the two types from Bomber Command such as 
the Whitley ' ... on the whole, given unsatisfactory service' and the Hampden which was 
' .. .incapable of operating in daylight... off the enemy coast '" without a very strong escort of 
long-range fighters.' 25 
There were no Beaufort-equipped squadrons left with Coastal Command, [they were 
posted overseas] and no trained Beaufighter squadron and it was known that German 
FW190 fighters were 50mph faster than the Beaufighter, thus hardly suitable as escort to 
the Hampdens even if available. 26 De Havilland Mosquitoes had been made available for 
Photo-Reconnaissance in 1942 but for the Mosquito Mark VI fighter-bomber priOrity was 
given to Fighter Command. 27 
When Air Marshal John Slessor assumed command of Coastal in February 1943 the 
strength was sixty squadrons with 'some 850 aircraft'. 28 Although he appeared largely 
content with the aircraft available to him both in respect of quantity and quality, he wrote 
to the Air Ministry in September stating: 'I now find that there are 120 first line Mosquitoes 
going into photo-reconnaissance in this country, and over 200 first line Mosquitoes going to 
the Army support in the Tactical Air Force' .29 
Thus, despite the need for reconnaissance, priority was given to the T AF. He refers , 
however, to the ' ... unforeseen requirement for modification of certain 4-engined types to 
Very Long Range' (VLR) coinciding with the introduction of a system of 'planned flyina 
and maintenance ... in what was a 'difficult period of availability,.3o \';rnl~';" '.:~," , 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas succeeded Air MarshalSl~ • ...., ... 
when, in respect of numbers of aircraft, equilibrium had obviously been reached. tIte 
Command's records written during his tenure refer to equipment of aiicraft'llllt1ll Mv 
and modifications to aircraft rather than the need for more airclaft. "'.111 .. 11_ 
Douglas included, (again as was the case for Slessor), 430 aireraft~lrint 
operations. 
25. Air 15-214 p.90. Letter 9.8.42. Joubert to Sir Dudley Pound. 
26. Air 15-214 p.100. Letter 27.7.42 Rear/Adml EJ.P. Brind to JOUbert. 
27. Air 15-214 p.13. AM letter 18.9.42 to Coastal Command. 
28. Air 15-340 Equipment and Re-equipment, Jun.l941- Sep.l943, p.96. 
29. Air 15-340 p.3. Letter 2.9.43. Slessor to DCAS, AM. 
30. Air 15-340 p.79. Letter c 26.2.43. Siessor to Admiralty. 
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The 430 aircraft however, were the equipment for ten squadrons of Liberators , 
including three of the United States Navy; five Leigh-Light Wellington squadrons, and two 
squadrons each equipped with Halifaxes, Hudsons and Fortresses. There were also seven 
Sunderland and two Catalina squadrons. 31 The heavy four-engined aircraft which Sir 
Sholto then had available did, however, raise another requirement - the need for runways of 
sufficient length to take such as the Liberator, Fortress and Halifax. 
Thus on 7 February 1944 the Air Ministry was asked to approve the lengthening of 
the runways at Brawdy, Chivenor, Aldergrove and Leuchars. 32 Although Sholto Douglas 
expressed no need for more aircraft, he referred to the ' ... Bomber Baron's decision finding 
the Liberator unsuitable for night operations ... ' such that 'Coastal's near starvation came to 
an end.' He added, 'By the time that I became C-in-C of Coastal we were using twelve 
squadrons ofthem,.33 
However, by the 27 April the Command was obviously preparing for Operation 
Overlord - the invasion of Europe, and a signal was sent to No 19 Group regarding the 
necessity for 'reducing wastage to conserve aircraft for forthcoming operations' . 
Specifically mentioned were Mosquitoes and Liberators.34 
In November the re-equipment of Halifax squadrons with Liberators was again 
mooted, although these were all bombers that had to be modified for Coastal Command.35 
In 1945, the Air Ministry agreed to thirty Mark V Sunderlands (those with Pratt,& 
Whitney 'Wasp' engines), which had been intended for overseas service, to be allocated to 
Coastal. This was in sharp contrast to Sir Philip Joubert's experience4ltree y-. ~ 
when he was losing both aircraft, and crews to overseas. During Sir Sholto's fiat __ "" 
a whole spectrum of aircraft types had to be considered. Thus during the 4 May-.i~ 
asked the Senior Air Staff Officer to find from the Air Ministtj, what,. 811'1' II .... 
commitments might be for modifying fifty Gloster Meteor jet airoIaft .. tItoto '-
reconnaissance, and those required for the Supermarine Sea Otter. 36 
31. Air IS-773 C-in-C's Despatches Vol. IV, paras. 1-4. 
32. Air IS-360 C-in-C's Meetings Nov. 1943- Dec. 1944, letter 7.2.44 to AM 
33. Douglas, S., Years of Command, London, 1966, p.246. . 
34. Air IS-360 C-in-C's Meetings 12.4.44. 27.4.44. 
3S. Air IS-360 Meetings 9.10.44. 6.11.44. 
36. Air 15-361 Meeting 4.5.45. 
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Aircraft Requirements 
Until the outbreak of World War II the number of aircraft considered necessary for 
Coastal Command to provide trade protection in Home Waters was 281. This number 
assumed a war by Britain alone against Germany.37 The prime duty was then to cover the 
exits from the North Sea.38 
The capitulation of France, the over-running of the Low Countries and the 
occupation of Norway and Denmark resulted in a vast coastline from the French Biscay 
ports to North Cape to be covered. The entry ofItaly into the war in addition to a possible 
hostile French fleet made further demands on Coastal Command. Thus in addition to 
covering the North Sea exits, three additional flying-boat squadrons were considered to be 
immediate requirements to cover the Irish Sea, Faeroes areas, and Western Approaches, 
plus an additional general reconnaissance landplane squadron and two long-range fighter 
squadrons, say, another 100 aircraft. 
For overseas, an additional five flying boat squadrons and one landplane squadron 
were specified; thus for additional home and overseas commitments, possibly 200 aircraft 
above the 281 already stated were needed. This assumed that other forces would cover the 
Caribbean and Newfoundland areas. 39 In December 1939, however, the Command was 
concerned with close escort of coastal convoys and the chain of patrols to the Norwesian 
coast. .. ,Itt ':. 
For those duties reference was made specifically to two types ofaittIllft,l theA't1'O 
Anson and the Lockheed Hudson, the reconnaissance landplanes then81lli1able.tWi1ba. 
two types, a total of273 aircraft was anticipated; this follOwing an ~.l_. 
the requirements of each squadron to 21 aircraft.
4o 
Other landplanes fur .., I I ill~ 
then being considered about that time were the Blackburn Botha,1heBria1t1811t. n .... 
Bristol Beaufort, with the comments that the Botha was 'SJlOCiIIy"~. for 
reconnaissance' but that the Blenheim was 'adversely reported'. 41 It Was hoped that twenty 
Bothas would be delivered to the Command by the end of 1939 and twelve Beauforts were 
expected in OctoberlNovember. 
37. Air 15-213 Expansio~ and Re-equipment Estimated Requirements for Coastal Co~ p.l. 
38. Air 15-284 Govt. White Paper, The Battle of the Atlantic, paras. 1-3. 
39. Air 15-213 pp.190-93. 
40. Air 15-46 Coastal's Aircraft Requirements Jul.I 939-Jun.l 943 m 111239 
h AM(OA) C · , emo ... 4l. Air 15-46 Letter from t e to -m-C 21.10.39. 
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The Bothas, however, were found unsuitable for operations, and no more of the Mark IV 
Blenheims were being allocated to Coastal Command. 42 
In October 1941 the Prime Minister became aware of U-boats operating further afield 
and suggested to the First Lord of the Admiralty that it was probably due to our air 
operations. Following this, Coastal's requirement programme was considered to be: 150 
Catalinas and 72 SunderIands for twenty-six flying-boat squadrons; 32 Liberators and 32 
Wellingtons or WhitIeys to equip four long-range GR squadrons; 64 Mosquitoes and 180 
GR Hudsons for fifteen and a half medium and short range squadrons; 128 Beauforts for 
eight torpedo-bomber squadrons and 160 Beaufighters for ten long-range fighter squadrons. 
However, four flying boat and 2 GR short-range squadrons were to be earmarked for West 
Africa and three flying boat squadrons earmarked for Gibraltar. 43 
By December 1941 the types of aircraft required were stated as: a long-range flying 
boat, a long-range landplane, a medium range landplane, a high speed reconnaissance 
landplane, a long-range fighter, and a torpedo bomber. Changes had been made to 
requirements following the previous three month's experience and an analysis of U-boat 
attacks.44 At that time it was considered that extra long range aircraft should have a range 
of2,000 miles because some U-boat attacks had been 700 miles from British bases and if 
air patrols were deployed 350-600 miles, the enemy would move to the 600-700 miles 31'ea. 
(600 miles from a United Kingdom base would be up to 20
0
15'W; from Iceland, up to 
40 0 12'W).45 f:u· 1:. ' .. ~'\\ I"~ 
Reconnaissance aircraft were then expected to have ASV, ~Itirtraft-~ 
Vessel) radar for homing; long -range planes were to be able to operatemraU weathers ..... 
have a short take -off and landing distance. For high speed reconnaissanceail • .atlllM\1r 
Ministry suggested the Mosquito; but other services were given priority~~ 
Three types were suggested to undertake the task of a torpedo bomber "'*~.': 
Page Hampden, the Bristol Beaufort and the Vickers Wellington m. ,', .: .... ' 
42. Air 15-46 Letter from the AM 21.10.39 to Coastal Command. 
43. Air 41-47 The RAF in the Maritime War, Vol. III, p,15. 
44. Air 15-46 Coastal's Aircraft Requirements JuI.1939-Jun.1943. Memo 5.12.41. 
45. Air 15-46 Memo 6.1.42. By Sep.1941 U-boats operated up to 350W 
Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic 1939-1945. London, 1992, para. 136. 
46. Air 15-46 Memo 5.12.41. 
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All three were to operate as such, despite the lack of forward annament in the Hampden 
and Beaufort, and the Wellington and Hampden had not been designed for maritime 
work. 47 
In early 1942 the functions of the Command's operational aircraft were clearly stated 
in six categories. Anti-submarine warfare was first in order of importance, covering 
reconnaissance, depth charging and bombing. Second and fifth were torpedo warfare 
(reconnaissance and the attack on large merchant vessels and enemy naval forces) and anti-
shipping warfare (reconnaissance and bombing). Third, fourth and sixth in order of 
importance were photo-reconnaissance, meteorological reconnaissance, and coastal fighter 
warfare. 
Coastal fighter and anti-shipping warfare were rated former RAP peacetime 
functions; that anti-submarine warfare had become a highly specialised category, as also 
torpedo warfare.48 Little consideration had been given to the latter, as it was 
, ... uneconomical to have torpedo squadrons locked up for a target which may never 
materialise so may find ourselves making more use of the GRffB squadrons for GR work,' 
as was the case with Beauforts. 49 
At the time of Air Marshal John Slessor assuming command of Coastal in February 
1943, the trend, (which is reflected in the Command's records), was the equipmentthen 
being added to aircraft, rather than the aircraft itself. This was resulting in an effect oq'lhc 
aircrafts' range due to the additional loads - a matter of concern throughout the war. 
Slessor addressed this matter in a letter to all his Group's headq~. Ma~hl~NJ~,\o! 
Range 
Range of aircraft for a given design is affected by many factors!such as '" att.p 
weight, the quantity of fuel carried and the type of engine(s). When~.t\.r .... 
include the height at which the aircraft is flown, (this because the .. i_'~ be 
designed for an optimum height for greatest efficiency). 
47. Air 15-46 Memo 5.l2.41. 
48. Air 15-46 Coastal's Aircraft Requirements. File S17012tractics to ACAS c Feb. 1942. 
49. Air 15-3 Coastal's War Plans, CAS memos 3l.10.37, 4.1.38, 7.2.38. 
50. Air 15-46 C-in-C's letter to Groups, 7.5.43. 
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Other factors for Coastal's aircrews to consider were; should they deploy side guns, 
in, for example, Wellingtons or Hudsons; and in the case of the Sunderland flying-boats, 
should they run out their depth charges onto the wings from the bomb-bay? 
These were ever tactical problems in addition to the reduction of speed and range. All 
four of Coastal's Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief show their awareness of the 
importance of range for aircraft in World War II; and notably Sir Philip Joubert who 
imposed a limit on the endurance for crews of eighteen hours, and even that figure was to 
be under exceptional circumstances. At RAP Waddington in April 1998, it was understood 
that the endurance of aircrew is still the deciding factor in maritime operations, albeit due 
to toilet facilities. 
Although given as having an endurance of 51f2hr at 103 knots, the Anson represented 
the operational equipment for Coastal's land-based reconnaissance squadrons at the 
outbreak of war excluding No 224 that had just re-armed with Hudsons. The Anson's lack 
of range precluded it being effectively used even for Coastal's prime task on the outset of 
war, reconnaissance from Britain to Norway. As Capt T. Dorling, RN stated: 'Ansons were 
unable to reach Norway and blockade the North Sea. Only flying boats and Hudson 
squadrons were able to do so.' 51 
The Air Ministry when writing to the C-in-C of Coastal Command in September 
1941 stated that a limit should not be set on the range of reconnaissance aircraft, bvttlilt 
the matter would be pursued with the Admiralty with a view to limiting the! 1baXi_ 
operating distance from base of 600 miles, as convoy escorts beyomt, thtR· Would ~ 
uneconomical. 52 Range was necessary to cover in particular, convoy routes, notably out 
into the North Atlantic as far as the 'prudent limit of endurance' or 'PLE'.. "~:: ':.; 
If on a 'sweep', that would have sufficed; but if a convoy was to be~. 
12 oW, it was essential also to have some hours in that area circling die ~~end_ 
was therefore also required. Opinions vary in what was considered a useful time with a 
convoy, but typically 2-3hr. In a letter dated 28 July 1941, however, from Air Commodore 
Lloyd, the Deputy SASO, it was recommended that at least one third of sorties should be 
with the convoy. 53 
51. Richards, D., RAF 1939-194~. London, 195?, Vol. I, p.412. Air 15-284, para.5. 
52. Air 15-213 p.St. Air ExpanSIOn and Re-equtpment Estimates. Letter 14. 9.41. 
53. Air 15-213 p.138. 
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In Coastal Command, it was decided that the limit oflong- range aircraft should be 
the endurance of the crew rather than the fuel supply. This was decided at a Command 
meeting on 7 January 1942 when Catalinas were considered able to have a radius of600 
nautical miles, 'on the fringe of the U-boat area', with a sortie of 18 hours duration. 54 
Sir Philip Joubert decided that routine patrols should not exceed 14 hours, but in case 
of emergency, could be extended up to 18hr due to: •... conditions of cold and cramp in 
which the crews are called upon to operate, and the need for sparing their endurance and 
not stretching it to the limit unless an emergency arises.' 55 
As an economy measure in Coastal's use ofCatalinas in respect oflong-range work, 
it was suggested by the Deputy Senior Air Staff Officer (D/SASO) that Sunderlands could 
be used for sorties between 250 and 440 nautical miles along convoy routes. It is not clear 
however, if that idea was followed. 56 
Range was considered so important that the question of Liberators with or without 
self-sealing fuel tanks was raised; as without them there would be a reduction of unladen 
weight but an increase in fuel capacity. 57 In January 1942 however, the Mark I Liberator's 
maximum range is stated as 2,720 miles but with the crew's endurance limiting it to 2,240 
miles.58 
When the Liberator was just coming into service with Coastal in June 1941 for aati-
submarine warfare, the C-in-C wrote to the Air Ministry: 
For duties of this nature, which involve flying for long periods by day and nipt, _ i 
of sight of land in all conditions of weather, the Long Range bombers~~t pro~ dIol . 
same amenities and freedom of movement to the crew as a flying boat. T,he ltl~~ ~ ,', 
is being provided for one squadron meets these requirements to a gre~ter exteat thas:t... . 
, "., \ 
existing British bomber ... 
,.., '" . l~~tt ,t 
He added however, that more attention should be given to their layout for ~~
'h,~ c.: ..... 
rather than bomb load. 59 
. n,~ 
...... . " 
54. Air 15-213 pp.66,148. Air 15-46 letter 7.1.42. to ACAS (T) When 600 miles radius was considered 
practical. 
55. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 64
th 
meeting 28.10.41. USN VP84 sqdn's ORB NRS-1977-104. 
56. Air 15-213 p.123, lette~28.7.~1. AlCmdre LT. Lloyd to Sir Philip Joubert. 
57. Air 15-369 C-in-C's 40 meetlOg 5.9.41. 
58. Air 15-46 Aircraft Requirements Jul.19~9-Jun.1943, letter Jan. 1942 Joubert to ACAS. 
59. Air 15-213 p.152, letter 12.6.41. Bowhill to U/Sec State AM. 
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The long range of2,240 miles enabled the Liberator in Coastal Command to help 
close the 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' south of Cape Farewell with such as a shuttle service 
between Newfoundland and Iceland. 60 
Sir Philip Joubert stated that his first problem when he succeeded Sir Frederick 
Bowhill in 1941 was' the need to fill the Gap' , and here the only land-based aircraft that 
could do the job was the American B24, the Liberator.61 The C-in-C, Coastal Command in 
a review of Coastal's expansion and re-equipment programme dated 12 June 1941 wrote: 
'The extension of unrestricted U-boat warfare against shipping in the Atlantic to areas 
outside the range of MR [medium range] aircraft has necessitated the use of LR [sic] 
bombers such as the Whitley and Wellington as anti-submarine aircraft' .62 
The twin-engined medium bombers which came from Bomber Command, the 
Wellington lC and Whitley V, were both serving in Coastal by late 1940. Although they 
helped to fill a gap in the Command's general reconnaissance requirements, Air 
Commodore I.T. Lloyd, the D/SASO, wrote to the C-in-C Coastal Command on 28 July 
1941: ' ... Whitleys and Wellingtons are uneconomical at their speed and with only nine-
hour sorties; we require a replacement for these types to give range up to 600 miles. " or at 
least 440 miles'. 63 
Four-engined bombers that were loaned or allocated to Coastal Command incluc4ed 
the British Handley-Page Halifax and the A vro Lancaster, but the Halifax when used for 
meteorogical flights was provided with drop tanks to increase the range;, .~ '.11 
By 30 November 1944 Coastal was due to receive Pathfinder ~Mk IIr¥IaIir.. 
from Bomber Command's production but it was considered necessruyfortbe firsiOllesOt.e 
examined and modified at Gosport to bring it up to Coastal's standard. ~ .•• "2 
squadron was due to re-equip with Halifaxes they were to be fitted with ....... 1IIta; 
compensated, apparently in respect of all-up weight, by having the front ~ ~~6S 
60. Harper, FltlLt C., RCAF. Letter to the author. ORB C12238 No 10 sqdn. RCAP 
Siessor, 1., The Central Blue, London, 1956, p.474. . , . 
Terraine, 1., Right of the Line: The RAF in the European War 1939-1945, London, 1985, p.442. 
61. Joubert, P., Birds and Fishes: The Story of Coastal Command, Londo 1960 146 
. C' M' 155 n, , p. . 62. Air 15-213 C-m- s eetmgs, p. . 
63. Air 15-213 C-in-C's meetings, p.133. 
64. Air 15-360 C-in-C's meetings, 30.11.44. 7.12.44. 
65. Air 15-214 p.49. Letter 14 .1.43 from CCHQ to DONC at AM. 
25 
This despite the fact that when considering the provision of Halifaxes for No 58 squadron, 
it was stated that, for operations in the Bay of Biscay front turrets were needed; largely 
against enemy fighters. 66 
These essentially bomber aircraft were nevertheless operated by Coastal in anti-
submarine warfare and for meteorological flights and anti-shipping sorties.67 The Avro 
Lancaster, another four-engined bomber, was only on briefioan to Coastal during the war 
and does not feature in the RAF's official history as a Coastal aircraft. With a range of 
2,350 miles it could have been invaluable; 68 but the Chief of Air Staff was strongly 
opposed to Lancasters being transferred to Coastal Command, as it was the only aircraft 
able to take an 8,OOOIb bomb to Berlin. 69 
The American built, B 17 Flying Fortress was rated a long range aircraft but was 
selected for Coastal Command because it was considered unfit for Bomber Command's 
night operations. 70 The Fortress served as a useful reconnaissance aircraft with such as 
Nos 59, 206 and 220 squadrons; fortunately not required by Bomber Command and it was 
reported on 27 January 1942 that all Fortress aircraft from America would go to Coastal 
Command. 71 
The C-in-C Coastal Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert wrote to the Air 
Ministry on 7 January 1942 of his concern that his long range aircraft ' ... except the 
Liberator, fall far short of Coastal Command's needs .. .' when U-boat attacks on shiPPiha 
were about 700 miles westwards with Catalinas at 600 miles only on the fringe oftbe u. 
boats' area.' In that same letter Sir Philip referred to the medium IlUlgfIHudsohas a ..... 
gap' with the Ventura [a development ofthe Hudson] oflesser range; thata:mediwft 1'Il8It 
aircraft should have a range of 1,200 nautical miles while the Wemngtoa_,~; 
' ... more nearly meet requirements' 72 The Air Ministry's ultimate resllOl1le, ......... 
dated 7 March 1942 that stated: '{,·wi :.i;." , 
66. Air 15-214 p.35, letter 6.2.43. AM to C-in-C. 
67. Air 15-360 C-in-C's meetings 2. 3. 44, 21. 4. 44, 12.6.44. 
Richards, D. and Saunders, R., RAF 1939-1945. London, 1954, Vol. II, p.375. 
68. Richards, D. and Saunders, R., Vol. II, pp 373,375. 
69. Air 41-47 p.23. The RAF in the Maritime War, minute 29.3.42. 
70. Air 15-213 p.39, letter, AM 7.3.42 to C-in-C. 
71. Air 41-47 p.20, Statement by the Director General of Organisation. 
72. Air 15-213 p.67. c 
It would be uneconomical to divert a successful heavy bomber type to a Coastal Command 
role particularly if..a less successful type of heavy bomber is available ... the Fortress .. .is unfit 
for night bomber operations and weather conditions strictly limit its employment...in high 
altitude bombing ... for these reasons it was selected for ... Coastal Command. 
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The Air Ministry did show some appreciation of Coastal's requirements but indicated the 
priority given to Bomber Command with: 
We should hamper the normal evolution of GR aircraft by setting a limit to their 
range. It is now apparent that our requirements for heavy bomber types are unlikely to be 
realised in full for a very long time. It will therefore be impracticable to provide many 
squadrons equipped with this type for general reconnaissance [GR] work. Consequently this 
role will have to be fulfilled by normal OR landplanes for some time to come. 
The Air Ministry added that the matter would be pursued with the Admiralty, with Coastal 
Command aircraft limited to a radius of 600 miles, greater distances 'should be the 
'b'l' f .. -C: r. , 73 responsl 1 lty 0 sWlace lorces . 
At Sir Philip Joubert's fifth staff meeting, photo-reconnaissance aircraft were stated 
to be Coastal's 'weak point' and he stated, 'we must have long -range Spitfires', 74 For both 
the Beaufighter, and later the Mosquito, attempts were made to increase their endurance 
and range by the addition of drop tanks. For the Mosquito, modifications are recorded 
from November 1941 until towards the end of the war.75 
Engines .. Nt ': 
British engines fitted to aircraft operated by Coastal Command included thOse 
designed by the Bristol Aeroplane Company, Rolls-Royce, and ·Atn\~0nf-8iddo1eJ: 
Predominating in Coastal's aircraft were Bristol engines that were in: fiVtfgroUps:· .. ':";' 
Mercury, Taurus, Pegasus, Hercules and ~entaurus (all air-cooled radiats)~ 
the front-line aircraft in World War II, the Pegasus and Hercules wereJ18l'lllrM_ .... 
important. The Pegasus served to power the Wellingtons and Sunder1ands;1ke more 
powerful Hercules, the Beaufighters and later marks of Wellington, increasing the latter's 
power by as much as 50% (from 1000hp to 1,500hp per engine). 
73. Air 15-213 p.~1 Expansi?n and Re-equipment Estimates. AM letter 17.9.41 to C-ia-C. 
74. Air 15-359 C-m-C's meetmg 5.7.41. 
75. Air 15-359 7204 meeting 6.1l.4l. Air 15-361 C-in-C's Meet' 4 1 45 mg ... 
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This increase in power for the Wellington was important as the early marks were apt 
to lose height if one engine failed.
76 
The Pegasus engines on both the Wellington and the 
Sunderland were rather overstretched, they ran dry oflubrication resulting in the propellers 
shearing off, with or without the reduction gear.
77 
Problems with Pegasus engines persisted 
throughout the war. Thus on 4 November 1944 the question of engine failures with 
Sunderlands at Operational Training Units (OTUs) was raised. It resulted in a conference 
by the Commander in Chief of Coastal Command with the AOC of No 17 Group on 6 
December. Sunderlands at the OTU at that time were unlikely to have had Pratt & 
Whitney'Wasps,.78 
Two American designed and built engines used to power many Coastal aircraft were 
the Pratt & Whitney 'Wasp' and the Wright 'Cyclone'. The Wright 'Cyclone' was installed 
in the first three marks of Hudson and also in some Marks of the Boeing Flying Fortress. 
An advantage of the 'Cyclone' over the 'Wasp' was that no gills were necessary. This 
reduced the possibility of an aircraft being 'uls' (unserviceable) through lack of a gill 
motor; and in flying, less need to watch the cylinder-head temperatures. 
Despite the improvement by having 'Wasp' engines in the Sunderland, it was not until 
12 March 1944 that trials were undertaken at Shorts. They were obviously successful as No 
10 squadron, RAAF was apparently to be fully equipped with them by the end of that 
month. That would have been by No lO's Sunderlands having the engines installed 
retrospectively. 79 It was to be in September that Coastal Command asked the Air Miaisby 
for the first Mark V Sunderland coming off the production line ·wLth.~tt .,,,~ 
engines to be provided for familiarisation. , ... , ...... :. 
The same type of engine on different types of aircraft might wotI __ ... 
differently, thus the Pratt & Whitney Wasp on a Liberator could havecmhi ........ 
80 
of 1,400rpm but on a Mark VI Hudson 1,800rpm. 1~11.T ".,~" ;;. 
,: .. ' I 
., ". 
76. The author saw the survivors from a No 179 sqdn. Wellington that ditched due to engine loss at 
Gibraltar in 1943. 
77. A Pegasus ~ng~ne seized on Sund~rland W2009 24.8.43. The propeller sheared offt.kias a I8COftd 
propeller WIth It. From the author slog. 
78. Air 15-360 C-in-C's meeting 4.11.44. 
79. Air 15-360 C-in-C's meeting 16.3.44. 
80. Engines cut on Hudson EW930 at 1750 rpm. (No 48 sqdn. 1942-43). 
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With most of the aircraft allotted to Coastal Command being designed either as 
bombers or fighters, by implication, the engines fitted to them would have been intended 
to operate from say 10,OOOft to 24,OOOft altitude, rather than, typically for Coastal, 50ft to 
3,OOOft altitude. 
The height to fly could well be 50ft when approaching the Norwegian coast~ while 
over the Atlantic it would normally be just below cloud. Problems were experienced with 
some engines when used in the maritime role~ such as the Rolls-Royce engines on Halifax 
aircraft used by the meteorological squadrons, when they might well be expected to operate 
from sea level up to the maximum heights obtainable.81 
In my experience for day -to- day operations, the first indication of trouble with any 
type of aero-engine was likely to a 'mag. -drop'. When magnetos were switched there was 
likely to be a small drop in revolutions, and was a routine test before any take-off, although 
I can recall only one occasion when a take-off was aborted on that account. It was with a 
Sunderland at aIU with three out of four engines considered 'uls' (unserviceable) _ all 
were Bristol Pegasus engines. In contrast, No 48 squadron was able to operate for a 
fortnight its Mark VI Hudsons equipped with Pratt & Whitney 'Wasp' without any 
maintenance by ground staff who had not arrived. 82 
Apart from a mag.-drop, another possible fault was with lubrication~ either low oil 
pressure or excessive oil consumption. It could be such that some Wellington squadrbDs 
operating in North Africa, carried extra cans oflubricating oil. With a gOOd aircrew whith. 
was allocated a specific aircraft, and certainly for such as a Sunderlad'that Would ..... 
had its own engineer, problems with engines were less likely to occur.83 , 
Applicable to all aircraft engines were extreme operating conditioas~ t'roI\ 
such as the volcanic ash at Hofn in Iceland, the sand at Gibraltar and in Nd ~ ... 
the tropical heat of West Africa. Engines were modified with special air filters forO\leBeas 
but the hazards remained. 84 
8l. Winfield E., letter to the author. See also: Saunders, H., RAP 1939-1945 V I III 16-7 103-5 
. 1943 ' o. , pp. • . 82. Coastal Command ReVIew . 
83. Air 27-1422 No 230 sqdn's. ORBs. Sunderland N9029. 
84. Author's experience 1942-43. 
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Production and Procurement 
At a conference of Chiefs of Staff in May 1937 Sir Edward Ellington, Chief of the 
Air Staff outlined the procedure for the Service obtaining aircraft, although at that time he 
was responding to remarks made by the First Lord ofthe Admiralty. The procedure was for 
a general specification of the kind of machine required. The specification would be 
examined by technical officers to see how far the requirements could be met. 
After discussions, detailed specifications would be drawn up for approval by the 
Service (either the Admiralty or the Royal Air Force). Selected manufacturers would then 
be invited to tender designs and quote prices. Experimental machines would be tested , 
after which the Service would decide which particular machine was to be adopted for 
production. Sir Edward added, the Service ' ... got whatever type they wanted within the 
limits of practicability of design and production.' 85 
For British aircraft, manufacturers included Short & Harland, Vickers Armstrong, 
The Bristol Aeroplane Co., Blackbums, Supermarine, Gloucestershire Aircraft Co., 
AY.Roe, De Havilland, Handley -Page, Fairey Aviation, Hawker-Siddeley and Saunders-
Roe (Saro); while for American aircraft, manufacturers were Lockheed, Consolidated, 
Boeing, and Glen L. Martin Co. 
Outstanding in numbers and usefulness was the Lockheed Hudson, and Lockheed's 
from the outset literally demonstrated their commitment not only in design, production aad 
delivery but in their personal attitude on receiving the British Purchasing Commission; 
their liaison with the first squadron to be equipped with Hudsons (No,224 squadron) ad 
even post-war. Unlike most of the aircraft assigned to Coastal, the Hudson was not 
designed for Bomber or Fighter Commands but as an airliner, the l.ocId.ed ,14,_ 
modified specifically for a maritime role, with the drawings preparedin.I .11 • ., ..... 
I . . h d 86 Clarence "Ke ly' Johnson m elg ty ays. \- til :'\ \' 
Prior to the British Purchasing Commission visiting the LOckheed factmy, Ken 
Smith, Lockheed's sales representative, obtained a photograph of the Commiaion tmd 
memorised their titles, names and faces. 
85. CAB 53-7 Imperial Defence Chiefs of Staff COmmittee 8 2 37 20Sth t' ". mee mg. 
86. Letters to the author from staff' of the Lockheed COrporation. 
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Sketches of a Lockheed Model 14 were prepared for use as a reconnaissance-bomber , 
and in ten days Lockheed produced a wooden mock-up of a medium-range reconnaissance 
-bomber, a task that normally would have taken three months. 
When modifications were suggested by the purchasing commission, they were 
surprised to find the changes were made and painted-in within the space of a lunch break. 
The Director of Contracts, Sir Henry Self, later invited representatives of Lockheed to 
London, including R.A. von Hake, their manufacturing manager; Bob Proctor, who was 
concerned with contracts, and the aeronautical engineer, Clarence 'Kelly' Johnson, MSc, 
FRAeS. An initial order for 200 aircraft was placed in early 1938, and a contract was 
signed on 23 June 1938 for Lockheed to supply 175 Hudsons plus as many more as could 
be delivered up to 250 by December 1939. The order was completed in November 1939, 
seven weeks ahead of schedule. The London Evening News reported on 10 June 1938 that 
the Hudsons cost £17,000 each (or $90,000), and the first Hudson arrived at Liverpool by 
sea on 15 February 1939.87 
The late 'Kelly' Johnson writing to the author stated: 
The Hudson was actually redesigned in England from the initial proposal that was 
shown to your purchasing group who came to Burbank. They turned down our proposal 
design the first day it was shown to your technical people in England. In a period of80 hours, 
working alone, I was required to revise our proposal to incorporate English annament such as 
fi . D JI turrets, torpedoes, mines, bombs and forward- mng guns. ata on your military equipment 
'-I 
was sent to Burbank in a diplomatic pouch so that when I returned we had proper data to . 
carry on the production engineering. 
\,'. :..' 
When the first three airplanes were delivered to Martlesham Heath, our test pilot Milo' . 
Bursham and I spent a number of months checking out your pilots and Crew, ~ .~" 
Squadron leader Red Collings. When it became time to prove our guaranteed.....,.. h. :: 
speed, I was given an RAF uniform so that I could be considered an official member ofttte 
crew during our long flights over England, Scotland and Wales. 88 '. ,. \ 
MRAF Sir Arthur Harris who was a member of the British Purchasing Commissi~~ i~' . I 
1938 at Lockheeds' stated: 
87. In correspondence with staff of the Lockheed Corporation. 
88. In a letter from Clarence 'Kelly'Johnson to the author. 
I. The production line of Hudsons of the Lockheed Corporation's Works at Burbank. 
They fulfilled their contracts on time, and maintained liaison with No 224 Squadron. 






;". ft ll l in 
3. The wireless operator's view on the Hudson flight deck that had about 100 instruments ~d 
Controls to b~ considered. Both the wire~ess ope~ator and navigator could be expected to help the- .. _ 
pIlot in landing at such as GIbraltar In respect of flaps and undercarriage. 
The result of this visit was the purchase of the fIrst batch ofHudsons and Harvards. 
The Hudson beyond doubt pulled us out of the soup when we used them for anti-submarine 
patrols .. .! was much impressed with the American business efficiency ... my reason for giving 
the order for Lockheed Hudsons was that I was much impressed by the aircraft itself...and 
was irinnensely struck by the ability and energy of the comparative youngsters who were 
running this factory ... only twenty-four hours later I saw a mock-up of all our requirements 
[for the Hudson] in plywood fItted complete in every detail ... at home we were never able to 
get a mock-up in less than a month ... 89 
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At a Coastal Command meeting in July 1941 it was reported that production of Hudsons 
was then 100 per month until September when it would then be 90 per month until April 
1942. The production was then in the proportion of2: 1 for Mark Ills [with Wright Cyclone 
engines] to Mark Vs [with Pratt & Whitney Wasps]. 
This was in contrast to the British Bristol Beaufort; as due to lack of these aircraft , 
two new squadrons could not be formed. 90 There was a further lack of Beauforts due to 
trouble with the tail wheel and Blenheims had to serve as replacements. 91 By the end of the 
month however, the Bristol Beaufort and Beaufighter were said to be 'coming on slowly' .92 
Coastal's experience with Short & Harland in the production of the Sunderland was very 
different. The Short's factory at Rochester was then delivering four Sunderlands per 
month, with the probability of five per month in the new-year. The new factory at 
Windermere was 'only scheduled to produce two boats a month' the first expected about 
March 1942. At Dumbarton, the programme 'calls for a peak production of three boats per 
month only.' 
The Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) felt that: 
... the limiting factor is undoubtedly lack of interest brought about by the contract 
position which is too small to warrant Short & Harland stretching themselves ... At present 
they hold contracts for a total of 5 5 boats (15 Mark II and 40 Mk ill), whilst up to 16 August 
last they had only 25 ordered! You will readily appreciate in these circumstances why the 
Sunderland is showing so little progress here, especially when compared to the Stirling for 
which they hold contracts for some 600 odd machines. 93 
89. Harris, A, Bomber Offensive, London. 1947, pp.27-28. 
90. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 15th meeting 24.7.41. 
91. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 23rd meeting 6.8.41. 
92. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 37th meeting 30.8.41. 
93. Air 15-213 p.94, letter 9. 10.41. MAP to W/Cmdr G.Shaw, CCLS Admiralty. 
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The Ministry of Aircraft Production wrote again to the Admiralty on 13 October 1941 
suggesting that the action ofW/Cmdr G. Shaw should help: • ... drag the Sunderland from the 
limbo into which it has fallen'. It refers to labour in Belfast being a political issue with 
some 11,000 unskilled registered as unemployed but which cannot be engaged by Short & 
Harland as all its employees belonged to Unions which refuse to admit them. Boy labour 
would be admitted but only as apprentices. The Northern Ireland Minister for Labour was 
·unhelpful, or possibly unable to help'. The letter refers to a: 
... continuous succession of strikes and threats of strikes in Belfast, [and] I am not 
satisfied in my own mind that Short & Harland are even attempting to put their backs into 
Sunderland production ... some 2,000 operatives (on Stirling fuselage production) are 
temporarily redundant...am trying to get them switched over onto Sunderlands until back on 
Stirlings in about 2-3 month's time. 94 
These letters were followed by Sir Philip Joubert writing to the Chief of Air Staff on 20 
October remarking that unless Coastal was prepared to constantly push its own case 
forward, •... an approved Air Ministry programme is allowed to fall behind performance 
because another Command has in a bigger order for aircraft and is therefore finanCially 
more interesting to the Company concerned.' 95 
Sir Charles Portal replied: 
A memo on behalf of the Director of Aircraft Production stated: "I agree ... that Short 
& Harland were making little effort to increase production, ... The production ofSund~i~ds 
in recent months has been most disappointing and has only just met the wastage of the .¥ 
existing five squadrons. The programme provides for a peak of fifteen per month by March 
1942." 96 Reviewing Sunderland production generally, I feel that this aircraft is suffering, and 
has long been suffering from complete lack of interest on the part of all concerned and is 
badly in need of publicity and drive. If the Service really needs Sunderlands this need should 
be emphasised. 97 
My experience in writing to manufacturers post-war reflected this difference in attitude; it 
was only the Lockheed Corporation that responded positively to my requests. 
94. Air 15-213 pp.96-7, letter 13.l0.41. MAP to CCLS Admiralty. 
95. Air 15-213 p.95, letter 20.10.41. Joubert to Sir Charles Portal. 
96. Air 15-213 p.88, letter 6.11.41. Portal to Joubert. 
97. Air 15-213 p.95, meeting 13.l0.41. 
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Long Range Liberators, because of their range, were much required by Coastal; but it 
was not until 11 August 1941 that specific numbers are mentioned, with seven 'on the line' , 
one in Northern Ireland 'and the prototype'. 98 At the next meeting of the Command it was 
stated: 'efforts to get more of these aircraft [Liberators] have been in vain;' 99 and on 23 
August the Commander-in-Chief called for a report concerning the position for forming a 
Liberator squadron. 100 Although twenty Liberators had been allocated to Coastal Command, 
it was to get only thirteen and they were not forthcoming even by the end of August. 101 Of 
the few Liberators apparently then with Coastal in October, three were taken from the 
Command; and on 10 October it was stated that Coastal had a 'call on ten altogether', 
instead of the twenty- four it was supposed to have received. 102 
The position regarding the first Catalina (P9630) to be received by the Marine 
Aircraft Experimental Establishment at Felixstowe in June 1939 was, as Consolidated's 
representative Mr J. H. Millar, recalls: 
When the war broke out, the PBY 4 was still at Felixstowe and was the only long _ 
range aircraft England had. Air Marshal Sir Roderick Hill asked me to go to Harrogate to see 
him and told me that they were going to order 40 more. Eventually they took over the French 
contracts. I had to go back with drawings of brackets the Air Ministry wanted mounted on the 
leading edge of the wings for ASV ... much more important was the need to order beaching ", 
gear to arrive ahead of the boats so there would be no delay in bringing that Catalina ashore to ;3 ~ , 
have guns fitted etc. but the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) refused to do SO.'103 \, . 
Air Commodore G. Bromet had two flights in this Catalina, possibly to give his app~~ 
in its acceptance for the RAF. After a flight on 14 November 1939 Bromet recorded: 'The 
Pratt & Whitney engines are about 1,050hp each, fuel 1,460 gallons and a range ofsOIhe 
4,000 miles at economical height. Speed 120 knots cruising.' This PBY4 appears as the 




98. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 27th meeting 11.8.41. 
99. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 28th meeting 14.8.41. 
100. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 32nd meeting 23.8.41. 
101. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 36th meeting 29.8.41. 




meetings on 8.10.41 and 10.10.41 res ectivel . 
103. Millar, J. H, letter to the author. P Y 
104. Conan-Doyle, Lady Jean, letter to the author quoting from Bromet's diaries. 
34 
In 1940 Boeing in Canada was licensed to build PBYs in Vancouver and in 1941 
Canadian Vickers Ltd agreed to construct in Carierville, Quebec, a Canadian version of 
the Catalina, the 'Canso'. By 17 May 1945 Canadian Vickers Ltd. had delivered 369 of 
these to the RCAF and USAAF. Boeing at Vancouver produced 240 Catalinas, but their 
first PBYs were fifty-five Canso A's (similar to PBY5As). The total Catalina production 
was 3,272 including 1,418 amphibians. The latter had a tricycle undercarriage of3,3001b 
that reduced the range of the aircraft by 640 miles. lOS Both the Catalina (PBY5) and the 
amphibian version (PBY5A) served with success in the Command but the amphibians 
were flown by the United States Navy and the RCAF (No. 162 squadron), the latter using 
the Canso. 106 Up to 14 August 1941, sixty-seven Catalinas were delivered to Coastal 
Command, but seven of them were written off. 
To gain more Catalinas, the Vice Chief of Air Staff informed Coastal that there was 
agreement with the Canadians to obtain part of the Canadian allotment of aircraft, and for 
the nine, which Coastal had apparently loaned to Canada, to be returned. 107 Near the end of 
the month, however, the C-in-C was promised fifty-four more Catalinas and felt that there 
fh b · . d108 was a reasonable chance 0 t em emg receIve . \ \' 
The supply of Catalinas, none-the-Iess, in addition to that of Sunderlands, \Vas 
considered 'poor' in the following month. 109 By February 1942 the Command! was 
expecting deliveries of the Catalinas at the rate of three per week, and with a final six ~ 
complete a batch of thirty before May. Those deliveries were to be offset however, by tine 
Catalina squadrons being posted overseas. (Nos 209, 240 and 413). 110 •. 
Wellingtons used for combating magnetic mines had been placed under Coastal 
control and at the Command's meeting on 27 August 1941, the Senior Air Staff Officer 
suggested that Coastal might form a new squadron of these aircraft after hearing that the 
manufacturers - Vickers had an order for a 100 and that they would be coming off the lme 
at two per week fully-fitted for Coastal Command. This, ' ... was in directoontradiction with 
the Air Ministry's statement that there were no Wellingtons available; ..•. t\ll ( ,j 
105, Scarborough, W" Capt USN. Correspondence with the author. 
106, USN ORBs NRS-1978-89, NRS-1977-104, NRS 256; VP63,VP84,VP73 respectively. 
C 12259/60 No. 162 sqdn's ORBs, 
107, Air 15-359 C-in-C's 38th meeting 2,9.41. . 
108. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 50th meeting 24.9.41. 
109. Air 41-47 The RAP in the Maritime War, p.16. 
110. Air 15-359 C-in-C's meetings 116th 29.1.42 143M 24.3.42. 
Ill. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 34th meeting 27.8.41. 
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At the following meeting on 28 August it was reported that the Deputy Chief of Air 
Staff could only have three Wellinhrtons per month, that is, enough to back one squadron~ 
the remainder of the production would go to Bomber Command. At that time Coastal was 
short of 176 aircraft.112 By December, however, Coastal Command was expecting four 
Wellingtons per month modified for general reconnaissance and also six GR Whitleys per 
month. 113 
At Coastal Command's fortieth meeting held on 5 September 1941 when a review of 
the aircraft position was given, only that for the Hudsons was given as 'very satisfactory'. 
The few Liberators were non-operational~ both the Bristol aircraft, Beauforts and 
Beaufighters were 'unsatisfactory', particularly in respect of the tail wheel 'shimmy'. The 
Sunderland production was 'behind schedule'~ and the Catalinas were shortly due for 
overhaul. Following recent intensive operations, many aircraft were due for servicing and 
with the risk of there not being enough to escort convoys. 1 14 
When the aircraft position was being reviewed near the end of October 1941, the 
supply of Sunderlands was considered bad due to 'poor workshop management'~ but 
Beaufighter supplies were 'at last fairly satisfactory'. Of the other aircraft produced by 
the Bristol company, the Beaufort, there was a need for a 100 replacements per month but 
it was stated that production of these was being 'cut across' due to another 'high spead 
fighter' designed by Bristols. 115 ";. ,'.~ 
The one type of aircraft for which there never appears to have been a shortage fer 
Coastal was the Hudson; and in December 1941 there were still '240 Mark ill Hudsons'" 
65 Mark Vs to hand' besides another forty still on the way. 
When reviewing the aircraft situation at the final Command meeting for 1941 the 
Liberator supply was restricted apparently due to modifications required for maritime 
operations but the C-in-C was prepared to have the modifications reduced to a miniDltIM. 
The Ministry of Aircraft Production was able to produce twenty-fOUf'Harnpdens within 
three months, but there was still a shortage of flying boats, Sunderlands and Catalinas for 
the OTUs. 
112. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 35ih meeting 28.8.41. 
113. Air 41-47 p.20. 
114. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 40th meeting 5.9.41. 
115. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 64th meeting 28.10.41. 
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The Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command, Sir Philip Joubert in the 150 
meetings that he held with his staff, almost invariably considered the 'Aircraft Position'. 
Thus on 15 January 1942 one-fifth were given as operationally serviceable; ofHampdens, 
only three were available. Hudson reinforcements were required for overseas, expected 
Swordfish had not materialised, and the two fighter squadrons, Nos 235 and 236, had only 
seventeen Beaufighters and six Blenheims. 116 No 236 squadron was then disbanded with 
the statement that there was then no fighter squadron on the west coast. Of Beauforts , 
twenty to twenty -five should have been available but only seven were expected. 117 
In February, Sunderlands were reported to be coming off the line at five per month, 
while Catalina deliveries were expected at a rate of three per week. These were being 
offset by losses at moorings in bad weather. There was the hope that Coastal would have 
two each of Liberators and Fortresses 'before long' .118 The allocation to Coastal at that 
time included 280 Fortress aircraft, and Sir Philip stated that ifthere was doubt about their 
full delivery then the Command should be granted a part of Bomber Command's Lancaster 
allotment. 119 Sir Philip was informed about that time that the whole of the Hudson output 
120 for February and March was to go overseas. 
This was confirmed later when forty-two Hudsons were assembled at Kemble for 
the Far East. Another twenty-eight Hudsons that had been allocated to Coastal had parts 
removed and were thus not usable. Four Liberators, also intended for Coastal had ROt 
materialised. I21 In a memo to the ACAS in February, Sir Philip stated: 'So far in thisWlf 
we have had to scrape along ... it's clearly useless to devote all our resources to maintainiag 
and increasing a Bomber offensive to win the war while neglecting the Coastal resources 
which will prevent us losing it'. 122 
When the aircraft situation was reviewed at the end of the March, the reliance on 
North America for supplies was made obvious, as 41 Hudsons, 5 Venturas, 3 Libe_ 
2 Fortresses and 8 Catalinas were held up in Canada due to weather conditions. 
~', ", :', "l .. 
116. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 109th meeting 15.1.42. 
117. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Illth meeting 20.1.42. 
118. Air 15-359 116th, 120th and 124th meetings 29.1.42. 5.2.42. 11.2.42. respectively. 
119. Air 15-359 BOth meeting 25.2.42. 
120. Air 15-359 131 It meeting 26.2.42. 
121. Air 15-359 134th meeting 4.3.42. 
122. Air 15-46 Aircraft Requirements, Ju1.1939-Jun.1943. Joubert memo to AM c Feb. 1942. 
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Of the three British-made aircraft, only the position in Beaufort supplies had 
improved; of Beaufighters the situation was 'bad'; and only 4 Sunderlands had been 
received. 123 During the period of Sir Philip Joubert's wartime command, (June 1941-Feb 
1943) the concern was primarily quantities of aircraft of whatever types were available. 
This is shown throughout 150 conferences which he held from July 1941 to April 1942. 124 
Sir Philip however, in his review of the period September 1939 to June 1942, but given in 
retrospect, states: 'More important than numbers, the range and hitting power of the aircraft 
had doubled.' 125 
Air Marshal John Slessor succeeded Sir Philip Joubert in February 1943 and gives the 
following in retrospect: 
The sixty squadrons of Coastal Command in Februruy 1943 had a strength of some 
850 aircraft plus three VSN squadrons. There were thirty-four anti-submarine squadrons with 
430 aircraft; twelve squadrons of flying boats including eight Sunderland squadrons and four 
Catalina squadrons which included VP84 's PBY s Catalinas were: ... lacking in perfonnance 
and hence rather too vulnerable to the V-boats' flak, but had the great asset of tremendous 
endurance. Of the landplanes, the prima donnas were the VLR Liberators with their range of 
2,300 sea miles. In Februruy we still had only two squadrons of these aircraft ... in the fIrst 
two months of the year we had only a daily average of about fourteen in all available for 
operations. The remainder were the shorter range Liberators, a few Fortresses and Halifaxes 
and the still shorter-range Hudsons and Wellingtons ... 126 There were torpedo strike ~ 
totalling 127 and a hundred BeaufIghters-long-range fighters and anti-flak escorts for the 
trik dr 127 S e squa ons. . 
, 
Slessor added that the rest of the Command comprised five photo-reconnais~ 
squadrons, three FAA Swordfish squadrons, two Air-Sea-Rescue squadrons, and about fifty 
meteorological aircraft. 
From November 1943 onwards, there is a noticeable change in the CorntnAftd's 
records in respect of aircraft. The Commander-in-Chiefs conferences, !hell under Air 
Marshal John Slessor, give more reference to the equipment and armlmMt alkhough'~ 
, , 
with concern for the range and endurance of aircraft. 
123. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 144th meeting 30.3.42. 
124. Air 15-359 C-in-C's meetings Jul.1941- Apr. 1942. • 
125. Joubert, P., Birds and Fishes: The Story of Coastal Command, London, 1960, p.143. 
126. Slessor, J., The Central Blue, London, 1956, Pp.465-6. 
127. Slessor, J., p.466. 
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Thus the minutes of the 16 December meeting include mention of more recent equipment 
and armament such as the 'Mark 24 mine', sono-buoys, cannon and radar. 128 
When the supply of Liberator aircraft was reviewed on 31 December, again there was 
reference to armament such as rocket projectiles being fitted rather than the number of 
aircraft forthcoming. 129 In that same month, however, the Command began additional 
meetings devoted to the aircraft situation in Coastal under the chairmanship of Air Vice 
Marshal Maynard, or his deputy Air Commodore Lloyd. Nevertheless, overall, the meetings 
to discuss the Command's aircraft situation from November 1943 to March 1945, are 
largely concerned with the various allocations to squadrons taking account of the 
equipment of ASV/ Radar. 130 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas succeeded Air Marshal John Slessor as C-in-C 
in January 1944; he found little cause to worry about aircraft deliveries. Rather was it a 
matter of ensuring that aircraft were modified satisfactorily for Coastal Command's 
requirements. At that time there was a need for building up aircraft and equipment as a 
prelude to Operation Overlord and both his staff meetings and those of the Committee 
dealing with the aircraft situation reflect those requirements. 131 
Additionally, the increasing use of heavy aircraft, resulted in the need for extendiatJ 
runways, but only to find that the Command was limited on how much it was allowed to 
spend for such work. 132 Sholto Douglas's summing up of the Command's aircraftsi1aation. 
is, however, given in his autobiography: 
In 1940 ... Coastal Command had to make do with aircraft that were both out-dated and 
insufficient in numbers, and when new aircraft were produced for them - the Lerwick flying 
boat and the Botha - they turned out to be failures. But eventually they began to receive 
American Catalinas and Hudsons in sufficient numbers to be able to operate more effectively; 
and when Bomber Command decided that the Liberator - the American B24 - was not , 
suitable for their night ops, Coastals' near starvation came to an end ... it w~ unquestionably 
the addition of large numbers of these fme aircraft that helped to bring about whet Jack 
Slessor has described as "the enormous advance in the lethal efliaeacy ;of Coastal 
Command." 
128. Air IS-360 C-in-C's meeting 16.12.43. 
129. Air IS-360 C-in-C's meeting 31.12.43. 
130. Air IS-282 Conferences on Coastal's Aircraft Situation, pp.S-114. 
131. Air IS-360 C-in-C's meetings Nov. 1943-Dec.1944. 
132. Air IS-3S9 C-in-C's meeting 6.11.41. Air IS-36O C-in-C's meeting 5.2.44. 
4. HM King George VI inspecting the pilots who converted the Anson squadrons to Hudsons, 
RAF Thornaby, November 1939 . 
. .,. 
5. HM King GeorgeVI viewing a No 220 squadron Hudson which lacked a turret. 
By the time that I became C-in-C of Coastal we were using twelve squadrons of them. 
In the strongest contrast to the work by our long- range heavy aircraft - the Liberators, the 
Sunderlands and the Catalinas and, to a lesser degree, the Wellingtons, we continued with and 
increased the activities of our strike wings. At first we had used Beaufighters in the Strike 
Wings, but later were able to add Mosquitos. 133 
Conclusions 
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The tasks for Coastal Command began with reconnaissance but came to include 
shipping strikes, anti-submarine warfare, Photo-Reconnaissance, Air-Sea-Rescue and 
Meteorological Flights. Throughout the war, some of its aircraft, throughout every twenty-
four hours, would be flying. For three-and-halfyears of the war, the numbers of aircraft 
available to the Command were inadequate for those tasks. Numbers had to be made up by 
the loan of aircraft from Fighter and Bomber Commands. When some squadrons were 
formed and equipped, they were posted overseas, creating a deficiency. 
Aircraft were required, not only in terms of numbers, but also of suitable types. Only 
one type had been specifically designed for Coastal's main task of maritime 
reconnaissance, namely the Catalina. The Beaufort had been designed as a torpedo-bomber, 
but had engine and armament problems, and many were posted overseas. 
Two aircraft that had been designed specifically for maritime work were the under-
powered Blackburn Botha and the Saro Lerwick; both proved to be unsatisfactory for 
operations. All the other types of Coastal's front line aircraft were modified civil, bomber 
or fighter aircraft. In modifying some types, the safety of the aircrews was jeopardised by 
replacing self-sealing tanks, (Liberators), or reducing armament by removing turrets. 
(Halifaxes). The prime need for most types was range, and coupled with that, was 
endurance, for such as convoy escorts. Only one type, available to the Command, with the 
range to close the 'Mid-Atlantic-Gap' and with effective armament, was the Liberator, 
although the Catalina had greater endurance. The deficiency in range for some such as the 
Halifaxes and Mosquitoes had to be compensated by the addition of drop tanks. As most 
aircraft engines were designed for fighters or bombers, there were some problems for 
Coastal's crews that had to operate from sea level to say, 24,OOOft. 
133. Douglas, S., Years of Command, London, 1966, p.246. 
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Substituting some engines with the Bristol Hercules or Pratt & Whitney Wasps 
overcame some engine difficulties. In production and procurement Coastal Command 
became third in priority, most notably by production of the successful Sunderland being 
reduced in favour of the unsuccessful Stirling bomber. It was fortunate, and literally a life-
saver, that Hudsons and Liberators were not required by Bomber Command. The Lockheed 
Corporation was the most helpful at both Command and squadron level to Coastal. 
Coastal's tasks such as reconnaissance and convoy escorts lacked the glamour of 
other Commands, and due to what was considered a 'defensive' role, found that precedence 
was given to its two 'offensive' sisters-FighterandBomberCommands. Coastal Command 





8. Altimeters could be set in millibars or 
altitude in feet but due to changes in air 
pressure, altitude displays could be 
false. 
6. A navigator using the basic instruments 
for DR navigation in Coastal Command; a 
Mercator's chart, parallel rulers, Douglas 
protractor, dividers, pencil and a computer. 
7, The circular slide rule on the 
Navigation computer. 
I.C.A.N. = International Convention of 
Air Navigation. 
9. A navigational computer that succeeded the 
CSC in DR navigation. 
10.. A C~urse S.etting Calculator (CSC) as was still 
be1l1g used 111 Apnl 1939 as an aid in Dead Reckoning 
(DR) navigation, 
2. Armament 
At the outbreak of war in September 1939 no clear plan for the armament of Coastal 
Command's aircraft was evident. The Command's duties however, had been decided; they 
were to patrol the northern exits to the North Atlantic against enemy surface warships 
attempting to break out. 1 This task was covered by flying boats patrolling a more northerly 
line from Britain to Norway while the more southerly patrols to Norway were flown by 
Hudsons. Of the nineteen squadrons listed in Coastal's Order of Battle for 1 September 
1939 only those equipped with Sunderland or Hudson aircraft were considered suitable to 
undertake these sorties, but at that time, only No 224 squadron had converted to Hudsons. 
Both the Hudson and Sunderland flying boat were aircraft which operated in the front line 
throughout the war and may serve as examples in respect of much of the armament used in 
Coastal Command.2 
Overall control of Coastal Command was given to the Admiralty that allocated tasks 
that were to undertake reconnaissance from Great Britain to Norway covering the exit 
routes from German ports to the North Atlantic for surface vessels. No provision had been 
made for covering the whole of the European coastline from the Spanish frontier to North 
Cape and no allowance had been made for enemy fighters being based in Norway; only the 
prospect of the Low Countries being occupied had been considered. 
The armament for aircraft considered suitable to cover the exit routes in 1939, the 
Hudson and the Sunderland was hardly enough, as in combat, both types were out-ranged 
by the enemy's cannon.3 No adequate provision had been made to combat U-boats, against 
which, the British had quite useless bombs available. The Air Ministry, considered Coastal 
third in order of priority, after Fighter and Bomber Commands, and had lacked any 
effective assessment of Coastal Command's needs. 
1. Air 15-3 Coastal Command's War Plans, AM letter to C-in-C, 29.1.38. 
2. Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945, Londo~ 1953, Vol. I, p.246. ORBs: Air 27-1384 No 224 sqdn. 1939. 
Air 27-1209 No 204 sqdn. 1940-43. Air 27-1298-99 No 210 sqdn. 1939-43. 
3. Air 15-213 Expansion and Re-equipment, Estimated Requirements, Jun. 1940-Jun.1942. 
Letter 29.5.41. C-in-C to SASO. 
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The Admiralty had pinned its faith in Asdic being able to counter any U-boat activity 
and as Air Vice-Marshal W.E.Oulton stated, Coastal Command's tasks reflected the 
Admiralty's view: ' ... with great confidence in the effectiveness of Asdic, they at first 
regarded the U-boat as a relatively minor problem~ their chief concern was with the 
activities of the enemy's surface ships'. LlCmdr W.J.R. Gardner expressed a similar view , 
with the Admiralty having~' ... an almost touching confidence in Asdic ... ' stating also, [for 
Coastal Command], ' ... there was no weapon truly suitable for engaging a submarine.' 4 
As a result of the Royal Air Force being fonned in 1918 from Anny and Navy 
services, annament available was designed more for the Army and Navy rather than for 
use by Coastal Command. Of essentially attack weapons such as bombs, after World War I, 
' ... the RAP was left with stocks of aircraft bombs which were a mixed collection of shapes 
and sizes, with many different methods of construction and fusing.' 5 This was possibly 
due to the wish to economise, but more likely, that no order had been issued to dispose of 
them; thus the situation prevailed by default rather than due to a definite policy. 
Between the wars~ ' ... prevailing conditions dictated a policy in which weapon 
efficiency was second to aircraft design, ... restricted money available for research and 
development, caused proposals to be curtailed and was largely responsible for the state of 
affairs in which we found ourselves in 1939,.6 
Although the Air Staff had discussions between 1921 and 1922 regarding a policy for 
bombs and future developments, the range of bombs considered was geared more to land 
targets rather than for maritime use. In 1923, however, W/Cmdr T.R.Cave-Brown-Cave, 
commanding the Marine and Armament Experimental Establishment, proposed a 'Buoyant 
Bomb'. It was intended for dropping ahead of ships under way thus, unlike mines, could 
not be swept. They would have exploded near the unprotected bottom of the ship. These 
bombs were supplied to Coastal bases, at the outbreak of World War II but no trials appear 
to have been undertaken by Coastal Command, and their use may be questioned due to its 
limited application and as a possible hazard to Allied shipping.7 
4. Battle ofthe Atlantic symposium, RAF Staff College, Bracknell, 21.10.91. Both were experienced officers 
See also: RoskilL S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, p.34. . 
5. Air 41-81 (AHBIIV1l7) Armament, Vol. I, Chap. 3, p.20. 
6. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. I, p.6. 
7. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. 2, p.9. 
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It was not until 20 May 1935 when bombs and the necessary components for 
effective attacks on 'every type of target from the air' came to be considered. This was by a 
Bomb Sub-Committee in which there were representatives of the Air Ministry, Admiralty 
and the War Office. 8 The outcome was to give priority to the development of a 30-50Ib 
bomb intended to be used against motor transport, houses and billets. Thus was priority 
given to Bomber Command. However, in April 1938 there were air-drop trials for live 
401b, 250tb and 500tb bombs at Martlesham Heath. For Coastal Command at the beginning 
of World War II: 'The primary weapon of all Coastal Command squadrons was the 100 lb 
anti-submarine bomb .. .' 9 
This bomb was being developed in 1926 following a request by the Admiralty in 
1925. Trials had been undertaken in 1927.10 When the 100tb anti-submarine bombs Marks 
I and II were introduced into service in 1931 no tests were made against a submarine or any 
investigation of their behaviour under water. 11 The Admiralty required a 100lb bomb for 
the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) but the Air Council wished for 250tb and 500tb bombs with 
fillings which were unacceptable to the Admiralty because of possible corrosion, due, 
perhaps to ammonium nitrate in the filling, but by May 1939 an order was given for fifty 
bombs of each size, almost certainly a trial order. 12 
The 100Ib anti-submarine bomb was useless; as Captain Peyton Ward, RN, a Naval 
liaison officer at Coastal Command Headquarters, stated in an appreciation of the U-boat 
threat: 
Aircraft alone cannot kill submarines because the majority of them can carry only two 
100lb bombs; the remainder only carry two to four bombs, neither of which are lethal to a 
submarine as witness the reports from our own submarines who have been bombed by them 
and in a Swordfish's case admit the bombs exploded right on them. 13 
8. Air41-81 VoI.I,Chap.l,p.35. 
9. Air 15-284 Coastal Command's Part in the U-boat War -1939-1940, para.5. 
10. Air 41-81 Vol. L Chap. 3, p.20. 
11. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. 3, p.20. 
12. Air 41-81 Vol. J, Chap. 3, p.35. 
13. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff Anti-U-boat File, Sep. 1939-Dec. 1944, para.8. 
Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1953, Vol. I, p.61. 
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Depth Charges 
On 3 September 1939 No 224 squadron's Hudsons were armed with bombs and not 
depth charges, (DCS).14 At that time the only type of depth charge available to Coastal 
Command was the naval 450lb DC and which then, of Coastal's aircraft, could only be 
carried by flying boats. Its advantage over anti-submarine bombs was that it could be 
dropped from very low altitude, which for accuracy, with no suitable bombsight available, 
was essential. 
Captain Ruck-Keene, RN, suggested on 16 August 1940 that DCs should be standard 
armament for aircraft on anti-submarine duties, and this was approved by the Admiralty. 
This was followed by Captain Peyton-Ward writing to the Air Officer Commanding-in_ 
Chief of Coastal Command on 8 September 1940 proposing that aircraft deployed on 
convoy escorts should carry depth charges, and on 30 September 1940 raised the matter 
again. IS 
The naval 450lb DC was modified for air use with nose and tail fairings and 
essentially, made so that it could be dropped Isafe'. This was in case an aircrew had to 
ditch. As Air Vice-Marshal Oulton stated: I ... through the local initiative of a Flight 
Commander, the standard naval depth charge was adapted and then improved.' 16 It had a 
hydrostatic pistol and was considered ' ... a safe weapon to release from aircraft at 50ft or 
less ... but that the low altitude release was an advantage in comparison with a 250lb anti-
submarine bomb ... which detonated instantly and was likely to porpoise'; 17 that was, the 
bomb was likely to break surface periodically. 
The 450lb naval DC remained a standard weapon during the first two years of the 
war, although it would have been extremely dangerous for any aircraft that lacked an 
accurate means of confirming its altitude. IS When No 221 squadron, equipped with 
WelIingtons operated from Limavady in May 1941 over the North Atlantic they carried 
three 450lb DCs for day patrols but for night sorties took five 250lb bombs. 
14. From a photograph which the author received from W/Cmdr G.C.C. Bartlett AFC. 
15. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff Anti-U-Boat File, Sep.1939-Dec. i944, para. 1 I. 
16. Battle of the Atlantic symposium, RAF Staff College, Bracknell, 21.19.91. 
17. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. 4, p.62. 
18. Air 27-272 No.48 sqdn's ORBs, 1943; C12296 No 423 sqdn's ORBs 1942-45 as examples. 
See also: Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, pp.l35. 
Terraine, 1., Right of the Line: The RAF in the European War 1939-1945, London, 1985 233 ,p. . 
-
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This was probably due to no suitable illumination being available to release depth 
charges from a low altitude; although not so stated in the squadron's records. 19 At the 
beginning of the war, the fuses available were unreliable and the path of the weapons 
underwater was unpredictable. 
As the weight of 450lb precluded many such charges being carried in Fleet Air Arm 
(FAA) aircraft, the Admiralty initiated the design of a 250lb DC. It could be used, not only 
by the FAA but also by Coastal Command's Hudsons that had a sophisticated bomb-release 
gear. Initially, the DC, when just in the form of a cylinder, proved unstable and a tail fin 
was fitted. 
The 250lb DC was cleared for use in theRAF on23 January 1941 and by May 1941 
tests showed that the tail fin had corrected the fall of the charge up to heights of 250ft. 20 
The efficiency of the early types of DC was to be improved by replacing the Amatol filling 
with Torpex. The comparative efficiencies of the Amatol and Torpex charges vary 
according to the source, but a figure of 30% improvement with Torpex appears likely. In 
respect oflethal distance from the U-boat, published sources give lethal ranges from 9ft to 
33ft but from operational records of many attacks by Coastal's aircraft, the mean lethal 
range of a 250lb depth charge appears as about 19ft. 
It was not before June 1942, however, that detonation problems with the fuse were 
resolved and I ••• the Command had a reliable and lethal weapon'. 21 A pistol which could 
cause detonation of the DC at 32ft depth was available, and when Torpex was coming into 
use. Even the relatively shallow depth of 32ft for detonation was improved upon, and in 
August 1944 depths of 16-24 ft were aimed at by an Anti-Submarine Warfare Committee, 
but to be achieved in January 1945 with a mean depth of 19ft.22 These improvements 
stemmed, not only from practical experience in operations, but also from research and 
trials that were ever being undertaken. Captain Peyton-Ward interviewed Coastal 
Command aircrews that attacked enemy submarines and analysed those attacks. At a 
meeting on 29 November 1941 he had commented on the Type 13 pistol giving a setting of 
26-30ft depth for detonating a DC and stated that aircraft should release its whole load of 
charges. 
19. Air 27-1368 No 221 sqdn's. ORBs, 1940-1943. 
20. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. 4, p.58. 
21. Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. II, p.lOO. 
22. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. 4, p.62. 
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The advisability of that might be questioned as there were some abortive actions 
when as many as ten DC s were released, and then later, for another sighting to be made, 
and for which there would be no DCs for an attack. 23 
The development of armament and the development of tactics continued during the 
war; and not in isolation, but following the successes and failures in operations. A Standing 
Committee on anti-submarine warfare had reported in March 1942 that it was more 
efficient to release a large stick of250lb DC s, rather than the equivalent weight in 500lb 
DC s, as the required lethal stick was equal to four times the bombing error in range. 24 For 
attacks against U-boats, the Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command, Sir Philip Joubert 
wrote to the ACAS(T) on 31 March 1942: 'For the entire duration of the war, to date, we 
have been attempting to attack U-boats with two types of depth charge, neither of which is 
capable of giving satisfactory results'. 25 
Sir Philip added that Coastal Command had begun with the Admiralty's 450lb DC 
followed by the Mark VIII 250lb DC that was not cleared for heights above 150ft and 
speeds of 150 knots. He hoped for a 500lb DC filled with Torpex and which could be 
dropped from 5,000ft at 200 knots. 
Hudson aircraft that were using 250lb DCs with success up to October 1943 were , 
however, unable to take 500lb weapons. There was, nonetheless, a positive response to Sir 
Phili p' s letter with the Director of Operational Research stating on 7 May 1942 that on high 
priority, the Director of Armament Development was to develop a weapon that would 
satisfy Coastal Command. The outcome was the production of a 600lb depth bomb that 
could be dropped from a safe height of 5,000ft but as the Army and Navy were given 
priority in respect of Torpex fillings, Coastal came third in that respect. Trials were 
undertaken under the auspices of G/Capt D' Aeth and Professor Williams, who reported 
their findings on 16 December. 26 
23. Air 15-57 Capt Peyton-Ward, RN gives the following lethal ranges of anti-submarine weapons: 
450lb DC - 21ft; 250lb DC -16ft; 500lb NS bomb -17ft; 100lb NS bomb -8ft. 
Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945 Vol. I, p.61 gives 250lb NS bomb - 6ft. 
By 29.11.41.a depth of26-30ft was given for Type 13 pistols. 
24. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. 4, letter 31.3.42. Joubert to ACAS(T). 
25. Air 41-81 Vo!.!, Chap. 3, p.38. 
26. Air 15-286 Coastal's ASW Committee. III meeting 8.5.42. 
See also: Hillmer, N., Official History of the ReAF, Toronto, 1980, Vol. II, p.474. 
Greenhous, B., Harris, S.1., Johnston, W.C., Rawling, W.G.P., Toronto, 1994, Vol. ro, p.378. 
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It had been further mooted at Sir Philip Joubert's second meeting on 17 June 1942 
when the name agreed for the new 500-600lb was decided as a 'depth bomb'. This probably 
followed Sir Philip's awareness of the Americans having such a weapon that could be 
dropped from 500ft albeit using a bombsight. 27 
Coastal Command's Naval Liaison Officer, Captain Peyton-Ward, showed his 
awareness of the use of such a weapon when on 1 July 1943 he stated that for the pilot to 
avoid being shot down when attacking U-boats, he was' ... to get his high level attack off 
before being sighted'. 28 This opinion was repeated by Capt T. Dorling, RN when referring 
to new weapons being introduced in 1943 such as the 600lb bomb. 29 
By 5 June 1943, the 600lb depth bomb was considered to be in service but there were 
developments for fuses between August 1943 and December 1944. In tests it was found 
satisfactory for heights between 1,200ft and 5,OOOft at any speed and with spacings of 
greater than 80ft.30 Although the depth bomb was successful, it came into service too late 
to materially affect the anti-submarine war, and the 250lb DC remained the standard 
weapon. 
When Air Marshal John Slessor succeeded Sir Philip as Air Officer Commanding-in_ 
Chief Coastal Command on 6 February 1943, Coastal was better equipped and aircrews 
had gained experience in anti-submarine warfare. As Sir John Slessor commented in 
retrospect: 'The decisive weapon of the anti-submarine squadrons was the Mark XI torpex-
filled depth-charge, dropped in "sticks" of four to eight from point-blank altitude, fifty to a 
hundred and fifty feet.' But of other weapons, SIessor stated ' ... the most effective was the 
rocket with the 25lb solid head ... the 600lb special anti-submarine bomb ... and the 40mm 
cannon ... none of them comparable as U-boat killers with the old Mark XI depth-charge,.31 
27. Air 15- 286 8th meeting 16.12.42. 
28. Air 15-57 Naval Staff ASW File, Sep.1939- Dec. 1944, para.70. 
29. Air 15-284 Government White Paper, Battle of the Atlantic, p.43. 
30. Air 41-81 Vol. I, Chap. 4, p.27. 
31. Slesser, 1., The Central Blue, London, 1956, p.466. 
See also: Hillmer, N., The Official History of the RCAF, Toronto, 1980,Vol. II, p.474. 
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In May 1928 the Chief of Air Staff criticised armament for aircraft which at that time 
had available the Lewis and Vickers guns from World War I. The Air Staff had also 
decided that there was nothing to be gained by introducing O.5in calibre guns. 32 
During the nineteen-thirties there had been various trials and by 1939 the Vickers Gas 
Operated (VGO) a 0.303in calibre machine gun was considered suitable for service. 
On 22 June 1934 the Browning machine was recommended as a replacement for the 
Vickers gun and by March 1936 the first British-made Brownings were delivered. 33 
The Vickers Gas Operated 0.303in and the Browning 0.303in calibre machine guns 
became standard weapons for Coastal Command throughout the war. Rates of fire could 
be varied in the designs but typical figures were 900 rounds per minute for the VGO and 
1030 rounds per minute for the Browning. 34 
The disadvantage of the VGO, as used in Coastal, was that ammunition was pan-fed, 
with greater likelihood of jamming, and if in action, the need to change pans at a critical 
time. The Browning was belt fed and despite being constructed of many parts, was almost 
trouble free. It could be considered of superior design, and perhaps, the only problem 
would stem, not from the Browning, but by not aligning the rounds in the belt feed. 
The all-up weight for Coastal Command aircraft was ever a serious consideration 
with the general aim of maximum endurance and range. This aspect had to be taken into 
account when the number and type of guns were being reviewed. 
This was apparently left in abeyance until 21 October 1942 when an Anti-U-Boat 
Committee considered the matter. It was then suggested that more forward-firing guns 
should be fitted to Coastal Command aircraft. The weight given for an installation of two 
0.303in machine guns with ammunition for a 15 second burst was 400lb; for one 0.5in 
machine gun, 500lb and for two O.5in, 690lb.35 These factors were taken into consideration 
according to operational requirements, and it was ever a compromise. 
32. Air 41-82 Annament Vol. II, Chap. 1, p.3. See also: Terraine, J., Right of the Line, p.18. 
33. Air 41-82 Vol. II, Chap. 1, p.23. 
34. Figures given to the author at No 1 Air Gunnery School, RAF Pembrey, Oct. 1941. 
35. Air 15-286 Anti-U-boat Committee's 6th meeting 21.10.42. 
II. A Handley-Page Hampden. 
A successful bomber aircraft that was used by Coastal Command as a torpedo aircraft. 
12. A Sunderland of No 330 (Norsk) squadron armed with front , rear and dorsal turrets. 
Sunderlands of No 10 squadron RAAF became armed with 18 machine guns for 
operating over the Bay of Biscay. 
13. The tail of a Sunderland with a Frazer-Nash turret armed with four 0.303" Brownings. 
In air-to-air combat it was not unknown for the hydraulic leads to these turrets to be cut and then 
to require manual operation. 
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The enemy aircraft using 20mm cannon would typically open fire at 1,000yd, and U-
boats at even a greater range. 400yd was considered the effective range of Coastal's guns 
and at which they were harmonised, thus they were out-ranged by the enemy. 36 
Coastal Command's records show that at Headquarters, the Air Officers 
Commanding-in-Chief, firstly Sir Frederick Bowhill and then Sir Philip Joubert were 
pressing for improved armament for both attack and defence. Those in the line of battle , 
the operational squadrons, endeavoured to improve what was in their power to do, albeit 
often quite unofficially, that was, their forward firing armament. Examples were No 500 
squadron prompted by their Commanding Officer, W/Cmdr Spotswood attacking a U-boat 
to become aware of the need for another in the crew to give covering fire while he could 
concentrate on the attack This resulted in a O.5in Browning from an American aircraft 
being fitted to a No 500 squadron Hudson.37 The United States Navy squadron in Iceland-
VP84 attempted fitting 20mm cannon in the nose of their PBYs.38 
In the Sunderland squadrons, particularly those operating over the Bay of Biscay, 
there was the obvious need for more than the initial seven machine guns, and with four of 
those confined to the tail turret. It was certainly on the initiative of the RAAF squadron 
No 10 that their armament was increased to eighteen machine guns, some ofO.5in calibre.39 
These were not only to counter anti-aircraft fire from U-boats, but when engaged in 
air-to-air combat with as many as half a squadron of enemy fighters. W/Cmdr Dundas 
BednaU, commanding a Sunderland squadron was, however, ordered to cease 
modifications to his aircraft.4o Generally, nevertheless, Coastal Command was prepared to 
agree modifications as exemplified in other fields such as equipment for Air-Sea-Rescue, 
and most notably the Leigh Light.41 
36. ORBs: Air-27-1223, (1943); 1366, (1943); 1431(1941-1942), 1566, (1942-1943); 1942, (1942-194jf 
2099, (1942); 1299, (1941-1943) 1668, (1942); 1687, (1942); 152, (1943), and RCAF C12259- ' 
C12260, (1944). The harmonisation distance of 400yd would be where the paths of the projectiles 
would converge; thereafter, the paths would diverge. 
37. Spotswood, MRAF Sir Denis, letter to the author. 
38. USN VP84 ORBs NRS-1977-104. 
39. Air 27-153 ORBs No 10 sqdn. RAAF. 
40. BednaIl, D., W/Cmdr, letter to the author. 
41. Ibid, Chap. 4. 
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Gun Turrets 
Although some RAF aircraft had gun-turrets at the outbreak of World War II, they 
did not satisfy the needs of Bomber Command. Bomber Command aircraft were being lost 
in fighter attacks, largely from below. Thus it was Bomber Command rather than Coastal 
that established the criteria. 
Types included; Bristol, such as on the Blenheim aircraft; the Frazer -Nash, and the 
Boulton & Paul. The Frazer-Nash and the Boulton & Paul turrets became standard 
equipment for Coastal Command. They were certainly improvements compared with the 
Anson's cupola and the turrets in Bristol Blenheims. What also became a standard was the 
installation of Browning 0.303in calibre, belt-fed guns to both the Frazer-Nash and the 
Boulton & Paul turrets. 42 
These types were not fool-proof; the Frazer-Nash had doors for entrance and exit 
which had to open outwards, and which could foul the fuselage unless the turret was 
suitably orientated; the Boulton & Paul had a table which was clamped down after the 
gunner was seated. This could all too-easily have snagged the CO2 bottle on the gunner's 
Mae West. The long hydraulic leads to turrets on Sunderlands were not infrequently cut by 
enemy fire in combat although they could be operated manually.43 While guns such as the 
manually operated VGO had a fixed sight, there was also a reflector gunsight to serve with 
twin or quadruple Brownings in turrets. It was electrically illuminated and which could be 
varied in intensity, but on very dark nights the gunner might see only the illumination of the 
gunsight. 
Cannon 
In 1937 the War Office undertook trials with 20mm cannon that were produced in 
France and by 1939, Air Ministry draughtsmen were working on 20mm cannon with the 
BSA Company in England. 20mm cannon became a standard weapon for Fighter 
Command while in Coastal attempts were made to install a 20mm cannon in a Hudson " , 
firing aft, but without success. 40mm cannon were also to be produced and trials were 
undertaken in 1939.44 
42. Air 41-82 Vol. II, Chaps. 13-19. 
43. Air 27- 149-153; 1178/9, 1830,1832; ORBs of 10 RAAF; 201 RAP; 422.423 RCAP 194Q....44. 
44. Air 41-82 Vol. II, Chap. 4, p.25. See also: Saunders, H., RAF 1939-1945, Vol. III, p.69 .. 
Terraine, 1., Right of the Line, pp.79, 87,440. Greenhous, B., Harris, S. 1., Johnston, W. C., 
Rawling, W. G. P., The RCAFOjficiai History, Toronto, 1994, Vol. III, pp.446-7. 
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The Command's records give frequent reference to both the 20mm and 40mm 
cannon. Aspects considered were availability, weight of both the weapon and ammunition, 
and installation. A serious disadvantage was the limited number of shells that could be 
fired before the cannon components were worn out. As the 40mm cannon could be used as 
an anti-tank weapon by the Army, should it not therefore be given priority where weight 
was ofless consideration? The weight of20mm and 40mm cannon was obviously greater 
than 0.303in machine guns and there was much to be said for having 0.303in calibre 
machine guns with the likelihood that out of say, a total of seven guns, most would be able 
to fire, compared with one cannon which might fail. The weight also, of a cannon's 
ammunition would preclude many rounds being taken. 
Trials were attempted with the 40mm cannon In SunderIands but proved 
unsatisfactory. 20mm cannon, although fitted to aircraft such as the Liberator, proved to be 
most suited to the Beaufighters of the Strike Wings. Not only, in terms of armament were 
the Beaufighters then equal to enemy fighters, (if not more so), but they were to be proved 
valuable in anti-shipping operations. 
As pilots who operated with No 404 (RCAP) squadron have indicated, they could not 
only give covering fire for Torbeaus (Beaufighters adapted to carry torpedoes), but they 
could damage enemy shipping in their own right. For Coastal Command, Mosquitoes came 
rather late in service as strike aircraft, but some were equipped with 6-pounder cannon and 
at least one U-boat, U-976, was claimed as sunk using this weapon on 25 March 1944.45 
Nevertheless, their greater weight and limited number of shells, was not conducive to their 
use as an aircraft weapon. 
Torpedoes 
The policy in the use of torpedoes, was that they were: 'always considered to be the 
most effective weapon against shipping at sea ... " but lack of a suitable aircraft and a 
shortage of torpedoes, resulted in this method of attack by Coastal Command being 
' ... severely handicapped,.46 They were nevertheless used by Coastal Command in Shipping 
strikes on occasions. 
45. Ibid, Chap. 5. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Table B. 
46. Air 41-47 Chap. VI, p.251. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, Vol. II, pp.165 268 
Terraine,J., The Right of the Line, London, 1985, pp.373, 388. ' . 
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Of torpedo supply; at a meeting on 10 December 1941 the Admiralty gave priority to 
the Fleet Air Ann that was to receive 75% of aircraft types, but only 25% to Coastal 
Command.47 
Disadvantages of torpedoes were their high cost; they were sensitive weapons; and 
restricted in use for Coastal due to the limited areas in which they could be dropped due to 
depth of water and geographical conditions off the enemy-controlled coastline. It was also 
uneconomic to use them against the low tonnage shipping that formed most of Coastal's 
targets.
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Furthermore, Coastal's torpedo bomber, the Beaufort, was being posted overseas 
from August 1941.49 
Following the setting up of a joint Admiralty! Air Ministry Committee meeting on 
11 June 1942 a report from the Operational Research Section CORS) stated that attacks on 
merchant vessels could be more effective if bombs rather than torpedoes were used , 
particularly so if the Mark XIV bombsight could be available. 
A similar conclusion was reached in respect of the buoyant bomb but that it would be 
of no value without the use of the Mark XIV bombsight. 50 The need for intensive training, 
lack of aircraft, and priority being given to the Navy, production limitations for the low-
level bombsight; all these factors must have influenced those who decided the policy 
concerning torpedoes. 
Torpedo trials were undertaken with Mark I and IT Catalinas during the months of 
July, August and September 1941 and at a Coastal Command Headquarters meeting on 3 
September, it was stated that a Mark XII torpedo could be used if one was prepared to 
accept the limitations of releasing from 35ft altitude at an airspeed of90 knots. 
Without a radio-altimeter to give an accurate altitude reading, that would have been 
far too dangerous, and a Catalina with a 104ft wingspan, flying steadily at 90 knots would 
be an easy target for anti-aircraft fire. 51 At a further meeting chaired by the Commander -in-
Chief Coastal Command on 1 November 1941, the Deputy AOA confirmed that a radio 
altimeter was needed for these torpedoes to be used. 52 
47. Air 41-47 The RAF in the Maritime War, Chap. VI, p.25l. 
48. Air 41-47 Chap. VI, p.251. 
49. Air 15-359 C-in-C's meetings Jut. 1941-Apr. 1942, 30th meeting. 
50. Air 41-47 Chap. VI, p.25l. 
5 I. Giese, 0., Capt, (U-405), letter to the author. 
52. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 74th meeting, 11.11.41. See also: Roskill, S. W., Vot. II, p.84. 
14. Beaufighters of No 404 squadron RCAF 
armed with eight 60lb head rocket projectiles 
as used in shipping strikes. Alternatives were 
251b solid head projectiles. 
16. Inner view of fuselage of a Wellington which 
when flying low, struck the sea resulting in the 
bottom of the fuselage being torn out. 
I 
15. The nose of a Wellington which is fitted 
with a Frazer-Nash hydraulic turret armed 
with two 0.303" Brownings. 
17. A bomb-sight as fitted to a Lockheed 
Hudson in the navigator's compartment. 
18. A Wellington of No 221 squadron which has just released a torpedo. Torpedoes were to be 
oflimited use in shipping strikes when most of the targets were less than 6,000 tons. 
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It was stated at a later meeting when a Torpedo Policy was being considered, that the 
Admiralty was prepared for Coastal Command to use torpedoes' ... whenever a favourable 
oPportunity ... ' occurred. 53 A 'favourable opportunity' was extremely unlikely, due not 
only to the limited areas, but also the need for either suitable cloud or night cover, escorts 
to be available for strike aircraft, ample warning for the strike aircraft to reach the target, 
for the forces to be effectively on 'stand by', and for a worth-while target to justify all the 
forces required and to suffer the risks involved. 
Bombsights 
FollOwing the production of the 600lb depth bomb, a Mark ill angular velocity low-
level bombsight was developed. At the eighth meeting of the Command's anti-submarine 
Committee chaired by Sir Philip Joubert on 16 December 1942, reports on trials were 
submitted by two squadrons. One of those squadrons was No 59, commanded by W/Cmdr 
G.C.C.Bartlett, when the squadron was operating Liberator aircraft. Bartlett gave the 
results of his trials thus: Thirty-four bombs were dropped by three aimers at a stationary 
target and later on, at a target towed at 8 knots. For forty-two bombs the average range 
error was 18 yd but it was considered that the low-level sight's chief advantages would be 
demonstrated under operational conditions. W/Cmdr Bartlett with his navigator P/O 
Longmuir considered also that the sight was a great advance on any previous method of 
low level bombing either by eye or with a bombsight. 
The best figures achieved in No 59 squadron's trials were 6yd range error with a 
release from 800ft and 5yd flying straight and level from 800ft and 5yd error When 
approaching at 100ft but releasing from 400ft with the aircraft's nose up. 
In contrast, at the same meeting, Professor Blackett gave 20yd range error for the 
Low Level Mark II and Mark XIV bombsights. 54 He considered the Mark III 'promising' 
and that the use of the Mark II could be improved if radio altimeters were available. Air 
Vice-Marshal Oulton referring to the adoption of the Mark XIV bombsight in 1943, ' ... 
never trusted that device.' 55 
53. ~r 15-359 C-in-C's 89th meeting, 11.12.41. 
54. Air 15-286 Coastal's ASW Committee. 8th meeting, 16.12.42. 
55. Battle of the Atlantic symposium, RAF Staff College, 21.10.91. Ouhon had sunk U-266 and U-563. 
See also: Richards, D. and Saunders, H., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. II, p.155. 
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It was a characteristic of many pilots that they were wary of trusting equipment with 
which they might have lacked experience. They were aware however, of how accurately, or 
otherwise, they could judge with their own eyes, and on which they all so frequently had to 
rely. Furthermore, they would not need to take directions from the bomb-aimer. 
Sir Philip Joubert, however, decided that the Mark III low-level bombsight should be 
an operational requirement and that it should be used over the Atlantic; the Mark XV over 
the Bay of Biscay. 56 Although not so stated, this could have been for two reasons; only a 
limited number of low level bomb sights were likely to be available, and over the Bay of 
Biscay one was more likely to have favourable visibility compared with operating over the 
Atlantic. 
Despite the low level sight being an operational requirement, a pilot who must have 
completed two tours of operations with Coastal wrote of the lack of a low-level sight. 57 
Here again, such a plea would have stemmed from the lack of availability and related to 
what priority was given to specific units. One of the first pieces of apparatus I used in an 
aircraft in April 1939 was a bombsight, and yet the Command never appeared to solve the 
need for bombsights to cover all the operational requirements for aircrews. 
This was due to changes in policy, and the development of new weapons and 
changes in tactics. In attacks on either ships or U-boats, there was the need to act with the 
minimum delay, and many pilots opted to use their ownjudgement by direct sighting, and 
often with considerable success. 
MAD Gear and the Mark 24 'Mine' 
Two further anti-submarine weapons which came into use during World War II 
Were named the 'Mark 24 Mine' and 'MAD' .Both the 'Mark 24 mine' and MAD (Magnetic 
Anomaly Detection), were to be used by the United States Navy's PBYs (Catalinas) with 
SUccess and when under Coastal Command control. The Mark 24 'mine' was really an 
acoustic homing torpedo, and was to be used by first dropping depth charges prior to 
releasing the 'mine'; this was to cause the U-boat to submerge and thus be unaware of any 
torpedo. The first success with the homing torpedo was claimed by Lt Wood when 
operating from Iceland on 20 June 1943 against U-388. 
56. Air 15-286 8th meeting 16.12.42. 
57. Edwards, G., Letter to the author. See also: Goulter, C., The Forgotten Offensive, pp.193-4. 
Richards, D.and Saunders, H., RAF 1939-1945, Vol. II, p.155. 
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Lt Wood saw the U-boat split open with 10 to 15ft of its interior visible. Four days later, 
VP84 sank another U-boat again using the 'Mark 24 mine'. 58 Publicity was lacking in 
respect of such armament and on RAF squadrons even the Commanding Officers were not 
expected to see the 'mine'. The 'Mark 24 mine' does, however gain some brief reference in 
the minutes of the Command's meetings on 16 December 1943 when it was stated that the 
Admiralty was endeavouring to obtain a relaxation in the 'conditions of extreme secrecy'. 59 
After some experience using a parachute a~achment with the 'mine', the policy for 
carrying the 'mine' was being reviewed. 60 
'MAD' for 'Magnetic Anomaly Detection' was a system for detecting submerged U-
boats. It comprised a sensitive magnetometer installed in a cone within the tail of a 
Catalina and which could detect anomalies in the Earth's magnetic field within a range of 
400ft, and was sensitive enough to detect a target within a few feet. 
This was used in conjunction with retro-bombs of65.5lb filled with 25lb Torpex. The 
bombs were rocket-propelled at a speed coinciding with the aircraft's forward motion, and 
released rearwards from rails on the wings of the aircraft. Thus the bombs fell directly on 
to the target detected. MAD gear therefore possessed two advantages over depth charges; 
no presetting was required for depth, and the enemy would be unaware of attacks if no hits 
were scored. 
VP63 Catalinas (PB Y s) ofthe United States Navy (USN) carried 24 to 30 such retro-
bombs that were released in groups of eight or ten each. The first kill by VP63 of the USN 
Was ofU-761 on 24 February 1944. 61 This was in the Straits of Gibraltar which proved 
particularly suitable for operating MAD gear because although the Straits represented a 
'gate' to the Mediterranean ofthirty-five miles, the gap was effectively reduced to seven or 
eight miles for submarines attempting to negotiate the Straits due to water-depth 
limitations. 
58. USN ORBs: VP63 NRSI978-89; VP84 NRS-1977-104. 
NiestIe,A., German U-boat Losses During WW2, Annapolis, 1988, p.284. 
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56 
It was therefore, comparatively easy for both aircraft and surface vessels working in 
conjunction with each other, to form a 'barrier' to U-boats. MAD gear was tried in other 
areas such as the English Channel, but where conditions proved less suitable and no 
Successes were recorded. 62 
Rocket Projectiles 
A weapon that was developed during World War II was the rocket projectile. 
Rockets had been used in World War I fired from the ground against balloons, and before 
1939 were again being considered by the War Office. In 1941 rockets were also considered 
by the Air Staff as an air weapon against armoured vehicles, but in Coastal Command they 
came to serve in both the anti-submarine war and in shipping strikes. 
For use by aircraft, there were two types of head, a 60lb one with high explosive, and 
a 25lb armour-piercing head of steel. Groups of four rockets were arranged on racks under 
each wing of an aircraft and were to be fired electrically by the pilot. 
There were trials in November 1942 at Pendine Sands with final trials in respect of 
anti-submarine attacks in February 1943. Against U-boats the range was considered to be 
less than a 1,000 yards and the rocket projectiles (RPs) could be fired in pairs or as a 
salvo.63 
One ofthe first successful attacks using Rocket Projectiles was by FlO H.c. Bailey of 
No 48 squadron who sank U-594 on 4 June 1943. It was with 25lb armour piercing heads, 
and as FlO Bailey commented at the time, one had to be careful to avoid some heads that 
followed an upward trajectory. 
The rockets tended to follow the line of flight of the aircraft rather than the line of 
sight. Although in tests one could expect to achieve 30% hits, one hit was lethal to a 
U-boat. 64 
Against U-boats a definite procedure needed to be followed as an ex No 608 
squadron pilot stated: 
62. Air 41-82 Armament, Turrets and Guns, pp.170-5. Air 41-47 RAF in the Maritime War, p.527. 
63. Air 41-82 p.170. 
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We commenced rocket-ftring training by doing twenty-degree dives from 2,000ft at 200 
knots and pulling out at 400ft, hence wing ripples etc. Next a hand-held camera was used in the 
nose by the navigator to photograph the target, a painted circle in a wadi, when told, as we pulled 
out of the dive. From the photographs the dive angle could be calculated and we adjusted the 
dive next time. When the angle was good enough we practised at sea with full rocket load of 
eight. We would drop a sea marker and then dive at it ftring single rockets and later salvoes 
taking photographs of the strike. 
We formed a habit of making violent climbing turns after ftring because the rockets 
were unpredictable under water and sometimes after a shallow entry would emerge from the 
water in front of us. As a result of using rockets under the wings the flight characteristics of the 
Hudson changed a great deal, our cruising speeds usually 120 knots [were increased] to 140 
knots and we had to land at a higher speed of ninety-ftve knots to feel safe as they were prone to 
high speed flick stalls.65 
About the same time that Hudsons were using Rocket Projectiles against U-boats , 
the Beaufighters of the Strike Wings were employing them against enemy shipping but 
with rather different tactics and with more strongly constructed aircraft; as a survivor from 
No 404 (RCAF) squadron relates: 
In August 1943 the squadron went in rotation to Tain, Scotland to learn to fIre rockets ... they 
were armed with armour piercing heads and could pass straight through a ship. They were 
harmonized so that a pair of rockets arrived with a spread of twenty feet between each pair. When 
entering the water they levelled out and thereby struck a ship underwater. Aiming was relatively 
easy; we fired them when we reached a point in our twenty-degree dive from 1,200 feet where our 
cannon and machine guns harmonized. This could be detennined by the splashes we observed in the 
water. 
Early in our dive the splashes were all around the ship. As we got closer the splashes 
converged until they all met at 700 feet the point of harmonisation. At that point we pressed the 
button on the left of the control column and off went the rockets. They would then automatically 
straddle the ship. Only if our aim of the cannons was off or the aircraft was skidding, were we likely 
to miss. So in our own right we did damage to the ships and we still cleared the way for the torpedo 
carrying Beauftghters to sneak in under. We found that our strafmg efforts almost silenced anti-
aircraft ftre altogether.66 
65. James, FlO RAAF, letter to the author. RCAF Vol. III, pp.447,453-4. 
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It can be said, that there was much to justify the use by Beaufighters of rocket 
projectiles against merchant shipping, using both High Explosive (HE) and armour piercing 
heads. Although they were useful against U-boats, depth charges were then the preferred 
weapon. 
Conclusions 
There was no specific armament policy for Coastal Command on the outbreak of 
World War II . . 
Armament available stemmed from World War I. The Chief of Air Staff considered 
armament for Bomber and Fighter Commands' requirements rather than any need for 
Coastal in either defensive or offensive roles. 
Initially, the only offensive weapons available to Coastal were bombs and a naval 
depth charge, the latter confined to use by flying boats. 
Torpedoes were 'out' due to lack of suitable aircraft; defensive armament was 
limited to O.303in calibre machine-guns. Of necessity, naval depth charges were modified 
for aircraft use, and later, due to FAA requirements, a 250lb depth charge became available 
for Coastal. 
The needs of Fighter and Bomber Commands meant that there had to be improved 
offensive and defensive armaments, and thus bombs, cannon and gun-turrets of improved 
design became also available for Coastal, albeit with priority given to other services. 
Likewise, for improved explosives such as Torpex, Coastal was last in priority. 
Torpedoes proved to be limited in use, either in the conventional form such as was 
used with success against Gneisenau, or the acoustic homing torpedo (Type 24 'mine'), 
against U-boats. Nonetheless, the naval historian, Capt Roskill considered that torpedoes 
were the best weapons against ships; but acknowledges that supplies were limited.
67 
Retro-bombs, used with MAD gear, also were shown to be oflimited use, but due to 
geographical conditions. 
The 20mm cannon proved its worth on the specialised tasks of the Beaufighter Strike 
Wings, but the 6-pounder cannon in the Tsetse Mosquito anti-submarine role was of 
limited value 
67. Roskill, S. W., The War at Sea, London, 1956. Vol. II, pp.l65, 258. 
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Rocket Projectiles were useful with either high-explosive (HE) or annour-piercing 
heads, but best applied in the anti-shipping role rather than in anti-U-boat warfare. 
Depth bombs came too late in the anti-submarine war to materially affect the 
outcome, as also, for the necessary bombsight. 
The initiatives of individual officers in Coastal Command, at Headquarters, on 
squadrons or stations, played a significant role in the use of whatever annament became 
available, and helped to promote the development of weapons suited to Coastal's tasks. 
Despite their limited range compared with the enemy's cannon, 0.303in calibre 
Brownings proved their worth, particularly when an increased number were placed in 
forward-firing positions to counter AA fire during attacks on U-boats. 
Overall, the three outstanding pieces of annament in Coastal Command were the 
250lb bomb, the 250lb depth charge, and the 0.303in Browning machine-gun. 
From the ultimate score of ships and U-boats, sunk or damaged by Coastal-controlled 
aircraft, the most valuable weapons were the 250lb bomb and the 250lb depth charge. 
Throughout, however, Coastal Command remained last in order of priority for 
armaments, even in respect of the Torpex filling for the invaluable 250lb depth charge. 
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare 1939 - 1941 
Introduction. 
There are many publications that give reference to anti-submarine operations in 
World War II, but few, ifany, are devoted to 'The Battle of the Atlantic' from the point of 
view of Coastal Command. 
The standard work covering anti-submarine operations may be considered to be 
Capt S.W. Roskill's The War at Sea. l Parallel to that are two volumes, Nos I and X 
of Professor S.E. Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II .2 Some United States Navy (USN) squadrons of aircraft operated within Coastal 
Command and Morison gives coverage of their sorties. 
A work intended for the general reader is Dan van der Vat's The Atlantic 
Campaign. 3 Van der Vat refers notably to aircraft best covering convoys by sweeps 
around a convoy rather than by close escort; also, the lack of Liberators provided for 
anti-submarine operations. 
The German point of view is best given by Admiral Donitz' Memoirs which are 
based on his experiences and war diaries.4 Fregattencapitan GUnter Hessler, in his The U-
boat War in the Atlantic 1939-1945 gives an analysis ofthe U-boat diaries with emphasis 
to the battles between 'wolf packs' and convoys. s Another former U-boat commander, 
Peter Cremer, has published his autobiographical U-333 The Story of a U-boat Ace. 
Cremer gives an overall view of World War II and acknowledges help from British and 
American sources.6 
1. RoskilL S. W., The War at Sea, Vols. I-III, London, 1954 -61. 
2. Morison, S.E., The Battle of the Atlantic. Sep.1939-May 1943. Boston, Mass. 1975. 
Morison, S.E., The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943-May 1945. Boston, Mass. 1984. 
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From the outbreak of war in September 1939, right up to the end of hostilities in 
Europe there was a progressive development in equipment used by Coastal Command 
in anti-submarine-warfare (ASW). 
There was progressive development also in weapons specifically intended for aircraft 
in attacking U-boats. The role of Coastal Command changed both in emphasis and location 
throughout the war, responding promptly to what was required of the Command in the light 
of major land battles in addition to the war at sea. In 1939, Coastal Command had no ASV 
(Radar), no weapon lethal to U-boats, and was grossly deficient in modem aircraft, with 
none specifically designed for anti-submarine-warfare. The sinking of the liner Athenia on 
3 September1939, made it apparent that there was a threat from U-boats and not just from 
surface warships. 
After the Battle of Britain 1940, Coastal Command's limited forces could be directed 
less to anti-invasion sorties and more to anti-submarine measures. From the outset of war , 
the Naval Liaison Officer, Captain Peyton-Ward at Headquarters, Coastal Command was 
plotting movements of U-boats and advising the Commanders-in-Chief accordingly. The 
occupation of the French Biscay ports in 1940 plus the occupation of the Norwegian ports, 
put a greatly increased load on the Command with German U-boats then able to use more 
freely, a northern exit route to the Atlantic and a much shorter route from the French ports. 
Mark I ASV (Aircraft to Surface Vessel) was coming into service in 1940 but was 
considered by aircrcws as unreliable. 
When an Admiralty memorandum on the strengthening of Coastal Command was 
being considered by the War Cabinet's Defence Committee on 5 November 1940, Coastal 
Command was referred to by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the RtlHon Mr A. V. 
Alexander as: ' ••• the Cinderella of the RAF'. 7 This was repudiated by the Air Minister, Sir 
Archibald Sinclair. On 10 December 1940 Winston Churchill announced that the 
Command would be under operational control of the Admiralty.8 1941 marked the entry 
into the war of Russia and USA. For Coastal on the debit side, there was the requirement to 
escort convoys to Russia against U-boats; but from America, some help and co-operation 
was gained in respect of both aircraft and equipment such as radar that was still being 
developed. 
7. Air 41-73 The RAF in the Maritime War, Vol. II, p.27S. 
8. Air 41-73 Vol. II, p.274. 
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For the development of anti-submarine- warfare, however, there was Winston 
Churchill's directive in 1941 on the Battle of the Atlantic, followed by the first meeting of 
the Battle of the Atlantic Committee that was chaired by Churchill on 19 March 1941.9 
In 1941 there was the tentative use of a modified naval depth charge, albeit limited to 
one type of land aircraft in addition to flying boats. In 1941 also there was a considerable 
improvement in aircraft for the Command with Wellingtons, Catalinas and a limited 
number of Liberators. The German codes 'Enigma' were broken by the Allies under what 
was coded 'Ultra'; although also, the enemy was able to break the Allies' codes. These 
Sources of intelligence were considered paramount in the Battle of the Atlantic, by, for 
example, Professor Jiirgen Rohwer. 10 In 1941 an Operational Research Unit was headed 
by two scientists, Professors P.Blackett and E.Williams. One of their tasks for Coastal 
Command was to analyse aircraft attacks on U-boats. II 
In 1942 Coastal Command was beginning to take some offensive against U-boats, 
and the Leigh Light was first used with success for night attacks. During Operation Torch, 
the Command's aircraft undertook a successful campaign against U-boats and with the 
notable use of 250lb depth charges with shallow setting pistols. 
Following the move of the German battle cruisers from Brest, there was a definite 
shift of Coastal's effort to the Atlantic, but still using the early Marks of ASV, although by 
then, the Mark II was in service. Coastal's ASV, which still used 1.5m wavelength was 
countered by 'Metox' receivers to detect it by U-boats. America was totally unprepared 
for countering U-boats on entering the war and was subjected to a disastrous U-boat 
onslaught Pauchenslag off its eastern seaboard for the first half of the year until a limited 
convoy system had been organised. 
1943 saw the defeat of U-boats in the North Atlantic with their withdrawal ordered 
by Admiral Donitz on 24 May. In that year also, another anti-submarine weapon was used 
with success - the rocket projectile. About that time also, improved radar (Mark III) was 
coming into service, notably of short wave (9.1cm) for which initially, the U-boats had no 
detecting devices. 
9. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War, London, 1979, Vol. III, p.l07. 
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New weapons had been used successfully such as the Mark 24 'mine' (an acoustic 
homing torpedo ), and the retro-bomb with MAD gear. The Allies counter to the schnorchel 
that enabled U-boats to operate submerged, was the sonobuoy, coded 'High Tea', and able 
to detect submerged submarines. 
An agreement had been reached in Washington with the Americans and Canadians , 
for deployment oflong-range aircraft from Newfoundland in defence of convoys. This was 
significant for two reasons; not only did it result in closing the Mid-Atlantic Gap south of 
Cape Farewell, but demonstrated also that the Americans were prepared to co-operate on 
an Atlantic, rather than just an American coastline basis. 12 
With the battle in the Atlantic largely won, there was a shift from the west to the 
North Sea, St.George's, Bristol and English Channels for Coastal Command in 1944. The 
prime duty for the Command became support for Operation Overlord - the invasion of 
Western Europe. Sorties for Coastal ranged from Norway with the Skagerrak and Kattagat 
down to the Spanish coastline. Other sorties still prevailed however around the shores of 
the British Isles. In 1944, there were then a number of schnorchel equipped U-boats, but 
there were some detected by sight. Another anti-submarine weapon that came into use was 
the 600lb depth bomb together with a bombsight for medium altitudes. 
The anti-submarine war was not completely over in 1945 as Germany was using 
midget submarines, the Seehunds over the North Sea and had been developing improved 
U-boats, which thankfully for the Allies came too late to alter the course of the war. 
Although there was no radical change in Coastal's anti-submarine policy with changes in 
the Commanders-in-Chief the tenures of the four wartime Commanders reflect the , 
situation during their respective periods of office. 
Thus for Sir Frederick Bowhill, from 1939 to 1941, it was a matter of holding the line 
with the limited forces available but with no definite policy in respect of U-boats. The , 
Command was still virtually ancillary to the Navy with its prime duty being reconnaissance 
against surface warships. 
When Sir Philip Joubert succeeded Bowhill in 1941, the Command's forces were still 
closely involved with the Admiralty'S concern regarding the enemy's surface fleet. 
12. Slessor, J., The Central Blue, London, 1956, p.498. 
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Although Coastal was receiving an increasing number of aircraft, whole squadrons 
were being posted overseas, and it was not until towards the end of his tenure, that Sir 
Philip was able to undertake some initiative in offensive sorties against V-boats in the 
operation 'Bolero', albeit for a limited time and in a limited area. 
1942 might be considered a period of consolidation where Coastal's policy, not only 
for anti-submarine warfare, but also for the Command's other duties, notably anti-shipping 
operations. This was despite the fact that Sir Ph~lip was losing much of his trained forces in 
po stings, as soon as they were formed. 
Air Marshal John Slessor acknowledged the 'spade work' of his two predecessors 
when he took command in February 1943 when the Battle of the Atlantic was not quite 
over. He made no appreciable change in policy but opted in anti-submarine warfare for the 
emphasis to be on 'the trunk of the tree', 13 that was the transit route for V-boats through 
the Bay of Biscay. 
Air Marshal Slessor was no less mindful, however, for the need to counter any 
concentrations of V-boats in the area of convoys; thus his policy was to consider both areas 
according to operational conditions and requirements. Although the Admiralty had overall 
command of Coastal Command's operations, for Slessorthere was no appreciable effect on 
Coastal's operations and the co-operation that prevailed between the two Services. 14 
Coastal's records emanating from Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas show that he 
continued to fight the battle against V-boats, but during his tenure, it was largely in Home 
Waters including the Channels, the Biscay ports, and, much as was the case in 1939, the 
northern transit route for V-boats. 
Sir Sholto had succeeded Air Marshal Slessor in January 1944 and during his tenure 
of office, considerable effort was devoted to Operation Overlord. He showed, as was so for 
Sir Philip and Air Marshal Slessor, his preparedness to take the offensive in anti-submarine 
warfare, (ASW). The minutes of his staff meetings indicate also, just how much attention 
Was given to equipment of aircraft. In his case, it was improved radar and installation of 
radio altimeters and ever with what he considered to be the right type of aircraft and , 
armament. 
~~~~~---------------~----------------------13. Slessor, J., The Central Blue, London, 1956, p.511. 
14. Slessor, 1., p.484. 
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In 1945 the Command was able to give attention to those finer points. In the anti-
submarine war undertaken by Coastal Command, the connective thread virtually 
throughout was the Naval Liaison Officer - Captain Peyton-Ward. There is no doubt that 
he played a leading role in its continuity; this through analysis initially of U-boat transits , 
followed by an analysis ofsightings and attacks, not only in collaboration with the Navy's 
tracking room, but also by de-briefing of the aircrews which were involved. Peyton-ward 
therefore, provided for Coastal Command wh~t Professor Jiirgen Rohwer considers the 
crucial factor in the Battle of the Atlantic, that was intelligence which he gained from those 
Sources, which he gave as an Afterword to Donitz' Memoirs. Peyton-Ward conferred with 
the Commanders-in-Chief of Coastal Command, and they, in their despatches and 
autobiographies, acknowledge his work. 15 
The anti-submarine war may be summed up in three words: ships, U-boats and 
aircraft. Ships were our lifeline; U-boats were to sink them; aircraft were to save them. All 
other factors were ancillary to those three. In the following I have therefore throughout 
given data applicable to them. Technical matters such as the wavelength of radar 
transmissions, lethal range of depth charges, whether or not an aircraft could reach 17° W 
or 27° W, were all critical factors in anti-submarine warfare. I have, therefore, stated such 
data in the script. Ultimately in such battles, the success or otherwise, depends on the man 
at the controls who presses a button or trigger, and I have mentioned the names of some of 
those men. 16 I have also included details of some representative ASW operations of Coastal 
Command such as their first and last successes in World War II. 
1937-1939 
When the role of Coastal Command was being reviewed in 1937, the Senior Air Staff 
Officer, Air Commodore Geoffrey Bromet wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick 
Bowhill pointing out that while both Fighter and Bomber Commands had clear roles in a 
War against Germany, it was 'Not so for Coastal Command'. 17 The primary role Bromet 
then considered being a part in 'Keeping local sea communications open, and preventing 
destructive seaborne raids on our coastline and ports' .18 
15. JOUbert, P., Birds and Fishes: The Story o/Coastal Command, London, 1960, p.l23. 
Slessor, 1., The Central Blue, London, 1956, p.486. 
~6. T?e theme of my first book: Wer kennet ihre Namen? 
7. Air 15-66 The Role of Coastal Command in War, Nov.l937-Mar.l939, Memo 1.10.37. 
18. Air 15-66 Memo 1.l0.37. 
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No mention was made of U-boats, but rather what was probably prompted by 
awareness of the surface raids made in WWl against the east coast of England. Both Sir 
Frederick and Bromet considered the defence of convoys but they were in home waters and 
the defence would have been against surface raiders and aircraft rather than U-boats. 
They were thus following the Admiralty's belief that there would be no threat by U-
boats. Sir Frederick however, was rightly concerned, as was to be shown, that surface 
raiders would enter the Atlantic before war was declared, and wished his forces to be at 
war stations four days in advance of any declaration of war. 19 
By January 1939 the Command's primary role was considered to be reconnaissance 
and convoy protection but with no mention of that protection being against U-boats.2o 
Both Sir Frederick and Air Commodore Bromet appreciated the need for co-operation 
between the RAP Commands and the Admiralty and both those officers made visits to the 
Admiralty to clarify issues. 21 As was the case within Coastal Command, so also for the 
Chiefs of Staff at their Imperial Defence Committee Me~tings~ there was no reference to a 
possible threat from U-boats rather was there mention, of surface raiders and the effort , 
necessary to counter them in WWl. 
The protection of trade routes was nevertheless considered. This aspect was raised by 
Admiral Sir Dudley Pound; the response of the Chief of Air Staff, Sir Cyril Newall was, 
, ... what foundation was there for the statement that "nothing would paralyse our supply 
system and sea-borne trade so certainly or immediately as successful attacks by surface 
raiders?" '.22 Sir Dudley'S answer was that ' ... sufficiently severe it would necessitate 
locking up all our traders in harbour' .23 Sir Cyril's response was: ' ... there was not enough 
jam to go round ... it would be preferable that we should face the risk oflosses on our trade 
routes in the Atlantic rather than accept further reduction of our Air Forces at home which 
We could not afford,.24 
19. Air 15-66 memo 23.3.39. 
20. Air 15-66 memo, Bromet to C-in-C. 1.10.37. para.4. 
21. CAB 53-11 meeting 2.8.39. 
22. CAB 53-11 meeting 2.8.39. 
23. CAB 53-11 meeting 2.8.39. 
24. CAB 53-10 meeting 18.1.39. 
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Thus even as late as just one month before the outbreak of war there was no mention 
of a possible U-boat threat either by Coastal Command officers or any of the Chiefs of 
Staff, and Sir Cyril appeared indifferent to Coastal Command's requirements, and the 
Admiralty thought of surface raiders rather than a U-boat threat. 
It had been left to an Anny officer, C.I.G.S. General Viscount Gort to appreciate 
what was to be the dominant factor in World War II - merchant-shipping tonnage, without 
which Britain would have starved and a war c~uld not have been fought through lack of 
materials. General Gort referred to merchant shipping prophetically as our Achilles' heel , 
although for him it was in respect of movement of troops. 25 
This attitude of being prepared to suffer shipping losses resulted in attempts being 
made to build ships to balance the numbers being sunk; thus the additional losses of 
merchant crews and the ships' cargoes were to be oflesser consideration. The cost of a ten-
ton aircraft such as a Hudson that needed only a crew of four; at that time, was £ 17, 000. 
Those figures contrast with a ship such as the SS Kensington Court of 4,863 tons with a 
crew of34.In this case, the ship and a valuable cargo, which in other cases could be as high 
as £2m, was lost; although the crew was, quite exceptionally, saved.
26 
There was some justification for both points of view. In the case of surface raiders, 
the forays by the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau with the cruiser Admiral 
Hipper and the pocket battleships Admiral GrafVon Spee and Deutschland showed how 
serious shipping losses due to surface raiders could be, 27 but were to be far out-weighed 
by losses due to U-boats.28 
For the Chief of Air Staff there was ever the need to consider the requirements of 
four Commands, when in August 1939 the effect of the U-boat menace was still to be re-
learned, and the maritime role for aircraft was rated of least importance, due to priority 
being given to the offensive requirements of Bomber Command. Germany on the outbreak 
of war was largely concerned with the Continent; Britain had to consider the prospect of 
Italy entering the war against the British in addition to Japan. 
25. CAB 53-10 Meeting, 18.1.39. 
26. ORBs: Air 27-1208 No 204 sqdn. Air 27-1412 No 228 sqdn. 1939. London Evening News 10.6.38. 
27. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, pp.194-5, 279-82. 
28. Air 15-57 Coastal Command Naval Staff U-boat file, paras.30, 60. Air 15-773, Vol. II.I, para. I. 
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The Imperial Defence Committee was mindful of the situation in the Middle East 
and Far East, of particular concern being Egypt and Singapore. 29 At these meetings the 
Cabinet appeared more concerned with keeping the British Empire intact, with its line of 
communication through the Suez Canal, and with maintaining its presence in the Far East. 
As was agreed by a group at the RAP Staff College, 'Until well into the thirties RN 
priorities were Imperial rather than European. Japan was the most likely enemy, which 
implied battle fleet actions, not attrition campaigns in defence oftrade,.30 
Many of the War Cabinet's decisions followed conversations and discussions with the 
French. Matters considered concerning the French included the question: 'Could we 
survive if [German] aircraft and submarines were established in the Low Countries and the 
Channel Ports?' (perhaps the one occasion when submarines gained a mention), 31 that the 
French expected the British to fight in France, also that 'the French might throw their hands 
in' unless assured of British support. 32 
No policy appears to have been decided in the event of a French capitulation, as the 
fiascos concerning the French fleet and its North African bases were to demonstrate. 
That both the Channel and Biscay ports became lost to the Allies and that the French 
did 'throw their hands in' were to require a considerable additional effort on the part of 
Coastal Command from June 1940 until the end of hostilities. This was because an 
additional length of coastline from the Frisian Islands down to the northern Spanish 
coastline needed to be covered. 
Furthermore, the Germans were likely to use the ports for both U-boats and surface 
craft. Additionally, former allied airbases could prove hostile, requiring additional fighter 
COver for Coastal's reconnaissance aircraft. All this came to pass. 
No attention had been given to the potential Atlantic U-boat menace, and as the naval 
histOrian, Captain Roskill, stated: 'The Naval Staffwas confident of the great value of the 
new ASdic anti -submarine device. In 1937 they reported to the Shipping Defence Advisoty 
Committee that "the submarine should never again be able to present us with the problem 
We were faced with in 1917" ,.33 
~AB 53-10 264lh, 26Slh and 281 11 meetings. Air 41-73 RAF in the Maritime War, Vol. II, pp.3-7. 
· Battle of the Atlantic Symposium RAP Staff College, 2.10.91. 
31 C ' · AB 53-10 265 th meeting. 
~i' CAB.53-10 268th meeting. 
· Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954,Vol. I, p.34. 
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Captain Roskill adds: 'The Naval Staff also considered that anti-aircraft fire from the escort 
vessels would adequately protect the convoys against air attack'. 34 
Subsequent events were to show just how wrong these statements were. Ships were 
attacked not only off Britain's east coast by enemy aircraft, but also over the Atlantic and 
the Mediterranean. Initially there were insufficient escort vessels to provide anti-aircraft 
fire, and initially, merchant ships lacked any defensive guns. This was partly due to lack of 
supplies of guns, but also lack of trained men to man them. 
By 31 August 1939 Germany had deployed twenty-one U-boats in the Atlantic; 
eighteen in the North Sea and seven in the Baltic.35 Those U-boats intended for the North 
Sea had sailed on 25 August, to be ostensibly in position by the 27 August. On the outbreak 
of war, two patrol lines of U-boats had been formed, with five west of the Skagerrak, and 
another five threatening the area from Flamborough Head to the River Thames. 
One was on passage to Utsire off southern Norway, two others had been detailed for 
mine-laying and two were off the coast of Scotland. 36 The Germans rightly assumed that 
on the outbreak of war Britain's • ... forces and air patrols would be small and 
inexperienced.' 37 How true; as Captain T. Dorling, RN recorded: ' ... Coastal Command 
was ill-equipped to deal with a long campaign against U-boats ... the Command was unable 
to devote anything like its full strength to anti-U-boat warfare owing to the heavy 
commitments imposed upon it in other directions.' 38 
The forces for Sir Frederick Bowhill at that time were only nineteen squadrons, of 
those only three could be considered suitably equipped with modem aircraft, and they were 
. h 39 , h d· . , WIt out any adequate anti-submarine weapons. Those ot er lrectlOns were towards 
reconnaissance to cover the possible break out of Germany's surface warships with which 
the Admiralty was pre-occupied and with some justification as later events were to show. 
It was fortunate at this stage in the war that Germany lacked the French Biscay ports and 
therefore the staffs at Coastal Command's Headquarters were able to concentrate 
reconnaissance sorties to the U-boats' northern exits into the Atlantic. 
34. Roskill, S.W., Vol. L p.34. 
35. Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic, London, 1992, para.3. 
36. Air 41-73 Vol. II, pp.41-44. Hessler, G., para.54 and Plan 4. 
37. Hessler,G., para. IS. 
~8. ~r 15-284 Govt. White Paper, Battle of the Atlantic, paras. 1- 2. 
9. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. I, para. 10. 
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The sinking of the liner Athenia on the first day of the war by U-30 in position 
56°44'N 14 °05'W that is in the Rockall area, demonstrated to all that there was a need to 
cover rather more than the northern North Sea exits against surface raiders. 40 
This sinking must have concentrated the mind of Winston Churchill, who, until then 
appeared more interested in a comparison of our surface warships with those of Germany 41 
but on the 4 September asked the Director of Naval Intelligence for a statement of the 
German U-boat forces most of which were ~cean-going and which he described as 
'formidable' as they were well able to operate over the whole ofthe North Atlantic convoy 
routes. 42 
In the first seven days of the war thirteen other ships were sunk by U-boats in 
addition to the Athenia. Those sinkings were all, apart from one, within longitudes 
07°49'Wand 15°34'W and most were therefore, within the range of Hudson aircraft; but 
the only land-based squadron, No 224, that had been re-equipped with those modem 
aircraft, was operating instead over the North Sea. 
Even at that early stage there was one landbase available in Northern Ireland which 
might have been used to give some coverage to ships over the North Western Approaches, 
but only a short range Anson squadron was deployed there.
43 
Most ships at that time were 
still sailing independently, and those losses prompted the Admiralty to operate a convoy 
system but it was not completed until the following month.
44 
Northern exits to the Atlantic were being used by U-boats and on 21 September 
Captain Peyton-Ward, RN, at Coastal Command's headquarters, produced plans to cover 
the routes used by U-boats north of Scotland. He took account of the times when the D-
boats were most likely to have surfaced to re-charge batteries. On his first plan he marked 
the locations of Rockall and the Athenia s sinking. Prior to the 21 October the Fleet Air 
Arm had undertaken recces between the Shetlands and the North Coast of Scotland; but 
from that date Coastal Command took over that area and also the Fair Isle Channel and 
anti-submarine search areas north-west of Cape Wrath and down the Minch. 
~~:7fu~'r~4~1-~73-RAF---l-'n-th-e-M-m-'-tim--eW--ar-,-Se-p-.1-9~39~-7Ju-n~.1~947.1~,~V~ol~.I~I.~I-,p~p~.4~14~4.--------------
41. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War, London, 1977, Vol. I, pp.367-9. 
42. Churchill, W.S., Vol. I, pp. 377-8. 
43. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. I, para. 1 O. 
44. Air 41-73 Vol. Ill, p.4l. 
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Peyton Ward advocated also covering an area bounded by 59°00'N, 57°30'N and 
08°00'W and 05°00'W. Those positions effectively covered the Rockall area, and which 
was in comfortable range ofHudsons operating from Northern Ireland, as they were later to 
do when based at Limavady, or Tiree in the Inner Hebrides to undertake sweeps as far as 
1 rw. Unfortunately, at the beginning of the war most of the land-based squadrons were 
using Ansons; and when the squadrons ultimately re-armed with Hudsons, they were 
required to undertake reconnaissance over the North Sea against the possible sailings of 
surface raiders.45 
Because of recent sightings of U-boats, Peyton-Ward gave a second plan suggesting 
that U-boats might be routed northwards along the Danish and southern Norwegian coasts 
before heading westwards as far as Rockall. He believed that Germany would expect the 
British to undertake air patrols between the Scottish and Norwegian coasts. Other areas 
considered for patrols were a line from the ShetIands to the Faeroes and the Fair Isle 
Channel, between the Orkneys and the Shetlands.46 
In fact, the Germans assumed that Britain, to seal off the North Sea would I ••• use 
light and heavy forces along the Shetlands-Norway line.' 47 Captain Peyton-Ward's 
concl usions were that while nights were short and the moon waxing, aircraft patrols should 
be continuous throughout the twenty-four hours; that a combination of aircraft and surface 
craft was essential to ensure a kill, and that hunting craft must be based near the hunting 
areas. He would have been aware that in moonlight a surfaced U-boat could be seen from 
the air, but that in 1939 Coastal's aircraft lacked weapons to sink a U-boat. 
Thus surface craft with their naval depth charges and/or cannon were essential to 
achieve a kill. There was a need to work in combination of aircraft with surface vessels, the 
latter equipped with Asdic to detect the U-boat after it had submerged, and also with the 
vessel armed with lethal 450lb depth charges. Although the 450lb depth charge could be 
carried by flying boats, it needed to be modified for the use of aircraft, and meanwhile 
Coastal Command could use only 100lb or 250lb bombs that were useless against U-boats. 
45. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff ASW File, paras. 1-4. 
46. Air 15-57 paras.3-5. 
47. Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic 1939-1945, London, 1992, para.54. 
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By 7 September two U-boats were deployed west of Northern Ireland, three west of 
the Straits of Gibraltar, and all the other nine were covering the South-Western Approaches 
and the Bay ofBiscay.48 At that time the U-boats were crewed by well-trained men and 
commanded by dedicated captains as subsequent events were to demonstrate. Those 
deployments effectively covered the Allies' major shipping routes to and from the United 
Kingdom. By then, eight Allied ships had been sunk by U-boats. 
Three ships out of the eight were sunk by the Gennan 'ace' Lt. Prien in U-47 and who 
the following month sank the British battleship HMS Royal Oak in the Royal Navy's base 
at Scapa Flow.49 By the 18 September six more Allied ships had been sunk including the 
aircraft carrier HMS Courageous. All these sinkings were east of 16°W; the first eight 
sinkings were all east of 15°W.5o Some were therefore outside the range of the Navy's 
escort vessels that were then limited to 13 OW. Although 16 oW was safely within the range 
of Sunderland flying boats, they were far too few. 
The limited numbers ofHudsons were concentrated on the east coast for North Sea 
operations but even if based in Northern Ireland, as they were later in the war, it would 
have been impractical for them to escort ships as far as 16 oW due to limited endurance. 
On 13 November 1939 a directive was issued to all Coastal Command's Groups from 
Headquarters that the destruction of U-boats was to be rated as of equal importance with 
the location of enemy surface craft. This resulted in many patrols being flown almost 
entirely as anti-U-boat sorties. 51 That momentous decision almost certainly stemmed from 
the serious losses of ships including HMS Courageous which had been sunk by U-boats, 
fifty-two in Septem~er and twenty-one in October. 
What were now needed by Coastal Command however, were sufficient aircraft of the 
right type, with sufficient range and endurance, weapons capable of sinking a U-boat, and 
improved ASV/radar. There remained also the need for effective illumination to attack 
Surfaced U-boats at night. Even when those requirements were to be fulfilled, there 
remained the desirability in anti-submarine warfare for co-operation between surface forces 
and Coastal Command. 
48. Air 15-73 RAF in the Maritime War, Vol. II, p.2. Hessler, G., para. 15. 
49. ROhwer, 1., Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945, Annapolis, 1983, pp.l, 4. 
50. Rohwer, 1., pp.I-2. 
51. Air 41-73 Vol. II, p.16. 
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The Royal Navy at that time was seriously deficient in surface escorts, and of those 
then in service, many lacked the range and were unable to extend their patrols far enough 
west into the Atlantic without refuelling, although after the Allied occupation ofIceland, 
refuelling could be undertaken there. 
The Royal Navy came to appreciate that neither aircraft alone, nor escort vessels 
alone, were the best means of countering V-boats, but rather that a combined force of 
aircraft and surface vessels were best, as exemplified at the time of sinking three U-boats, 
(U-461, U-462, V-504), in July 1943.52 The Navy pressed for more aircraft to be used in 
anti-submarine warfare on 4 November 1940, and reiterated as late as 8 May 1942.53 Thus 
it had taken the Admiralty over a year to change its policy. 
It became the policy of Admiral Donitz to deploy U-boats as near to the shores of the 
British Isles as was reasonably safe but to operate the U-boats further and further 
westwards as opposition from Coastal Command aircraft improved. It was in fact, the 
aircraft, rather than the Navy's warships that resulted in such strategy. 
Germany's success in the initial phase of German U-boat operations is best illustrated 
by Sir Winston Churchill's chart for the period 3 September until the German invasion of 
Norway on 9 April 1940 with all sinkings of merchant shipping eastwards of 15°W 
approximately, 54 but by December 1941 all merchant vessel sinkings by U-boats were 
clear of the British Isles. 55 Churchill would have given 9 April as the end of the first phase 
of sinkings of merchant vessels by V-boats in the Atlantic because by that date the U-boats 
had been withdrawn to concentrate along the Norwegian coastline in operation Hartmut for 
SUpport in the invas~on of Norway. 56 
Donitz' overall strategy was to deploy over a wide area thus requiring the British to 
Spread their opposing forces thinly; he was able to hold the initiative in the first phases of 
the U-boat war, and it remained for the Admiralty and Coastal Command to try and counter 
each move by Germany as each occurred. 57 
SiStiebler, W., (Capt ofU-461). Letter to the author. 
~3. Air 41-73 First Lord of the Admiralty. Air 15-213 pp.32-8, Sir Dudley Pound's letter. 
4. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War. London, 1979, Vol. ill, p.135. 
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It may be argued that this state of affairs prevailed right up to 24 May 1943, when it 
could be said Coastal had gained the initiative and with Donitz ordering the withdrawal of 
U-boats from the North Atlantic. 58 By that time Coastal Command's aircraft had been 
equipped with ASV!Radar and many were also equipped with the Leigh Light. 
It was the policy of Admiral Donitz throughout the war however, to sink Allied ships 
wherever they could be found. He was adept in using 'soft spots' where there was a lack of 
air cover as was to be shown in the 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' south of Greenland, the 'Azores 
Gap' and in 1942, off the American eastern seaboard, and other areas such as East Africa 
and West Africa. 
Influencing specificaIIy Coastal Command's modified role, was the work at the 
Command's Headquarters of Captain Peyton-Ward, who deduced with remarkable accuracy 
the routes followed by German V-boats and made recommendations concerning the 
deployment of Coastal's aircraft in what was to become anti-submarine warfare (ASW). 59 
For that purpose he was assisted by the Navy's Tracking Room and reports from aircrews. 
Although the Admiralty's initial assessment concerning the war at sea may not be 
Considered 'wrong', it certainly had under-estimated that the main threat to Allied shipping 
Would be from U-boats rather than surface warships or raiders. The Admiralty had pinned 
its faith on ASDIC, the sonic means of detecting submerged V-boats, overlooking the fact 
that V-boats could attack while on the surface at night, thus nullifying the use of ASDIC. 
Q.onvo~ 
The Admiralty had assumed control of all British merchant shipping by 26 August 
1939 and embryo outward-bound ocean convoys began on 7 September.60 Meanwhile 
thousands of ships were at sea devoid of any protection and they were to become easy 
targets for both U-boats and surface raiders but it was not until October that a convoy 
system was formed. 61 Reasonable cover was provided up to 200 miles south-west ofFastnet 
Light, although convoys to Gibraltar, which began in October, formed off the Scillies and 
Continued as a convoy, but shortage of flying boats resulted in limited cover after 100 
miles. 
----~~~~----------------~~~~--~~-----------------­~:. H~ssler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic,. London, 1992, para.333. 
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Coastal still lacked aircraft, particularly those of suitable range and with emphasis 
given to its patrols over the North Sea rather than the Atlantic. The only suitable aircraft for 
Atlantic patrols available and deployed at that time were the few Sunderlands. According 
to Professor Rohwer, Coastal Command's aircraft at that time therefore posed no threat to 
U-boats, as most were obsolete, were lacking in range and they had no suitable armament. 
It was not until 1941 that such deficiencies were remedied. 62 
The Navy's destroyers had limited endurance and were only able to escort convoys up 
to 13
0 
W. 63 Hudsons could have operated to 17°W in sweeps, but were lacking endurance 
to remain there. Sir Frederick Bowhill was wen aware of the shortages and wrote to the 
Under Secretary of State for Air on 12 September and again on 30 October concerning this 
lack of aircraft. 64 
The Inwards Ocean Convoys began on 14 September from Freetown, West Africa, on 
the 16 September from Halifax, Nova Scotia, and on the 26 September from Gibraltar. 
There were still many ships sailing independently however and the anti-submarine patrols 
flown by No 15 Group's Sunderlands experienced I ••• a constant stream ofSOS signals from 
Sinking ships'. 65 
With all types of ships being used it was inevitable that some compromise was 
necessary for masters of merchant vessels to accept. If they captained ships capable of 
being able to cruise at say 15 knots, they would have been reluctant to form part of a 
convoy confined to 11 Yz knots. In practice, convoys came to be formed to sail at typically 
11 Yz knots or 7Yz knots and with some fast convoys that later prevailed for Malta at 17Yz 
knots. Such a speed would have served to reduce the likelihood of being attacked by U-
boats, due to the U-boats' limited speed of about seventeen knots, but not to avoid attacks 
by aircraft as was to be experienced. The East Coast convoys that had been in operation 
from 7 September had by October, I ••• at least one aircraft on escort from dawn to dusk.' 66 
62. Rohwer, 1., at RAF Staff College symposium. 21.10.91. 
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Coastal Command endeavoured to arrange convoy escorts from 'first light' to 'last 
light' that resulted in a greater period of time on escort, compared with 'dawn to dusk'. 
This was important, as they were likely times for U-boats to attack, as the U-boat 
COmmander could see ships silhouetted under such lighting conditions with the rising or 
setting sun. Not infrequently, just as a Coastal aircrew reached PLE (Prudent Limit of 
Endurance), or had reached the end of a patrol or a convoy escort, there would be a signal 
from the SNO (Senior Naval Officer) ofthe convoy escort to investigate a specific area 
for a possible U-boat, or perhaps the aircrew would themselves make a sighting. 67 
To compensate for the lack of suitable aircraft to escort East Coast convoys, De 
Havilland biplane Moth aircraft were used in providing 'scarecrow flights'; so called 
because they could do little more than indicate their presence as they carried no bomb load 
but were to operate as far out as possible with surface craft. Nevertheless, Professor 
ROhwer Who was a submariner, acknowledges that, just the sight of an aircraft had an 
important side effect, and if over the Atlantic would have forced U-boats further out. Their 
use followed Captain Peyton-Ward's awareness, at Coastal's headquarters, in the early 
months of the war that the Command lacked both suitable aircraft and had no effective 
anti-submarine weapon. 
There is no doubt that 'PW', as he was known, exercised considerable influence. He 
had a direct line from the Command's headquarters to the Admiralty, and as Sir Philip 
Joubert adds: [worked] ' ... with an energy, an intelligence, and a courage beyond praise'. 68 
For Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, 'PW' was: ' ... always ready with wise advice and 
willing help.' and, ' ... part of the inner circle at Coastal from the beginning to the end'. 69 
Flights of the DH Moths became attached to squadrons such as No 269 although in 
the case of No 269 it had a full establishment of Anson aircraft. The Command was 
nevertheless stretched to fulfil all its duties. Tiger Moth aircraft arrived at Abbotsinch to 
undertake anti-submarine patrols although there would have been no question of them 
being able to make any useful attacks on U-boats. At least one of the Moth's pilots lacked 
Operational training although an experienced civil pilot, and that might well have been the 
case for some other DH Moth pilots. 
67. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff ASW File, para.7. 
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By 28 November there were nine of these biplanes serviceable but not operational due to 
them waiting for marine distress signals. 70 
The advantage of the convoy system for the Navy was that it would be covering ships 
rather than an area, and it was to be shown that even a few escort vessels could be enough 
to deter U-boats which at that time were able to attack many ships sailing independently. 
Those who suggest that the east coast convoys were pointless overlook the fact that British 
transport was highly specialized, and it would have been impracticable to put bulk shipping 
cargoes on an overstretched rail service. The Navy's destroyers however, were limited in 
number and limited in endurance. 71 
Donitz had organized trials in the Baltic during 1938-1939 of 'wolf packs' against 
likely convoys but then, due to lack of U-boats; he was using aircraft for reconnaissance. 
Later, aircraft to undertake reconnaissance on behalf of his U-boats was to become one of 
his requirements. 
When the Luftwaffe was able to provide such machines they lacked the range. When 
ultimately he gained the use of some FW 200 Kondors that had the range, he found that 
their navigation was unsatisfactory and positions given of intended targets were 
unreliable. 72 
Due to an obvious need to compensate for Coastal Command's lack of aircraft to 
cover the Western Approaches, the aircraft carriers Hermes, Ark Royal and Courageous 
sailed with their own destroyer escorts in an attempt to fill this gap. HMS Ark Royal 
survived attack by U-39 on 14 September but U-39 was itself sunk by the destroyer escort. 
Courageous was torpedoed by U-29 in position 50 0 1 O'N 14 0 46'W on 17 September. This 
Was enough for the Admiralty to withdraw the carriers from such costly operations. The 
loss of HMS Courageous demonstrated how vulnerable such a valuable target could be 
when deficient in its own escorts, or flying off or recovering its own aircraft. Two 
destroyers from the HMS Courageous escort had been withdrawn to help a merchant vessel 
that had been attacked. 73 
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Those carriers using tons of fuel and requiring many personnel to sail them may be 
contrasted with the relatively trifling cost of a few Sunderlands that could have done the 
job more efficiently and certainly with no risk of being torpedoed. 
There was another ship which also gained the headlines out of the fifty -two which 
were attacked by U-boats in the North Sea-Atlantic area during September 1939.74 This 
Was the merchant vessel SS Kensington Court; which, like HMS Courageous, was on a 
regular shipping route in the South-Western Approaches. 75 On 18 September the SS 
Kensington Court was torpedoed by U-32 seventy miles west of the Scillies in position 
50
0
31'N 08 ° 27'W, thus well within range of both destroyers and aircraft. Signals 
'SSS' were received from the ship by three Sunderlands of No 228 squadron.76 One of 
those three was flown by Acting FltlLt Thurston-Smith and PIO Bevan-John. Gp/Capt 
Bevan-John's account indicates the various aspects to be considered although understated: 
We were returning from an AlS patrol ... when we picked up an SSS as it was 
then ... we soon came upon the Kensington Court which was well down by the bow and all her 
crew were in one lifeboat. Having searched for the sub without success we decided to try a 
landing. It was a lovely day and the sea seemed like a millpond. AlF/Lt Smith made an 
excellent landing on what turned out to be quite a swell. The lifeboat which seemed very full 
came towards us during its passage. Another Sunderland captained by Jackie Barrett appeared 
overhead. He signalled by Aldis lamp asking if we wished him to land. We replied it was up 
to him as it was a risky business. He did. By the time we had picked up the captain and 
nineteen of his crew, we were prepared to take the whole lot had it been necessary. The take-
offwas somewhat hairy ... we found we had landed with our bombs on ... we had to jettison 
them before take-off ... and two hung up and had to be pushed off with a boat-hook. 77 
FlO Barrett of No 204 squadron picked up the remaining fourteen survivors while a third 
Sunderland captained by SlLdr Menzies acted as guard overhead. (Later in the war it was 
not unknown for the Luftwaffe to attack rescue operations). This incident, so fully reported 
in such as the News Chronicle might well have given the impression that crews of 
torpedoed ships were easily rescued and that flying-boats could land on any stretch of 
water. Neither was true. 
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As another pilot from No 228 squadron recalls: 'The Atlantic soon became a striking 
grave-yard of ships. Day after day we would fly over oil slicks or flotsam from sunken 
ships. We saw ships sink but could do nothing to help the passengers or crew ... radio silence 
was absolute. Landing in the open sea was strictly forbidden later because the risk ofIosing 
. . 78 precIOUS aIrcraft and aircrew was too great'. 
The intensive press reports on the SS Kensington Court were almost certainly 
intended as favourable propaganda for the British, but unfavourable to the enemy. This, 
however, in contrast to the sinking of V-boats by Coastal Command which were not given 
Such coverage. This was apparently due to the Admiralty's wish not to disclose such 
information to the enemy, although the Admiralty was prepared to publish the Navy's 
successes. 
By the 19 December when U-48 was through the Fair Isle Channel on its homeward 
voyage, there were no V-boats in the Atlantic. 79 Nevertheless, by the end of 1939 about 
160 ships, out of 5,800 at sea had been sunk by U-boats, but only 30 of those in convoy 
were sunk by U-boats for their loss of only nine. Aircraft sank none of those V-boats. 8o It 
Was fortunate that Donitz began with only fifty-seven U-boats rather than the 300 to which 
he aspired. 
Qonclusions 
By the end of 1939 Britain still had France as a vacillating ally; 81 as was to be 
demonstrated in the following three years, and when the term 'ally' could be doubted. 
Account had to be taken of Russia, Italy and Japan. There was an awareness of what the 
loss of the Low Countries to Germany could mean in respect of their ports, (including 
notably their use by U-boats), but not the potential loss of French and Norwegian ports 
Which were later to prove invaluable for V-boats. 
The maritime role of the RAF came last in order of priority as indicated by the Chief 
of Air Staff. A determined enemy could avoid detection despite reconnaissance designed to 
prevent any escape of surface warships. This was achieved by using dark periods and 
weather conditions unfavourable to aircraft that were still without Radar. 
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Coastal Command had insufficient aircraft and trained crews to undertake the tasks 
expected of them as shown by using Tiger Moths with civil pilots to supplement even the 
inadequate Anson squadrons. Supplies to maintain existing aircraft were insufficient as 
demonstrated by the shortage of engines for Ansons and the lack of gun turrets for 
Hudsons. Armament on aircraft for both defence and attack was lacking as shown by a 
Hudson being unable to respond effectively to an attack by enemy aircraft. Only 100lb 
bombs could be used by Ansons, and there were no 250lb depth charges for Hudsons. 
Aircrews were expected to take quite unreasonable risks due to weather conditions, lack of 
armament and over heavily defended areas. A convoy system was rapidly organised on the 
East coast and to some extent, ocean -going convoys, but with limited cover for the latter 
up to 200 miles. 
There were still many ships sailing independently, and fifty- two were attacked by V-
boats in the first month of the war including the liner Athenia on the 3 September and the 
aircraft carrier HMS Courageous on the 17 September. Priorities in the role of Coastal 
Command changed rapidly from one of North Sea reconnaissance to include convoy 
escorts, and patrols in support of the Navy. Of crucial importance was the directive that 
anti-V-boat sorties should be of equal importance to anti-shipping reconnaissance. 
Captain Peyton-Ward, RN at Coastal's headquarters remained in the forefront by 
specifying areas for anti-V-boat operations for Coastal Command. 
By the end of January 1940 a V-boat offensive had re-opened and in that month 
alone, forty-two ships had been sunk by V-boats. 82 At Christmas 1939 there had been no 
V-boats in either the North Sea or the Atlantic but in January at least twenty-two were 
operating with success in the North Sea and Atlantic areas. 83 
The most alarming aspect of these V-boat successes was that they were all east of 
11 oW. Thus they were all, not only in range of naval escort vessels but also Coastal's 
Sunderland and Hudson aircraft and indicative of our serious shortage of aircraft and also 
escort vessels for the Navy. 84 
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At that time the Command was lacking in fully-equipped Hudsons and seriously so 
in respect ofSunderlands. Although the Lockheed Corporation was fulfilling its contracts, 
it was taking about three months for aircraft to reach operational units due partly to them 
being disassembled and sent by sea. This delay was to be overcome later by flying Hudsons 
across the Atlantic in what came to be known as the' Atlantic Feny' and for which much of 
the credit must go to Sir Frederick Bowhill and Captain Don Bennett. Manufacture of 
Sunderlands was to be ever limited. This was due to preference being given to Stirling 
bombers for which the manufacturers had a much larger contract. 85 
Coastal's sorties were concentrated in the North Sea area and the Command had a 
very limited number ofland bases in the west, lacking also in night-flying facilities. There 
had been a vain hope of obtaining bases in Southern Ireland but with negative results due to 
the political situation, this despite the fact that Ireland was depending on Britain for some 
of its supplies, and therefore British convoys. 
As late as July 1940, to cover the Western Approaches, the Irish Sea and Northern 
Ireland, there were only four flying-boat squadrons, two GR landplane squadrons, and one 
long-range fighter squadron.86 These figures take no account of overseas requirements of 
the Command. To detect surfaced U-boats in bad visibility, Mark I ASV had by January 
1940 become available but by the end of the month only fourteen Hudsons and one 
Sunderland had been equipped with ASV.87 
The Command's first anti-U-boat success was in January 1940 and credited to a 
Sunderland of No 228 squadron. On 21 JanuaryU-55 had sunk a ship in position 58°18'N 
02 ° 25'W, and on the 30 January sank two more, both in an outward-bound convoy OA80G 
from the Thames through the English Channel about position 49°N 07°W. A No 228 
squadron Sunderland based at Pembroke Dock was ordered out on a strike. 
At the time of the attack on the convoy, only the sloop HM:S Fowey was on escort 
although two destroyers were sent to assist. The Sunderland located HMS F owey, a French 
destroyer rescuing survivors from a torpedoed ship, and then two more destroyers. Half-an-
hour later the Sunderland sighted a U-boat which apparently was unable to submerge. 
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The Sunderland bombed and machine-gunned the U-boat before directing the escort 
vessels to the scene. The U-boat, U-55, was scuttled by its crew, which was picked up by 
HMS Fowey. In the naval historian's opinion, Captain Roskill, the U-55 would probably 
have escaped but for the Sunderland's presence. 88 
This episode is given in some detail as it demonstrates how lacking we were in anti-
submarine warfare at that time. There was just one U-boat success in the month for Coastal 
although there were at least twenty-two U-boats at sea. The Sunderland was not able to 
sink the U-boat as it had only the non-lethal bombs. 
Although machine gun fire should not be under-rated, for if enough of the U-boat's 
crew were killed or wounded it would require it to return to port, but at that time, the 
forward-firing armament of the Sunderland was very limited. Most obvious was that two 
ships in convoy could be sunk so close to our shores, and that only one Sunderland was sent 
on a strike. There was a gross lack of cover for the convoy available from the Royal Navy 
and Coastal Command. The shortage of aircraft was demonstrated by only one Sunderland 
out of all types being sent at a critical time. 89 
During the first five months of 1940 Germany progressively reduced restrictions on 
its U-boats in respect of what and where ships could be attacked. By 24 May in the whole 
of the sea areas around Britain and most of Ireland, up to as much as 100 miles from the 
coasts, U-boats were free to attack merchant vessels. The only exceptions were the ships of 
the 'friendly' neutrals, Spain, Italy, Japan and Russia. The last areas to be included were the 
coastal areas of France and the Netherlands. 90 This really made no difference in the anti-
submarine campaign, as from the beginning of the war it had been shown that even liners 
with civilian passengers were targets for German U-boats, and the convention of giving 
warning before an attack was not followed. 
There was a respite for Coastal Command in purely anti-submarine measures during 
March and April, due to the U-boats' involvement in the Norwegian campaign, Coastal 
remained fully occupied with its other many tasks of general reconnaissance and special 
reconnaissance. 
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For the Navy, there was mine-sweeping, mine-laying, photo-reconnaissance, 
meteorological flights, and anti-invasion sorties.91 The invasion of Norway, Denmark, the 
Low Countries and the French campaign resulted in an additional series of duties for the 
Command, such as supporting our forces which had made landings in Norway; those 
landings alone had required a considerable effort on the part of the Sunderland and Hudson 
squadrons. 
Donitz had ordered U-boat sailings to be stopped by 10 March in preparation for 
Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark, and the first V-boat to sail to the Atlantic 
subsequently was U-37 on 15 May, which sank eight ships in ten daYS.92 In June most of 
the V-boats were operating at the western end of the English Channel and it was made 
obvious by the number of ships sunk in that area. 93 It was serious enough for the Admiralty 
at a meeting on 20 June to recommend the re-routeing of ocean convoys to the north of 
Ireland and for the mining of the Bristol Channel. 
At a further meeting on 22 June it was decided that inbound convoys which had 
sailed from 28 June were to be routed to the north of Ireland except those for the English 
Channel ports as far east as Southampton. Outward-bound convoys were to continue until 
necessary to meet the first re-routed inbound convoys.94 By such means, the inward and 
outward-bound convoys would effectively share the limited escort vessels then available 
and when they were in comparatively easy range of U-boats. 
Although it was obviously necessary for Coastal Command to re-deploy squadrons 
from the east coast to the west, there was a lack of suitable bases, notably for land aircraft. 
Pembroke Dock and Mount Batten in the south-west were available for flying-boats but 
there were still not enough Sunderlands to cover the western approaches and at the same 
time cover the more northerly part of Norway. It was to be quite some time before the 
deficiency in western bases was made up, thus when No 224 squadron was posted to Tiree 
in April 1942 the aerodrome was hardly complete.
95 It thus effectively resulted in an 
increase in the number of V-boats on operations.96 
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This change in bases for U-boats to the south did provide at least one advantage for 
Coastal Command. That was, over the Bay of Biscay more favourable weather was likely to 
prevail and therefore cancellations of Coastal's sorties due to bad weather were less likely. 
It was more favourable for the flying-boat squadrons which otherwise would have had to 
contend with bases on such as Islay, or the Shetlands where strong winds prevailed. 
Danitz had become aware that the British had re-routed their convoys to the north-
west and were using the Rockall latitude route. As he stated: 'I at once ordered a re-
distribution of my forces.' Donitz added that improvements in his U-boat campaign were 
' ... due primarily to our possession of the French port of Lorient on the Bay ofBiscay,.97 
That there had been thirty-one sightings of U-boats in June with seventeen attacks by 
Coastal's aircraft with negative results demonstrated the need for a lethal weapon to replace 
the 100lb and 250lb NS bombs. The outcome was for NS bombs to be rejected in anti-
submarine warfare in favour of depth charges. In 1940 however, a depth charge specifically 
designed for used by aircraft was not available and initially a compromise was reached 
with the use of a naval 450lb depth charge modified for aircraft use. These, however, could 
only be carried by flying boats. 98 
It was to be 1941 before land-based aircraft such as of No 221 squadron's 
Wellingtons were able to take three or four ofthese 450lb depth charges; but then for that 
squadron to be lost to the Command by being posted to the Middle East. 99 
By the end of July U-boats had been sent to the North Channel, North Minch 
(between the Outer Hebrides and Scotland), and the Pentland Firth (between the Orkneys 
and Scotland). From 27 August the U-boats' operational area was increased to 20 o W, 
initially between 45 ON and 57°N but by 19 October, further northwards to 62 ON. Thus the 
U-boats were operating out of the range of most of Coastal's aircraft based in the United 
Kingdom.loo This aspect was to be compensated for to some extent by the use of bases in 
Iceland. 
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They were ultimately established along the southern part of Iceland; initially at 
Kaldadarnes and later at Reykjavik and with a landing strip further east at Hofn. 
No 98 squadron equipped with out-dated Fairey Battles was the first to be posted to 
Iceland, but the Fairey Battles were single-engined bombers and quite unsuitable for 
maritime patrols. They were to be followed, notably by No 269 squadron Hudsons, which 
operated from Icelandic bases with success against V-boats up to January 1944 despite the 
severe conditions. Sunderlands and Liberators were to follow, however, and which was 
ultimately to result in the closure of the Mid-Atlantic Gap. 101 
In 1940, due to lack of forces, it was a matter of filling one gap at the expense of 
another, and after a Sunderland squadron was posted to Iceland, it was shortly afterwards 
sent to West Africa to cover convoys to Freetown, for which there was another obvious 
need in our defences against V-boats. 
With Reykjavik at about another 14° longitude westwards of bases in Northern 
Ireland, the effective range westwards for Coastal's aircraft in Iceland was obviously 
increased but the Mid-Atlantic Gap south of Cape Farewell still remained to be filled 
despite Reykjavik becoming available. Lack of the required VLR Liberators to cover that 
gap still prevailed. There was still a need for more bases in the North West, and the Inner 
and Outer Hebrides were to serve in that respect. 
In August, there was another problem to engage both Coastal Command and the 
Admiralty. V-boats were attacking ships at night while on the surface and against such 
tactics in 1940; neither the Admiralty nor Coastal Command had an effective answer. ASV 
was still in the development stages for Coastal Command and likewise a means to 
illuminate the target was still in the embryonic stage. 
Even if an aircraft located a V-boat, flares to illuminate the target could not be used 
at the low altitude required for the aircraft to attack. There was still no low -level 
bombsight. The Asdic on which the Navy had pinned its faith, was useless against surfaced 
V-boats. 102 
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The urgent need to combat the menace of night attacks on convoys by U-boats 
resulted in further Coastal CommandIRoyal Navy co-operation initiated by Sir Frederick 
Bowhill who wrote to the VCAS and VCNS on 7 August concerning the U-boat effort in 
the Western Approaches. A discussion followed at the Admiralty on 10 August when it was 
decided to have a limited programme of co-operation in the anti-submarine war (ASW) 
under Capt B. Ruck-Keene, RN of joint CoastallNaval staff on HMS Titania at Belfast. 
This was the modest beginning of what was to become a feature ofthe Allies' ASW, 
that is, close co-operation between Coastal Command and the Navies. In 1940 however, it 
was not very obvious due to the Navy's lack of escort vessels and Coastal's lack of aircraft. 
Later it developed into the 'hunterlkilIer' groups of sloops with which Coastal's 
aircraft worked to the full and to be exemplified in July 1943 with Capt F. 1. Walker, RN, 
and FIVLt Dudley Marrows. 103 
Capt B. Ruck-Keene's work resulted in a meeting at the Admiralty on 23 September 
chaired by the VCNS but with Sir Frederick Bowhill present. The conclusions were that 
full use was not being made of our ASW capabilities; that depth charges were the suitable 
weapon against U-boats and that a new Command should be based in the north-west for 
operational control and administration. Henceforth there were to be weekly meetings at the 
Admiralty to review all existing ASW methods and suggestions for new methods of trade 
protection. 104 No 15 Group of Coastal Command became part of the new Area Combined 
Headquarters (ACHQ) that was not just the control centre for the North-Western 
Approaches, but effectively the 'nerve centre' of the Battle of the Atlantic, and, it is 
believed, had a direct line to the Prime Minister. 
With about seventy ships torpedoed in September 1940, and with most of those 
attacked at night, and many east of20oW, it was again demonstrated that the Command 
needed aircraft in sufficient numbers and suitably equipped with ASV and means of 
illuminating targets plus armament which was lethal. 105 
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In an attempt to improve the ASV position, No 502 squadron Whitleys were equipped 
with Mark II ASV but they were lacking in ASV to home on to the target after it was 
located. Night sweeps were envisaged with these aircraft but they could only be undertaken 
when there were enough aircraft available. At the end of October the Air Ministry stated 
that priority would be given to Fighter Command in respect of aircraft, to make up for its 
losses incurred during the Battle of Britain. 106 
From the 1 October to the 1 December, however, about a 100 Allied ships were sunk 
by U-boats and which must have prompted Winston Churchill to write: 'The only thing that 
ever frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril'. 107 He held a meeting with the 
Admiralty on the 1 December and ordered minefields against U-boats to cover the 
approaches to the Mersey and Clyde. 
At that time the major Atlantic ports were Liverpool and Greenock, and Churchill 
decided that Coastal Command was to dominate the outlets from the Mersey and Clyde for 
which, ' ... it had supreme priority.' Churchill stated also that 'The bombing of Germany 
took second place'. 108 Thus an about-face of Churchill's who subsequently acknowledged 
that' '" the success of Coastal Command overtook ... the minelaying'. 109 
For Donitz the first phase in the Battle of the Atlantic began in JUly 1940 follOwing 
one U-boat sinking eleven ships totalling 43,000 tons. 110 For Professor Rohwer this was 
the beginning of the second phase of the U-boat war when the use of Norwegian and 
French bases allowed 'wolf packs' to operate. The shorter routes they provided to the 
Atlantic and down to West Africa effectively made more U-boats available to form 
packs. 11 1 
Donitz became aware from reports by his U-boats that the Rockall latitude 
corresponded to a convoy route and that Allied convoys had been routed from the south-
western approaches to the North Channel between Scotland and Ireland. He deployed his 
U-boats accordingly. 112 
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In 1940 the German High Command was able to decode the signals sent by the 
Allies, which gave details of convoys and Domtz was able to use these with some limited 
success in the second half of 1940. 113 This was an example of the use of intelligence which 
Professor Rohwer rated the crucial factor in the Battle of the Atlantic. 114 
Two major changes were adopted in the second half of 1941 by the Command in its 
operations to counter the V-boat menace: 115 
1. To undertake sweeps along the routes followed by our convoys rather than giving 
close escort to the convoys by circling them. The disadvantages of providing close escort 
to convoys by aircraft were that only a comparatively small area of the Atlantic was 
covered, and furthermore, there was nothing to stop U-boats shadowing the convoy and 
then at last light when the air escort departed, the U-boats could close in, literally for the 
kill. Aircrews took this matter seriously, and although close convoy escorts were still 
undertaken, aircrews would endeavour to remain even after their prudent limit of 
endurance (PLE), at some risk therefore of not having enough fuel to reach base. 116 
In contrast, sweeps along the convoy's route by, say three or four aircraft flying 
parallel tracks, (if aircraft and crews were available), were able to cover a much wider area 
and could effectively limit the ability of V-boats to shadow convoys. There was the further 
advantage, that if one of the aircraft sighted a U-boat, it could gain rapid support from at 
least one of the other aircraft on the same sweep. This aspect was not infrequently brought 
into practice and with the probable kill of the V-boat. 
Both the Italian and German submarine logs were later to reflect the effectiveness of 
sweeps, with tpo Sunderland frequently appearing in the Italian logs, and in German U-
boat logs, Durch Sunderland unter Wasser. In the case of German V-boat logs in later years 
they relate notably to the longer- range aircraft - Liberators, Catalinas and Sunderlands. 
For example, U-476 April, 1943; Argo, May 1942.117 In practice, Coastal used both 
methods for trade protection with sweeps along convoy routes and close escort by aircraft 
circling convoys. My own log confirms this as my final six trips with No 48 squadron in 
May 1943 included three escorts, two anti-submarine sweeps and one U-boat search. 
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2. To institute air patrols along the route followed by V-boats from the French ports 
in the Bay of Biscay. This was later developed to a considerable degree; but when more 
aircraft and crews became available, it became a battle in its own right. 'The Battle of the 
Bay' was later to involve flights of fighter aircraft from both the Allies and Germany, and 
with many air- to- V-boat and air-to-air combats. 
It perhaps reached its peak in 1943 when Air Marshal John Slessor took the view that 
it was better to act against V-boats while they were en route in the Bay of Biscay rather 
than wait until they reached the Atlantic. IIS Slessor's predecessor, Sir Philip Joubert had 
also appreciated there was much to be said for attacking U-boats when en route through the 
Bay of Biscay, as assuming that enough aircraft were available, a given area could be 
swamped with ASV signals from aircraft as in Operation 'Gondola'. 
Air Marshal Slessor, nevertheless, was prepared to modifY his strategy concerning the 
route through the Bay as the 'trunk' of the tree where attacks by aircraft should be 
concentrated. He acknowledged that there was a case for deploying aircraft near threatened 
convoys, as in such an area, V-boats would be concentrated. II9 From the point of view of 
aircrews there was much to be said for undertaking sweeps along the convoy routes rather 
than close escort of the convoys. 
Apart from the obvious fact of covering a much greater area and thus with the 
prospect of a sighting, aircraft such as Hudsons had automatic pilots which in straight and 
level flight could relieve the pilot of much strain. In contrast, during close escorts when 
literally circling a convoy for two or three hours, much was expected of the man at the 
controls. The strain was such that three pilots were used in some Sunderland squadrons that 
lacked automatic pilots and when flying up to fourteen hours. 120 
Germany had begun the war with fifty-seven V-boats and a year later that figure had 
just been maintained but with the advantage of the French Biscay ports. Nevertheless, in 
1940 even with much less at sea than fifty-seven, Germany had been able to sink 517 ships. 
The Italians had claimed another six. As a result of using the French Biscay ports, the U-
boats' period in transit to the Atlantic was reduced by about 450 miles. Thus, they were in 
effect able to have more V-boats deployed in the Atlantic at a given time. 
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From Rohwer's list, 252 of the ships sunk were in convoy, and many of those 
convoys were coded 'HX' for ships from Halifax, Nova Scotia; thus the British were losing 
ships carrying vital supplies to Britain. 
The American historian, Professor Samuel E. Morison, comments for that period: 
'The Summer of 1940 was the U-boats' greatest harvest season of the war'; and: 
'Obviously, if no answer could be found to the wolf-pack, Britain was doomed.' 121 
That would have been so; the British would have been starved to submission in 
months; certainly ifDonitz had available his desired 300 U-boats. Admiral Donitz refers to 
the British lack of protection to our convoys in his resume of his chapter 'The Battle of the 
Atlantic July -October 1940' with: 'Inadequate protection of British convoys' and that 
measures taken by the British Government showed • ... clearly how very inadequate the 
measures that could be evolved against the U-boat were considered to be'. 122 
The measures that Donitz mentions were the fifty ancient destroyers that the British 
acquired from America and their occupation of Iceland. The occupation of Iceland had 
certainly provided bases to cover the great circle route in the North Atlantic and to some 
extent cover for Russian convoys, also refuelling facilities for the Navy's escort vessels 
which had limited range, but what were still needed by the Command were VLR aircraft 
with suitable armament to sink U-boats. For Coastal Command in 1940 its successes 
against V-boats are given as two sinkings shared with HM Ships, one sunk unaided, and 
one damaged. All of those were by Sunderlands while escorting convoys. 
Hudsons also damaged one, and in this case, it can be said, that a kill would almost 
certainly have resulted if the Hudsons had been armed with 250lb depth charges rather than 
bombs. The obvious success of the Sunderlands at this early stage and still without depth 
charges designed for aircraft, indicates what was surely a major mistake in policy, that was 
to take men off manufacturing Sunderlands to produce the unsuccessful Stirling bomber. 
Much of the Command's effort in 1940 was directed, not towards combating V-boats but to 
attack enemy controlled ships; and in that year alone, sank or damaged twenty enemy-
controlled ships. There were still the other duties for Coastal Command to be undertaken , 
general reconnaissance and photographic reconnaissance. 
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1941 ----. 
In 1941 the maj or political changes were the entry of USA and Russia into the war as 
allies of the British. Winston Churchill gives that as his main theme for his The Grand 
Alliance with: 'Soviet Russia and the United States were drawn into the great conflict'. 123 
America's entry into the war was tentative when in January there was a conference in 
Washington that included the American and British Chiefs of Staff but with notably Air 
Vice Marshal John Slessor who was later to become Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of 
Coastal Command. 124 Slessor represented the Chief of Air Staff at the AnglO-American 
conference that, as he states, was to cover: ' ... the whole range of Anglo-American strategy 
in the event of the United States entering the war'. 125 Britain had spent much of its assets 
in fighting the war and the American President, Roosevelt, signed a 'Lease-Lend' Bill on 
11 March which provided for both military equipment and food for Britain and as Professor 
Morison records: ' ... purposely left vague the method of repayment. .. '.126 
For the conclusion of the Anglo-American agreement on 27 March, Morison gives 
the American co-operation with Britain apparently quoting Roosevelt as 'short of war'. 127 
The British had been paying $90,000 (£17,000) for each Hudson aircraft; now, not only 
Hudsons but also the invaluable long-range aircraft such as Catalinas and Liberators were 
to become available to Coastal Command, and by the end of the year, Boeing Flying 
Fortresses. 128 
A further immediate outcome of Anglo-American liaison was that some United 
States Navy pilots came to serve with Coastal Command and to be crewed with RAP 
personnel, a figure of sixteen American pilots being quoted on 9 June. 129 
This system was obviously of mutual benefit, giving the Americans experience of 
wartime flying and relieving the shortage of pilots for the Command. Later also, some USN 
squadrons were to come under Coastal Command control in Iceland and England. 
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Churchill makes particular note to the supply of American aircraft with: ' ... we 
planned to increase this Command by fifteen squadrons in June 1941, and these 
reinforcements were to include all fifty-seven American long-range CataIinas ... ' which 
he expected in April. 130 
There had been a meeting of the Air Ministry with the Admiralty on 27 February and 
the same day there was a Chiefs of Staff meeting when it was considered that six Coastal 
Command squadrons should be moved from North Sea operations to reinforce the North-
Western Approaches by being deployed in Northern Ireland bases and also at Wick. The 
Hudson squadrons were each to have six of their aircraft fitted with long-range tanks. To 
compensate for the lack of Coastal's forces on the east coast and the English Channel , 
Bomber Command was to take over those duties. Work on the construction of new air 
bases in Northern Ireland, and the Hebrides was to be expedited. At that time the 
Command was stiIllacking in long-range aircraft with only ten Catalinas available. 131 
Churchill issued a directive on 6 March, 'The Battle of the Atlantic'. His intention 
being' ... to concentrate all minds and all departments concerned about the U-boat war'. 132 
The Battle of the Atlantic began in August 1939, lasted throughout the war and 
involved all commands of the RAP, the Royal Navy, and the long-suffering Mercantile 
Marine.133 The Allies had lost seventy-nine ships to enemy submarines in the first part of 
1941 up to 5 March and Churchill had been so informed by Admiral Dudley Pound; this 
must have concentrated Churchill's mind also, and almost certainly resulted in him issuing 
his Battle of the Atlantic directive. 134 
In Churchill's directive of thirteen paragraphs, the first line reads: 'We must take the 
offensive against the U-boat and the Focke-Wulf ... ' followed in the first paragraph by: 
'The U-boat must be hunted ... ,.135 
Thus for Coastal Command this meant that a radical change in policy had been 
confirmed. It was no longer to wait and then respond to enemy actions. Coastal and the 
Navy were to attempt the first moves. 
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In early 1941, however, the Command was stilI short of aircraft to cover all its tasks 
and the Navy stilled lacked escort vessels such as were later to be used in 1943 to form 
'hunter-killer groups' in co-operation with Coastal. Churchill had, none-the-Iess, given the 
go ahead for offensive anti-submarine warfare. 136 By the beginning of June, follOwing 
Churchill's directive on the Battle of the Atlantic, there was a considerable shift in the 
deployment of Coastal's forces. There was increasing emphasis towards the North-Western 
Approaches under No 15 Group's control at Liverpool and with the development of bases 
in Iceland, Northern Ireland and the Hebrides. As early as 10 December 1940, the Air 
Ministry had decided to send a flying boat and a Hudson squadron to Iceland and 
additionally to replace No 98 squadron, equipped with Fairey Battles, with No 330's 
Northrop float-planes. 
This, however, was not approved by the Chiefs of Staff until January 1941. 137 The 
bases in Iceland effectively extended Coastal's patrol area over the North Atlantic by 
another 140 westwards compared with those in the Londondeny area of Northern Ireland. 
Furthermore, they were on the Great Circle route from North America to the United 
Kingdom that was favoured by the convoys being shorter, but a greater distance from U-
boat bases. 
Hudsons in Iceland were able to verify the extent of the icefield for the benefit of 
convoys, and with convoys being formed later for Russia in Iceland, aircraft based there 
could give more extensive cover. 138 
In July, American Marines formed part of allied forces in Iceland, and in August 
aircraft of the United States Navy - six PBY S ofVP73 and 5 PBMs (Martin Mariners) were 
deployed there. These American aircraft were to undertake 'Neutrality Patrols', over the 
North Atlantic convoy routes, ostensibly to protect America's neutrality. 139 For Iceland, it 
was really 'Hobson's choice'; if Britain and U.S.A. had not occupied Iceland, almost 
certainly it would have been used by German U-boats, and no doubt, by the Luftwaffe. 
They could have cut the vital route to America and Canada, and that supply route was 
essential for us to continue in the war. 
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Following a meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill at Argentia on 10 August, the 
'Atlantic Charter' was drafted. It was important enough in Churchill's view for him to 
include a copy of his modified draft in The Grand Alliance that states eight principles. 
They could be summed up with the resolve to fight the aggression of dictators and to 
maintain the freedom of nations to live in peace. For Churchill, however, he had gained 
the support of the American President in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic. 
On 4 September 1941, an event of great significance occurred in the Battle of the 
Atlantic. Until that date, captains of American ships were uncertain of what action to take 
on encountering a German ship or aircraft. U-652 clarified the issue by launching two 
torpedo attacks against the USS Greer that was en route to Iceland. Thereafter, according 
to Professor Morison, America was de facto in the Atlantic war with Germany. 140 
On 11 September Roosevelt broadcast: 'From now on if German or Italian vessels 
enter these waters [between Iceland and North America], they do so at their own periJ'. 141 
The United States Navy would be escorting convoys that were not necessarily flying the 
American flag, and the Royal Canadian Navy might also escort American vessels. 142 
It was to become a feature of North Atlantic convoys, that, not only would one see 
British destroyers, but also those remarkable Canadian corvettes, that represented a 
considerable Canadian contribution to the war effort. Additionally there were later, the 
rapidly constructed American merchant vessels, the 'Liberty ships'. 
With both Coastal Command and the United States Navy operating aircraft from 
Iceland, the senior RAF Officer, Air Commodore Primrose, suggested on 30 September, 
that the same operations room should be used by both Services. The response from 
Washington however was: ' ... any departure from the principle that the Western Atlantic 
will be controlled from Washington and Canada must be avoided'. 143 This rebuffprobably 
stemmed from Admiral King, who, as Sir John Slessor considered: 'King never really 
understood the subject. '[Referring to the U-boat war]. 144 
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22. A 'first day cover' mark ing the Battl e of the Atlantic and with the signatures of fi ve Coastal 
Command pilots who all sank U-boats, namely: Flt/Lt John Cruickshank, VC; S/Ldr Tony 
Bulloch, DSO, DFC; A VM W.E. Oulton, CB,CBE,DSO,DFC; S/Ldr Peter Cundy, 
DSO,DFC,AFC,TD, and Flt/Lt Les Baveystock, DSO,DFC,DFM. 
23. A Wellington bomber, but modifi ed for maritime use with aerials for detecting vessels on the 
beams, and Vagi ASV/radar aerials for homing. 
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Admiral King appeared as the exception in respect of co-operation with the American 
forces, both at Command and squadron levels. This must have stemmed from the 
traditional rivalry between the USN and AAC, but also that Admiral King was more 
mindful of the Pacific rather than the Atlantic. Ultimately both the United States Navy and 
the RCAP demonstrated that they were quite prepared .to follow Coastal Command's 
procedures to the full. This was to be exemplified in the RCAP by their No 11 squadron 
operating from Canada, readily adopting Coastal's camouflage for aircraft, and the 
Command's operational procedures. 
Additionally also, the shuttle service of Liberators from No 1 0 squadron RCAF in 
1943 from Labrador to Iceland then came under Coastal's control. By 1943 the liaison 
between the USN squadrons and Coastal Command was to be such that three of their 
'Patrol Plane Commanders' were awarded the RAF's DFC by RAP officers in Iceland 
fOllOwing their success in anti-submarine operations when under Coastal's control. 145 
Despite both the USN and the RCAF providing cover for convoys from the Western 
seaboard, and both the USN and Coastal Command patrolling westwards from Iceland, the 
notorious 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' , south of Cape Farewell in Greenland, prevailed in 1941, and 
in September, of fifty-three ships sunk, three quarters were in that gap and the area north-
west Africa to the Azores. 146 
The Azores area provided another 'gap' in which U-boats could operate against 
British, Gibraltar and West African convoys, and so remained until bases in the Azores 
were granted to the Allies by Portugal. On the credit side, only three ships were sunk 
within 350 miles of Allied shore-based aircraft, thus again demonstrating the value of 
aircraft in the anti-U-boat war. 147 
In addition to land bases in Iceland, Sunderland flying boats of No 204 and No 201 
squadrons were able to operate from there but using the SS Manela as a base and for 
accommodation. SS Manela was one of two such vessels controlled by Coastal Command 
which served to transport supplies and act as a troopship for ground staff, the other ship 
being the SS Dumana. 148 
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There was much to be said for the use of those two ships that came under Coastal's 
contro1. They not only served as 'instant bases' for flying boats, but could serve also as 
transport for personnel and the many tons of equipment necessary for each squadron (a 
figure of eighty tons was specified for one squadron). The two loughs in Northern Ireland, 
Lough Erne and Lough Foyle could both be used by flying- boats but Lough Erne was 
found to be most suitable. 
From there squadrons, such as Nos 201, 422, and 209, were able to operate with 
success over the Atlantic, the bases on Lough Erne serving for both Sunderlands and 
Catalinas. The main hazard was the weather; and it could range from dense fog to gale 
force winds that could seriously disrupt flying. 149 
The C-in-C Coastal Command, Sir Frederick Bowhill had written to the Air Ministry 
on 17 May stating: ' ... it has been one continual struggle for aerodromes in which we have 
not always come off best vis-a-vis the other commands'. 150 Sir Frederick was thinking 
specifically of aerodromes for training but there was ever to be some overlap with facilities 
for operations and training such as I was to experience at both RAF Thornaby and RAP 
Leuchars in 1941 and 1942, and even later at Chivenorin 1944. Sir Frederick's successor, 
Sir Philip Joubert, also experienced the problem of bases, and found it necessary to 
undertake 'horse trading' for bases with other Commands. Land bases were, however, 
being prepared by June in Northern Ireland at Limavady, Aldergrove and Nutt's Comer. 
There was a prime need for runways. With increasing use of heavy four-engined 
aircraft, and with a heavy war-load, properly constructed runways and of considerable 
length were essential. It was such that Nutt's Corner was earmarked specifically to 
accommodate the newly-formed Liberator squadron, No 120 in June. I51 The lack of 
aerodrome accommodation and adequate runways was to persist for Coastal Command as 
was to be experienced by subsequent commanders - Air Marshal John Slessor and Sir 
Sholto Douglas. 
Further new bases were being opened at Stornoway, Benbecula and Tiree in the 
Hebrides but Tiree was hardly complete in February 1942 when No 224 squadron was 
posted there. 152 
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Islay had some provision for both landplanes and flying-boats but weather conditions, 
particularly for flying-boats could make it dangerous enough for the C.O. of No 422 
squadron to complain. 153 The opening of these new bases reflected the emphasis then 
being given to the Battle of the Atlantic, and specifically the North Western Approaches 
rather than the North Sea or the Bay of Biscay. 
There was tacit agreement with the Irish for Coastal's aircraft flying over what was 
part of their neutral territory, and on those occasions when aircraft crashed in that territory, 
help was provided. On the mainland, were other bases for No 15 Group's flying boats at 
Oban and Stranraer, and for landplanes at Leuchars, and further south, Hooton Park. In the 
Shetlands there was Sullom Voe for flying boats and Sumburgh for Iandplanes. For 
aircrews, all the northern bases suffered the disadvantage of strong winds that could be 
serious if one suffered a change to a head wind when returning to base. Winds could be so 
high that the ground speed of some aircraft could be as low as 10 knots, that is less than for 
some convoys. 154 In contrast aircrews might well have found their base to be completely 
'closed in' due to thick fog and with the need to be diverted if possible. 
To cover the South-Western Approaches in 1941, No 19 Group had land bases at 
Carew Cheriton and St.Eval, while Pembroke Dock and Mount Batten served for flying 
boats. Both St.Eval and Pembroke Dock served to cover the Atlantic, but also over the Bay 
of Biscay. 
This latter aspect became increasingly important resulting from the U-boats using the 
French Biscay ports and what was to develop into the Battle of the Bay. That was to be 
primarily against U-boats, but also surface craft including blockade -runners. Typically 
both those bases would have three operational squadrons at anyone time. The two Groups 
responsible for covering the eastern seaboard ofthe United Kingdom, Nos 16 and 18, were 
not completely bereft of forces as a result of the shift to the North-Western Approaches. 
Coastal Command remained ever responsive to whatever was expected according to 
the changes in the war situation. and whole squadrons would be moved if necessary at 
twenty-four hours' notice, while flights from squadrons could be deployed almost 
immediately. 
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As an example, at the end of January 1945 I was operating off the Dutch coast from 
Langham, and then at the beginning of February was detached in a Flight to Dal1achy, 
ostensibly to operate to Norway. Likewise, A squadron in Iceland could be moved dO\\11 to 
West Africa in the same month. Such a move was facilitated by using one or more of the 
two ships, SS Dumana and SS Mane/a. 155 
As prevailed in 1940, so also in 1941, Coastal Command was in a transitional stage. 
Overseas, Gibraltar was about to come under the Command's control serving as a base for 
flying boats such as for No 202 squadron, and as a land base for initially No 233 squadron's 
Hudsons. Freeto\\11 and Bathurst in West Africa were receiving No 228 squadron's 
Sunderlands, and Hudsons for No 200 squadron respectively. 156 
These moves stemmed from the need to cover the Gibraltar and Freeto\\11 convoys 
that up to that time had been given little support. Furthermore the convoys in the Gibraltar 
area and further south, were being reported to Admiral Donitz, even if not attacked, by the 
Focke-Wulf Kondors. 157 Aircraft at Gibraltar could serve to cover the western 
Mediterranean and much ofthe Iberian coastline. With closure of the Mediterranean after 
the entry of Italy into the war, shipping had to use the Cape route and the West African 
bases were needed to cover that route. ISS 
Aircraft at Gibraltar were also to act as escorts to the convoys to Malta, and following 
the capitulation of the French, additional need to cover the western basin of the 
Mediterranean in support of the Navy's 'Force H' and to counter also, hostile French units. 
Nevertheless, the Freeto\\11 and Gibraltar convoys were proved to be vulnerable even 
to the Italian submarines as Admiral Donitz confirms: 'In these southern waters, some of 
the Italian submarines ... achieved considerable success' .159 This was after Donitz had 
directed them to operate west of Gibraltar and off Freeto\\11. Coastal's aircrews in the 
Gibraltar- Freeto\\11 areas found that they had to contend not only with enemy submarines 
but also with units of the French navy and air force. 
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There were to be reconnaissances for the battleship Dunkerque and with the risk 
of attacks from French aircraft. It was such that Group Captain Fergus Pearce, then the 
senior RAF officer in West Africa organised a flight of Hurricanes to protect his No 95 
squadron Sunderlands. 160 
Following Churchill's directive on the Battle of the Atlantic offensive with the 
emphasis towards the Atlantic and other convoys, the North Sea areas gained less 
consideration. No 16 Group at Chatham had No 59 squadron Blenheims at Thomey Island, 
No 500 squadron was converting to Blenheims from Ansons at Detling but required to 
move to Bircham Newton. Significantly, No 206 squadron had flights at both St.Eval and 
Bircham Newton but was required to send six of its long-range Hudsons to Bathurst. 
This was indicative of how stretched Coastal's forces were. In this case No 206's 
Hudsons were needed at St.Eval for anti-submarine patrols in the South-Western 
Approaches but also to protect Freetown convoys, thus depleting the east coast forces. 
Most of the attacks by U-boats in May were in the dark hours; thus there were fewer 
sightings made by aircraft and therefore fewer attacks. This lack of sightings was also due 
to fewer aircraft available for anti-submarine operations, and of those which were used, the 
ASV was not considered reliable, and as Sir Philip states: ' ... aircrews had little confidence 
in the ability of ASV to help them in their task of searching for submarines ... ' .161 
In his summing up of the anti-submarine campaign as he found it in June 1941, Sir 
Philip confirms that while the role of his aircraft' ... was to be offensive, to seek out and 
destroy V-boats ... rather than wait for them to come to us ... we were still fighting a 
defensive ... war against the V-boat and close convoy escort was still being given.' Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert succeeded Sir Frederick Bowhill as Air Officer in Chief 
Coastal Command on 13 June to find that' ... the situation in the anti-U-boat war looked 
bad ... '.162 This was because the number of U-boats at sea had increased to twelve and they 
were using well-organised wolf pack tactics. Joubert gives 325,492 tons of allied shipping 
sunk in May, while Donitz claimed eighty-four ships sunk by his U-boats in March and 
April totalling 492,395 tons. 163 
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Conclusions 
In 1941 the anti-U-boat campaign was still very much trial and error. The naval 
liaison officer at Coastal's headquarters, Captain Peyton-Ward, was ever examining reports 
and putting forward suggested policies, such as sweeps to harass U-boats but to be diverted 
to the position of any sighting report, expressing the view also that dark night air escorts of 
convoys were useless; as even with an ASV contact, an air attack could not be made due to 
the lack of effective illumination. 164 While the British attempted to respond to any changes 
in the enemy's tactics such as his use of wolf packs; the enemy, likewise, would react to 
changes made in the British policy and tactics. Thus, most notably, when the British were 
able to extend their patrols further westwards, U-boats operated even further westwards. 165 
There was a comparative lack of success for the Command's aircraft in anti-
submarine operations in the first half of the year when only one U-boat had been 
damaged. 166 From August to December however, three U-boats were sunk, and another 
three were so damaged by air attacks that they had to return to port. 167 
With about twelve U-boats at sea there was obviously a limited number of targets for 
Coastal Command aircraft to sight. Thus its successes are even more remarkable. They 
could be attributed to crews gaining experience and being more clearly aware of what was 
expected of them, and that also in 1941, depth charges were becoming available for 
aircraft. 168 . 
The question of what weapons to use in anti-submarine war were reviewed at a 
new Joint Standing Committee held at the Admiralty on 26 June. 
The outcome of this meeting was that Coastal Command issued Tactical Instructions 
on 25 July for attacks on U-boats. They stated that the approach to the U-boat should be 
along the shortest path and at maximum speed, but from any direction. Depth charges 
should be set at 50ft depth for detonation and spaced at 60ft and for them to be released in 
one stick. 
164. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval StaffUSW file, para. 18. 
165. Donitz, K., Memoirs, London, 2000, p.149. 
166. U-93 by No 502 sqdn. 10.2.41. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Table B. 
167. Air 15-162 Table B. 
168. Ibid. Chap. 2. 
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The depth of 50ft was decided by the type of pistol then available, and the aim was to 
develop a pistol that would cause detonation at 25-32ft; such was achieved later. 169 The 
spacing of 60ft was later to be changed to 100ft, but releasing all the depth charges in one 
stick prevailed. This decision was surely questionable. For aircraft carrying only three or 
four depth charges, releasing them all in one attack might have been justified, but some 
aircraft such as Wellingtons were able to carry ten 250lb depth charges. 
There was much to be said for retaining some for a second attack should the first 
attack fail, or in case an additional sighting was made. This was to be seen in the Polish 
squadron records where a failed first attack with ten depth charges was followed by a 
second U-boat sighting, but then with no means to attack other than with machine guns. 170 
Just one 250lb depth charge was enough to sink a U-boat given that it was within thirteen 
feet of the submarine. The altitude for release of depth charges was given as 100ft and to 
be within 30 seconds of sighting the U-boat. The limit of 30 seconds was essential as the 
Gennan U-boats could crash dive in 25 seconds. Some aircrews were prepared to attack at 
even lower altitude, so low that they had to 'pull up' to avoid striking the vessel. As 
sightings were typically made at 6 miles, or detected at that distance by ASV, it is obvious 
that aircraft would need to fly very fast indeed to reach the U-boat within 30 seconds. 171 
The 4501b depth charge was being carried in 1941 by Wellingtons of No 221 
squadron in addition to some flying boats. It was, however, only a naval weapon which had 
been modified and could not be released at a greater speed than 150 knots and altitude 
above 150ft otherwise it would break up. 172 
The 250lb depth charge came into being in May and tests showed that it could be 
released at 200 knots, by human eye, and was 'astonishingly accurate'; it was to become 
the standard anti-submarine weapon for Coastal Command. 173 
A sub-Committee meeting later proved far-sighted by considering alternative 
169. Air 41-47 The RAP in the Maritime War, Jul. 1941- Feb. 1943, Vol. II, p.S2. 
170. Air 27-1668 No 304 sqdn's ORB 1942. 
171. Giese, 0., (ex U-405), in a letter to the author. 
172. Air 41-47 Vol. II, p.S2. 
173. Air 41-47 Vol. II, p.S2. 
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Both these weapons were to become in being. Small bombs were later used by USN 
Catalinas in the Straits of Gibraltar with success, and 600lb NS bombs by Halifaxes of the 
RAF.174 
In one analysis by the naval liaison officer at Coastal Command's headquarters for. 
the period 1 March to 31 July, four V-boats were sighted as a result of an ASV contact, 
compared with sixty-one gained visually. This was considered to be due to the enemy using 
a receiver to detect ASV transmissions, and the use of ASV was suspended temporarily 
from 18 August. 175 Coastal Command was still lacking in ASV equipment for its 
operational aircraft, and by the end of June out of 150 Hudsons, only eighty-seven had 
ASV; there were seventeen Sunderlands equipped out of twenty-seven, and twenty-three 
Catalinas out of thirty. 
The maximum range at which an ASV contact was obtained, was fifteen miles; and 
the average for an ASV contact was nine miles, but for sighting by the human eye, the 
average was 5Y4 miles. 176 The average distance of5Y4 miles for visual sighting of U-boats 
was not to be improved very much in later years, although many operational records of the 
various squadrons show; typically, the distance was about 6Yz miles. To counteract the 
detection of the ASV by the enemy, a Radar officer on at least one squadron modified the 
squadron's ASV installations by inserting a variable capacitor in the circuit. This was to be 
used to reduce the strength of ASV transmissions during the approach to a suspected enemy 
contact. Thus the enemy might assume that the aircraft was not approaching,l77 
Although the role of the Command's aircraft became that of attacking and sinking U-
boats, on 27 August in position 62°15'N 18°35'W, U-570 surrendered to a Hudson of 
No 269 squadron based in Iceland. 178 As the naval historian Captain Roskill records: 'This 
valuable prize was successfully towed to Iceland and finally entered British service as 
HMS Graph', 179 U-570 was the first of seven successful attacks on V-boats by No 269 
squadron Hudsons up to October 1943, 
174. Air 41-47 Vol. II, p.54. 
175. Air 41-47 Vol. II, p.54. 
176. Air 41-47 Vol. II, p.55. 
177. The author was aware of this modification in No 48 sqdn. Apr. 1943. 
178. Air 27-1565 No 269 sqdn's ORB. 
179. RoskiIl, S. w., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, p.467. 
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The position is of note~ it was out of effective range ofHudsons operating from the 
United Kingdom, but obviously not from Iceland. The service of No 269 indicated just how 
useful Iceland could be as a base for aircraft engaged in anti-submarine warfare. In those 
northern latitudes with few hours of darkness in the summer months, U-boats were more 
likely to be sighted on the surface to charge their batteries. This capture ofU-570 became 
the subject for one of two wartime posters depicting the exploits of Hudson aircraft; the 
other one being No 220 squadron's shipping strike at Alesund. 180 
Sir Philip Joubert had chaired a meeting at the Air Ministry with the Admiralty in the 
spring when it was agreed that the principal role of Coastal Command's aircraft was to be 
to seek and destroy U-boats rather than wait for them but ' ... full implementation was 
prevented only by reason of the shortage of the right type of aircraft'. 181 The general trend 
was to be sweeps in the area of convoys with the object of contacting shadowing U-boats 
and also to attack any following U-boat packs. 
As a result of this policy, in September there were forty sightings and thirty-seven 
attacks. 182 Nevertheless, in the author's experience, close convoy escorts were ever to 
remain part of the Command's anti-U-boat role. There were ever the facts that a friendly 
aircraft in sight of the convoy was good for the morale of the merchant seamen, and a 
discouragement for the enemy, whether aircraft or U-boat, which might consider closing 
for an attack. 
By July, Coastal Command's patrols had forced U-boats from The United Kingdom's 
shores to 300 miles out into the Atlantic; thus the enemy was in an area with a reduced 
density of shipping and where he would gain less help from Luftwaffe aircraft. British air 
patrols however, were also reduced in density; thus at 500 miles from British bases, there 
was only 20% of aircraft density which prevailed at 300 miles. For threatened convoys 
however, some air support could be given up to 700 miles. It would have been limited at 
that time, as only long- range aircraft such as the Catalina and Liberator could extend that 
far and they were only just coming into service. 
180. ORBs: Air 27-1365 No 220 sqdn's; Air-1566 No 269 sqdn 'so 
Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para. 16. 
181. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para.5. 
182. Air 15-773 Vol. II, paras,4, 10. 
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The Liberators with which it had been hoped to fonn a squadron, No 120, were 
required for transport and ferrying purposes, and by October only ten were available to the 
Command. Furthennore, the Admiralty required that they should be kept in reserve in the 
autumn due to the prospect of a break-out ofGennan capital ships. 183 Sir Philip Joubert, 
as prevailed with his predecessor, was setting a policy for the Command to function 
effectively by co-operation of the various authorities involved. 
In the case of Coastal's operational Groups, Nos 15,18 and 19, he stated that while 
the disposition of squadrons remained his responsibility, nevertheless, there should be co-
operation between Groups sharing boundaries such as Nos.IS and 19 Groups using their 
aircraft in the Western Approaches to mutual advantage. 184 Even without Winston 
Churchill's directive on the Battle of the Atlantic, some minds were concentrating on the 
U-boat war. Such as those of Captain Peyton-Ward at Coastal Command's headquarters 
and the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches at Liverpool. 
Peyton-Ward gave his views in May which included reference to the opening of new 
bases on such as Greenland and the Azores; aircraft sweeps to harry U-boats; DIP facilities 
to fix the positions of U-boats which were transmitting in wrr, and that independent ships 
should be in the faster convoys. He added however, that the policy would be wrecked due 
to lack of long-range aircraft. 185 The policy of using sweeps certainly prevailed but not to 
the exclusion of convoy escorts as I was to experience. 
The C-in-C Western Approaches effectively endorsed Peyton-Ward's policy by 
abolishing regular convoy escorts in favour of sweeps, abolishing night escorts by aircraft 
but that protection of ships against air attacks would be made by fighters. 186 All that was 
required were the aircraft and the aircrews to fulfil that policy. 
Later in the war, a base for Coastal Command was established in the Azores, in co-
operation with Britain's oldest ally - the Portuguese. The Americans installed bases in 
Greenland, notably at Narsarssuak which they coded Bluie West 1 (BW1). Its position was 
important as it gave immediate cover to the 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' south of Cape Farewell. 
183. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, paras.24-28. 
184. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para.3. 
185. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff ASW file, para. 18. 
186. Air 15-57 para.20. 
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The geographical conditions however, rather than the weather, made it very difficult for 
aircraft to operate from there. 187 
At the twenty-second meeting of the Battle of the Atlantic Committee in October, the 
question of a base in Greenland had been discussed~ and at a further meeting in November 
it was stated that the Americans did not intend forming an air base there until the spring of 
1942; meanwhile their ships would use Greenland. 188 Nevertheless, the Greenland base of 
BW1 was later used to a limited extent by Coastal's aircraft. The advantage of a base in the 
Azores was that it could help to cover the Freetown and Gibraltar convoys. It ultimately 
had its own Headquarters control under the late Sir Geoffrey Bromet. 189 
During the second half of 1941,Coastal had on average about 200 aircraft available 
for anti-submarine operations. They included seventeen Sunderlands, thirty Catalinas, 
eighty Hudsons, forty Whitleys and twenty Wellingtons. Thus Coastal Command was 
relying very much on the American Hudsons and Catalinas. The Hudsons would have 
served to keep U-boats away from British shores thus effectively dispersing them away 
from where Allied shipping was concentrated and into the wide Atlantic. The Catalinas 
with their long range and endurance could serve to harass the U-boats which in June were 
operating as far west as 40045'W.190 
Despite the new policy of avoiding close escort to convoys, the Catalinas were to be 
used for that purpose. They were most suitable due to their endurance and low speed; the 
latter particularly, was an advantage when circling convoys, say at 90 knots instead of 
possibly 120 knots as for the Sunderlands and Hudsons, and compared with the 
Sunderlands, about half as much petrol was being used. The mere presence of aircraft was 
enough to discourage U-boats, as their logs were to show. 191 
There was a compromise in the Command's policy, with close convoy escort being 
given only if it was thought that the convoy was threatened, but nevertheless with aircraft 
undertaking sweeps in the area of the convoy. This had the obvious advantage of covering a 
much greater area in a given time. 
187. Gregory, R., USN. Letter to the author. 
188. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, paras.32-3. 
189. Air 15-162 Table B. Air 27-1227, No 179 sqdn's ORB. Green, J., FlO. Letter to the author. 
190. Example: U-I77 on 13.6.41. 
191. Examples: U155, U-476 and U-533. 
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Even if such aircraft failed to make any U-boat sightings, any U-boats that sighted the 
aircraft would be thwarted to some extent, and might well lose track of a convoy being 
shadowed. This was ostensibly a defensive role, but for the U-boat's transit areas in the Bay 
of Biscay and between Scotland and Iceland, regular sweeps were flown with the object of 
attacking U-boats. 192 
By the end of 1941 Coastal Command was able to claim successes against seven 
German U-boats that were either sunk or damaged and one Italian submarine that was sunk. 
Most notable about these successes was the fact that they were sighted by the aircrews 
rather than detected on ASV. 
The exceptional one was U-570 that was first sighted by a Hudson which in turn 
homed in a second Hudson to which the U-boat surrendered. I93 That aspect of the 
Command's anti-submarine sorties could be quantified; what could not be treated so was 
the likely effects on the crews of the U-boats and those merchant seamen in the Allied 
convoys. The morale of the former was likely to be lowered, but of the latter raised. 
Furthermore, a number of ships might well have been saved simply by keeping U-boats 
submerged at a critical time. 
192. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.9. 
193. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record, 1939-1945, Table B. 
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24. 
Korvettenkapitan Peter Cremer commanded 
U-333 and with great success. He demonstrated 
hi s concern for fo rmer enemies hav ing shot 
down a Sunderl and that attacked him . As he 
said , 'I had no choice' . 
26. 
A rubber dinghy dropped by Sunderl and N/228 in 
position 45°04' N 09° 14 ' W on 13 July 1943 for 
the surv ivors o f U-607 who were later taken 
aboard HM S Wren. 
25. 
Korvettenkapitan Wolf Sti ebler (U-46 1), was 
the senior offi cer of three U-boats sailing on 
convoy on the surface, U-504, U-46 1 and U-462. 
All three U-boats were sunk in a combined 
Naval/Coastal operation on 30 July 1943 , 
pos ition 45°40 ' N lOo55 ' W. 
27. 
Sunderland W60n U/46 1 whose Captain , FIULt 
Dudley Marrows, RAAF, sank U-46 1, a unique 
incident in WW2. He dropped hi s own dinghy 
and thus was the capta in of U-46 1 saved . 
4. Anti-submarine Warfare 1942 - 1945 
For the naval historian, Captain Roskill, 1942 was the 'Period of Balance' in the 
war, but in respect of anti-submarine warfare, this was hardly so. From Roskill's own 
figures British imports were only two thirds of those for 1939, and the Allies had lost 1,664 
ships, and of that total 1,160 had been claimed by U-boats. Although the Allies had built 
7,000,000 tons of shipping, the enemy had sunk almost a million tons more. There was a 
deficit therefore; the British were not in balance.} 
Winston Churchill's volume covering 1942, The Hinge of Fate, although it gives 
some emphasis to the 'hinge', that was, the Allies' victory at El Alamein, nevertheless, on 
two pages, charts all the Allied ships sunk by U-boats in the Atlantic. The first of these two 
charts gives a total of3,250,000 tons sunk during the period 7 December 1941 to 31 July 
1942, and are notable in being sinkings largely off the American seaboard from 
Newfoundland southwards to include the Caribbean. The second chart, covering the second 
halfof 1942 but also up to 21 May 1943, gives a total of3,760,000 tons of Allied shipping 
lost to U-boats. These sinkings, however, reflect the sea areas which were lacking in air 
cover, such as notably south of Greenland, what was referred to as the 'Mid-Atlantic gap'.2 
All of those sinkings would have been in range of aircraft such as the Consolidated 
Liberator (B24), but in 1942, very few of these aircraft were provided for Coastal 
Command. 
1942 for the Command in respect of its anti-submarine operations was, however, a 
year of the offensive over the Atlantic, the Bay of Biscay, and the western Mediterranean. 
To a limited extent also, Hudsons of No 53 squadron were on the offensive off the 
American seaboard from July. In this year, Coastal Command's squadrons were operating 
not only from the United Kingdom but also from Iceland, Russia, Gibraltar, North Africa 
and West Africa. Despite, therefore, any possible improvement in supplies of aircraft, the 
Command's resources was stretched to the limit. 
1. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea. London, 1956, Vol. II, p.217. 
2. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War, London, 1977, Vol. IV, pp.116-7. 
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Due to the entry of Japan into the war, some of the Command's squadrons such as 
No 413 were posted to the Far East. Additionally, Coastal's forces were being depleted by 
postings to the Middle East in support of the North African Campaign, which was to be 
followed by Operation Torch. 
On the credit side for the Command, its efficiency in anti-submarine operations was 
increased by new armaments becoming available such as the Torpex-filled 250lb depth 
charge with an improved pistol for detonation at shallower depths. Against submarines 
also, another weapon, rocket projectiles, was being developed. 
One of the most important innovations in 1942, however, was that the Leigh Light 
came into operation, initially with No 172 squadron Wellingtons, but subsequently to be 
fitted to other types of aircraft such as the Liberator. This device enabled successful night 
attacks on U-boats to be undertaken. Additionally, improved ASVlRadar was becoming 
available, albeit to a very limited extent, due partly to production limitations but also the 
demands of Bomber Command. 
Captain Peyton-Ward summarised the U-boat war in early 1942 from his standing as 
the Command's Naval Liaison Officer. His view was that once U-boats had sailed there 
were two areas within the reach of Coastal's aircraft, the Bay of Biscay and the northern 
exit from the North Sea. There was thus the inference that the Command should 
concentrate its forces on the two transit areas. 
At that time Gibraltar was not under the Command's control and the Mediterranean 
area is omitted. On the outbreak of war, Peyton-Ward had given full attention to the 
northern exit, but then the French ports were not available to the U-boats, and Norway was 
still neutral. There was much to be said for concentrating on the U-boats' transit routes as it 
had been proved possible to forecast with some accuracy just where they were likely to be 
at a given time. Agents, both in Norway and France were able to give details of sailings, 
and the transit routes, as Peyton-Ward indicated, were in range of Coastal Command's 
shorter range aircraft. There was the additional advantage, that due to the shorter range, in 
the event of a sighting, reinforcements could be activated more rapidly. 
Despite the Command's limited number of long-range aircraft, the Atlantic was 
considered reasonably clear of risks from U-boats up to about 350-400 miles from the 
coasts of the United Kingdom. 
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That view is endorsed by the American historian, Professor Samuel Morison. 3 
Coastal's sorties in the Bay ofB iscay had resulted in V-boats diving by day when east 
of 12°W, and Peyton-Ward considered the northern exit from the North Sea impossible to 
guard due to Norway being under enemy control and that V-boats could only be harried 
between the Shetlands and Faeroes, and the Faeroes to Iceland, but for the latter more long-
range aircraft were required. It was certainly true that V-boats could be harried between the 
Shetlands and Faeroes, as I was to experience in 1942. 
There were bases for both flying boats and landplanes in the Shetlands, and some 
attempts were made at using the Faeroes as a base. Ofthe eastern seaboard of Canada and 
America, 'the present plague spot' , could only be resolved when measures similar to those 
applied off the Vnited Kingdom were employed in the western Atlantic. Peyton-Ward's 
view at that time was: 'There is no continuity of policy or purpose and [anti-submarine 
warfare] has become a Cinderella branch of a Cinderella Service. Anti-V-boat matters, in 
the present organisation, are of necessity tacked on as an afterthought to Plans, Training, 
and Operations' . 4 
Germany had declared war on America on 11 December 1941 but Hitler had removed 
restrictions on attacking American ships on the 9 December and Admiral Donitz asked his 
Command 'to release twelve V-boats for operations off the American coast,.5 What 
followed from January to July 1942 under the V-boat's operation Paukenschlag was by 
Donitz termed a 'merry massacre' and which Professor Morison refers to also as a 
'massacre' and for the Americans a 'national disaster'. 6 Although Donitz was allowed only 
half the V-boats he had asked for to operate off the American seaboard, they were able to 
select their targets at leisure with no effective opposition and ships were clearly illuminated 
at night by the unrestricted lights on the mainland. 
Ships were not in convoy and lacked effective cover by the American forces. The 
policy of Donitz was for his V-boats to sink ships where-ever they could be attacked, 
Donitz is quoted as stating in his diary for 15 April: 
3. Morison, S.E., The Battle of the Atlantic Sep.1939-May 1943, Boston, Mass. 1975, Vol. I, p.124. 
4. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff File, Sep. 1939-Dec. 1944, paras.34-35. 
5. Demitz, K., Memoirs, London, 2000, p.195. 
6. Morison, S.E., Vol. I, p.127. Donitz, K., p.197. 
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'The enemy merchant navies are a collective factor. It is therefore immaterial where 
anyone ship is sunk ... what counts ... is sinking over new construction'. 7 
Off the American seaboard in the first half of 1942, it was a 'happy hunting ground'. 
Unfortunately for the Allies also, many ofthe ships sunk carried most valuable cargoes of 
oil or bauxite, the latter used in the production of aluminium required for aircraft. The U-
boats had been expected to confine their attacks to ships greater than 10,000 tons;8 in fact 
from Morison's figures; the average tonnage of those sunk was 6,000 tons that still 
represented serious losses to the Allies. Professor Morison sums up Paukenschlag with 360 
ships totalling 2,250,000 tons sunk by Ge~any for the loss of only eight of their U-boats.9 
The Americans had expected U-boats to operate off their coast due to their experience in 
World War I, but it was not until April that the beginnings of a convoy system was 
formed. 10 
There were each day 120 to 130 ships requiring protection but only twenty-eight 
vessels available to serve as escorts. 11 This resulted in one of the positive measures made 
by the Americans; they were to request aid from Britain both for escort vessels from the 
Admiralty and aircraft from the RAF. In respect of aircraft, that aid was rather late. 
However, when Coastal Command despatched No 53 squadron on 5 July equipped with 
Hudsons and as their Commanding Officer, Gp/Capt Leggate recalls: 
The move of the squadron of comparatively short-range aircraft from Cornwall to 
Trinidad was more than just interesting for all the pilots and aircrew, both in mid-summer and 
midwinter on the return. Prestwick-Reykjavik-Bluie West One-Goose Bay-Montreal-Quonset 
Point, Rhode Island-New York-lacksonville-Miami-Guantanamo Bay-Cuba-SanJuan-Puerto 
Rico- and so on to Port of Spain, Trinidad . 
... After a few days in the Caribbean it was agreed with our Engineer Officer that we 
would be able to remove the turrets from all the Marks of Hudsons in the squadron. The 
absence of the turret made a considerable difference - not only to the handling qualities of the 
aircraft, but also its speed and range. As we were operating outside the range of enemy 
aircraft, these improvements were vital to the efficiency of anti-submarine work. 12 
7. Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic, 1939-1945, London, 1992, para. 191. 
8. Hessler, G., para. 170. 
9. Morison, S.B., The Battle oj the Atlantic, Sep.1939-May 1943, Vol. I, pp.56-7. 
10. Morison, S.E., Vol. J, p.254. Hessler, G., para.188. 
11. Morison, S.E., Vol. J, p.255. 
12. Leggate, 1., G/Capt, letter to the author. 
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By 31 July fifteen of the squadron's aircraft were in America and on 22 August there 
was a move to Trinidad. The United States Navy had provided a liaison officer, LtJCmdr 
Sutherland, and some USN personnel flew with No 53 squadron. It had come under the 
RAP's Delegation in Washington for administration, but for operational control, under the 
United States Navy. While operating off the American seaboard, No 53 squadron made a 
number of attacks on U-boats, but their greatest contribution was probably to promote the 
methods of Coastal Command, which both the Canadians and the Americans came to 
accept. This is confirmed by the official history ofthe RCAF. 13 
A mistake made by both adversaries in the war was to give insufficient care in 
respect of radio transmissions, and during the U-boat campaign off the American seaboard 
in the first half of 1942, transmissions to ships were intercepted by Germany to be passed 
on to its U-boats, This intelligence, Professor Rohwer considered to be a major factor in the 
U-boat war. 14 At the 123rd meeting ofCoasta}'s Headquarters Staff on 2 February it was 
stated that fifteen U-boats were off the American coast, six were homeward-bound from 
the Bay of Biscay, and four U-boats were in the South-Western Approaches. IS 
It was possible to keep track of U-boat positions because of Donitz' policy of 
expecting U-boats to transmit radio messages. By such means, the first U-boat to sight a 
convoy would transmit to the U-boat High Command, and Donitz was then able to control 
the deployment of his U-boats and maintain overall control by WIT. He was prepared to 
forego security on that account. 16 
Due to the U-boats' policy of attacking ships indiscriminately regardless of the 
consequences, some Brazilian ships were sunk with serious loss of life. This prompted 
Brazil into declaring war on Germany and Italy on 22 AUguSt. 17 This resulted in 
considerable co-operation between the United States Navy and Brazil. Although Brazil's 
forces were limited, what were of great use, not only to the United States Navy, but also to 
the British, were invaluable bases along the Brazilian coastline which extends out 
eastwards into the South Atlantic and which was to provide a route to British bases in West 
Africa. 
13. Hillmer, N., (Ed), Official History of the ReAF, Toronto, 1986, Vol. II, p.485-6. 
14. Rohwer, 1., at a symposium, RAP Bracknell, 21.10.91. 
15. Air 15-359 Coastal Command's Conferences, Ju1.1941-Apr.1942. 
16. Donitz, K., MemOirs, London, 2000, pp.129-130. 
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There was a fear at that time that the Vichy French might again co-operate with the 
enemy by providing a foothold in South America through its former colonies such as had 
occurred in the Far East. 
Three days after the Channel Dash my squadron was posted from St.Eval to 
Limavady in Northern Ireland. My log for the next three months reflects the shift of Coastal 
Command's operations from the North Sea and Bay of Biscay to the North Western 
Approaches. It confirms that by early April 1942, bases such as Limavady, Aldergrove, and 
Nutts Corner in Northern Ireland, and Stornoway and Tiree in the Inner and Outer Hebrides 
to cover the North Western Approaches w~re available; at least for a twin-engined aircraft 
such as the Hudson, but not all of those bases at that time could have been suitable for a 
four-engined Liberator due to the length of the runways. 
The question of suitable bases for Coastal Command was of much concern to Sir 
Philip; thus a runway for Stornoway needed Treasury approval and the Air Ministry 
was asked to give a 'daily reminder'. For both Stornoway and St.Eval, Sir Philip was 
, ... emphatic that the runways should be first class'. 18 This was due to aircraft such as 
Flying Fortresses and Liberators which were then coming into service and which required a 
much greater length of runway than medium sized aircraft. 
For the first part of my first tour of operations, my log again reflects what was to 
prevail for the Command's anti- submarine operations; they were, convoy escorts, anti-
submarine sweeps and reconnaissance patrols. From those north-western bases sorties 
would have been over the North Atlantic and typically to about 14°W or as far as 17°W. 
That would have been enough to cover what appeared as a favourite area for U-boats at that 
time, namely Rockall, the one 'landmark' to check one's position, and, incidentally, give 
an indication of the massive swell of the Atlantic Ocean should an aircraft have to ditch. 
On 4 June 1942 Wellington ES986 captained by SlLdr Jeaf H.Greswell gained an 
ASV contact at 6Y2llliles and on homing, sighted two submarines. The Leigh Light was 
switched on at 1 mile from the target and Greswell attacked one of the submarines in a 
shallow dive beginning %mile distant and releasing four depth charges from 50ft altitude. 
Three of the depth charges exploded one on the starboard quarter about five yards from the 
hull and the other two on the port side. 
18. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 125th and 127th meetings. 
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The second submarine was located about twelve miles from the first and was 
attacked from about 150ft altitude with machine gun fire, scoring hits on the hull and 
conning tower. Sl1dr Greswell with his crew visited Coastal Command's headquarters the 
following day for interrogation. 19 
This sortie marked a turning point in anti-submarine warfare. It was the first 
successful attack using the Leigh Light against a submarine, and Sl1dr Greswell was the 
Command's pilot who was directly involved in the Leigh Light trials. No172 squadron's 
record of this operation is notable also in giving details ofthe armament used, that is with 
Torpex-filled depth charges and which w~re fitted with a pistol set at 25ft depth. Thus at 
long last, Coastal Command had the necessary weapon that would be lethal to a U-boat. 
According to an account by Sir Philip Joubert, the lethal radius of the Torpex depth 
charges were at least 30% greater than the earlier Amatol filled charges.2o Detonation at 
25ft depth increased the chance of the U-boat being at least damaged before it could 
escape. The Torpex-filled depth charge was considered also, lethal to a U-boat within the 
range 15-18ft.21 The use of the Leigh Light not only gave the necessary illumination for 
attack on U-boats, but also enabled the aircraft to achieve surprise. 
The submarine, however, was an Italian one, the Luigi Torelli. The first German U-
boat sunk by a Leigh Light aircraft was U-502 and credited to a Wellington of No 172 
squadron captained by PIO W. B. Howell on 6 July 1942. These successes were the 
beginnings of as many as forty German U-boats and two Italian submarines sunk or 
damaged by Wellington aircraft equipped with Leigh Lights. Additionally, other types of 
aircraft were also to have Leigh Lights. A necessary adjunct to their use however, was 
suitable ASVlRadar that was being progressively improved.
22 
It was in June 1942 that Germany became certain that Coastal's aircraft had a 
detecting device such as ASV. Their response was for them to have the French company, 
Metox, produce a receiver capable of detecting the 1 Yzm ASV transmissions from aircraft. 
19. Air 27-1105 No 172 sqdn's ORBs, 1942-3. 
20. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.57. 
21. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff ASW File, para.45. 
22. Air 27-1105-6 No 172 sqdn's ORBs, 1942-45. 
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On 24 June all V-boats on transit in the Bay of Biscay were ordered to remain 
submerged night and day except to re-charge their batteries.23 This order would of course, 
have put additional strain on the V-boat crews and limited the time that they could spend 
on operations in the Atlantic. Additionally, but as a temporary measure, four machine guns 
were provided for defence against attacking aircraft. After V-71 had been damaged by 
aircraft on 5 June, and V-105 on the 11 June, Donitz requested fighter cover from the 
Luftwaffe and on 2 July twenty-four JU88 C6 aircraft were promised.24 
As was to be demonstrated later, however, Coastal's aircraft such as Sunderlands and 
Wellingtons were able to give a good acc~unt of themselves in air-to-air combat against 
ostensibly overwhelming numbers of Gennan fighters. 25 A German account of what was 
most likely the first attack using the Leigh Light on a V-boat stated: 
In June 1942, the ftrst dark night attack was made in the Bay of Biscay when a U-
boat was caught in the beam of a searchlight which switched on suddenly 1,000 to 2,000 
metres away. Before frre could be opened, an aircraft, with a powerful light in its nose, roared 
over the conning tower at low level, dropped bombs, and turned to renew the attack. 26 
This unsuccessful attack, from No172's records, must have been by W/Cmdr Russell who 
would probably have had little experience with his equipment in a Leigh Light Wellington, 
and probably overshot the target, thus the lack of success. He had as a passenger, a Royal 
Navy officer, LlCmdr Brooks, who was nevertheless 'impressed,.27 Air Commodore 
Greswell in a letter to me remarked: 
I think it important to include ... [the1 U-boat sightings and attacks which took place 
between 3/6/42 and the frrst kill by Howell on 6 July' 42. On my second patrol on 6 June' 42, 
I made contact with a U-boat -Unfortunately my approach to attack was too high, because of 
the altimeter error, and the Leigh Light overshot the target rendering it impossible to drop the 
depth charges. The sub crash-dived before I could have another try. 28 
That brief statement demonstrates two aspects applicable to attacks by aircraft on 
submarines at that time. 
23. Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic,1939-1945, London, 1992, para.2IO. 
24. Hessler, G., para.2Il. 
25. Air 27-151/2 No 10 RAAF sqdn's ORBs, 1942-43. 
26. Hessler, G., para.209. 
27. Air 27-1105 No.In sqdn's ORBs, 1942-3. 
28. Greswell, 1., AlCmdre, letter to the author. 
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They were, an unreliable altimeter, (which effectively measured the column of air 
above rather than the distance to the surface below); which it would have been unwise to 
have attempted to check at night by going down to sea level. Also, that after an abortive 
first attack, the element of surprise was lost. In this case, it was not human error, as S/Ldr 
Greswell was almost certainly the most experienced pilot in handling a Leigh Light 
equipped aircraft, having been directly involved in its trials. To overcome the problem of 
measuring altitude, particularly at night, there was tbe need was for radio altimeters, still to 
be satisfied. 
Although Germany was initially able to counter the Allies' use of 1 Yzm ASVlRadar 
using the French produced 'Metox' receiver, they also had production problems. It was 
such that they considered U-boats in transit, sailing in convoy, with one of the vessels 
equipped with Metox, as they required the equipment for U-boats in transit from Bergen 
and Kiel in addition to those from the Biscay portS.29 Metox receivers gained the U-boats 
some respite against Allied aircraft using the early marks of ASV, which transmitted at a 
wavelength of 1 Yzmetres, that disadvantage for the Allies was later to be overcome by 
radar transmitting on a 9.1cm wavelength. 
The German fighters were intended to protect their U-boats against Allied anti-
submarine aircraft, while the British fighters such as the Beaufighters, were to protect our 
reconnaissance aircraft. Nevertheless, reconnaissance aircrews in such as the Sunderlands 
were able to give a good account of themselves and against which the Luftwaffe considered 
it needed at least two fighters. If the Luftwaffe encountered Beaufighters over the Bay of 
Biscay, it decided to withdraw.30 Even the Wellington anti-V-boat aircraft were able to 
gain an advantage against superior Lufwaffe odds as the Polish squadron No 304 
demonstrated, and on one occasion, successfully opposed six Junkers 88s.31 
By July 1942 there was increasing evidence of Coastal Command gaining the 
initiative and with the U-boats having to react accordingly. Thus with the V-boats then 
attempting to resume operations against the Atlantic convoys such as SC97 and SC99, but 
also OS33 and SL118, the U-boats found that they had to cease operations due to 
'continuous air cover' .32 
29. Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic, 1939-1945, London, 1992, para.235. 
30. Hessler, G., para.296. 
31. Air 27-1668 No 304 sqdn's ORB, 19.9.42. 
32. Hessler, G., para.236. 
28. FIULt Dav id Hornell , VC (second from ri ght ) here at RA F Wick in 1944. 
Hornell was lost with some of his crew after ditching, following his attack on U-1 225. 
29. Hornell 's Canso No 9754 in which he sank U-1 225 in position 63°00 'N 00050'W. 
It was due to the arrival on the scene of the sinking by a No 333 squadron Catalina , 
that the event became known . 
30. The ltalian submarine Luigi Torelli, 1,191 tons, here entering Bordeaux ex La Spezia. It was the 
first enemy submarine to be successfull y attacked by Leigh Light . That was on the 4 June 1942, 
pos ition, 44°43' N 06°46' W by a No 172 squadron Wellington captained by S/Ldr Jeaf. Greswell. 
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Coastal's naval staff considered that Sunderland flying boats had an operational 
radius of 600 miles,33 but on 17 July U-202 sighted an aircraft 800 miles out into the 
Atlantic from the nearest land base. This event is recorded by three writers; Donitz in his 
memoirs, Hessler in the edited U-boat diaries, and the naval historian, Captain Roskill. It 
was however, an exception, due as Roskill adds, to Coastal Command being able, 'to 
scrape together only one squadron of American Liberators'. 34 That Liberator would have 
been from No 120 squadron that had been earmarked to receive Coastal's first few 
Liberators. 
The distance of 800 miles, from the U-boats' point of view was an increase of 300 
miles over the previous year. 35 This increase could be accounted for by the Allied use of 
bases in Iceland in addition to long-range aircraft such as the Liberators that were coming 
into service. 
During the months of July and August Coastal Command's successes in the anti-U-
boat warfare were greater than for the previous six months. 114 sightings had been made 
with eighty-nine attacks. This was due to the return of U-boats from their forays off the 
American seaboard, but also that 62% of Coastal's operations had been on the offensive 
rather than on convoy escorts. Aircraft based in Iceland had enabled the Command to give 
more attention to the northern transit area of U-boats, i.e. to and from Norwegian and 
German ports in addition to those using the Bay of Biscay route from French portS.36 The 
U-boats had suffered losses of 15% in July and 9.3% in August, but only 6% in September. 
The monthly average for the previous year had been 11.4%.37 The progressive drop in U-
boat losses could be attributed to the counter measures taken by U-boats against air attacks 
such as the use of the Metox receiver to detect ASV signals from aircraft, and that the U-
boats were remaining submerged except to charge their batteries. 
In July 1942 the U-boats became aware of Coastal Command aircraft using another 
innovation, sono-buoys which could be thought of as the air equivalent of the Navy's 
Asdic. A U-boat reported them on 29 July being dropped in the north transit area, and was 
thought by the enemy to be devices for preventing U-boats travelling on the surface. 38 
33. Air 15-57 Coastal Command's Naval Staff ASW File, para.44. 
34. RoskiIl, S.W., Vol. II, p.108. Donitz, K., Memoirs, London, 2000, p.245. Hessler, G., para.236. 
35. Hessler, G., para.236. 
36. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, paras.65-66. 
37. Hessler, G., para.249. 
38. Hessler, G., para.238. 
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They were in fact, for detecting submerged U-boats, and were to be used by such squadrons 
as No 201 operating Sunderlands. In operational records they were coded 'High Tea,.39 
Although I was on anti -submarine operations in 1942, I was quite unaware of the existence 
of sono-buoys until I studied the operational records of the Sunderland squadrons post-war, 
and it was in 1998 before I saw these devices which were then with an operational 
squadron. The RAF appeared adept at keeping details of equipment secret, even from those 
who could be expected to use it. 
There was another factor in favour of the Allies' aircrew involved in anti-submarine 
warfare in 1942; that was the increasing use of aircraft with a greater speed. This was 
important as typically a sighting or contact was made at about 6Yz miles and with a U-boat 
able to crash-dive in 25 seconds, slow aircraft such as the Catalina, could hardly hope to 
attack before the U-boat had dived. Traditionally, the U-boats relied on vigilant lookouts, 
but with faster aircraft, as a former U-boat officer, Hessler records: ' ... greater airspeeds 
changed this '" that even if detected by U-boats attacking aircraft could not always be 
evaded,.40 
Convoys to Russia had begun in September 1941 from Iceland,41 and Coastal 
Command had been able to provide air escorts only as far as 70'N. It was at the suggestion 
of Sir Philip Joubert that a detachment of aircraft should be established in Russia. The 
Russians permitted Coastal's Catalinas to operate from Lake Lakhta, near Archangel where 
there were facilities for six flying boats. During the period 1 to 4 July four Catalinas from 
No 210 squadron and two from No 240 squadron flew to Russia and were able to operate as 
far north as 770 N. From bases in Norway, the enemy was able to threaten the Russian 
convoys, not only with U-boats but also capital ships such as the battleship Tirpitz and 
heavy cruisers. 
For that reason, Coastal provided additional support by means of the strike 
squadrons, Nos 144 and 455 which were detached to Russia.42 My own involvement was 
to be on a reconnaissance ofTrondheim fjord on 10 June looking for Tirpitz and the heavy 
cruiser Admiral Hipper. 
39. Air 27-1178 No 201 squadron's ORBs, 1941-43. 
40. Hessler, G., para.243. 
41. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. 1, p.492. 
42. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.72. 
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In September I was on a detachment to Iceland from No 48 squadron to escort a Russian 
convoy, that, perhaps due to one of our aircraft being lost, the task was aborted.43 
Other squadrons including Nos 422 (RCAP) and 333 (Norwegian) also provided 
detachments to Russia but were more involved in transport of goods, personnel and 
diplomatic missions rather than anti-submarine warfare. Accounts from their aircrews show 
that the Russians gave very mixed receptions to their allies that ranged from armed guards 
to an escort by young ladies! 
The aircraft chosen for the Russian detachments for convoy escorts, Catalinas, were 
suitable in respect that they had the required range and endurance; they were however, 
sadly lacking in not having an efficient heating system. This was to be critical when even 
the interior of aircraft became frosted up, including the cockpit, thus reducing visibility to 
nil. Even at the much lower latitude ofTrondheim, the air temperature in mid-summer was 
found to be -7°C. One Catalina operating over the White Sea reported a complete 'White 
OUt'.44 
Sir Philip sums up the support given by his Command for one cycle of Russian 
convoys that involved thirteen squadrons with over a hundred aircraft. They flew 269 
sorties totalling 2,320 hours of which 184 Y2 hours were over the convoys. This was because 
they had to fly 1,000 miles before reaching the convoy. The detachments to Russia were to 
be proved justified because in the Russian area covered by those aircraft, only one ship was 
lost. 45 Other factors justifying the detachments cannot be quantified. 
They are the effect on the morale of the merchant seamen who sight a friendly rather 
than hostile aircraft, and the effect on the enemy that does sight a hostile aircraft. There 
was above all, the need to ensure the 'safe and timely arrival' of allied convoys to whatever 
ports they were routed. There was a particular need in the case of the Russians, not only to 
deliver essential supplies but also to show that they had the support of their allies. 
43. Author's Log- book. 
44. Air 27-1830 No 422 sqdn's ORBs, 1942-5. Letter from SILt H. Hartmann to the author. 
45. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.73. 
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Bremen 
One of the most controversial uses of Coastal Command's forces took place on the 
night of the 25/26 June 1942 when 102 of the Command's aircraft, including eighty-two 
Hudsons, took part in Millennium II, the second thousand-bomber raid on Germany. This 
was to Bremen, and rated part of the anti-V-boat campaign with Coastal's forces comprised 
of a number of squadrons plus incompletely trained crews from OTU s, the latter albeit 
with experienced captains. While about 900 of Bomber Command's aircraft attacked a 
Focke-Wulffactory, Coastal Command was to bomb the Deschimag V-boat yards. 
The Hudsons were armed with either four 250lb or ten 100lb bombs, while Bomber 
aircraft had such as 4000lb bombs. Some Bomber aircraft also had the invaluable 
navigation aid GEE, although not available to Coastal's Hudsons. The organisation of such 
a raid meant that squadrons operating over the Atlantic had to be withdrawn from western 
bases to the east coast and put on standby for the signal to take off. Although Bremen was 
covered with cloud, aircraft with GEE should at least have been able to bomb with some 
degree of accuracy. For others such as all the Coastal aircraft, it would have meant 'finding 
a hole in the cloud' or bombing on fires already produced. Sir Arthur Harris claimed: ' ... a 
very important Focke-Wulf factory was largely destroyed' ,46 but didn't state an opinion on 
the use of Coastal's maritime aircraft. 
By the standards of Coastal's anti-shipping strikes, the overall losses of only 4.9% 
were of little concern, in fact one of its squadrons, that suffered over 50% losses in a 
shipping strike, wanted to go on further bombing raids to Germany; their aircrews who 
were not detailed for the raid were disappointed. All the aircraft returned safely from at 
least three of Coastal's squadrons. 47 
Professor Overy has stated: 'Bomber Command insisted that the threat from V-boats 
could only be met by attacking the sources of production rather than the end product at 
sea,.48 That statement was to be disproved even in that year, and certainly by October 
1943, by which time Coastal's Hudsons alone had sunk about two-dozen V-boats at sea. 
46. Harris, A., Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, p.121. 
47. ORBs: Air 27-1385 No 224 sqdn . Air 27-1793 No 407 sqdn. Air 27-555 No 59 sqdn. 
48. Overy, R., The Air War 1939-1945, London, 1980, p.71. 
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They would not have just destroyed the hull of the vessels as in a factory, but the 
enemy would have lost with each U-boat at sea, two or three dozen trained men, plus tons 
of valuable oil. Coastal's aircraft just flying over the sea rather than Germany would ever 
present a potential hazard to U-boats. Captain Roskill confirms the uselessness of 
combating the U-boat menace by bombing building yards with: 'Not until April 1944 was a 
completed U-boat destroyed in a German building yard'. 49 
The 18,000 tons of bombs and incendiaries dropped on U-boat bases and building 
yards in the first five months of 1943 apparently without destroying a single U-boat may be 
contrasted with one 25lb rocket projectile or one 250lb depth charge capable of sinking a 
U-boat at sea. 
Operation Torch 
The invasion of the French North African colonies was agreed by Churchill and 
President Roosevelt in April and on 1 August, Field Marshal Dill, the Head of British Joint 
Staff Mission, Washington, informed Churchill that orders had been issued for that 
operation. 50 The purpose was to relieve the pressure imposed on the Russian forces which 
were fully engaged by the Germans. General Auchinleck, who commanded the British 
forces in North Africa had made a stand on 8 August at EI Alamein, about sixty miles west 
of Cairo; it remained then for Generals Alexander and Montgomery to advance westwards 
against German forces when sufficient strength in both men and armament had been built 
up and which was to result in the Battle ofEI Alamein. 
Before Operation Torch could be launched, it was essential that victory at EI Alamein 
was achieved. It was in the Middle East, probably more than in any other area, where co-
operation of the three services, Army, Navy and Air Force, was essential; all three were 
individually dependent on the other two. 
For the Army to capture the French bases, troops and supplies had to be shipped, and 
those ships had to be protected by both the Navy and Coastal Command. When once bases 
or ports were captured, they needed to be protected by the Army. 
The 8 November 1942 was fixed for the landings near the French bases on North 
Africa and for which 340 ships were required to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar during 
the 5 and 7 November in a definite sequence. 
49. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1956, Vol. II, p.353. 
50. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War, London, 1977, Vol. IV, pp.281,406,873. 
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For the Army, about 70,000 troops were to be deployed to attack the areas of 
Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The enemies, Italy and Germany, had therefore the means to 
make a killing of sinking many ships and with the Allies possibly losing thousands of 
troopS.51 
That most of the ships were unmolested was due to Germany being taken by surprise, 
it had not expected an assault to be made on the North African shores, believing rather that 
allied shipping movements were geared to the support of Malta and a possible attack on 
Dakar. 52 
About the time of the operation, there were twenty-five U-boats in the Mediterranean, 
while the Italians had thirty-four submarines between 02"E and 11 "E off the North African 
coast in November. On the 8 November the German U-boat group Streitaxt was shadowing 
a Sierra Leone convoy SL125 and five from the U-boat's Delfin group were entering the 
Straits of Gibraltar; two others from that group were off the coast of Portugal. Three others 
were outward bound from Biscay ports, while twenty-one U-boats were in the North 
Atlantic but at least as far west as 23°W. 
While the Allies wondered whether Germany would react by sending troops through 
Spain, Germany wondered if the Allies would occupy Spain. The German Naval Staff gave 
an appreciation on 20 October, which considered that an Allied second front was militarily 
impossible. 53 
The success of Operation Torch could be attributed to taking Germany completely by 
surprise, due to various rumours being successfully spread, and the only one to which 
Germany reacted was of a possible Allied attack on Dakar. 54 Additionally, the close co-
operation between the Americans and the British, from their Commanders General 
Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham who shared a tunnel within the Rock as their 
headquarters. 55 As Admiral Cunningham stated: ' ... with a number of services involved 
'" there reigned a spirit of comradeship which provided the vital force which brought 
success '" The embodiment of that spirit was exemplified in our Commander-in-Chief, 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower ... ,.56 
51. Hendrie, A., Lockheed Hudson, Shrewsbury, 1999, pp.64-5. 
52. Hessler, G., The U-boat War in the Atlantic, 1939-1945, London, 1992, para.268. 
53. Hessler, G., para.268. 
54. Hessler, G., para.276. 
55. Eisenhower, D.O., Crusade in Europe, New York, 1968, p.101. 
56. Cunningham. Viscount, A Sailor's Odyssey, London, 1951, p.493. 
32. U-I06 0n 2 July 1943 
which was sunk in 
co-ordinated attacks by 
Sunderlands N/228 and 
M/46 1. 
3 I . U-200 seen from a PBYSA 
(Catalina amphibian) of VP84 
USN 24 June 1943. U-200 was 
attacked and sunk using DCs 
and then an acoustic homing 
torpedo (a 'Mark 24 mine' ).This 
was one of the first successful 
uses of that 'mine'. 
33. An attack using rocket projectil es on U-S94 by FlO H.C. Bailey in Hudson F/48 on 4 June 1943 
position 3soS5'N 09°2S' W. It was one of the first 'kills' on a U-boat using RPs . 
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Of Gibraltar, Eisenhower stated: '[it] made possible the invasion of northwest Africa. 
Without it the vital air cover would not have been quickly established on the North African 
fields,.57 
When the V-boat Command received a report of the North African landings, fifteen 
U-boats were ordered to the Mediterranean although they were aware of the additional 
risks there due to the calm waters. 58 This was to be made apparent later when there were a 
series of attacks by Coastal's Hudson aircraft. 
With 340 Allied ships at sea and of necessity having to concentrate in the approaches 
to the Straits of Gibraltar, the Command's squadrons had to be withdrawn from northern 
areas to operate from Gibraltar and subsequently from former French bases in North Africa 
after they had been captured. Two squadrons, Nos 202 and 233 were already at Gibraltar, 
but No 500 squadron was moved from Stornoway, and No 608 squadron from Wick down 
to southern bases in August to prepare for Mediterranean operations. I was posted with No 
48 squadron from Sumburgh in the Shetlands to Gosport in November where the squadron 
re-equipped with Mark VI Hudsons, but to reach Gibraltar by Christmas. By that time the 
three squadrons, Nos 233,500 and 608 had sunk or damaged seven V-boats, all within a 
fortnight. 
Such success was not due to luck; the comparatively clear and still waters of the 
western Mediterranean area and with generally good visibility, favoured visual sightings, 
although only Mark II ASV was then being used by Hudsons. Very high morale prevailed 
within many of the Hudson crews, such as in No 500 (County of Kent) squadron, and the 
aircrews would have included a number of battle-hardened and experienced men, many on 
their second tour of operations. 
Another, factor was that in a comparatively confined area with many aircraft 
available, it was possible, and did occur, that when once an aircraft made a sighting, other 
aircraft could be homed to the area. This was by using other apparatus, which gained little 
publicity, if any, due to the nature of the equipment, which was IFF (Identification Friend 
or Foe) that could be switched to give a homing signal and could result in as many as three 
squadrons being involved. 
57. Eisenhower, D.D., Crusade in Europe, New York, 1968, p.l02. 
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A further factor was that Coastal's aircraft were camouflaged white, and under the lighting 
conditions that prevailed over the Mediterranean at that time, white camouflage could 
certainly have made a difference. 
To undertake anti-submarine night operations, a detachment of No 179 squadron 
Wellingtons began operations on 19 November but ultimately for the whole squadron to be 
based at Gibraltar. They, however, gained no successes against U-boats during operation 
Torch but claimed a number of successes the following year. 59 Sir Philip Joubert gives the 
Command losing ten Hudsons, four Catalinas and three Wellingtons, during the campaign, 
some to our own forces. Four of No 233 's Hudsons were shot down by the French at 
Casablanca. 60 
Aircrews were warned to beware of French aircraft even after the landings had been 
made. Arabs appeared rather more friendly and aircrew from No 48, 500 and 221 
squadrons, all experienced courtesy and help from the Arabs.61 In an attempt to placate the 
French, leaflets had been dropped over French bases in North Africa, written in French but 
emphasising the American rather than the British involvement, by the Stars & Stripes 
being printed in colour, no doubt, because of anti-British feelings. 
The success of the Eighth Army commanded by General Alexander with General 
Montgomery gained the publicity and rather overshadowed what was a remarkable anti-
submarine campaign by Coastal Command's squadrons. They were given reasonable 
operating conditions, (although not necessarily living conditions), and achieved much. The 
leadership shown by the Commanding Officers of No 500 and 48 squadrons was certainly a 
factor in maintaining high morale, with both aircrew and ground crew. That high morale 
was duly acknowledged for at least one of those squadrons in a subsequent issue of 
'Coastal Command Review' . 62 An official Italian view of Operation Torch was given thus: 
'11 mese di novembre 1942 rappresento il "turning point" della 2 guerre mondiale nel 
Mediterraneo '. 63 It was certainly a turning point for Italy as control of North African 
bases enabled the Allies to harass Axis shipping and ultimately to invade Sicily and the 
Italian mainland. Coastal Command squadrons continued to playa part in such operations. 
59. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record, 1939-1945, Table A. 
60. Herington, 1., Air War Against Germany & Italy, Canberra, 1962, p.412. 
61. Andrew, T. and Hoskins, 1., letters to the author. 
62. No 48 sqdn in 1943. 
63. Bertini, Cap.di v., Sommergibili in Mediterraneo, Rome, 1968, Vol. I, p.283. 
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Donitz acknowledges the successes against U-boats in the Mediterranean at the time 
of Operation Torch with: 'I received orders on November 16 to make good the heavy U-
boat losses in the Mediterranean by transfers from the Atlantic ... ' but was permitted to 
reduce the number to twelve, and adds: 'I myself was still most anxious to see these twelve 
U-boats withdrawn from the murderous area west of Gibraltar ... ,.64 
Those Hudsons that had operated with such success during Operation Torch, carried 
no more than four 250lb depth charges with possibly, two 100lb AlS bombs. That success 
may be contrasted with the same type of aircraft used to bomb the U-boat building yards at 
Bremen with the equivalent weight of bombs. In Operation Torch not only had some of 
the U-boat menace been removed, but also some of the potential French menace, aided 
about that time by the French scuttling their fleet at Toulon. The capture of French North 
African bases at such as Tafaraouri (Oran), enabled Coastal's aircraft to gain closer control 
over the western Mediterranean. Roskill stated: ' ... the greatest benefits of all lay in the 
additional security of Atlantic shipping, and in the prospect that the Mediterranean would 
soon be opened ... ,.65 
The Gibraltar area had obviously proved a 'happy hunting ground' for medium range 
aircraft against U-boats; it was not so, however, in the Bay of Biscay and the North Atlantic 
in the latter part of 1942. The prime reason for this was that from August onwards, the U-
boats were being equipped with Metox receivers which could detect aircraft using the Mark 
II ASV which transmitted on 1 Yzm wavelength.66 In the Bay of Biscay, U-boats when on 
the surface were relying on their Metox receivers to give warning before any possible 
attack. Sir Philip Joubert ordered counter measures in the inner Bay with constant patrols 
by Leigh Light Wellingtons supplemented by other aircraft dropping flares periodically. 
Normal day patrols continued with ASV to be switched on for ten seconds every 
fifteen minutes except in good visibility when U-boats could well be detected visually. 
There was an attempt also to maintain long-range patrols up to 15°W. 
64. Donitz, K., MemOirs, London, 2000, pp.284-285. 
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These measures proved unsuccessful and in November Sir Philip issued a further 
directive to the AOC of No 19 Group. They were that aircraft with ASV, other than 
Liberators, should fly only at night and operate from as high an altitude as was practicable. 
The higher altitude would enable the ASV in individual aircraft to cover a greater 
area, albeit at reduced intensity. By this means it was hoped that the area would be so 
flooded with ASV transmissions that U-boats could only ignore at the risk of being 
attacked. It was considered that if the night patrols were able to keep the U-boats 
submerged, there was a greater chance of them being sighted in the day. The emphasis was 
to be in the inner Bay, which was probably considered to be at about 3°W. There were to be 
additionally, Beaufighters armed with bombs or depth charges when possible. It was 
realised that aircraft flying so near the enemy-controlled French coast were vulnerable but 
that the risk was to be accepted. 67 
However, from the German account, the sight of Beau fighters would have deterred 
enemy fighters. 68 In December, Joubert extended the patrols over this southern transit route 
for U-boats another 200 miles west beyond 15°W with long range aircraft and the few 
aircraft which had the experimental 10cm wavelength radar. It was to be the following year 
however, before such as No 224 squadron, which had then converted to Liberators, were to 
receive such equipment.69 Despite all these measures, for the latter months of1942, No 19 
Group claimed only two U-boats sunk and two damaged. The two damaged were in 
November, and U-216 and U-599 were sunk in October. 
FlO David Sleep claimed U-216 at 19°W, and it was notable that he released his 
depth charges from only 30 feet, with instant detonation, and his Liberator was seriously 
damaged by the blast from the depth charges. The recommended height for release at that 
time was 50-100ft but flying at probably at least 140 knots, it would not be easy to judge 
height precisely with an aneroid altimeter and at the same time follow a precise track 
against a hostile vessel. U-599 was also sunk near the limit of effective range of medium 
. m 
aIrcraft at 17°W by another No 224 squadron Liberator. 
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Sir Philip Joubert considered that the sightings and attacks on U-boats in the Bay of 
Biscay during this latter part of 1942 as 'dangerously low'; 71 it maybe said however, that 
there had been success on account of some of the patrols, in that the U-boats were not 
sighted, that is they had been forced to remain submerged due to the air patrols. Thus the 
U-boat crews would have been under additional strain and taken longer in transit. 
The German Naval Staff considered that the Gibraltar area was too well defended 
and on 21 November decided that only four U-boats would be sent to the Mediterranean 
and twelve U-boats should be deployed west of Gibraltar. The defence of that area could be 
attributed in no small measure to the aircraft under Coastal Command's control such as the 
four Hudson squadrons, Nos 233, 48, 500 and 608. Subsequently there was a renewal in 
attacks on the North Atlantic convoys and they were all west of20oW, thus out of effective 
range of Coastal's medium range aircraft operating from the United Kingdom. 
As Captain Peyton-Ward records: 'By the 28th November the U-boats in the Gibraltar 
area had had enough ... the remnants being withdrawn to refit'. 72 Most allied ships in the 
last two months of 1942 were sunk between about 200W and 60oW. 73 Many ofthese were 
centred about the 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' south of Cape Farewell but also the Trinidad area. 
This was due to lack of air cover as only a limited number of aircraft could have operated 
so far west, and allied forces covering the American seaboard still lacked the efficiency of 
that which prevailed from the United Kingdom. The Allies were still' ... one j ump behind 
the U-boats as regards "soft spots'" according to Peyton-Ward. 
He considered that would prevail until the offensive against U-boats in all parts of the 
world were under a single Anti-U-boat Command.74 That opinion was reflected by John 
Slessor who considered that the whole of the Atlantic should be considered as one 
battlefield, contrasting with the view of the United States Navy which tended to think of 
the American eastern seaboard in sections to be defended individually.75 
The most necessary requirement was to close the gap in terms of air cover south of 
Cape Farewell; this was so because of the need to cover the vital convoys from Halifax, 
Nova Scotia to the United Kingdom, (those coded HX and SC). 
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Other gaps in respect of air cover for convoys still prevailed in the Azores area and 
also near the Canary Islands. 76 Churchill was well aware of the desirability of having bases 
in the Azores for that purpose and diplomatic moves towards Portugal that controlled the 
Azores were being considered. 77 Bases in the Azores could have provided air cover for the 
Gibraltar convoys and those routes further south to West Africa and onwards round the 
Cape of Good Hope. 
This route was of great importance due to the Mediterranean still being closed to 
through traffic of merchant vessels. It had been demonstrated very clearly in the second 
week of December just how effective air cover could be in the notorious Mid-Atlantic Gap. 
It was not until October in the following year, however, that a Coastal Command base 
became established in the Azores.78 
One of the few Liberators available to the Command flew out 800 miles from Iceland 
and was able to escort convoy HX217 which was bound for the Vnited Kingdom. The 
Liberator remained with the convoy for six hours, and was followed by three more 
Liberators. Although fifteen V-boats were deployed against HX217, only two ships in the 
convoy were lost, plus one straggler.79 This episode was, however, exceptional. Few 
aircraft were available to fly that distance and remain with a convoy for six hours; two-
three hours was more likely. Furthermore, all crew positions would at least be duplicated, 
and for circling a convoy where the automatic pilot could not be used, three pilots would 
have been considered necessary. Nevertheless, it demonstrated how valuable aircraft 
escorts could be in protecting ships. 
Conclusions 
In the year 1942 there had been some improvement in the numbers of aircraft 
available to the Command, and the types of aircraft that were to come into service. There 
had been considerable improvements in the equipment available and armament; most 
notably the Leigh Light and the 250lb Torpex -filled depth charge fitted with a pistol able 
to detonate at 25ft depth.80 The Leigh Light enabled the Command to attack V-boats at 
night. 
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By the end of 1942, most reconnaissance squadrons appear to have been equipped 
with Mark II ASV and some; such as No 500 squadron had Yagi aerials for homing. 
Although the initiative using Mark II ASV which transmitted at 1 Yzmetre wavelength had 
been lost due to U-boats gaining the use of the French 'Metox' receiver; the U-boats had 
nevertheless been put on the defensive shown by their attempts to improve their anti-
aircraft armament with machine guns. They were also seen to be on the defensive by asking 
the Luftwaffe to cover them in the Bay of Biscay. 81 
In 1942 Coastal Command claimed twenty-seven enemy submarines sunk, one 
captured and eighteen damaged. Some of the successes had been shared with lIM ships. 
This year marked the entry of United States Navy squadrons operating under Coastal 
Command control in Iceland and two of the sinkings were claimed by VP73 PBY s and one 
of the U-boats damaged by a PBY ofVP84. 
More operations were being undertaken by longer-range aircraft including the 
Liberator, Flying Fortress and Catalina. The successes of medium range aircraft such as the 
Hudson nonetheless, operating from both Iceland and Gibraltar still served a useful purpose 
in anti-submarine warfare. 
There was still a need for greater numbers of the long range Liberator bases, provided 
with longer runways able to accept the heavier four-engined aircraft; need also for aircraft 
to be equipped with Mark III radar; for the provision of radio altimeters and for a low-level 
bomb sight. Due to campaigns in the Middle East and the Far East, a number of squadrons 




The Allied leaders arranged a number of conferences in 1943 and all had a direct or 
indirect bearing on Coastal Command. Those relevant to Coastal's anti-submarine 
operations took place in Casablanca in January and at Washington in March. At the 
Casablanca conference in January, the Combined Chiefs -of- Staff decided that the first 
charge on the combined allied resources in 1943 should be directed towards the defeat of 
U-boats. 
81. Hessler, G., The V-boat War in the AtlantiC, 1939-1945, London, 1992, para.296. 
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For the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command at that time, Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, 'It revealed the degree of concern with which the Battle 
of the Atlantic was regarded, and it held promise, if interpreted literally, of Coastal 
Command receiving its full requirements'. 82 At that time, as throughout his tenure with the 
Command, Sir Philip appreciated that to fully satisfy the requirements of Coastal, it 
would be at the expense of the resources for other forces: 83 Prior to the Washington 
Conference there had been no co-ordination of the Canadian (RCN and RCAF) forces, 
and likewise no co-ordination between the American Navy and Air Force. 
The RCN and RCAF had needed to settle their differences in much the same way as 
had prevailed with Coastal Command and the Admiralty. They were resolved with 
maritime air sorties being under operational direction of the Naval Commander responsible 
for protecting shipping, but the Air Officer Commanding was to exercise general 
operational control. 
This agreement was considered necessary to satisfy the American Admiral King 
(Cominch). Portal, the CAS, appeared more interested in bombing Germany; his 'Course 
B' for winning the war.84 
There had been five separate controls for the American's naval and air forces on their 
eastern seaboard, but following the conference chaired by Admiral King, a statement was 
issued on the 11 March that: 
All ASW aviation of the Associated Powers based in this region is to be under the 
general operational control of the Canadian AOC EAC Halifax who, under general 
operational direction of the C-in-C North Western Atlantic shall be responsible for the air 
coverage of all shipping within range including Greenland convoys and other shipping under 
US control. 85 
Decisions made at a conference at Washington in March had an immediate bearing on the 
Battle of the Atlantic. That was to close the 700-mile 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' by having 
convoys with escort carriers and which were provided by the United States Navy. 
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A further outcome of the conference in March was the re-organisation of the convoy 
system on the eastern seaboard of the Americas, with both the United States Navy and the 
RCAF having anti-submarine forces that included VLR (very long range) aircraft in 
Newfoundland. For the effective protection of the North Atlantic convoys it was necessary 
to have intelligence of U-boat movements and this was gained largely through decoding of 
the enemy's signals. 
The British Admiralty began the organisation by issuing a daily message prefixed 
'Stipple' and categorised convoys according to whether they were under attack or 
threatened, needing air cover in the near future, or considered out of danger. Account was 
taken also of the fast liners such as the Queen Elizabeth, which sailed independently. 
Coastal Command prefixed its messages 'Tubular' which outlined the probable U-boat 
areas with the object of helping to co-ordinate air patrols under Eastern Air Command at 
Halifax and those under No 15 Group at Liverpool. 86 
In applying this procedure, Air Marshal Slessor adopted the view that it was for the 
Admiralty to state what air cover was required, but for the Air Officers to decide how they 
could best deploy their Air Forces to achieve the required aim. He advised the Canadians 
that it could be through day-to-day discussions rather than to ' ... raise it as a policy issue'. 87 
The practical application ofthe agreement made at the Washington Conference was 
that there was daily telephoning between the Admiralty, Coastal Command HQ, and ACHQ 
Liverpool to check the dispositions of convoys and of the believed positions of U-boats 
which were based largely on decoded German signals. All of Coastal Command's Groups 
and HQ at Iceland, Gibraltar and the Azores, plus the RCAF at St.John's and Cominch in 
Washington signalled each other of what they were able to undertake the following day. 88 
Britain and Canada were to become entirely responsible for convoys on the North Atlantic 
route with their Headquarters at Liverpool, England and Halifax, Nova Scotia respectively. 
It was to result in a shuttle service ofVLR Liberators between Newfoundland and Iceland 
that thus covered the gap south of Greenland. 
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The crucial aspect that resulted from the Allies' agreement was that VLR aircraft 
were operated from Newfoundland in protecting the North Atlantic convoys, notably those 
from Halifax. The VLR aircraft, which sortied from Newfoundland were in addition to 
Coastal's limited VLR Liberators operating from Iceland. This resulted in a shuttle service 
of Liberators in sorties of about 12-13hr duration between Newfoundland and Iceland. 
Thus was the notorious Mid-Atlantic Gap closed. That the United States agreed to provide 
VLR aircraft to operate from Newfoundland, for a total of thirty-six VLR aircraft to operate 
from there, and to accelerate the supply VLR Liberators for the RCAF in that area, 
represented a considerable concession on the part of Admiral King whose thoughts were 
ever directed to the Pacific rather than the North Atlantic. Sir John Slessor considered this 
to have, ' ... more than any other single factor ... closed the Mid-Atlantic Gap' . 89 
Both Sir Philip Joubert and Air Marshal Slessor had wished for the Atlantic battle to 
be considered in it entirety by the Allies, that aim had now been achieved. 9o Any 
dissension, notably from Admiral King, had effectively been removed. Appropriately, after 
Churchill attended a conference at Quebec in August, HMS Renown, in which he returned, 
was escorted by No 10 squadron RCAF Liberators operating from Gander. 91 
A decision had been made at the Casablanca conference in January to invade Sicily. 
This may have had no immediate effect on Coastal's anti-submarine operations over the 
Atlantic, but resulted in some of the Command's squadrons such as Nos 500 and 608 
remaining in the Middle East which might otherwise have been deployed in the Battle of 
the Atlantic. 92 
By February 1943 there were a series of changes of Command. Admiral Horton had 
been appointed C-in-C Western Approaches at Liverpool, Admiral Donitz had succeeded 
Admiral Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, and Air Marshal John 
Slessor became AOC-in-C of Coastal Command. For Donitz it meant that he was able to 
approach Hitler direct and plead more strongly for his requirements in his U-boat campaign 
including not only materials for U-boats but his requirement for support from the 
Luftwaffe. 93 
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Admiral Horton at ACHQ Liverpool, was an ex-submariner and therefore, in fighting 
the Battle of the Atlantic, was well-suited to the task and able to anticipate how the enemy 
would react to any of his decisions. As D6nitz stated: 
Vnder the Command of Admiral Horton the British anti-submarine forces made great 
improvements ... particularly in tactical leadership and morale. Admiral Horton was better 
qualified than anyone else to read the mind of Gennan V-boat Command and therefore to 
take steps which would render more difficult the prosecution of our V-boat campaign. 94 
For Coastal Command, it was apparent that the views of its Naval Liaison Officer, Captain 
Peyton-Ward, also an ex submariner, were considered by Admiral Horton in respect of his 
proposals in connection with the U-boat war. 95 
Air Marshal Slessor had the advantage of having attended the Casablanca Conference 
and earlier in his service had visited America as the representative ofthe C.AS. and met 
the American Chiefs of Staff. He was effectively therefore, well briefed to understand the 
American points of view when liaison was necessary in combating U-boats and requiring 
supplies of American-built aircraft and equipment. 96 
At the Washington Conference in May, Winston Churchill recorded that he 'Did not 
propose to deal with the U-boat war' , rather was he concerned with the invasion of Sicily 
and to 'Take the weight off Russia' .97 That Churchill was prepared not to deal with the U-
boat war at that time was understandable; as Sir John Slessor stated; 'The Gap was closed 
in May' 98 and D6nitz withdrew U-boats from the North Atlantic on 24 May. 99 
Radar 
As late as May 1943 Mark II ASV was still being used in operations, although by 
then Germany had the 'Metox' receivers to detect the 1 Ylm radiations. A modification 
undertaken on at least one squadron was to install a variable condenser in the output 
.' 
circuit, to act as an attenuator and thus reduce the strength of the signal after a U-boat had 
been located to give the enemy the impression that the aircraft was disappearing. 
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Aircraft of some units such as No 500 squadron were equipped with Yagi aerials for their 
Mark lIs, which should have enabled them to home on to a target with greater accuracy and 
to obtain a much stronger return signal. 
There was a radical change in 1943 with radar equipment when the Mark III was 
becoming available to Coastal Command. Its most important advantage was that it 
transmitted on a much shorter wavelength of 9.1 cm instead of 1 Ylm as for the Marks I and 
II, and could not be detected by the Metox receivers in U-boats. 
Instead of fixed aerials there was a rotary scanner, and thus the return signals gave a 
visual trace through 3600 on a CRT known as the Position Plan Indicator (pPI). This was in 
contrast to the Mark II which, (unless beam aerials were installed), would cover only a 
forward arc. Near land, it would give a trace ofthe outline ofthe coast while vessels on the 
surface of the sea would be indicated by little more than dots on the screen. Mark III radar 
had another important advantage over the earlier marks, which was the lack of ' sea returns' 
that masked targets at short range. Some operators found that targets remained visible on 
the screen down to a quarter of a mile. Other forms of radar were being developed for 
Bomber Command such as 'Oboe', 'H2S', and 'Gee'; there was thus a conflict of interest 
as components such as magnetrons and CRTs that were common to the various forms of 
radar. Production of radar was being undertaken in both North America and the United 
Kingdom, and this was one occasion when priority was given to Coastal Command with the 
supply of a limited number of Mark III ASV. 
There was obvious co-operation between Britain and USA in respect of radar both in 
development, production and availability; it was such that, 'As a stop gap, fourteen 10cm 
[9.1cm] sets were built at the MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] radiation 
laboratory and flown to the British, to be used in the RAF planes patrolling the Bay of 
Biscay' .100 The VCAS had also decided in favour of Coastal receiving 9.1cm radar; in 
preference to Bomber Command being supplied with H2S radar that would have needed 
related components, and provision had been made at a Cabinet Anti-Submarine Committee 
meeting for the two Wellington Leigh Light squadrons, Nos 172 and 179 to be equipped 
with the new radar by February 1943. 101 
100. Morison, S.E., The Battle of the Atlantic, Sep.1939-May 1943, Boston, 1975, Vol. I, p.226. 
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34. An attack on U-980 on II June 1944 by FlO Shennan of No 162 squadron RCAF, 
position 67°0TN 00°26' E. The U-boat was sunk using four 250lb DCs. 
35. U-461, U-462 and U-504 in position 45°40 'N JOo55' W on 30 July 1943, seen from 
Sunderland JM 679. All three U-boats were sunk in a combined operation. 
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That the earlier Marks of ASV could be detected by U-boats, was in one respect a 
disadvantage to the enemy. If Coastal Command deployed enough aircraft in a transit area 
such as the Bay of Biscay, it could be 'swamped' with 1 Ylm transmissions. 
The U-boats would then have the option of either submerging, or risk being attacked by 
remaining on the surface. 
A series of alarms would at the very least, affect the morale of the U-boat' s crew by 
being made aware of hostile aircraft. There would also be a limit to the number of crash 
dives that could be undertaken, due to reducing supplies of compressed air. The U-boats, 
nevertheless, were able to detect Mark IT ASV signals at 30 miles while Coastal aircraft 
with Mark IT ASV would detect U-boats at about 6Yl miles, and perhaps up to 10 miles. 102 
The German reaction was that Admiral Donitz had ordered his U-boats to dive for 
thirty minutes when they became aware of radar transmissions from aircraft, but Donitz 
stated, it was of' doubtful effect'. 103 Sir Philip Joubert deployed his aircraft accordingly by 
so arranging patrols in the Bay of Biscay transit area in what was part of operation 
'Gondola' during late January and early February. The patrols extended from the inner Bay 
at about 3 oW using the shorter -range aircraft, and to as far as 22°W with his limited number 
of Liberators during the day and Catalinas with Leigh Lights during the night. Sunderlands, 
Halifaxes and Wellingtons covered an area 120 miles east of lOoW, and Leigh Light 
Wellingtons, that same area during the night. 104 
Sir Philip was conscious of having a very limited number of Leigh Light Wellingtons 
equipped with Mark TIl radar, and limited also in the numbers of Liberators available. 
Throughout his tenure as Commander in Chief of Coastal Command, it was to be as he 
said, 'Make do and Mend'. 105 He had concentrated his forces in the Bay of Biscay because 
in that area he could take the initiative. In contrast, in the area ofthe Atlantic convoys, the 
enemy had the initiative. 106 By deploying his forces in the Bay of Biscay rather than the 
Atlantic, his shorter range aircraft such as Wellingtons, could playa more active part and 
for a greater length of time. Furthermore, there was a greater likelihood of obtaining 
sightings of U-boats as they were in a more confined area. 
102. Air 41-47 The RAP in the Maritime War, Jul. 1941-Feb. 1943, para.487. 
103. D6nitz, K.,Memoirs, London, 2000, p.325. Hessler, G., para.313. 
104. Air 15-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. II, paras. 121-2. 
105. Joubert, P., Birds and Fishes, London, 1960, Chap. 10. 
106. Air 15-773 Vol. II, paras.I32-4. 
135 
Joubert would have been well aware ofthe risks for aircrew in flying to about 3°W, 
thus well in range of enemy aircraft, but as operational records of both Sunderlands and 
Wellingtons were to show, their crews could give a good account of themselves, and they 
were prepared to accept the risks. 107 
Armament and Tactics 
Following the unsuccessful tactics of U-boats being ordered to dive for thirty minutes 
on being aware on aircraft using radar, further measures were attempted. They included 
increasing the armament of U-boats with the addition of machine guns, quadruple 
installations of 2cm cannon, and a 3.7cm cannon. Additionally, some U-boats were given 
exceptionally heavy anti-aircraft armament, and with the intended object of attracting 
aircraft to shoot them down. The additional armament did, however, make the vessels top 
heavy. These measures were to prove successful only briefly, due to the surprise advantage 
and, it appears, against some inexperienced pilots. 
Thereafter, U-boats found that aircraft would circle and call for assistance. As was to 
be acknowledged by the enemy in the Bay, ' ... it was patrolled by units of Nos 15 and 19 
Groups ... which were highly trained in anti-submarine methods' .108 It was so. As one 
aircraft captain, FltfLt Baveystock, after getting a blip on his radar at nine miles stated: 'We 
felt sure it was our quarry as the size of the blip was the same as we normally got from our 
tame sub.' (A Royal Navy submarine which was co-operating with Coastal Command 
training). 109 After dropping a flame float to mark the position of the U-boat that had crash-
dived, Baveystock started baiting tactics to give the impression of having left the area. He 
adds: ' ... knowing that the U-boat would have to re-surface to recharge' .110 Baveystock 
correctly estimated when the U-boat would surface~ and despite its improved anti-aircraft 
armament of quadruple cannon, it was sunk. 
Because of Coastal Command's ability to detect U-boats on the surface, and 
following the improved anti-aircraft armament on U-boats, Donitz ordered some to traverse 
the Bay of Biscay in convoys of up to five in number, remaining on the surface and being 
prepared to 'fight it out' against Coastal's aircraft. 
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The first outward-bound group of U-boats sailed on 12 June 1943. 111 
The failure of traversing the Bay by U-boats on the surface was clearly demonstrated 
by three U-boats, U-461, U-462 and U-504, although in fact they were only on the surface 
for one of the three to charge its batteries. Because they were in convoy, all had to be on 
the surface. The senior officer, Captain Wolf Stiebler recalled: 'It wasn't long before 
several planes were above us ... our defence with the quadruple guns worked very well ... ' 
112 But when two aircraft attacked from different angles the quadruple cannon could 
counter only one, leaving the other aircraft free to attack. 
One of the aircraft captains, FltfLt Dudley Marrows recalled: ' ... when we got within 
attack range aircraft were circling, the U-boats manoeuvring in formation keeping bows on 
to aircraft, and putting up a formidable barrage of cannon and machine gun fire'. 113 
Marrows found, as did other aircraft captains that U-boats could always outmanoeuvre 
aircraft. Nevertheless in his attack with Sunderland U/461, he sank U-461. Against orders 
he dropped his own dinghy, which saved Captain Stiebler and some of his crew. 
This episode on 30 July 1943 appears unique in Coastal's records, as all three U-
boats were sunk and with the support of an escort group of sloops which in tum was 
operating with the co-operation of a Catalina aircraft. This co-operation between the Navy 
and the Command had been long advocated, it was delayed however, due to the lack of 
escort vessels in the Navy.114 In addition to such as Marrow's Sunderland, and the Catalina, 
there were other aircraft types including a Liberator and Halifax, which was indicative of 
an improvement in Coastal's supply of aircraft, but the question of types of aircraft with the 
appropriate equipment was still not completely resolved. I IS 
In May and June 1943 another weapon was being used against U-boats; it was the 
rocket projectile, and for the RAP, its first successes were gained by Hudsons of Nos 48 
and 608 squadrons in the Mediterranean. Its success as an anti-submarine weapon was 
Confirmed by the sinkings ofU-755 and U_594. 116 
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Although rocket projectiles could be used with success against U-boats, there was 
perhaps more to be said for them to form part of the armament together with cannon of 
long- range fighters such as Beaufighters, which came to constitute the Strike Wings of 
Coastal Command. Particularly so, as Beaufighters were more strongly built and better able 
to withstand the stresses involved. 
The Last North Atlantic Convoy Battles 
In the North Atlantic the last great convoy battle was fought by three groups ofU-
boats, appropriately named Sturmer, Dranger, and Raubgraf They formed a combined 
force of thirty-eight U-boats to attack two convoys SC122 andHX229 from the 16 March. 
At that time British cipher officers had been unable to decode the enemy's signals, but in 
sharp contrast Germany was using British signals from either the Admiralty or the C-in-C 
Western Approaches that gave the enemy the vital details of, not only the position of 
convoys, but also their courses across the Atlantic. Thus the enemy was able to deploy its 
U-boats accordingly. 117 
It was not until air cover from Coastal Command appeared on the 17 March that the 
U-boats were restricted, ' ... which allowed only five boats to make submerged attacks' 
and' ... ever increasing air defence caused us to lose contact with both convoys'Ys For 
Admiral Donitz there had been no air cover on the night of the 16-17 March, ' ... and the 
U-boats took full advantage of the fact.' Of the signals sent by the British Admiralty and 
the C-in-C Western Approaches, Donitz comments: 'These signals were most useful to U-
boat Command' .119 Of air cover then available; from the limited successes achieved by 
Coastal Command, Sunderlands and Fortresses of No. 18 Group were deployed, damaging 
three U-boats which were not identified. 120 
Although at the Washington Conference in March it had been decided to re-organise 
cover for convoys from Newfoundland, this had not taken effect at the time of the sailings 
of HX229 and SC 122. Thus the RCAP patrols at that time by No 5 squadron from Gander 
were short by sixty miles from the U-boats' first attack. 
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It was apparent that from both Coastal's bases in the east and from Gander in the 
west, that long- range Liberator aircraft were still lacking. As the official Canadian Air 
Force historian has stated: ' ... even one VLR Liberator, able to extend that patrol by another 
200 miles, might have made a crucial difference' .121 
Three causes may be attributed to the serious losses in those two Atlantic convoys 
therefore: the enemy's use of the Admiralty or C-in-C of North Western Approaches 
signals giving positions and courses of the convoys; the lack of deployment ofVLR aircraft 
on both sides of the Atlantic for convoy protection, and the inability at that time for the 
Allies to decode the enemy's signals. Former Coastal Command aircrew who were 
forbidden to transmit by W rr when near convoys, might well ask, 'Why was the Admiralty 
so blase in transmitting courses and positions of our convoys?' 
Various accounts differ in respect of the number of ships sunk in the U-boat attacks 
on convoys SC122 and HX229 but the naval historian gives the figure of twenty-one 
merchant vessels for one U-boat sunk. This battle demonstrated the need for cover by 
aircraft rather than escort vessels as only one ship was sunk when once air cover was 
maintained. 122 These serious losses, did not gain the publicity given to the 'Channel Dash' 
although there was infinitely more need. The movement of the three warships was not life 
threatening to Britain, but the rate of loss of merchant vessels in March was so. Sir John 
Slessor gives the losses in that month alone as 620,000 GRT. As he rather understates: 
'It clearly could not go on' .123 
What followed in the following two months in the Battle of the Atlantic resulted in 
the defeat of the German U-boats and which was to be acknowledged by Admiral Donitz 
on 24 May 1943. During the period 26 April to 23 May fourteen groups of U-boats were 
involved in attacks at various times against four Atlantic convoys. 124 
The most significant fact about those convoy battles was that they were in the area 
south of Cape Farewell, thus within what had been the 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' and which had 
been a 'happy hunting ground' for U-boats. Now it was to become a grave-yard for U-boats 
rather than merchant ships. 
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38.A page from the logbook of FlO Harper 
of No 10 squadron RCAF who was one of the 
pilots on a shuttle service of Liberator aircraft 
between Reykjavik and Gander which closed 
the 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' south of Green land. 
37. Part of No 10 squadron RCAF records 
which corresponds to FlO Harper' s log 
and shows that another Liberator, 
captained by FltlLt R.F.Fisher, whi le on 
the same sweep across the Atlantic, 
attacked U-341 which was one of three 
sunk, and three dan1aged in a major battle 
against convoys ON202 and ONS I 8. 
39. A Liberator in maritime camouflage such as was 
pioneered by Coastal Command, and the type flown 
by FlO Harper and FltlLt Fisher. 
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Between the 3 and 6 May six U-boats were sunk directly south of Cape Farewell in 
operations against ONS5; two in attacks against HX23 7, and two more sunk during attacks 
on SC129, four were sunk in operations between 15 and 20 May against SC130, and two 
between 21 and 23 May against HX239. 125 The reasons for the Allies success were greatly 
improved provision of surface escorts including aircraft carriers, and improved air escorts. 
The American surface escorts had HFIDF (High frequency direction-finding) with 
their aerials located higher up than was the case with the Royal Navy's escorts, and were 
able to detect U-boats on the surface and before the U-boats had seen such vessels. 
The Royal Navy, with aerials set lower on their vessels, lost some of their advantage. 
Allied Intelligence had enabled the convoys to be aware of the U-boats, and air escorts 
were thus laid on accordingly. It was Air Marshal Slessor's policy to be fully prepared to 
deploy maximum effort in support of threatened convoys, and such was to prevail at this 
time. 
Of the four U-boats sunk in attacks against SC130, three were claimed by Coastal 
Command's aircraft; two by Liberators, and one by a Hudson, that operated from Iceland as 
far west as 25°48'W. Convoy SC130 was considered by the Naval Staff to be the last 
convoy to be seriously menaced and Roskill stated: 'This fine achievement was largely due 
to the almost continuous presence of air cover during the time when the convoy was being 
threatened'. 126 
Thus was Air Marshal Slessor's policy justified. The German, Commander Hessler's 
view was: 'The most surprising feature of the enemy's success was that according to our 
radio intelligence there were never more than one or two aircraft in the air at the same 
time' .127 
Admiral Donitz' opinion was that the success of the Allies against the convoys was 
due to the escorts working in 'exemplary harmony' with support groups which were 
specially trained, but supported by 'continuous air cover' with aircraft equipped largely 
with the latest radar, although the Hudson, which sank U-273 had sighted it through a gap 
in the clouds from eight miles. 
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40. A Coastal Command base in the Azores which was established in October 1943. 
It was important in the Battl e of the Atlanti c as on 24 May 1943 , Admi ral D6nitz 
ordered hi s U-boats to that area. 
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It had used baiting tactics, which appear as a feature of No 269 squadron's anti-U-boat 
successes. Aircraft equipped with radar had for Donitz 'robbed the U-boats of their power 
to fight on the surface' .128 
After the attacks against those four convoys during which, sixteen U-boats had been 
sunk and others seriously damaged, Donitz considered that Germany had lost the U-boat 
battle and ordered those in the North Atlantic on 24 May 1943 to sail with caution to the 
Azores area. 129 
The Bay of Biscay 
After Donitz withdrew his U-boats from the North Atlantic he had to decide whether 
he should abandon his anti-shipping campaign. He considered that if he did so, it would 
be difficult to re-open that offensive. He was conscious of the other German forces fully 
engaged in fighting and opted therefore, to continue, but with the object of tying down 
considerable anti-submarine forces of the Allies rather than sinking ships. With the Allies' 
anti-submarine forces now much stronger, and therefore to increase the chances of U-boats 
surviving, it was necessary to improve their armament. Against escort vessels, an acoustic 
homing torpedo Zaunk6nig was provided. With the improved AA armament it was 
intended that U-boats should be able to remain on the surface and fight it out against 
aircraft. These tactics, however, gained only a short initial success due to the surprise 
element. 130 
On 2 August, shortly after a group of the U-boats was sunk in the Bay, U-I06 an 
ostensibly well-armed U-boat against attacks by aircraft was also sunk. As in a previous 
action, aircraft co-ordinated their attacks such that quadruple cannon was a disadvantage 
for a U-boat~ the four cannon could only fire in one direction, and fire against a second 
. ft 1·· d d h· 131 aircra was ).mIte to one cannon an mac me guns. 
Thereafter, Admiral Donitz cancelled sailings of U-boats from the Biscay ports. As 
he conceded: 'It was therefore no longer possible to fight our way through the Bay of 
Biscay by means of U-boat AA fire'. 132 
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Dcmitz then expected his U-boats to dive as soon as their receivers detected aircraft. U-
boats that had to traverse the Bay sailed along the Spanish coast. By using neutral waters 
they would not expect to be attacked and by being near the coastline, some shielding 
against detection by radar would have been given. 
The U-boats were given additional cover also by the Luftwaffe with flights ofJunkers 
88s that resulted in a number of air-to-air combats between a single Coastal Command 
aircraft against as many as eight German fighters. Such odds came to be accepted by 
Coastal's aircrews despite also, the additional disadvantage of being out-ranged by the 
enemy's cannon against machine guns. . 
Also, when attacking U-boats, pilots found it desirable to concentrate on the handling 
of their aircraft rather than using their fixed guns. 133 Sunderlands had a number of air-to-
air combats; the one advantage they had was that when one gunner was killed, another 
crew member could be found to take his place; the specific disadvantage of aircraft such as 
the Sunderland was the long hydraulic leads which all too often were cut by cannon or 
machine gun fire. 
By the end of May 1943, Germany was thinking in terms of building more U-boats to 
compensate for its losses, which in that month had reached a peak of 32.2% of those in 
operations, having risen sharply from 9.2% average losses.134 Coastal Command had 
contributed in no small measure, claiming seventeen U-boats sunk. Seven of those had 
been sunk in the Bay, and another six seriously damaged in that area. This was before the 
Command had gained the co-operation of the Navy's hunter-killer groups. The other 
sinkings by Coastal had been one in the North Transit area, and the remainder while on 
convoy escorts. 
These successes could be attributed to Air Marshal Slessor pursuing his policy of 
deploying aircraft where U-boats were most likely to be concentrated, and those areas were 
the Bay transit area and near convoys. Slessor thought of the Bay as the 'trunk of the tree' 
and where U-boats were bound to be more concentrated. He therefore was prepared to 
Concentrate his forces in an area approximately 300 miles by 120 miles, through which 
most U-boats had to enter (those based in the French ports). 
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In contrast, when once the U-boats entered the Atlantic, they could spread far and 
wide like the branches of the tree. For that purpose, he was fortunate in having a number of 
bases in southern Britain that were less likely to be closed in by bad weather than those in 
the North. Thus a programme of sorties laid on had a fair chance of being fulfilled. Other 
factors were that the enemy was still unaware of the Mark III radar being used by some 
aircraft, and that more experienced aircrews were then available and dedicated to anti-
submarine warfare. 
Specifically in the Bay transit area, U-boats were fighting back. By not submerging 
when an aircraft appeared, they lost the initiative. Aircraft could circle out of range but 
close enough to prevent the U-boat deciding to submerge, and the aircraft was not limited 
to the 30 seconds in which to attack. It was able to home in other aircraft for a co-ordinated 
attack. 
In the following month the enemy effectively increased the anti-aircraft fire of U-
boats by them sailing in groups of up to five. This was certainly too much for lone aircraft 
to counter, and Coastal's sorties were adjusted accordingly, while the Admiralty organised 
surface vessels to co-operate with the Command's aircraft. Nevertheless, in June despite 
the increased number of Coastal's sorties over the Bay, the number of attacks on U-boats 
dropped to 34% from the previous 53%.135 
This drop could be accounted for by aircrews being understandably more cautious; 
and in fact, being required to call for assistance. During most of July, the enemy was still 
prepared to risk U-boats crossing the Bay in groups, and they included their valuable 
tankers or 'milch cows'. By then, the Command was gaining support with the Navy's 
sloops and the U-boats suffered serious losses. 
Accordingly on 2 August, Donitz stopped sailings from the Biscay ports, and those 
that had sailed on the 1 August were recalled. 136 In the previous five weeks fifteen U-boats 
had been lost to Coastal's aircraft and one to the Royal Navy. 137 This fact rather discounts 
Captain Roskill's chapter 'The Triumph of the Escorts' where credit tends to be for the 
surface vessels.138 
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The V-boats which had to traverse the Bay were now required to use the cover of the 
Spanish coast and at least one of those was prepared to sail in neutral waters, and also to 
gain some cover from Spanish fishing vessels. 139 
It was believed at that time by aircrews that Spanish fishermen were in fact covering 
German V-boats. Operational records of the Leigh Light Wellington squadrons, which flew 
at night over the Bay, are indicative of that, albeit with no direct evidence. Apart from 
those V-boats that were prepared to use the Spanish coast for transit, others were to await 
new receivers Wantz, which were able to detect Coastal's Mark III radar, which had been 
available from March. Commander Hessler gives figures which confirm the Allies' success 
in the Bay of Biscay from April up to the end of August 1943 with 35% lost in the Bay. 140 
What came to be known as 'The Battle of the Bay', was considered by Professor Rohwer to 
be an intermediate phase extending from June to August 1943.141 Thereafter, Admiral 
Donitz deployed his U-boats where there was less opposition. In September he attempted 
his last offensive in the North Atlantic pinning his hopes on an acoustic torpedo Zaunkonig 
that was to be employed against escort vessels rather than the merchant vessels they were 
covering. 
The outcome was a series of failures against six convoys during September and 
October.142 In this final battle by two wolf packs, nine V-boats were lost to aircraft and 
three to surface vessels. The Allies' success was due to considerable air support including 
Liberators and Sunderlands. 
Other factors were good intelligence on the part of the Allies, but lack of intelligence 
for the U-boats. The German historian Hessler, attributes success also to: ' ... good co-
operation between enemy air and surface escorts keeping V-boats beyond visual range of 
convoys' .143 . 
The Azores 
Although by May 1943 the Mid-Atlantic Gap had been closed, there still remained 
another gap in the Atlantic, and that was in the Azores area. It was where Donitz had 
ordered his V-boats from the North Atlantic, that was, near the Azores. 
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Following a political agreement with Britain's oldest ally - Portugal, a base for 
Coastal Command's aircraft was formed at Lagens on the island of Terceira and opened in 
October. 144 It was important as both Gibraltar and Freetown convoys were able to gain 
additional air support from that base. For U-boats operating in the Azores area, the enemy 
had the advantages of allied convoys being reported by agents, probably in southern Spain, 
and also by Luftwaffe aircraft, which not only could serve for reconnaissance but also in 
actual air attacks on convoys. Nevertheless, in the following month three U-boats were 
sunk by aircraft operating from the Azores, with the successes claimed by a Flying Fortress 
and Leigh Light Wellingtons. 145 Those first anti-U-boat successes gained by Coastal's 
aircraft operating from the Azores reflected a complete reversal in respect of U-boats 
versus convoys. 
Convoys MKS30 and SL139 which included 66 merchant vessels had been reported 
to the enemy who ordered twenty-three U-boats and twenty-five aircraft against them. Only 
one merchant vessel was sunk and one damaged. As one of the U-boat captains - L/Cmdr 
Peter Cremer recorded: ' ... only one got near the merchant ships; U-333. All the others 
were forced away'. 146 This was due to overwhelming support by both escort vessels and 
Coastal Command. The successful attack on one ofthe U-boats by a Wellington is notable 
in demonstrating the training and experience of the pilot (FlO D. F. McCrae, DFC). 
He had gained an ASV contact at 3 miles to port (indicative of the aircraft having 
Mark III radar with a scanner); he turned to port and saw by moonlight a surfaced U-boat 
and attacked without using his Leigh Light to achieve complete surprise. Exceptionally 
also, he attacked at 90° to the vessel, instead of the more usual 30-35° or along its track. 
Thus to achieve a kill he needed to be extremely accurate to within 19 feet of the hull. 
Flying at probably 140-160 knots, that was a considerable feat. The reason for attacking on 
the beam was probably to have the U-boat silhouetted against the moonlight. 
This attack was in sharp contrast to a bomber crew employed in anti-submarine 
warfare. They had a similar aircraft and weapons but lacked the training and experience 
and were unsuccessful. 147 
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Typically, in the early part of the war, convoys would have been lucky to have six 
surface escorts, and just one aircraft as close escort. These two convoys had up to twenty-
eight escort vessels in addition to Coastal providing aircraft not only from the Azores, but 
also from Britain. For another U-boat captain the attacks on the convoys were a 
, l.r. '1 ' 148 ... comp ete lal ure .... 
Although the Command was able and prepared to operate many aircraft including 
Hudsons, Catalinas, Wellingtons, Beaufighters and Liberators in support of those two 
convoys, it ' ... left only two Liberators available on 22 November' .149 This deficiency 
stemmed from the policy of , Com inch' (Admiral King). The Allies had ostensibly enough 
aircraft to cover all exigencies, but many Liberators were deployed in the wrong areas. 
Two of the sinkings of U-boats by Wellingtons from the Azores reflected the 
usefulness of the later type of Radar that was the Mark lIT with a scanner. On both 
occasions a trace was made from abeam rather than ahead of the aircraft and at very close 
range of 3-4 miles. Such would not have been possible with Mark IT ASV and without 
beam aerials. Those aircraft then had lethal weapons - 250lb depth charges. 
With both detection and lethal weaponry requirements fulfilled, trained and 
experienced crews flying a suitable type of aircraft were able to do the job. Yet a further 
but elusive factor was to have crews of high morale, and from a squadron with high morale. 
In the case of the example given in some detail, (FlO McCrae then with No179 squadron), 
all those aspects prevailed. 
Summary -1943 
The Battle ofthe Atlantic against U-boats was won in 1943~ the Allies had gained the 
initiative. This was due to a number of factors: politically there was agreement with both 
Canada and USA for a North Atlantic convoy system with co-operation between St.John's, 
Newfoundland and Liverpool but with the concurrence of , Com inch' in USA, VLR aircraft 
Were to operate from Newfoundland in support of North Atlantic convoys. This resulted in 
the closing of the Mid-Atlantic Gap south of Cape Farewell. Later in the year, the Azores 
Gap was closed by Portugal acceding to the Allies having bases in the Azores. 
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Long -range aircraft, notably the Liberator became available to the Command which 
had begun the year with only half a squadron of those aircraft but by the end of the year had 
seven squadrons so equipped. There was increasing availability of Leigh Light equipped 
aircraft, and the Mark III radar (9.1cm wavelength), which initially could not be detected 
by U-boats, was coming into service. 
While Coastal Command was gaining more and more aircrews with experience in 
anti-submarine warfare, and with increased high morale, Germany was losing its more 
experienced U-boat commanders, and its crews were being demoralised. 
In 1943 Coastal Command had effective weapons, which were lethal to U-boats~ the 
2501b Torpex depth charge fitted with a shallow depth pistol, the 35lb rocket projectiles, 
and the acoustic homing torpedo. 
Strategy and tactics had been developed with the C-in-C Coastal Command opting 
for the offensive in two areas; the Bay of Biscay against U-boats in transit, (Slessor's 'trunk 
of the tree '), and near convoys which were threatened with attacks. Tactics employed by 
Coastal in the Bay of Biscay were on one or two occasions, to 'swamp' a given area with 
radar transmissions. Tactics that were modified were to opt for a 100ft spacing of sticks of 
depth charges and to be released along the track of the U-boat, thereby increasing the 
prospect of a kill by 35%. Aircrews on encountering severe anti-aircraft fire would circle 
and await assistance from at least one other aircraft, or possibly from surface craft. 
The armistice with Italy in 1943 did not reduce the requirements of the Command, 
rather did it mean that some squadrons such as Nos 500 and 608 remained in the Middle 
East area in support of invasion operations. Still lacking in 1943 for Coastal Command 
were a low-level bomb-sight and radio altimeters. There was still a need for closer co-
operation between the Admiralty and the Command in respect of keeping Coastal informed 
about the movement of convoys and the Navy's vessels, and also to provide hunter/killer 
groups of such as sloops to operate with aircraft. 
A weakness shown in both the German U-boat Command and the Admiralty was the 
lack of security in transmitting by wrr signals; thus in the Admiralty's case, by giving 
courses and positions of convoys, albeit in code. 
For his period of command, Sir Philip Joubert gives in respect of the anti-U-boat 
Campaign, 825 sightings that resulted in 607 attacks but with only twenty-seven U-boats 
sunk plus three shared. Additionally 120 were so damaged that they had to return to base. 
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Against those figures Coastal lost 233/4 aircraft of which 116 were due to hazards 
such as the weather. Out of the 233 losses, 179 were from No 19 Group and could be 
attributed to operating over the Bay of Biscay and encountering many enemy fighters in 
addition to heavily- armed U-boats. 150 
The comparatively few sinkings in relation to sightings could be attributed to lack of 
suitable weapons, but also lack of suitable aircraft. To a lesser extent, inexperienced crews 
were operating in the earlier period of his tenure. The part played in the defeat of the U-
boats in the Battle of the Atlantic by aircraft under Coastal Command's control amounted 
to ninety U-boats sunk, and fifty-one damaged. 
Of the ninety, which were sunk, fifty-three had been in the area of convoys; only one 
ship was sunk in a convoy when an aircraft was in close support. Overall in 1943, Germany 
lost 258 U-boat due to all causes. lSI As the American Air Force decided after a survey in 
1943 ' ... attack from the air against the U-boat at sea had been the most effective single 
factor in reducing the German submarine fleet. .. '.152 
In 1944 there were three major operations in Western Europe. They were the Allied 
landings at Anzio in January; Operation Overlord, (the Normandy landings in June); and 
the last German counter attack during December in the Ardennes. A comparatively minor 
operation by the Allies was 'AnvillDragoon' -landings in Southern France in August. 153 
Operation Overlord was to be uppermost in the minds of all Allied services from 
January onwards. In that month General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander 
of the Allied Expeditionary Forces with Headquarters in England from whence the Allied 
invasion of Europe would be launched. This was to have an immediate bearing on Coastal 
Command, as, although victory in the Battle of the Atlantic had been achieved in 1943, 
U-boats still posed a threat particularly against a vast armada of shipping required in taking 
troops and equipment to the Continent. 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas succeeded Air Marshal Slessor as AOC-in-C 
Coastal Command in January and summed up his anti-submarine forces as 430 aircraft 
including ten squadrons of Liberators (including three from the USN), and five squadrons 
of Leigh Light Wellingtons. 
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There were also two squadrons each ofHalifaxes, Hudsons, Fortresses and Catalinas, 
and seven squadrons of Sunderlands. 154 Most notable, was the improvement in the 
availability of Liberators, as in 1943, Air Marshal Siessor had begun his tenure with only 
half a Liberator squadron. There was an improvement also, by now, not only having the 
'right type' of aircraft, but also effective weapons were generally available against V-boats 
including the 250lb Torpex depth charges with shallow depth pistols, and rocket 
projectiles. The improved radar (Mark nl) was becoming more generally available also. 
There were still sixty V-boats in the Atlantic well able to pose a serious threat to 
Allied shipping. V-boats in 1944 were better armed against air attacks with 37mm and 
20mm cannon. When on the surface they could use improved detection devices against 
Coastal Command's radar such the Mark Ins. There were an increasing number of V-boats 
equipped with schnorchels that were comprised of two tubes, which extended above the 
surface allowing exhaust gases from the Diesels to escape, and with the second tube taking 
in fresh air. Donitz had looked upon the schnorchel-equipped type as the 'one hundred 
per cent under-water boat', 155 but it was to be proved otherwise. 
Although, as Donitz had hoped, it enabled V-boats to operate in the English Channel, 
a great strain was imposed on the V-boat crews due to remaining submerged for so long in 
hostile waters. 156 In rough sea conditions the schnorchel was automatically closed causing 
at least, severe discomfort to the crews. Furthermore, Coastal Command aircrews were able 
to detect the schnorchel boats using Mark III radar and also visually, not infrequently 
reporting seeing on the surface of the sea 'white smoke'. One such sighting made from a 
1 ,OOOft altitude, included not only mention of the white smoke, but that it was emitted from 
a grey object 1 Ylft in diameter, projecting about 2ft and moving at 12-15 knots. In that 
specific example the V-boat was sunk with co-operation from a naval escort group. 157 
There were, however, two other natural forms of disturbance with which schnorchels 
. h . h I 158 mIg t be confused; they were waterspouts and spoutmg w a es. 
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The Command's response to schnorchel U-boats was to operate what was coded 
'High Tea'. This was to release a pattern of sono-buoys in the area of a suspected 
submerged U-boat. Sono-buoys could be thought of as the air equivalent of the Navy's 
Asdic, that was, they could detect sound waves, with signals sent to the aircraft by 
electromagnetic means. Against such devices, schnorchel U-boats were at a disadvantage 
as the noise of their Diesels would mask the sono-buoys' signals, but the additional noise 
from the U-boat would aid detection by the aircraft. 
It was the strategy of Donitz to ever deploy his U-boats where they were likely to 
sink ships with the minimum danger to themselves, and in January thirty-three U-boats 
were sent to operate against Russian Convoys, where in those Arctic waters they could gain 
the support of the Luftwaffe operating from Norway. 
Germany had been losing 20% of its U-boats every month and of 70% that returned 
from operations, some were seriously damaged. While in transit through the Bay of Biscay, 
U-boats were remaining submerged for as long as twenty to twenty-two hours per day and 
were taking twelve days in transit. Donitz had exhorted his crews to accept the harsh 
conditions as their only option against the Allies' superior forces in both aircraft and escort 
groups, and as an ex-U-boat captain Commander Hessler stated, it was a matter of 
'Containing the enemy' and' A more cautious strategy was required.' 159 
In the early months of 1944, although U-boats had ceased making pack attacks on 
shipping, there was some concentration of U-boats west of Scotland and Ireland. 
Furthermore, in the Bay of Biscay, fewer sightings were being made due to the U-boats 
remaining submerged, and spending a minimum time surfaced to re-charge their batteries. 
Sir Sholto Douglas therefore reduced the density of his patrols in the Bay of Biscay to 
concentrate his forces off the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland. For this purpose, the 
operations of his Groups Nos 15,18,19 and Iceland were co-ordinated under No15 Group at 
ACHQ Liverpool. It was a logical decision, as Allied convoys, of necessity converged in 
that area. There was the advantage also, that his medium range aircraft such as Hudsons 
and Wellingtons, could effectively operate to a considerable distance into the Atlantic from 
both Iceland and the north-western bases which by then were available. 
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The success of this strategy could not be assessed solely on the number ofsightings 
and 'kills' made however, as just to keep the U-boats submerged could be rated a success. 
In fact, it resulted in U-boats being dispersed away from the shores of the United Kingdom, 
'beyond 15°W where conditions were somewhat better' . 160 
The Command's aircrews came to accept that flying for hours over the Atlantic, now 
sighting convoys, rather than empty lifeboats, was more thanjustified. The last attack on a 
North Atlantic convoy was in February. It is notable, not just for being the last attack, but 
for the contrast in points of view by German and British historians. Hessler dismisses it in 
one short paragraph with the loss of two U-boats in the period 16 to the 19 January. 
Captain Roskill gives a chart for the 29 January to 24 February and states that eleven U-
boats were sunk, six by escort groups, against the losses of one straggler and one sloop. 
Within that period, two U-boats were sunk by Coastal's WeIIingtons. 161 
Features of note concerning one of those sinkings, were that earlier on 7 February, 
one of the Wellingtons had obtained a radar contact at 9 miles that was not lost until the 
'i4mile range of the scanner had been reached. This showed what a great improvement in 
radar had occurred. With the earlier Mark I, a U-boat might well have been missed, or lost 
in 'sea returns' well before a Y.t mile range. The attack on the U-boat, which followed, did 
not result in a kill, but later, the same Wellington captain was successfuL Many operational 
records indicate that when once a captain has made an actual attack, (rather than a practice 
run), he was likely to be successful in subsequent attacks. 162 
The Wellington successes were notable also in that they used six depth charges 
spaced at 60 feet rather than what had been earlier been advocated - 100ft spacing. When 
100ft was specified, the Command, perhaps, was thinking in terms of four rather than six 
depth charges. This success in the final convoy battle demonstrated what had been 
advocated at the beginning of the war; that was to combat the U-boat menace~ a combined 
effort of both surface vessels and aircraft was required. It had been shown earlier during 
July 1943 in the Bay of Biscay; but due then to the shortage of escort vessels, the system of 
combined operations had been discontinued. 
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At this stage, the Gennan point of view became: 'there was no point in disposing 
the U-boats primarily for attacks on convoys, and the sole remaining purpose was to 
discomfort the enemy, while at the same time providing ... sufficient freedom to escape the 
concentrations of A/S forces.' And the 'Costly convoy were attacks were therefore 
abandoned,.163 Despite the freedom given to U-boat Commanders, their losses 'remained 
high' and it was 'believed' that most were being lost in an area 700-800 miles south-west 
ofIreland. 164 This indicated that U-boats could not have made W rr contact with the U-boat 
Command before being lost, and possibly that they were sunk in a surprise attack by Leigh 
Light aircraft which gave no opportunity for the V-boats to signal their Headquarters. 
Because of such losses, V-boats were ordered on 27 March to avoid that area of the 
Atlantic. 165 
Operation Overlord 
General Eisenhower, the Allies' Supreme Commander, had for Operation Overlord, 
all of the air forces in Britain under his control, but had made an exception of Coastal 
Command, which he considered 'inescapable'. 166 This decision may have stemmed from 
his fonner collaboration with Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham at the time of the Torch 
Operation. Certainly when Sir Sholto was considering his own position in respect of 
'Overlord' he asked for a directive from the Admiralty by which the Command was 
ostensibly controlled. The response came from Admiral Cunningham thus: 'You know 
perfectly well what you've got to do, Sholto, get on with it' .167 In fact it was done. Sir 
Sholto's Overlord-The Role of Coastal Command gave an order of battle for each of his 
Groups and Headquarters in Iceland, Gibraltar and the Azores. Each squadron was allotted 
to a specific base and task. It included an appreciation ofthe enemy's likely moves and the 
reasons for Sir Sholto's decisions. 
Contingencies for which Sholto Douglas was prepared were: (i) transits of U-boats 
between Norway and the Atlantic; (ii) the threat to invasion convoys in the Channel and 
South Western Approaches; (iii) a possible offensive against Atlantic convoys.168 
163. Hessler, G., The V-boat War in the Atlantic, 1939-1945, London, 1992, paras.408, 417. 
164. Hessler, G., para.417. 
165. Hessler, G., para.417. 
166. Eisenhower, D.O., Crusade in Europe, New York, 1968, p.236. 
167. Douglas, Lord, Years of Command, London, 1966, pp.262, 264. 
168. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.4l. 
152 
Thus the AOC-in-Chief, Coastal Command was effectively given carte blanche. His 
action was then to issue a directive to all his Groups and ACHQ s on 18 April 1944. It was 
apparent from Eisenhower's and Cunningham's statements, that both had faith in Coastal's 
leadership; and in the case of Admiral Cunningham, that he could trust the Command to 
counter any offensive by U-boats, as he was later to confirm. 
Germany still had about 200 U-boats available for operations, but also twenty to 
twenty-five destroyers, thirty-five torpedo boats, 90-100 E-boats, 135 R-boats, and about 
150 W-boats (midget submarines). The possibility ofa break-out into the Atlantic by heavy 
warships had also to be considered. 169 
The Allies plan for Operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe had been agreed on 
8 February,170 and on 12 April Sir Sholto Douglas had asked his D/SASO to prepare an 
Order of Battle for Coastal Command's role in Overlord. 171 The D/SASO's directive was 
issued by Sir Sholto giving comprehensive details of that role to his Group Commanders 
on 18 April. I72 Although the role included other duties such as anti-shipping operations, 
the main threat against the Allies forces was considered to be U-boats, of which it was 
estimated, there were about 200, with many surface craft such as E-boats. 
The U-boats were thought most likely to attack in the South-Western Approaches. To 
counter this threat, Coastal Command would deploy aircraft from the western limits of 
St.George's, Bristol and English Channels up to the route of the cross-Channel invasion 
convoys. Patrols would be so arranged that the whole area would be covered every thirty 
minutes. Thus that area would effectively be 'flooded' with the object of forcing the U-
boats to remain submerged. When they ultimately had to surface to recharge their batteries, 
they would be attacked by surface forces. This flooding of the Channel area, Sir Sholto 
likened to the cork in a bottle and applied with the pressure eastwards. 173 
Sir Sholto's forces included two-dozen squadrons whose prime duties were to be 
anti-submarine operations in the South-Western Approaches, with aircraft largely 
Liberators, Wellingtons, Sunderlands and Beaufighters; and seven of the squadrons had 
Leigh Light aircraft. 
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This was a considerable improvement in aircraft and equipment availability 
compared with just a year previously. Such an improvement itself created a problem; that 
was of accommodation both for aircraft and personnel. Not all stations could take aircraft 
such as Liberators and Fortresses, and Sholto Douglas in 1944 was following the 'horse 
trading' of bases such as prevailed two years earlier for Sir Philip. 174 
Such strong forces devoted to a specific area, had none-the-Iess been at the expense 
of Atlantic sorties that were 'drastically reduced' .175 This reduction in Atlantic sorties was 
however offset by the enemy likewise reducing the number of U-boats in the Atlantic to 
protect his coastline. During this period of preparation for Overlord, Sholto Douglas had 
to take account of his forces based in Iceland, the Shetlands, Hebrides, Northern Ireland, 
Britain, Gibraltar and the Azores. 
Even maritime squadrons ostensibly outside his control needed to be born in mind 
such as those in the Eastern Mediterranean and West Africa. Some ofthe squadrons in the 
Mediterranean outside his jurisdiction, in fact, were subsequently transferred to Coastal to 
alleviate deficiencies. Although the Air Ministry had granted Coastal Command an 
increased establishment of personnel, Sir Sholto was still short-staffed and expected 
therefore both aircrews and ground crews to work much harder to compensate. He 
specified a requirement of a maximum effort for a month, followed by a second month in 
which the work would be less intensive. For Sunderland and Liberator aircrews their sorties 
would be of 13Y2hr and for Wellington aircrews, of 10Y2hr duration. 
With possibly a third of each squadron's aircraft operating every twenty-four hours, 
much was therefore expected of both aircrews and ground staff. I76 Sir Sholto's 
appreciation of the situation on the German side proved justified as on the 6 June twelve 
U-boats sailed from Norway en route to the Atlantic, and of those in the French ports, 
thirty-five sailed, only to suffer fifty attacks from the air on the first night, and with six 
returning due to damage. From the 6 to 30 June twenty-four U-boats were Sunk. I77 
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In the eady stages of the Nonnandy landings only twelve schnorchel-equipped 
U-boats were able to act against the seaborne forces, and they were expected to attack 
' ... even at the cost of [the] boat' .17S Following a break-through by the Allies land forces at 
Avranches on 4 August, the U-boat bases at Brest, Lorient and St.Nazaire were threatened 
and the U-boats attempted to transfer to La Pallice and Bordeaux. By 25 August those that 
were seaworthy left the French ports for Norway, and Donitz recalled all U-boats operating 
in the invasion area during the 24 and 26 August. This was because of the strong defensive 
forces that he considered would be progressively increased. By 30 September all had 
transferred to Norway. 179 
For most people, Operation Overlord, with its maritime counterpart, Operation 
'Neptune' is probably thought of as being confined to the Nonnandy area. It was not so for 
Coastal Command. During the month of June one squadron of Cans os (Catalinas) alone, 
sank four U-boats and all north of 62°N, with one captain being awarded a posthumous VC. 
Another VC was awarded to the captain of a Catalina who sank a V-boat north of the 68th 
parallel in July.ISO As Lord Douglas stated: ' ... the far Northern phase of the invasion 
operations was in its way as hard as the assault on the Nonnan beaches'. lSI 
Sir Sholto Douglas had issued a new directive in September, which gave priority to 
Coastal's operations in the areas of Cape Wrath, Northern Ireland, St.George's Channel 
and Bristol Channel. This was under No 15 Group that was able to draw upon the resources 
of both Nos 18 and 19 Groups. 
This action was in response to V-boats which were then patrolling inshore waters of 
the Vnited Kingdom. ls2 As a result, according to the naval historian Captain Roskill, the 
north transit area was neglected allowing V-boats to get through to the Atlantic. One ofthe 
reasons for U-boats evading detection at the time, was that Donitz had ordered on 1 June 
that only schnorchel V-boats should go into the Atlantic. ls3 
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Nevertheless, as was to be shown, from 6 June to 31 August, twenty schnorchel 
V-boats were lost out of thirty, and for Admiral Donitz, it had' ... marked the end of the 
V-boat campaign in the Channel'. 184 
Three illustrations given in the official naval history, show clearly the problem that 
aircrews had to contend with in respect of schnorchel V-boats. Certainly they were able to 
see the 'white smoke' from schnorchel tubes but they were all too easy to confuse a water 
spout for a potential target and thus for a decision to be made in less than twenty-five 
seconds. Nevertheless, some crews did sink schnorchel V-boats. The deployment of his 
V-boats by Donitz in the inshore waters of the Vnited Kingdom, represented a tactical 
advantage but only in respect of possible attacks by surface craft. The various layers of 
water of different densities would impede detection by Asdic. 
Additionally, Donitz advised V-boat commanders to do what might not be expected, 
that was, attacking from inshore, and attempt also to escape via inshore, rather than 
seawards. He rightly gave his V-boat commanders discretion and WIT silence was 
maintained, in contrast to their former operations in the Atlantic. 185 
V-boats operating in inshore waters, however, were of advantage to Coastal 
Command as those operational areas were all within range of the Command's medium 
range aircraft. 
By the end of 1944, as Lord Douglas suggests, the second phase of Overlord could be 
considered over. Of V-boat sightings made by the Command, 47% were attacked, and of 
those, 20% resulted in the V-boats being sunk. These figures were an improvement on 
those of the year as a whole, and in spite of the increased AA armament of the V-boats, and 
their preparedness to fight back. 186 
An appreciation of Coastal Command's work in Operation Overlord was given by 
Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham thus: 'Our comparative immunity to submarine 
attack was principally due to the enthusiastic efficiency of Coastal Command'. 187 
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The Straits of Gibraltar 
In the early part of 1944 there were about fifteen U-boats in the Mediterranean and 
there was considerable allied shipping there but with limited escort vessels. Sholto Douglas 
attempted to limit the entry of U-boat enforcements by adopting a system similar to that 
employed by the former Commanders, Sir Philip Joubert and Air Marshal Slessor. 
The procedure was to 'swamp' a given area with aircraft equipped with radar, and in 
this case, the approach areas to the Straits of Gibraltar. By such much means it was hoped 
to force the U-boats to use their batteries before reaching the Straits where they would be 
vulnerable to both surface craft and aircraft. The 'swamp' system was used in other parts of 
the Mediterranean area but outside Coastal Command's control by Wellington aircraft co-
operating with the Royal Navy. 188 The conditions in the Straits of Gibraltar lent themselves 
to the use of a highly specialised system of anti-submarine warfare. That was Magnetic 
Anomaly Detection (MAD) gear, which was employed in conjunction with retro-rockets. 
MAD was fitted to the tail of some United States Navy's PBYs (Catalinas). 
The presence ofa U-boat would cause an anomaly in the earth's magnetic field that 
would be detected by the MAD gear, which was effectively a magnetometer. Retro-rockets 
would then be fired rearwards; with the speed so adj usted to counter the aircraft's forward 
motion. Thus the bomb fired by the rocket would fall vertically on to the detected target. 
The retro bombs had the advantage over depth charges by not needing to be set for depth, 
that the enemy would be unaware of attack until the bomb struck the U-boat. 
Additionally, much less Torpex was required to fill the bomb of only 25lb MAD gear 
was used with some success by VP63 of the United States Navy in the Straits of Gibraltar; 
it proved less useful in other areas due to topographical conditions. 189 Although the 
Command's forces had been improved compared with earlier years, they were still 
stretched, particularly with the need to support Overlord, and Sir Sholto withdrew some of 
the forces from the Gibraltar area. 
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The Bay of Biscay 
By early 1944 some U-boats were still crossing the Bay of Biscay on the surface, 
confident apparently, that their improved armament of quadruple 20mm cannon and a 
3.7cm cannon would deter attacks from aircraft but were prepared to 'fight it out'. When a 
NolO squadron RAAF sighted a U-boat with its conning tower awash, instead of 
submerging, it surfaced and opened fire at 2 miles range. 
NolO squadron RAAF was one ofthe first to install four 0.303" additional machine 
guns in the nose of its Sunderlands and opened fire at 1200yd. Forward-firing guns were 
shown to be an important factor in attacks on U-boats, as if used promptly, they could clear 
the U-boat's anti-aircraft gunners, and in some cases, so many of the U-boat's crew were 
put out of action, that it was required to return to port. The Sunderland, nevertheless, had to 
make two attempts before sinking U-426 due to the difficulty in deploying its depth 
charges. This latter aspect was ever a matter for Sunderland crews to consider; to run out 
the depth charges in advance, or wait for a sighting before doing so? 190 
About this time, Sir Sholto Douglas attempted to blockade the Biscay bases within an 
area from 11 oW to 8°W and within latitudes 48° and 43°N. Because also, U-boats left their 
French bases on the surface he hoped to cover that area where the U-boats met or left their 
surface escorts. This would have been by using Liberators but with a long- range fighter 
escort. This plan was however rejected by the Chiefs of Staff as long- range fighters were 
to be for Bomber Command's offensive. 191 As an alternative measure, a few Mosquito 
aircraft armed with 6-pounder cannon (Tsetse aircraft) were deployed with limited success 
in anti-submarine warfare, but later diverted to anti-shipping sorties for which they were 
more suited. 192 
Additionally, Sir Sholto deployed from the end of March, night patrols covering the 
100-fathom line from Point du Raz down to the Gironde. The Gironde was an important 
base for both German U-boats and had been so for Italian submarines and became 
increasingly so when the other French bases were captured. The 100-fathom line would 
have probably coincided with the point where U-boats gained or lost their surface 
escorts. 193 
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They were therefore on the surface and were open to be attacked, despite Coastal's aircraft 
being in turn attacked by enemy fighters in addition to fire from V-boats and surface 
escorts. 
Two major events in January were to have repercussions in the anti-submarine 
warfare; they were the beginning ofa Russian offensive on the 12 January and the end of 
the German break-through in the Ardennes with the enemy being forced back. 194 The 
Russian offensive resulted in German forces progressively retreating westwards such that 
ultimately they were limited in the area even for U-boat trials. 
U-boats at that time were being manufactured in eight sections involving thirty 
factories, and V-boat equipment and armament required another twelve factories, 
production was thus easily disrupted by the bombing of supply lines and the over-running 
of factories by advancing Allied forces. 
By 15 February Admiral Donitz still considered that he could exert a considerable U-
boat threat as 237 U-boats were being prepared for operations, and that number included 
111 of the earlier types, but significantly, eighty of the greatly improved Mark XXI and 
forty-two Mark XXIIIs.195 
It was fortunate indeed for the Allies that the Mark XXI did not become operational 
until 30 April as it had an underwater speed of 17Y2 knots, that was greater than the 
corvettes and sloops of the Navy which were typically 15-16 knotS. 196 Eight of the Mark 
XXIII U-boats of 234 tons were able to prove their worth in Britain's home waters by 
sinking ships at no loss to themselves. In addition to schnorchels, they were equipped with 
echo-ranging gear (S-Gerat) attached to the schnorchel that could give warning of escort 
vessels at up to 7,000m. 197 
Although by January there were ostensibly enough aircraft in the United Kingdom for 
Coastal, in fact there was a shortage of available operational aircraft for all the tasks 
expected of the Command. 
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In the case of some Wellingtons, it was due to lack of spares, while for Liberators; 
modifications were required for which skilled personnel were necessary. Some electricians 
had been transferred from Scottish Aviation, which was involved with the modifications on 
Liberators, to the Army. It was serious enough for the Ministry of Aircraft Production to 
request the loan of personnel from Coastal Command, while in turn Sir Sholto Douglas, 
asked the Air Ministry to intervene. 198 There was still a drain on the Command's resources 
such as Sir Philip Joubert had experienced in 1942, that was crews trained by the 
Command but were then posted overseas with their aircraft. 199 
In January Coastal Command had thirty-two anti-submarine squadrons but of those 
twenty-nine and a half were in the United Kingdom and Iceland comprising 420 aircraft. 
Of those, the First Lord of the Admiralty considered they were: ' ... not enough to patrol 
transit routes and give continuous air escort to all the many convoys,.200 The Navy, 
however, was well equipped against V-boats with 426 escort vessels, which included 
destroyers and frigates that had a greater speed than most V-boats. The Allies successes 
against V-boats about this time reflect those aspects, with forty-three sunk by ships, but 
only nineteen U-boats sunk by shore-based aircraft during 1945.201 
Coastal's aircraft were however, becoming better equipped for anti-submarine 
warfare. There were now a number of Marks of Radar, ranging from Mark II s of 1 Yzmetre 
wavelength to later Marks with 3cm or 9.1cm wavelength. The increased sensitivity of the 
short wavelength radar however, presented the disadvantage of receiving signals from 
flotsam. For navigation, at least two squadrons were equipped with GEE which was geared 
largely to North Sea sorties and proved accurate enough for a navigator to pin-point the 
runway of his base in thick fog. 202 There was a report on a possible new LORAN (Long 
Range Navigation) chain, but the Americans objected to the equipment being diverted from 
Bomber Command. 203 Nevertheless, for aircraft operating from eastern England, GEE 
proved excellent. 
198. Air 15-361 C-in-C'sMeetingson22.1.45. 25.1.45. 29.1.45. 
199. Air 15-361 Meeting on 4.1.45. 
200. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1961, Vol. III.2, p. 285. 
201. Roskill, S.W., Vol. III.2, p.285. 
Niestle, A., German U-boat Losses in WW2, Annapolis, 1998, p.202. 
202. The author's experience in No 524 sqdn. 
203. Air 15-361 Meeting on 22.1.45. 
160 
It was a feature of Sir Sholto's tenure that much attention was given to the training of 
aircrews while with their squadrons; this stemmed, no doubt, from the considerable new or 
modified equipment that was then becoming available. Sir Sholto gave particular attention 
to the training on Radar, but requested a 'submarine sanctuary' for use in No 15 Group's 
area for anti-submarine training.204 
In early 1945 Admiral Donitz' strategy remained to tie down as many Allied forces as 
possible. This was achieved by widely dispersing his U-boats as far as the American 
eastern seaboard in addition to the home waters of the British Isles and eastwards as far as 
the ScheIdt where Allied ships were to supply the land forces. During the three months, 
February to April, 114 U-boats sailed from Norway but of that number only thirty reported 
reaching the Atlantic/OS In March, Donitz ordered his U-boats to withdraw from coastal 
waters to seawards. This stemmed from being aware of anti-submarine mines being laid, 
and also of increasing U-boat losses. 206 
Sir Sholto countered the U-boat offensive in home waters by sorties of Nos 15 and 19 
Groups co-operating with the Navy's surface vessels under the C-in-C Western Approaches 
but giving priority to the Irish Sea. Patrols were laid on so that the whole of the Irish Sea 
was completely covered night and day, once every hour. This was because it was believed 
that the U-boats were sheltering in the shallow waters where they were not easy to detect 
due to the layers of water of differing density which affected the use of Asdic, and by 
schnorchelling, they reduced also the risk of being detected by aircraft.207 
There still remained a shortage of aircraft for convoy escorts and a compromise was 
to provide an escort only when the convoys were in threatened areas.208 Additional support 
was gained for No 19 Group by the United States Navy providing three anti-submarine 
squadrons plus a detachment ofPBY s equipped with MAD gear. The latter was something 
of a trial but did gain some success.209 
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While these moves could be considered defensive in response to the enemy's 
initiative, Sir Sholto took the initiative literally into the enemy's camp. Anti-submarine 
aircraft such as Liberators undertook night patrols in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. They, 
however, were vulnerable to air attack in those areas due to fighters based in Norway and 
Denmark. In April, therefore, the strike wings of Beau fighters and Mosquitoes undertook 
sweeps against U-boats during the day. This was still a hazardous operation even for fast 
and heavily armed aircraft as the DaUachy strike wing experienced in February due to the 
still very active German fighters in Norway.2JO 
The risks to both the strike aircraft and the Liberators proved justified as a number of 
U-boats were sunk by those aircraft in that area, including the use of rocket projectiles by 
the strike aircraft, although Sir Sholto still rated the standard weapon against U-boats to be 
the depth charge, and it could be considered rightly SO.211 
Remarkably, at that late stage in the war, an escort of Mustang fighters was still 
expected for the squadrons of Beaufighters and Mosquitoes which operated in the 
Norwegian area, although earlier in the war, lone Hudsons just had to take a chance and 
suffered accordingly with 300 aircrew killed over Norway.212 
Coastal's offensive was extended in the northern area to the Baltic and Bornholm. 
With the latter becoming the only area available to U-boats for training and working up, 
there became no waters where U-boats could be considered free from air attack.213 
The last German U-boat claimed by Coastal Command aircraft was U-320. It is 
notable; not only for being the Command's final kill, but also for showing how far the 
Command had progressed in respect of equipment and the training of crews since January 
1940 when a Sunderland shared the destruction ofU-55. Catalina XJ210 was airborne at 
0443hrs on 7 .May 1945 and while flying at 500ft altitude gained a radar contact at 2 miles 
range. One minute later a schnorchel, periscope, white smoke and a wake indicating an 
underwater speed of7-8 knots was sighted. An attack was made one minute later within six 
seconds of the schnorchel disappearing by releasing four depth charges spaced at 100ft. A 
pattern of sonobuoys was then used. Base was signalled for instructions adding that the 
Catalina had enough fuel for another fifteen hours. 
210. C12269 No 404 sqdn's ORBs, 1944-45. 
211. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, paras.97-99. Air 15-162 Table A. 
212. Skaugstad, P., list to the author . 
. 213. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.94. 
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Contact was maintained with the U-boat by sono-buoys for eleven hours before returning to 
base after a sortie of 13 hr 20min. This episode showed how sensitive radar had become by 
detecting a schnorchel at 2miles, but above all, how remarkably efficient that Catalina 
crew had become using a slow ponderous aircraft designed as a patrol plane in 1928. 
Prompt decisions were made by the captain, FltlLt Murray; and he showed foresight 
in releasing only four depth charges, when he might well have had eight; thus retaining 
enough for a possible second attack. The Catalina had only two advantages, the sea was 
calm, which facilitated visual sighting, and in those northern latitudes it experienced only 
1hr 16min of darkness. 214 The official naval historian, Captain Roskill, gives U-320 being 
the last of 699 German U-boats claimed by Allied ships and aircraft in WW2.215 From 
official records, Coastal Command aircraft sank 185 German U-boats in World Warlland 
shared the sinking of23 others.216 
Conclusions 
The first requirement of an air force is to have aircraft and Coastal Command 
throughout the war had none that had been designed specifically for anti-submarine 
warfare. In the U-boat war it was the American-built aircraft such as Hudsons, Catalinas 
and Liberators that served to a considerable extent and without which the British would 
have been in dire straits. Notably, the Liberators were able to close the Mid-Atlantic Gap. 
Aircrews were trained in their particular aircrew categories, pilot, navigator 
(observer), wireless operator etc, and all would have had some training in gunnery. Notably 
lacking was training in anti-submarine warfare, although some specialist training was later 
to be given in ASV!Radar, either before or when on a squadron. This could be considered a 
reasonable compromise in view of the constant operational requirements that prevailed 
right up to and including the 8 May 1945. The advent of Coastal Command's Leigh Light 
aircraft in 1942 represented a turning point enabling aircraft to attack U-boats which were 
on the surface at night, thus at no time throughout the twenty-four hours could the enemy 
feel free of attacks. 
214. Air 27-1300 No 210 sqdn's ORBs, 1944-45. 
215. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1961, Vol. III.2, pJOO. 
216. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record, 1939-1945, Table A. 
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With about forty-two successes against enemy submarines by just the Wellington 
Leigh Light aircraft, a major contribution was made by this device, although other types of 
aircraft were additionally so equipped. 
The Lufwaffe's part in the Battle of the Atlantic was threefold: its aircraft attacked 
ships, served as reconnaissance to the U-boat Command in reporting positions of Allied 
convoys; and in the Battle of the Bay, endeavoured to protect U-boats in transit from 
Coastal Command's aircraft. It was not very successful in the latter, due notably to the fact 
that Sunderlands were able to defend themselves, and additionally, the Luftwaffe was 
reluctant to engage in combat with Beaufighters that were used as a counter-measure .. 
British strategy was based on having France as an ally, but although the prospect of 
the French 'holding up their hands' was touched upon, no preparations had been made for 
that possibility. 
In respect of the U-boat campaign, the effect of the collapse of France was twofold: 
( a) its Biscay ports became the base for both German and Italian submarines; (b) actions in 
the French colonies both in North Africa and the Far East drained the resources of Coastal 
Command. The policy of the Allies building ships to keep up with the numbers being sunk, 
may be questioned. No account appears to have been taken of the losses of merchant 
seamen and the ships' valuable cargoes. The cost of building aircraft to protect the ships 
should surely have been much less and with lives of many merchant seamen saved thereby. 
The Admiralty's beliefthat the major threat to our trade was from surface warships 
rather than U-boats was to be proved wrong; as also that Asdic would effectively counter 
U-boat actions. When ultimately the U-boat threat was acknowledged, tactics for aircraft to 
attack them were developed. Coastal's aircrews demonstrated their adaptability in this 
respect with remarkable success. This was despite ever lacking throughout, both a low 
level bombsight and a radio altimeter. It is fairly certain that a number of aircraft and crews 
were lost due to those deficiencies. 
Coastal Command modified its ASW tactics with changes in U-boat tactics, and 
likewise, the U-boats adapted to Coastal's offensive. Although ASVlRadar became 
available to a squadron in 1940 as a means of detecting vessels on the surface, it was not 
until 1943 that more efficient radar became available to most squadrons, and which 
initially could not be detected by receivers on German U-boats. 
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Admiral Donitz considered Radar to be the crucial factor in ASW, but for Professor 
Jiirgen Rohwer, the crucial factor was intelligence. Both Germany and the Allies used 
intelligence extensively through the breaking of codes and ciphers under 'Ultra' and 
'Enigma'. It was a mistake on the part of the British Admiralty to disregard the danger of 
transmitting signals giving positions and courses of allied convoys that were invaluable to 
the enemy. Donitz directing his U-boats through WIT signals was questionable, but which 
he must have justified by having control over his 'wolf packs' and being aware of their 
situation. 
Initially, Coastal Command had no weapon lethal to U-boats and most of its aircraft 
lacked even suitable armament for defence. For specifically ASW, the most significant 
improvement in respect of machine guns was to have more firing forward to counter AA 
from U-boats during an attack by the aircraft. A crucial factor in air attacks on U-boats was 
the lethal 2501b depth charge filled with Torpex and with a pistol for shallow depths. Other 
weapons which were to be used with some success were rocket projectiles, cannon, retro-
bombs and the depth bomb but the latter in conjunction with a medium altitude bomb-
sight. What was coded the 'Mark 24 Mine'; in fact was an acoustic torpedo, and gained 
Some success with Coastal-controlled aircraft of the United States Navy. It did not 
however, displace the 2501b depth charge that became the standard primary weapon. 
Naval and Coastal Command co-operation was demonstrated from the outset 
with Sir Frederick Bowhill transferring his Headquarters to be close to the Admiralty. 
Co-operation between the two Services was to become very obvious at Command, Group, 
Station, and in convoy escorts, thus at crew level. 
This co-operation must represent one of the crucial factors in the anti-submarine war. 
Coastal Command became the model in ASW, not only for Canada but also for America 
(which both acknowledge in their histories). 
The Command's Commanding Officers of squadrons led from the front, literally in 
operations, and this served to promote high morale - one of the conditions for success. 
Coastal Command co-operated fully with the other Commands in the RAF both 
Fighter and Bomber, which provided additional support in some ASW operations. With 
both the Dominions and America there was some interchange of both personnel and 
squadrons, but many nations were represented in Coastal including personnel from Europe. 
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With their squadrons spread around half the world- USA, Iceland, Gibraltar, North 
Africa, the Azores and West Africa, the Commanders-in-Chief, Coastal Command had a 
difficult task. 
Both men and machines had to be 'fitted in' into what ever was available at various 
bases and to move a squadron involved not just men and aircraft, but certainly about eighty 
tons of equipment. An important factor was runways; the length had to be considered even 
for twin-engined aircraft, and lIM Treasury limited the funds available. 
When Sir Frederick Bowhill was in Command in the first stage of the war, his task 
was largely organising reconnaissance against surface warships; anti-submarine warfare 
was taking second place. With the resources then available, he could only just hope to hold 
the line. 
The tenure of Sir Philip Joubert who succeeded him represented an interim period in 
changes of policy both in respect of ASW and anti-shipping operations. His task was not 
helped by having his trained forces being posted overseas. Nevertheless, this period marked 
a phase when an offensive was taken against U-boats in Operation Bolero. Despite all their 
tasks, those two Commanders-in-Chief set the standard that was to prevail in Coastal; and 
When Air Marshal John Slessor succeeded Sir Philip in early 1943, he found that much of 
the spadework had been accomplished. There was a U-boat crisis in early 1943 with many 
ships sunk, but Slessor was able to concentrate his attention on ASW which nevertheless 
approximated to what Sir Philip had aspired. He wished the Allies to consider the Atlantic 
as one battlefield with all forces co-ordinated, and this was ultimately achieved. For an 
offshoot of the Atlantic battle - the 'Battle of the Bay', Biscay, he considered as the 'trunk 
of the tree', through which all U-boats passed to the 'branches' in the Atlantic. Forces 
should therefore be concentrated in the Biscay transit area, but not at the expense of 
threatened convoys. 
In anti-submarine-warfare, Coastal Command attempted a balance between close 
convoy escorts, sweeps perhaps ahead of convoys, and patrols in the U-boat transit routes, 
both in the north from Norway, and the route from the French Biscay ports, the latter ever a 
serious thorn in the side of the British up to the time those ports were isolated following 
Operation Overlord. The Norwegian fjords as cover for U-boats remained a threat right up 
to and even after the 8 May 1945. 
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In the final stages of the war, some U-boats were fitted with schnorchels that enabled 
the U-boats to remain submerged but still using their Diesels. They came too late however, 
and in too little a number to affect the outcome. Additionally also, greatly improved 
designs in U-boat with a high underwater speed came too late. They could well have 
provided a very serious threat to the Allies' communications. 
Overall, one must agree with Professor Rohwer that the prime factor in the Battle of 
the Atlantic was intelligence; both for Germany and the Allies. The necessity for 
intelligence was to be demonstrated, not only in the U-boat war, but also for some of the 
major battles - Midway, Cape Matapan,' 'Bismarck'. and when Ceylon was saved from 
attack. 
Secondary to intelligence was Radar and to a lesser degree, the Allied Navies' 
HFIDF. Of specific importance for Coastal Command were the long-range aircraft and the 
2501b depth charge. From the Command's records a total of 185 German U-boats and four 
Italian submarines were sunk by Coastal Command controlled aircraft in World War II. 
Shared with naval forces were another twenty-three U-boats and one Italian 
submarine sunk. Additionally another 117 U-boats and four Italian submarines were so 
damaged by Coastal controlled aircraft that they had to return to port. Against those 
successes the Command lost a total of741 aircraft that were engaged on anti-submarine 
operations. That about six aircraft were lost for every U-boat sunk by its aircraft, refutes the 
belief that flying in Coastal Command was a 'piece of cake'. 
The official RAF history acknowledges that Coastal's shipping strikes were 
dangerous; there was also an element of danger in flying over the Atlantic or the Bay of 
Biscay against U-boats in World War II. Some historians tend to single out one Liberator 
squadron due to its obvious successes in sinking U-boats. 
This is unfair to all the other squadrons, including those on loan from Bomber 
Command. They all served, if only to keep the U-boats submerged and therefore unable to 
track convoys as Professor Rohwer acknowledges. The particular Liberator squadron had 
the advantages of that type of aircraft, with experienced crews (if not handpicked), the right 
weapons in abundance, and was in the right place at the right time. 
Germany had only fifty-seven U-boats at the beginning of the war, and just one of 
those, (U-47), sank forty-two ships up to February 1941. 
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It was fortunate for Britain that of the 1,170 U-boats that Germany produced, most were 
considerably less successful. 630 were lost at sea, but only 123 in port. 
At the Service of Commemoration held in Liverpool Cathedral for the Battle of the 
Atlantic in May 1993, precedence was given to the British Mercantile Marine; its losses 
had been catastrophic. 
Epilogue 
In my first tour of operations (500 hours), of the enemy I saw only a guard ship in 
Trondheim fjord; the periscope of a U-boat north of the Shetlands, and had air-to-air 
combat with a Lufwaffe fighter over the Mediterranean. I heard later that the U-boat we 
had reported was sunk by a destroyer. I ever wonder about the pilot of the fighter, who, I 
felt at the time, had no wish to kill me. My home suffered damage due to bombs and a V2, 
but at no time did I feel bitterness or animosity against either Germans or Italians. 
Post war I have had friendly correspondence with a number of enemy submariners 
including notably Peter Cremer ofU-333 and Wolf Stiebler ofU-461. Although there were 
exceptions on both sides, Coastal Command aircrew were concerned, not with killing men 
but sinking U-boats. Some risked both their aircraft and their lives in an endeavour to save 
the enemy, such as the one who dropped his own dinghy to Korvettenkapitan Stiebler, and 
another who landed his Sunderland in open sea to rescue three Italian submariners. Some 
of the Command's pilots became deeply distressed at the plight of their enemy; in the case 
of the USN pilot who sank U-388, he 'bottled up' the memory until he related it to me 
many years later. 
The Norwegian who sank U-423 saw the cap of its captain on the sea, and was so 
affected that he did not join his squadron's celebrations. Some Italian and German 
submariners have become friends with those who were their former enemies. 
Poignant for me, were two telephone calls from Peter Cremer asking if there were 
survivors from the Sunderland that he had shot down. One of his crew had seen two 
survivors through the flames. 'No' was my reply. As Cremer added, 'I had no choice'. The 
tone of his voice, showed his obvious regret. I had flown in that same aircraft only a short 
time earlier. There was a human aspect in the U-boat war. 
Prelude 
5. Anti - Shipping Operations 
Part 1 Merchant Shipping 
An anti-shipping policy had been agreed by the British with their French allies 
in April 1939. It stated: 
The Allies would not initiate air action against any but ptrrely 'military' objectives in the 
narrowest sense of the word and would as far as possible confine it to objectives on which 
attacks would not involve loss of civilian life. 1 
In August 1939 the Admiralty and Air Ministry issued instructions that only enemy 
warships, troopships and auxiliary vessels in direct attendance on the fleet were aircraft 
free to attack. In the case of merchant vessels, they were not to be attacked. At best they 
might be ordered to a port, or for the aircraft to await the arrival of an allied surface 
vessel.2 Coastal Command's role in counter offensive action was limited' .. .in defence 
of seaborne trade embodying attacks on the enemy fleet, air forces or submarines 
operating against our trade,.3 Even against the heavy fleet units, the Command was not 
allowed to bomb ships in harbour, but only when merchant vessels were not at risk, and 
with the naval units anchored in more open waters.4 
Thus Coastal Command was effectively restricted to attacks on the enemy's 
heavy naval ships when they were at sea, and even then, as a defensive rather than an 
offensive measure. For that task the Command had only two squadrons of Vildebeest 
aircraft, out-dated biplanes, which were lacking in both speed and range, and thus could 
not be used for the task. With Britain inhibited by the 1923 Geneva convention, and the 
vacillating French,S there was no clear specific anti-shipping policy in September 1939 
for Coastal Command. It was to be demonstrated on 13 December when a No 220 
squadron Hudson that had shadowed four enemy destroyers, needed instructions from 
base before it could bomb the enemy. 
1. Air 41-73 RAF in the Maritime War, Chap.1.2.iii. 
2. Air 41-73 Cbap.I.2.iii. 
3. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. I, para.S. 
4. Air 15-173 Vol. I, paraA. 
5. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War, London, 1917, Vol. n, Chaps. X & XI. 
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This was the first attack by Coastal Command's aircraft on any enemy 
shipping. Lack of suitable armament was demonstrated by the attack made with only 
two anti-submarine bombs from 2,OOOft. 
No success was claimed, but at that time, the squadron had hardly completed its 
conversion to Hudsons, and accuracy from 2,OOOft altitude was limited. Furthermore, 
the NS bombs were designed to be dropped on to water. Hudsons, nevertheless, were in 
the war to claim sixty ships sunk or damaged, (including four Japanese merchant 
vessels in the Far East).6 
At the outbreak of war the German fleet included two battle cruisers, the 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the heavy cruiser, the Admiral Hipper. Later in the war 
another heavy cruiser, the Prinz Eugen and two modem battleships, the Bismarck and 
the Tirpitz came into service. Coastal Command was to become closely involved with 
all those vessels. 
Although the primary task of the Command was specified as reconnaissance to 
report the outbreak of any surface raiders, shortage of aircraft, and what was to remain a 
problem throughout the war, aircraft of sufficient range to undertake reconnaissance of 
the Kattegat and Skagerrak, that is, the areas through which enemy ships were likely to 
pass. Aircraft that were becoming progressively available, certainly to operate to the 
Norwegian coast, were the Lockheed Hudsons, and they were to be followed by Bristol 
Beauforts and Blenheims. Standing patrols against the possible outbreak of enemy 
surface raiders began on 23 August 1939 from Scotland to the southern coast of Norway 
at Stadlandet, albeit when just one squadron, No 224, of the land-based reconnaissance 
units, was then fully equipped with Hudsons. The other squadrons were still using 
Ansons that lacked the range to operate off Norway. 
The Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick 
Bowhill had anticipated that the Kriegsmarine would attempt a breakout of major naval 
units before war was declared, and thus had laid on patrols on 23 August. Nevertheless, 
two 'pocket battleships', the Admiral Graf Spee and the Deutschland had evaded 
detection, the Admiral Graf Spee leaving on 21 August and the Deutschland three days 
later.7 It was one of their two supply ships, the Altmark that was later to involve the 
Command.s 
6. Hendrie, A., Lockheed Hudson in WW2, Shrewsbury, 1999, p.122. Air 27-1223 No 220 sqdn's ORB. 
7. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, p.58. 
8. Air 27-1365 No 220 sqdn's ORB, 1940. 
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With emphasis given to countering major fleet units, no specific plans had been 
made in respect of possible attacks on minor naval units such as destroyers, 
minesweepers or E-boats. Nevertheless, these smaller vessels were to pose a threat to 
British shipping, and to require considerable effort on the part of Coastal Command 
right up to the end of the war in Europe. 9 
Anti-shipping policies for Coastal Command were still being formulated in 1939 
and on 12 October there was a directive from the Air Ministry that required Bomber 
Command to provide three bomber squadrons to co-operate in strikes against German 
naval units. This bomber force was to be under the direct orders of Coastal Command. 10 
This decision stemmed from a Coastal Command aircraft giving a sighting 
report of enemy ships which had not been followed up with a strike by Bomber 
Command against the German naval vessels as was expected. It was indicative of what 
was to prove one of the weaknesses in anti-shipping operations; which was of a strike 
force unable to locate the target after a sighting report was transmitted. 
Due to German attacks on Allied shipping, the Chief of Air Staff chaired a 
meeting on 7 December when the lack of co-ordination of the British forces in anti-
shipping operations was expressed. The outcome from the meeting was that although 
Naval and Air Staffs would retain executive control of their forces, they would be co-
ordinated by joint Admiralty and Air Ministry staff with Admiral Holland responsible 
On behalf of the Admiralty and Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert representing the Air Staff 
as 'Advisor on Combined Operations in the North Sea'; this co-operation was with 
effect from 12 December 1939. 11 During my second tour of operations in 1944-45 I 
became well aware of the friendly co-operation with the Royal Navy at operational level 
over the North Sea working with His Majesty's Ships. 
At Command level in 1939-1940, however, it was found that the advisors had 
become involved only with forward planning and in April 1940, Sir Philip Joubert was 
appointed to a new post, that of Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Radar). 
For aircrews there still remained uncertainty concerning the bombing or 
otherwise of ships, and on 30 December there was a meeting at the Air Ministry with 
representatives from the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. 
9. Air 15-773 C-in-C' s Despatches, Vol. I, para. 51. 
10. Air 41-73 The RAP in the Maritime War, Vol. II, Chap. I, p.14 
11. Air 41-73 Vol. II, Chap. I, p.14. 
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This resulted in the Air Ministry issuing instructions on 4 February 1940 that any 
part of the enemy fleet could be attacked, sunk on sight, but merchant vessels in convoy 
were excluded. 12 
There remained to be resolved the control of Bomber Command's strike force and 
on 22 February it had been agreed that two bomber squadrons should be detached from 
No 5 Group, Bomber Command, to be based in Scotland under Coastal's control 
through the AOC No18 Group, but training of the squadrons would rest with No.5 
Group although advice from Coastal Command would be welcomed. 13 This typically 
British compromise was representative of what was to prevail for Coastal Command 
throughout the war; that was, tentative agreements with the other Commands in respect 
of operational squadrons, as also with the Fleet Air Arm. The agreements applied also, 
not only for squadrons, but also for the use of bases. In respect of Coastal Command's 
anti-shipping operations, the major event in 1940 was Germany's invasion and 
occupation of Norway in April. 
The ill-conceived Allied Norwegian campaign proved too little and too late to 
thwart the Germans. From the outset of World War II, the Command had laid on patrols 
to Norway with Hudsons flying the more southerly sorties, while the few Sunderlands 
available flew the more northerly trips due to their greater range. The first casualty of 
that invasion commemorated by the Norwegians was in fact a Coastal Command 
Sunderland lost on 9 April 1940.14 The invasion of Norway on 9 April must have 
served to concentrate the minds of the War Cabinet, as on that day it authorised Coastal 
Command to attack without warning, any ships underway in the Skagerrak. 
The directive included notably, merchant vessels and those eastwards of 8°E in 
harbour. It resulted in six attacks in the first ten days but limited to those by Hudsons 
with 250lb bombs and Blenheims with machine guns, with the first attack on a merchant 
vessel in Norwegian waters by a Hudson of No 224 squadron on the 11 April. 15 
Account now had to be taken of the whole of the vast Norwegian coastline up to 
North Cape, particularly when later; Britain was sailing convoys to Russia. This was 
because Norwegian fjords provided protected bases for Germany's capital ships in 
addition to bases for the Luftwaffe, such as at Stavanger. 
12. Air 41-73 Vol. II, Chap. VI, p.l73. 
13. Air 41-73 Vol. II, Chap. 1, p.14. 
14. Air 27-1299 No 210 sqdn's ORB, 1940. 
15. Air 41-73 Vol. II, Chap. VI, p.174. 
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The safe anchorages gained additional natural protection by surrounding hills and 
mountains on which gun emplacements could be located. Such was to be demonstrated 
in February 1945 when a German destroyer anchored in a fjord near a cliff became an 
'impossible' target for a powerful strike force. 16 
What the Admiralty had not realised also was that Norway's Indreled (inner 
leads), that is, the coastal waters with the natural protection of islands, could be 
negotiated by warships and merchant vessels, and could serve as a route for surface 
raiders to break out into the Atlantic after leaving the Skagerrak. There was, however, a 
stretch of open water off southern Norway that ships had to enter and were open to 
attack, and Coastal's strike aircraft were to make good use of that fact. Additional 
protection of the enemy's ships in Norway was given by the Luftwaffe's single-engined 
and twin-engined fighters, and as late as 1945, the enemy was able to muster as many as 
forty-five fighters including some of the latest marks to protect his ships against 
Coastal's aircraft. 
Thus Norway's topography and location provided Germany with excellent bases to 
protect its own ships, which at the same time could ever seriously threaten allied ships. 
Germany employed that advantage to the full. 
Economically, Germany depended considerably on high-grade iron ore from 
Sweden and Norway that would have been shipped from the Swedish port of Lulea in 
the Baltic or Narvik on Norway's northern coastline. The cargoes were received at 
Emden or Bremen but after 10 May 1940 when the Low Countries were over-run, the 
Dutch port of Rotterdam was Germany's preferred route to its industrial Ruhr, with 
Rotterdam having better port facilities and able to handle a much greater tonnage. By 
the nature of Norway's topography, the preferred route from Scandinavia was by sea, 
although there was a railway from Trondheim to Oslo. 
In addition to iron ore, Germany required from Norway, fish and forestry products. 
Return trade was such as coal and coke; but with Norway occupied, military traffic was 
added. Thus, now for Coastal Command, were the additional tasks of reconnaissance of 
a greatly extended coastline, an increased likelihood of a break-out by surface raiders, 
and finally to take on an anti-shipping role against merchant vessels sailing between 
ports such as Narvik and Rotterdam. For all these tasks, it was largely dependent on a 
converted airliner, the Hudson. 
16. Air 41-73 Vol.lI, Chap. VI, p.174. 
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Merchant Vessels 
One of the first anti-shipping operations to Norway was against the 12,000-ton 
Altmark that had been the supply ship for the Admiral Graf Spee. It had arrived at 
Trondheim on 14 February but on 15 February was reported passing Bergen. The 
Admiralty, although it had deployed a cruiser and five destroyers had lost track of the 
vessel and asked Coastal Command to undertake a search. The Altmark was located by 
a No 220 squadron Hudson in J0ssing fjord, and then considered 'neutral' waters. 
Following Winston Churchill's intervention, Captain Vian on HMS Cossack entered the 
fjord, and the Navy's boarding party freed 300 allied prisoners. The incident gained 
much publicity for the Navy, and at that time could be considered useful propaganda. 
Dr Goulter's account of this incident gives emphasis to the intelligence provided 
through diplomatic channels. I consider it much more likely that there were agents in 
Norway who would give immediate reports by radio on both ships and aircraft such as I 
was to experience in 1942. Of greater importance than any intelligence reports, in this 
case, would have been the dedication of the Hudson captain in his search for Altmark; it 
was typical of such men in the early stages of the war, that they accepted considerable 
risks, particularly over Norway. 17 
On 25 April 1940 the Air Ministry signalled Groups that aircraft were permitted 
to attack merchant vessels underway within ten miles of the Norwegian coast, anywhere 
east of6°E and from 61~ to 54~. 
It was thus against coastal traffic from just south of Alesund down to the north 
German coast. This decision must have stemmed from the realisation that the enemy 
was attacking allied ships while vital enemy supplies were being allowed to sail freely. 
By that time, however, the Luftwaffe had gained bases at Trondheim and Stavanger, and 
as Coastal's aircrew were to experience, the enemy was prepared to give overwhelming 
fighter cover to its shipping. Germany had invaded the Low Countries on 10 May 1940 
and France capitulated on 21 June with the signing of an armistice. Britain had lost 
France as an ally but gained the Vichy French as a potential enemy of which Coastal's 
aircrew were to become acutely aware. 
Thus by June 1940 tasks for the Command then ranged from the Spanish border 
up to North Cape, and that vast coastline had then to be covered to a lesser or greater 
degree up to 8 May 1945 and even beyond that date. 18 
17. Goulter, C.,A Forgotten Offensive, London, 1995, p.123. Air 27-1365 No 220 sqdn's ORB, 1940 .. 
18. Air 41-73 The RAF in the Maritime War, Vol. ll, Chap. lll, p.86. 
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On 16 July another Air Ministry directive permitted the Command to 'sink on 
sight' but in prescribed areas of the North Sea and Skagerrak. In respect of anti-shipping 
operations, the occupation of Norway, the Low Countries and France resulted in areas 
to be covered which corresponded generally to three of the Command's Groups; No 18 
for the largely Norwegian sector, No 16 Group for the Netherlands, and No 19 Group 
for the French coastline. For anti-shipping, the Norwegian and Dutch coasts remained 
paramount throughout; for shipping (rather than U-boats), the French ports, after the 
'Channel Dash' proved less significant, although there were some destroyer escorts and 
blockade runners to contend with from time to time. 
For anti-shipping operations off Norway, the Command, in 1940, was largely 
dependent on Hudsons, although some Bristol Blenheims and Beauforts were becoming 
available. Because of the range, some of the few Sunderlands available were required to 
undertake the more northerly sorties, along the Norwegian coast, although they could 
hardly be considered as strike aircraft, and generally, would not be so used. For aircraft 
operating in the northern part of the Norwegian coast there was ever the problem that 
enemy shipping could gain shelter in the leads, particularly from any possible torpedo 
attack. 
The first confirmed anti-shipping success for the Command in the Norwegian 
area was in fact gained by a Hudson which damaged a 1,939-ton merchant vessel in 
Grimstad fjord on 29 April 1940.There was a further directive on 14 June from the Air 
Ministry which required all merchant vessels in Norwegian fjords between Trondheim 
and Kristiansand to be attacked and sunk. This was due to the belief that invasion forces 
Were being prepared in Norway. 
The Command's strike force of Beauforts, due to their unreliable engines, and 
limited defensive armament were considered unsuitable for what was acknowledged to , 
be a dangerous task that was thus left effectively to the Hudson squadrons. Additionally, 
however, the Air Ministry required two medium bomber squadrons to be available 
primarily against invasion transport and the sister squadrons, Nos 53 and 59 were 
transferred from Bomber to Coastal Command. 19 This decision was made at an Air 
Ministry conference on 26 June and it was intended that those squadrons should fill the 
gap left by Coastal squadrons being deployed in the North West, where there was now 
an increased need for anti-submarine forces due to French and Norwegian bases then 
available to the enemy. 
19. Air 15-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. I, para. 103. 
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It was a No 59 squadron Blenheim which claimed the first sinking of a merchant 
vessel off the French coast near Cherbourg on 18 September. Off the Dutch coast a 
Hudson had earlier damaged an auxiliary vessel. A Beaufort from No 22 squadron, 
which had recently rearmed, followed these successes, damaging a merchant vessel off 
Den Helder. Those examples represented the strike aircraft for Coastal Command up to 
the end of 1940; namely Hudsons, Blenheims and Beauforts, although they were aided 
by Swordfish from the Fleet Air Arm that came under the Command's control. It was to 
be late 1942 before any success against enemy shipping was recorded for Beaufighters 
and Hampdens. 
Meanwhile it was for aircraft such as Hudsons and Blenheims to serve as a 
strike force and with the low-level tactics employed up to the middle of 1942, to suffer 
serious losses accordingly.2o After the Battle of Britain, in September, the German 
invasion preparations were considered complete and for Coastal Command, emphasis 
was given to shipping targets rather than anti-invasion reconnaissance. Hitler had 
planned the invasion, Operation Sealion for 15 September, but having failed to gain air 
superiority, it was postponed indefinitely until 12 October but not discontinued until 9 
January 1941.21 
On 18 September Rover patrols were introduced against enemy shipping off the 
Dutch coast but also further south to the areas of Cherbourg and the Channel Islands. 
This represented the commencement of the Command's change to an anti-shipping 
offensive.22 There had, however, been a progression from anti-invasion reconnaissance 
towards anti-shipping patrols. 
Such 'Rover patrols' tended to be referred to as 'armed recces' with aircraft 
looking for ships and convoys to attack. Former anti-invasion reconnaissance became 
anti-shipping patrols and with the intention of attacking with bombs and torpedoes. 
With the end of the immediate invasion threat, the Prime Minister chaired a 
meeting of the War Cabinet's Defence Committee on 31 October at which it was agreed 
that a seaborne invasion threat was reduced during the winter months. Meanwhile 
Coastal Command would still undertake reconnaissance of potential invasion ports, 
although offensive patrols were being substituted between Stavanger and Horns Reef, 
that is, an area where ships would be in open sea and could be more readily attacked. 
20. Richards, D., and Saunders, H., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. II, p.95. 
21. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record ,1939-1945, Table F. 
22. Air 41-73 The RAF in the Maritime War, Vol. II, pp.156, 161. 
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Four standing patrols were laid on to cover the area from Stadlandet to Horns 
Reef; and these appeared still in force during the summer of 1942 when I was on sorties 
to Norway.23 Generally, it may be said, that by December 1940, Coastal Command was 
undertaking regular sorties covering the enemy-controlled coastline from at least 
northwards as far as Bergen and southwards down to Lorient. 
Thus the three Groups at this time, Nos 18, 16 and 15 Groups were involved, 
with No 18 responsible for operations to Norway, No 16 Group covering the Dutch 
coast, and No 15 (later No.19 Group) concerned with the French coast and the Bay of 
Biscay. 
The year 1940 marked a turning point in the duties to be required of Coastal 
Command. Its two main roles had become anti-submarine warfare and anti-shipping 
operations. At this stage in the war, the anti-submarine sorties were still of a defensive 
nature; but in the anti-shipping role, Coastal Command was on the offensive. Within the 
year 1940, No 16 Group's aircraft had sunk or damaged in the four months September 
to December, ten ships, while No 18 Group's aircraft claimed ten ships sunk or 
damaged in the nine months April to December. 
Tactics were being developed in shipping attacks by the squadrons, and with low 
level bombing, rather than medium or high-level methods. Low-level attacks resulted in 
greater accuracy but much greater losses of aircraft and crews. Sir Frederick Bowhill 
was ever mindful of the welfare of all his personnel; he had taken the view, however, 
that bombing at low level was safer because of the rapid change in angle of attack. 
Subsequent records of such as No 407 (RCAF) and No 220 squadrons were to disprove 
that belief. Coastal Command aircrew again showed that they were prepared to suffer 
such losses, and which the official RAF historians were later to acknowledge.
24 
Sir Frederick Bowhill summed up Coastal Command's shipping offensive for 
the period 1 June to 31 December 1940 with 141 bombing attacks on merchant vessels 
at sea, with thirty ships suffering direct hits. Of those, Hudsons scored sixteen, 
Blenheims, thirteen, and one by Ansons. Additionally in those 141 attacks, thirty-seven 
vessels were damaged.2s That period was a transitional one for the Command's aircraft 
with Hudsons replacing Ansons, as the reconnaissance squadrons converted. Ansons 
were at a disadvantage in shipping strikes by being limited to a 200lb bomb load, they 
lacked also the speed of the Blenheims and Hudsons. 
23. Air 41-73 Vol. n, p.161. 
24. Richards, D., and Saunders, H., Royal Air Force 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. n, p.95. 
25. Air 15-773 Vol. I, para. 110. 
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In February 1941, two Blenheim squadrons were temporarily transferred from 
Bomber Command to Coastal; they were No 107 which went to Leuchars, and No 114 
to initially, Thomaby.26 This was to help maintain Coastal's operations in the east in 
anti-submarine, anti-shipping and anti-invasion patrols. 
This stemmed from Coastal transferring some forces to the west in anticipation 
of a spring offensive by Germany's U-boats, and demonstrated how stretched were 
Coastal's forces. There was much rearming of squadrons in Coastal Command during 
1941, and the first to become operational with Beaufighters was No 252.27 Initially 
these Beaufighters were intended to protect Allied shipping against the FW200 Kondor 
aircraft, but later they were to replace the Hudsons, Blenheims and Beauforts in the 
Strike squadrons. It was to be found, however, that better aircraft, (as they were in the 
strike role), did not necessarily result in greater efficiency. Experienced aircrews were 
also necessary. This period was not only transitional with the need to gain 
reinforcements from other Commands, and the re-arming of squadrons, but also changes 
in tactics. This was most obvious by the change from medium-level to low-level 
bombing, with some squadrons attacking from literally 'mast height'. 
This was to be exemplified later by PIO O'Connell ofNo.407 (RCAF) squadron 
who left a bomb door on the mast of a ship.28 These low level tactics resulted in greater 
successes against ships, but squadron losses disproved Sir Frederick's belief that low-
level attacks were safer.29 
The need for precise flying if attacking from high levels is shown by the 
following: a lateral error in flying the aircraft of 2° would result in a ground error of 
220yd, and a fore and aft error of 2° gives a ground error of 250yd; albeit from 20,000ft 
altitude.3o In this period of attacks on enemy shipping, the weapon most used was the 
250lb general-purpose (GP) bomb, and with which 68% of the attacks were made. They 
represented a balance between high blast and fragmentation, for which a cast iron case 
was used. Anti-submarine (AlS) bombs were used in 12% of the attacks, but they were 
intended to be dropped into water. This was because they provided high blast due to 
mUch explosive filling but which was contained in a thin casing. 
26. Air 15-773 Vol. I, para.l16. 
27. Air 15-773 Vol. I, para.1lS. 
28. Air 27-1793 No 407 sqdn's ORB, 1942. 
29. Air 15-773 Vol. I, para 121. 
30. Student Notes for Aircrews, 1942. 
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More important for the safety for aircrews and aircraft was the use of an 11 
second delay fuse replacing the former instantaneous fuse. This was to enable aircraft 
to be well clear of the target before the bomb exploded.31 Although 7% of the bombs 
used were 500lb GPs, (general purpose), they were confined to the Beaufort aircraft that 
were able to accept them. 
By the end of his tenure as Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, Sir 
Frederick Bowhill considered that the Command's anti-shipping operations had 
developed into a carefully planned and co-ordinated attack on the enemy's sea 
communications against which at that time, Germany had no effective counter 
measures. He acknowledged Bomber Command's contribution in the development of 
low-level attacks that he considered 'most profitable,.32 Coastal Command still lacked 
aircraft to undertake a more intensive anti-shipping campaign, as could be said also for 
anti-U-boat warfare. 
When Sir Philip Joubert succeeded Sir Frederick on 14 June, he was aware of no 
immediate threat of a German invasion and was able to divert more resources to an anti-
shipping offensive. This was directed mainly against shipping off the Norwegian coast 
using Hudsons and Beaufort aircraft. He gave credit largely to the Beauforts,33 as it was 
likely that Sir Philip was pleased that at long last Coastal had two squadrons (Nos 22 
and 42), of torpedo aircraft~ the Beaufort which had a suitable range, and which was 
then operating successfully. Those two squadrons were, however, posted overseas the 
following year. 34 
Sir Philip made a change of policy in July by directing squadrons more to an 
offensive against shipping at sea, rather than to land targets that had been expected of 
the Command. Joubert had intended laying on anti-shipping patrols in the Channel and 
Dover Straits, for which he could have obtained intelligence, not only from photo-
reconnaissance, but also from radar or DIF stations in the South-East of England. At a 
meeting on 15 July, however, it was decided that anti-shipping attacks between 
Cherbourg and Texel should be the responsibility of Bomber Command.
35 
Sir Philip's 
motives included the possibility of attracting the fighters that might be used to cover the 
enemy's ships and thereby lessen the forces against Russia. 
37"1."7K::-y-:-dd-=-,-=C:""-.,-=S-=/L--:d-r,--O-:-S--O--:, O-F-C""",-to-t-he-a-u-th-o-r.-S-ee-a-::-Is-o:--=M""7a-st-:-"e-rs--;, 0:::-.-, Sno--;F;;:;-e-w,--;Lo;--n
7do=-=n,-.-r19;";47"1.----
32. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Oespatches, Vol. I, para.l21. 
33. Air 15-773 Vol. I, para. 147. 
34. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Meetings, 134tb 4.3.42. 
35. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para. 155. 
41. Strike crews of No 404 squadron ReAF at Davidstow Moor in June 1944. The 
Beaufighter in the background shows the single machine gun for the navigator. 
42. A Hudson of No 320 (Dutch) Squadron. 
This unit lost twenty -one aircraft while on shipping strikes. 
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These intended shipping operations prompted Sir Philip also to consider tactics 
against enemy vessels which he decided should include close co-operation between the 
Navy's surface vessels and strike aircraft; and that a fighter escort for the strike aircraft 
should be provided to engage enemy fighters. A further requirement was that there 
should be close liaison by the reconnaissance aircraft with the organisation for the strike 
force. 36 Sir Philip's appreciation of what was necessary for a successful strike was to 
be endorsed by aircrews that later formed the Strike Wings. There were occasions, 
however, when the system fell short of his requirements. 
They were: 1. Reconnaissance aircraft failed to give the essential details of the 
target; position, time, speed and direction, type of target, and if the enemy was under 
way. It was important also, to transmit such intelligence promptly, before the enemy 
gained cover, by, for example, entering Den Helder that was heavily defended. This 
question was raised later by the AOe at a conference on 19 September 1941 although 
he was thinking of the potential targets off Norway gaining cover in the fjords. To 
counter that he suggested constant patrols covering both reconnaissance and strikes. 
What in fact were to become 'armed recces,.37 This appreciation, however, was in the 
transitional stage of anti-shipping operations, with some crews still untrained in 
maritime operations and lacking experience. Nevertheless, even reconnaissances that 
produced no obvious results, gave that experience to aircrews, and would have been at 
least a nuisance to the enemy, and only some of the sorties proved abortive. 2. Fighter 
aircraft intended for escort sometimes failed to rendezvous at the right time and 
position. This was vital for a Strike Wing with many aircraft so that it could formate in 
as short a time as possible, due to limited endurance. 
Sir Philip, in his appreciation, had stipulated that it was essential that some of 
the fighter escort should be able to attack the enemy ships in advance of the strike 
aircraft to neutralise any opposition. In practice, with Beaufighter aircraft forming the 
main body of the Wing, this was to be proved unnecessary. This was because the 
Beaufighters had such a powerful forward-firing armament. Furthermore, those armed 
additionally with Rocket projectiles, were able to harmonise the release of the RPs with 
their cannon, using the trajectories of the shells as a guide and with positive results.38 
36. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.l56. 
37. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 48th meeting, 19.9.41. 
38. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para. 156. 
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Fighter Command showed that it was prepared to co-operate with Coastal by 
providing escorts for shipping strikes, although the C-in-C Bomber Command 
considered that bombing, whether against ships or other targets was a task for his 
Command, he accepted that torpedo attacks should be left to Coastal. 39 It was decided 
that Bomber Command should be responsible for bombing ships between Cherbourg 
and Texel and with two Blenheim squadrons from No 2 Group Bomber Command to be 
based in range of the Dover Straits with a controller sharing No 16 Group's 
headquarters. 40 
This compromise was probably due to Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of Air Staff, 
who, from Coastal Command's records, demonstrated a remarkably balanced view, 
although Sir Philip showed that he was ever prepared to accept a compromise after 
stating his views, and in the light of the whole situation. The personality of the C-in-C 
of Fighter Command doesn't 'come through' except to ever be prepared to co-operate 
with Coastal Command if other commitments allowed. 
On 2 September 1941 a 'Directive for Coastal Command' was issued following 
a review by the Air Ministry of the Command's operations. There had been an 
agreement between the Admiralty and the Air Council that the primary role of Coastal 
Command was reconnaissance. 
The Command was still permitted, however, to use bombs, depth charges or 
torpedoes against naval units and U-boats at sea, and under favourable conditions, 
torpedo attacks on naval units in harbour. 
When there were no naval targets, Coastal was permitted to bomb enemy 
merchant vessels, but not the escort vessels, and the areas were to be outside those 
allocated to Bomber Command, namely between Texel and Cherbourg.
41 
The Admiralty's reasoning, (as it almost certainly was), appears 
understandable. There were still a number of powerful enemy warships, that even 
Singly, could wreak havoc should they get within range of an allied convoy as was to be 
shown, for example, by the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper. The Royal Navy would wish 
to know, not only if such a ship had sailed, but its position, its course and speed, ideally 
also, its type and name. Trained and experienced Coastal aircrew could best give such 
details, and such men were coming into service. 
39. Air 15-773 Vol.ll, para. 157. Agreed 15.7.41. 
40. Air 15-773 Vol. II, paras.158-162. 
41. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para.163. 
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With the policy to avoid the escort vessels in bombing attacks on enemy 
convoys, there was more to be said for attacking the merchant vessels that were likely to 
carry valuable cargoes, rather than the escorts that were likely to be much more heavily 
armed, as for example, the sperrbrechers. Bombing of 'fringe' land targets was 
permitted but when no enemy shipping was sighted. 
This was in accord with Sir Philip's policy. Aircrews had from the outset 
tended to bomb land targets rather than return with a bomb load when no ships were 
sighted, as for example, FlLt Jim Romanes who bombed Aldemey, albeit at some 
considerable risk. 42 
On the night of the 29 October, nine Hudsons from No 220 squadron bombed 
ships in Alesund harbour. Smoke and fire was seen from the ship attacked by W/Cmdr 
Wright and it was reported sinking. Sergeant Houghton attacked another ship and saw 
sections of the deck and superstructure blasted into the air. FlO Tarrant hit a 2,00Oton 
merchant vessel with his bombs. Other Hudsons attacked shore installations These 
details are given from the squadron's record 43 as three other accounts of the result of 
the strike all differ. 
From the Command's record, one ship of3,101 tons was sunk and two others of 
1,371 tons and 1,108 tons were damaged.44 From the Norwegian historian, Per 
Skaugstad, with whom I corresponded, another ship the Archimede, was also 
successfully attacked. Two other Norwegian historians, Jan Flatmark and Harald 
Grytten in their book give: 'Resultatet var at DIS Barcelona pa 3,100 brt ble senket og 
Vesla skutt I brann' (The steamship Barcelona of 3,100 tons was sunk and Vesla set on 
fire). 45 
This, I consider, was the most successful strike ever undertaken by Coastal 
Command, bearing in mind, all the factors involved. This because, at least two ships 
were claimed, (if not three or four), and all aircraft returned to base. Only one squadron 
was used, and of Hudsons, which according to Dr Goulter, were ' ... unmanoeuvrable 
and relatively slow'. 46 
42. Romanes, J., letter to the author. 
43. Air 27-1365 No 220 sqdn's ORB, 1940. 
44. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record, 1939-1945, Table F. 
45. Flatmark, lO., and Grytten, H., Alesund I Hverdag og Krig, Alesund, 1988, p.168. 
46. Goulter, C., The Forgotten Offensive, London, 1995, p.76; 
Lockheed's give 208 knots and 291 knots for cruising and maximum speeds. 
See also: Hendrie, A., Lockheed Hudson in WW2, Shrewsbury, 1999. 
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That successful strike may be contrasted with one attempted by the Dallachy 
Wing on 9 February 1945 when forty-six heavily armed strike aircraft from three 
squadrons, with an escort of Mustangs, plus an outrider and two ASR Warwicks sank 
no ships; when one of the three squadrons (No 404) lost six out of eleven Beaufighters. 
The reasons for the Hudsons' success, I consider were due to their crews, which by then 
had gained much successful experience, they were a small number, all in one squadron, 
led by their own Commanding Officer, the raid was in a harbour, and they gained 
surprise. In contrast, the Dallachy Wing had lost surprise, were in a closely confined 
area, in which far too many aircraft had to operate, against both ships and enemy 
fighters. 
Sir Philip Joubert in an analysis of shipping strikes for the period July, August 
and September 1941, gives eighty-eight vessels being attacked and of those 62.5% were 
from altitudes less than 500ft.47 From Coastal's record of successes however, ten 
merchant vessels were sunk or damaged off Norway by No 18 Group aircraft, largely by 
Beauforts, but also Hudsons. 
There was just one success by No 19 Group in the Biscay area.48 Regular traffic 
in the Biscay area included ships taking iron ore from Bilbao to Bordeaux or Bayonne. 
As they sailed at night and close to the Spanish coast, they were difficult to intercept, 
and the Command had not enough long-range Hudsons for that area. 49 
Sir Philip Joubert considered that the last quarter of 1941 was the most 
successful since the beginning of Coastal's anti-shipping operations, despite shorter 
days and less favourable weather. He gives fifteen vessels sunk in that time, eighteen 
severely damaged and thirty-three damaged, those for the loss of nineteen aircraft. 50 
The Command's record, however, gives seventeen sunk and ten damaged.51 These 
successes were gained by the three Groups, Nos 16,18 and 19 covering the three areas, 
Dutch, Norwegian and French coasts, but with emphasis on the Norwegian and Dutch 
coasts.52 
In the first few years of the war when Coastal was under the Command of Sir 
Frederick Bowhill and followed by Sir Philip Joubert, the question of dangerous 
operations undertaken by aircrews was raised not infrequently. 
47. Air 15-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. II, para. 166. 
48. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record, 1939-1945, Table F. 
49. Air 15-773 Vol. IT, para.168. 
50. Air 15-773 Vol. IT, para.180. 
51. Air 15-162 Table F. 
52. Air 15-162 Table F. 
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Thus the 'costly patrols' off the Norwegian coast in the Bergen and Stadlandet areas 
were mentioned with the suggestion that aircraft should be flown very low at about 50 
feet altitude to avoid RDF detection and when there was no cloud cover. 53 
Flying low, however, resulted in some aircraft having their propellers damaged 
by hitting the sea or rocks. Cloud cover would hardly save them from detection as, for 
example, at Alesund alone there were twelve DIF stations coded Siegfried in addition to 
'heavy and light flak,.54 Later in 1941 losses of the Dutch squadron, No 320 operating 
of the Netherlands coast, had by early September, left it with only six aircraft and five 
aircrews; and it was considered necessary to take them off shipping strikes. Normally, a 
squadron would expect to have sixteen aircraft with another four in reserve. 55 
There was a notable difference between Coastal's operations off Norway and 
those off the Dutch Coast. In the latter area, certainly for those involved in shipping 
strikes, Intelligence officers would warn crews to beware of the coastal batteries. They 
were found particularly intensive due to the routes used by Bomber Command aircraft. 
Over Norway, it was acknowledged, and in fact found, that fighter opposition by both 
single-engined and twin-engined aircraft could be expected. 
The strain on all Coastal Command aircrew was raised in connection with the 
length of their tours of operations. They were so much longer than those for Fighter or 
Bomber Commands with the latter having a first tour of200hr, and a second of 50% of 
the first. The tour on Hudsons was 500hr, and on flying-boats 800hr, although Medical 
Officers on squadrons certainly studied their aircrews and responded accordingly. 56 
The major events in 1941 were the German invasion of Russia (operation 
Barbarossa) in June, and the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 
December. The effects on Coastal due to the invasion of Russia, were that Luftwaffe 
forces were drawn away from the west; but more obviously was that Sir Philip Joubert's 
thinking was directed to the prospect of drawing some of those forces back to the west 
to ease the pressure on Russia; the prospect of escorting convoys to Russia, and 
ultimately, as was to occur, detachments from his Command to Russia. 
53. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Meetings 24tJi 7.8.41. 
54. Air 15-530 Mining in Norwegian and Danish Waters, p.14. 
55. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Meetings 38th 2.9.41. and 74th 11.11.41. 
56. A medical officer to the author. 
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Both shipping strike, and anti-U-boat squadrons were to become involved in 
support of Russia. Some of Coastal's squadrons already in the Middle East were 
retained there, and more squadrons were to be posted there, as I was to experience. 
There remained the need in the Mediterranean to keep open the route to at least Malta. 
The entry of Japan and America into the war did not reduce the load on Coastal 
Command, rather was it increased. Squadrons were posted to the Far East, and later, 
even one to USA to help the Americans. Some squadrons remaining in the United 
Kingdom were depleted of their personnel to form new squadrons in the Far East. 
By the end of 1941 anti-shipping operations had become a major task for 
Coastal Command, second only to anti-submarine operations. The other requirements of 
the Command~ photo-reconnaissance, meteorological flights, and air-sea-rescue (ASR) 
were just accepted as part of Coastal's routine. Anti-shipping operations had settled into 
the two main areas; off southern Norway, and the Dutch Coast. Occasionally also, the 
French coast and the Bay of Biscay. 
The battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau with the heavy cruiser Prinz 
Eugen at Brest were to require considerable effort on the part of both Bomber and 
Coastal Commands right up to the middle of February 1942. Although the battleship 
Bismarck had been sunk, there remained its sister ship Tirpitz. 
In respect of anti-shipping operations, at the last meeting for Coastal Command 
in 1941, it was reported that the Ministry of Aircraft Production, (MAP), would be able 
to supply twenty-four Hampden bombers modified to Coastal's requirements for using 
them as torpedo strike aircraft. 57 The Ministry kept its word, as No 455 squadron 
received them in May 1942, and later, I saw the whole squadron circling to land at 
Sumburgh in the Shetlands; the only occasion when I experienced such a sight. 
Despite the requirements to have strike units available, the Command's forces 
had been depleted by postings of squadrons overseas, and also there had been some 
serious losses of aircraft in anti-shipping operations. Losses had been such for Bomber 
Command's No 2 Group, which had opted to undertake shipping strikes, that they had 
withdrawn their aircraft from such operations, leaving Coastal's Hudsons to accept the 
risks. 58 The official RAF history gives No 2 Group Blenheims losing thirty-six aircraft 
in 297 attacks against enemy merchant vessels during the period 1 April to 30 June 
1941, while Coastal lost fifty-two aircraft in 143 attacks. 
57. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Meetings 100th 27.12.41. 
58. Air 15-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. II, para.l84. 
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As the official historians stated: 'As a healthy occupation for aircrews in mid-1941, 
bombing German ships by day had much less to commend it than bombing German 
towns by night'. 59 
Hampden bombers, modified to Coastal's requirements to carry torpedoes were 
coming into service in April with the Command's Dominion squadrons No 415 (RCAF) 
and No 489 (RNZAF). Two more Hampden squadrons were transferred from Bomber to 
Coastal Command, Nos 144 RAP and 455 (RAAF). Apart from No 415, all these units 
were later to convert to Beaufighters. In 1944-45 during my second tour of operations, I 
met up with these squadrons when they formed part of the Strike Wings.60 Coastal's 
shortage of Hudson aircraft in early 1942 resulted in Sir Philip ceasing to use those 
machines for anti-shipping operations and informed the Air Ministry accordingly. The 
official response was that overseas commitments had caused the shortage, but that 
further allocations would be made to the Command in the near future. 61 Hudsons were 
being sent to the Middle East for anti-submarine and anti-shipping operations, and to 
the Far East for transport, anti-shipping and anti-submarine operations.62 
Sir Philip reviewed operations against merchant ships during the first six months 
of 1942 specifically by Hudson aircraft. He contrasted the difference in successes 
between the months of January and February with those in March and April. Only 
two ships were sunk in March and April but five in January and February, although 
sixteen were damaged in the second two months, and thirteen in January and February. 
Sir Philip gives no reason for this, although likely causes were increased vigilance on 
the part of the enemy, and increased numbers of escort vessels, in addition to arming all 
merchant ships. What is notable, however, is that all the anti-shipping successes 
claimed by No 16 Group during the first six months of 1942, were gained by Hudson 
aircraft. They had sunk eleven ships and damaged five others.63 These were all off the 
Dutch coast, and it was a feature of the squadrons involved, that they maintained high 
morale despite their serious losses. They included the 'sister' squadrons Nos 53 and 59, 
while the Canadian squadron No 407, ever co-operated with No 320 (Dutch) squadron. 
The high morale that prevailed in those units, despite losses, must have contributed 
to their successes.64 
59. Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1953, Vol. I, p.354. 
60. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.185. 
61. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para.l82. 
62. Air 27-471 No 48 sqdn's ORBs 1941-2. Air -1157 No 194 sqdn's ORBs 1942-45. 
63. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Table F. 
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For the same period No 18 Group's successes for operations off the Norwegian 
coast were eight ships sunk, and of those, Hudsons claimed seven. 65 In those first six 
months of 1942, the Hudsons were attacking at low level, (literally mast-height), and 
losses were therefore relatively high. Later when one of those squadrons, No 407 
(RCAF) was taken off anti-shipping strikes to operate against U-boats, they were 
demoralised and wished to return to their more hazardous work. 66 
Although aircrews demonstrated that they were prepared to suffer the risks of 
low-level attacks on shipping, the Air Officer Commanding No 16 Group thought 
otherwise. He sent a memorandum to the C-in-C Coastal Command on 3 June 1942 
stating that during May, out of ninety-seven sorties on strikes, the aircraft that returned 
reported fifty-four sightings with forty-seven attacks, claiming thirty-four hits but with 
twelve aircraft lost. In addition to about 20% losses, a further 25% of the aircraft had 
become unserviceable and required repairs by contractors. 
A Hudson captain on No 407 (RCAF) squadron gave this account: 
No 407 perfected the science of ship bombing against enemy shipping with a 
marked degree of success. This required that the attack be pressed home at close range 
and from zero height, generally lifting over the target ship and flying between the masts. 
As enemy ships increased their defensive armament our losses mounted and eventually 
skip bombing was replaced by bombing from heights up to 4,000 feet with limited 
success. 67 
The same captain gave a terse account in his personal diary that showed that aircrews 
could not relax after an attack until they had literally reached the end of the runway on 
their return: 
Bright moonlight-good for nightfighters so went in on the deck-found target (a convoy of 
eight merchantmen with four escorts) Attacked at 0106hrs scored hits on large MV. Took 
photographs ... flak hot and heavy. Returned to fmd Docking under fog ... vis zero down 
to deck. Diverted to Manston, still zero vis. Diverted to Donna Nook, no vis then 
Cranwell. Still closed in ... no fuel, flying at 150ft flashed SOS on downward recognition 
lights. Searchlights came up and directed me to Hibaldstow. Landed in very low cloud 
and poor vis. Fuel remaining 10 gallons. Target strike at 5333N 0535E. 68 
65. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Table F. 
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Hudsons would typically be using one gallon per minute. As an experienced Wing 
Commander remarked to a group of aircrew: 'Gentlemen, remember the bacon and eggs 
at the end of the runway'. 69 
The AOC No 16 Group suggested that low-level attacks on convoys were far too 
costly, and he proposed withdrawing his Hudsons from strike operations for training in 
high-level attacks. This memorandum was considered by the SASO who was doubtful 
'whether high level attack will be remunerative.' He had reported that for No 59 
squadron there were only five aircraft operational, with two others 'shot Up,.70 
One of No 59's Hudsons had come back with a hole in a wing large enough for 
three of its crew to stand in.7I At that time also, No 407 squadron had only seven 
Hudsons operational. The SASO therefore considered that drafting back No 53 
squadron to No 16 Group and 'such few Hudsons as we may be able to pick up', that 
would 'justify losses which in a short period will mean the non-mobilisation of the main 
anti-shipping Group,.n Sir Philip Joubert agreed to No 16 Group's proposals and by 
July, low-level strikes on merchant shipping were discontinued in favour of medium 
height attacks. He had rated the strikes in the Hook-Elbe area to be the most important 
in May, and with the four squadrons mentioned using aircraft numbers ranging from 
two to twenty-nine in a strike. 73 
A Naval Lieutenant who operated with No 320 (Dutch) squadron from Bircham 
Newton wrote: 
Here we started immediately flying operationally making low-level strikes (mast 
height) at German shipping off the Dutch coast, mostly between Flushing and Den 
Helder. These strikes were usually at night after a reconnaissance aircraft had reported a 
convoy. In the meantime crews of 320 and 407 - mostly six crews of each squadron, were 
standby and took off at once after the report height one had to fly over the convoy, not 
being able to do any evasive action. During the last stage of the attack run, the observer or 
second pilot next to the pilot flying the aircraft, calling out speed, height and looking after 
the bomb doors. The pilot in command dropped the bombs a split second before the 
attacked ship disappeared under the nose of the aircraft. [sic] 
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We flew practically every other day and the losses of crews from both squadrons, 
[320 and 407] in the period April to July 1942 were very high. The Geffilans split up 
convoys in two and increased their flak ships. Coastal Command changed tactics and 
after July we attacked shipping more individually at a height of at least 4,000 feet 
depending on weather, making a proper bombing run, and using a bomb-sight Now the 
GeImans didn't use big convoys any more but sent ships in threes or fours, bigger and 
faster enabling them to use facilities ofljmuiden or Den Helder to make harbour.74 
The procedure described by Lt. de Liefde was to be followed to a remarkable degree by 
the Strike Wings that formed later. The differences were however, that after an initial 
report, an outrider would be sent to check the position of the enemy. If at night, a 
Wellington would be used as a 'pathfinder' to drop flares for the Beaufighter strike 
aircraft. 
Those four squadrons of Hudsons mentioned, would not have considered 
themselves 'elite'; they just became dedicated to their job and with high morale despite 
their losses. They became effectively the precursor of the North Coates Strike Wing of 
Beaufighters. Official records confirm de Liefde's reference to the enemy's reactions. 
As the SASO at headquarters stated: ' ... we have forced the Germans to so heavily ann 
their convoys, even to the extent of every ship, including escort ships, carrying balloons, 
that I feel the continued low level attack will inevitably mean heavy casualties ... ,.75 
Those strengthened defences which resulted in Coastal Command's losses of over 20% 
as Sir Philip stated: ' ... forced us in July 1942 to discontinue low-level attacks'. 76 
The Blenheims from Bomber Command on shipping strikes had suffered even heavier 
casualties of35%.77 
The positive aspect of these strikes for Britain was that the enemy had needed to 
employ considerable forces to protect his ships which, nevertheless, had suffered not 
only losses but the enemy's supplies between Scandinavia and the German and 
Netherlands ports had been seriously disrupted. An estimate of 3~ million tons per 
annum of iron ore was considered to be shipped to Rotterdam for the industrial Ruhr, 
with probably 2 million tons to Emden.78 
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On 19 June 1942 there was a newspaper report from Stockholm, which was 
repeated in the English Press that Swedish shipowners had protested that Swedish ships 
were being used to transport iron ore to Rotterdam, while in that traffic, only 10% of the 
ships were German. The Swedes therefore decided that they were no longer prepared to 
sail to Rotterdam. 79 
Following the decision by Coastal Command to cease low-level attacks on 
shipping, one of the first medium-height strikes was attempted on 30 July, led by the 
W/Cmdr Brown of No 407 squadron but with No 59 squadron and the torpedo unit No 
415. Brown had obviously carefully considered the tactics to be used and he acted as 
what was later to be referred to by the Strike Wings as an 'outrider'. Brown shadowed 
an enemy convoy and homed on his strike aircraft using his 'SE' or 'IFF'.sO He 
released flares to illuminate the target, as also did No 59 squadron for the torpedo 
aircraft to attack. Although this strike was apparently unsuccessful, it exemplified the 
procedure that was to follow for the Strike Wings. 
One of the first attempts at operating a combined strike force that included 
surface vessels of the Royal Navy was on 28 August 1942. It was to be based on a 
sighting report from three Beaufighters. Two of the Beaufighters were, however, shot 
down by enemy fighters, and the third one returned with a nil report. Coastal 
Command's squadrons would have included Nos 320 (Dutch), and 407 (RCAF), and 
with Fleet Air Arm aircraft, and the Navy's motor torpedo boats. It had to be cancelled 
'mUch to everyone's dismay,.81 This demonstrated once again the need for an initial 
accurate report on the enemy's position. The two Beaufighters that were shot down 
probably attempted to 'run for it' and would have been outpaced by the enemy. With a 
likely attack on their tails, their navigators could have responded to stern attacks with 
only single machine guns, but to be out-ranged by the enemy's cannon. 
Although Command's operations off the Norwegian coast were largely 
concerned with naval units, sixty convoys and independent ships had been sighted in 
May and June between Trondheim and Kristiansand. Out of thirteen strikes on merchant 
vessels, ten had been made by Hudsons of Nos 48 and 608 squadrons.82 
79:Hendrie, A., Canadian Squadrons in Coastal Command, St.Catharine's, Ont., 1997, p.39. 
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I had been posted to No 48 squadron at the end of May with a number of other 
aircrew from No 224 squadron. It was obvious that this move was to make up for the 
losses; even the new Commanding Officer lasted only a few months before being 
seriously wounded in combat with two fighters. My first trip was just one of the 
standing patrols, Bergen-Haugesund, a flight of only 4hr 20min. Sir Philip Joubert 
stated that No 18 Group at that time was largely concerned with naval units. 
The need to change tactics for attacks on enemy merchant shipping prompted Sir 
Philip to consider the formation of a highly specialised strike force, and furthermore, a 
suitable aircraft had been coming available to Coastal Command as early as March 
1941, namely, the Bristol Beaufighter. Although the RAF had bomb-sights,83 Sir Philip 
stated that 'an adequate bombsight wa~ not available,.84 By 1943 a bomb-sight for 
medium heights was available. For daylight attacks against a heavily defended convoy 
he decided that his strike force should comprise: torpedo aircraft of 'good speed and 
manoeuvrability' .85 Aircraft also of similar speed and endurance, but armed to give 
covering fire for the torpedo aircraft against anti-aircraft fire. This section of the force 
was to be trained and briefed together so that their operations were synchronised in 
attacks. 
They would need to fly fast enough to operate with single-seater fighters from 
Fighter Command that would serve to give 'top cover' against enemy fighters.
86 
Such 
forces did come into being such as I was to see at RAP Langham, North Coates, and 
Dallachy in the period November 1944 - May 1945. 
As torpedoes were very costly, and effectively 'rationed' with priority given to 
the Navy, one may question their value compared with rocket projectiles that were to 
become available. There appeared little advantage in using a torpedo against a ship of 
low tonnage, when it could be more easily sunk with other weapons. Furthermore, 
torpedo attacks were very much more vulnerable, with the need to fly low, at limited 
speed and with great accuracy. 
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As I had witnessed some of the outcome of a disastrous strike by the Dallachy 
Wing, I question the value of the effort involved requiring three strike squadrons plus a 
squadron of single-engined fighters plus the outrider and ASR aircraft. Perhaps all that 
effort could be justified against a large convoy off the Dutch coast but not such as was 
to apply for strikes in Norwegian fjords where a multitude of aircraft might be 
surrounded by cliffs, anti-aircraft batteries, and modem single-engined fighters in 
opposition. Such in fact was used against just one enemy destroyer in February 1945.87 
Sir Philip appreciated that differences in speed between strike aircraft and those 
aircraft in support to counter anti-aircraft fire or fighter cover, precluded effective use of 
the strike machines. When, therefore, Hampdens were coming into service in late 
summer 1942, to serve as torpedo bombers, and thus with limited targets; he considered 
different tactics. They were for only three or four Hampdens to operate at low altitude to 
avoid detection, either visually or by radar. If in daylight, for cloud cover to be available 
at say I,OOOft because convoys along the Norwegian coast were less well defended, that 
area should be the preferred one for such operations. 88 The results gained by the 
Hampden squadrons in the last three months of 1942 justified Sir Philip's decision 
In that period the Hampdens sank five ships off the Norwegian coast and 
damaged one other. Four were sunk by the New Zealand squadron, No 489, one by No 
144 squadron.89 To ensure that the Hampden units did not suffer from low morale due 
to lack of action, they were allocated fringe targets and mine-laying. The hardest task 
for aircrew was ever to be just on 'standby'; particularly when there was limited 
literature to read. 
While Nos 18 and 16 Groups contended with anti-shipping operations covering 
the Norwegian and Netherlands coastlines respectively, No 19 Group was involved with 
operations over the Bay of Biscay and the French coastline. In respect of anti-shipping 
operations this was to prove threefold; the heavy warships that were at Brest up to the 
middle of February, minor war vessels such as destroyers and E-boats, and thirdly, the 
blockade-runners. 
During Sir Philip Joubert's tenure as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Coastal 
Command, two important procedures were adopted. They were a change from low-level 
bombing attacks on merchant vessels to medium-level bombing. 
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This had resulted in fewer successes but fewer casualties, or less 'wastage', that was, 
loss of aircraft and crews. The second change was the concept of a Strike Wing with 
some squadrons devoted to attacks on shipping and operating together. 
When Air Marshal John Slessor succeeded Sir Philip in February 1943 his 
immediate concern was with Anti-Submarine-Warfare in the Battle of the Atlantic. This 
was because in January and February there had been heavy attacks by U-boats on Allied 
shipping. 90 Slessor's establishment on 18 February for strike aircraft included five 
squadrons of Beaufighters represented by Nos 143 and 236 squadrons at North Coates, 
No 235 at Leuchars, and in the south, No 404 at Chivenor, and No 248 squadron at 
Predannack. The Australian squadron No 455 still had Hampdens at Leuchars but was 
scheduled to re-equip with Beaufighters.91 On the enemy's side, by 1943, the German 
Mercantile Marine had become highly organised and reached a peak in providing 
defensive measures against air attacks. 
The proportion of escort vessels to merchant ships was greatly increased such 
that an enemy convoy might comprise just one merchantman with six escort vessels. 
Both the merchant vessels and the escorts were heavily armed and balloons were flown 
to impede aircraft. Some escorts, known as sperrbrechers were virtually flak-ships, 
and the earlier decision by Sir Philip to cease the 'mast height' attacks, was therefore 
fully justified. It showed also, that Coastal's offensive was imposing a considerable load 
on the enemy's resources. For Coastal's aircraft operating off the Dutch coast, there 
remained the serious hazard of shore batteries. They had been greatly increased on 
account of Bomber Command's raids on Germany. At briefings for aircrews operating 
round the Frisians, Intelligence Officers would give warning 'Don't fly too near the 
Coast. ' 
The names 'Den Helder' and 'Texel' remain ever ominous to me. Although 
there were also coastal batteries in Norway, such as the 'Siegfried' installations at 
Alesund, there appeared to be a greater prospect of encountering fighter opposition off 
Norway, as so many aircrews were to suffer. Despite Germany's efficiency in 
organising its merchant shipping, it depended on Swedish ships for as much as 50% of 
its transport of iron ore from Norway and Sweden.92 However, from the Command's 
record of successes against enemy shipping, few Swedish vessels were Sunk.
93 
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In January, the Command flew 461 anti-shipping sorties but sank only two 
ships.94 These were claimed by the highly experienced Hudson squadrons Nos 407 and 
320 operating off the Dutch coast, and the relatively new squadrons No 455 (RAAF) 
and 489(RNZAF) on a strike off southern Norway. The attacks off the Dutch coast 
which were on 18 January proved to be the last success out of about fifty-eight claimed 
by Hudsons in the Home theatre since October 1940. 
While on shipping strikes, No 320 of the Royal Netherlands Naval Air Service, 
but under Coastal Command control, had lost twenty-one Hudsons, which was 
equivalent to more than a whole squadron, but with no sign of loss of morale. The 
Dutch had at least one other squadron; many personnel had escaped to Britain, and were 
able to compensate for casualties. 
After the first Strike Wing operations in November 1942 the Wing lost twenty-
three aircraft and had been withdrawn from the front line, leaving the work to the 
Hudsons, and for the Beaufighter crews to undertake further training. 95 The first 
effective operation by the Strike Wings was on 18 April when a well-escorted enemy 
convoy was attacked off Texel. It had required nine Torbeaus (Beaufighters modified to 
take torpedoes), covered by six Beaufighter bombers, and six Beaufighters with cannon. 
They sank one ship and apparently damaged one escort vessel. The merchantman of 
only 4,906 tons received six torpedo hits. 
Sir John Slessor, in his account of this episode, gives emphasis to the success of 
the use of cannon fire by supporting Beaufighters which cleared the decks of the ships 
to counter anti-aircraft fire.% That the Torbeaus were then able to launch their 
torpedoes was no mean achievement. That view, of using cannon to counter anti-aircraft 
fire, was later to be endorsed by some aircrews. Nonetheless, using torpedoes against a 
non-armoured vessel of low tonnage was a costly way of sinking a ship. The strike with 
such a strong force did, however, give that Wing the opportunity of gaining further 
experience of operating together and losing no aircraft or aircrew. This first strike by the 
North Coates Wing in 1943 was against a convoy of nine merchant vessels with six 
escorts. 
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The Beaufighters had been provided with fighter escort of three squadrons from No 12 
Group as it was considered that ' ... a very strong single-engined fighter escort was 
essential to the safety of attacking aircraft'. 97 It was also considered that the minimum 
economical force was eight Torbeaus, with sixteen Beaufighters, and two squadrons 
of single-engined fighters as escort. 98 The North Coates Wing followed its initial 
success eleven days later on 29 April sinking two merchant vessels and an escort for the 
loss of one Beaufighter.99 
In May, the Canadian squadron, No 415 operated Hampdens off both the Dutch 
and French coasts sinking a minesweeper and a naval auxiliary vessel. No 415 was 
really the Cinderella squadron within the Cinderella Command, being equipped with 
whatever aircraft came its way; they included Hampdens, Albacores and Wellingtons. 
Although the new tactics of bombing from medium height rather than mast 
height, still prevailed, torpedoes had to be released from low level, and No 415's 
operational records show that altitudes of 60-80ft were flown for the release of 
torpedoes against heavily armed ships at a distance as short as 600yd (that may be 
compared with the Navy's release of torpedoes during the Channel Dash at 3,OOOyd). In 
1943, No 415's Hampdens in N016 Group sank four ships, but with serious losses of 
aircraft and crews. 100 
The record of successes for No 16 Group during the last six months of 1943 
shows a decreasing number of ships sunk, the last one being on 23 November when a 
6,316-ton merchant vessel was attacked off Texe1. 10l This apparent lack of success in 
the number of sinkings, in fact, represented a success for Coastal Command's offensive 
off the Dutch coast. It had resulted in the enemy diverting his shipping from Rotterdam 
to the German ports of Emden and Bremen. This was of considerable importance to the 
enemy as Rotterdam was the natural gateway to the industrial Ruhr for notably the iron 
ore from Scandinavia, and also the exit for the coal and coke required by Sweden. The 
POrt facilities at Emden and Bremen were limited compared with those at Rotterdam. 
Thus an increasing strain was imposed on the enemy's internal transport system. 102 
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In giving a brief conclusion to this phase of operations, Captain Roskill states 
that bad weather and imprecise reconnaissance led to a lack of surprise in making some 
attacks and was to result in failures. Operational records of many squadrons confinn the 
importance of those two factors - bad weather and imprecise reconnaissance~ aircrews 
that had flown on such sorties would likewise endorse that view. Before the 
Beaufighters were anned with rocket projectiles, they relied on 'four 20mm cannon and 
six machine guns ... to straf enemy ships ahead of the Beaus with their torpedoes as they 
went in at low altitude to drop their fish'. 103 
By August 1943 rocket projectiles were coming into operation with No 404 
(RCAF) squadron Beaufighters~ as one oftheir pilots recalls: 
They were armed with armour piercing heads and could pass straight through a 
ship. They were harmonised so that a pair of rockets arrived with a spread of twenty feet 
between each pair. When entering the water they levelled out and thereby struck the ship 
underwater. Aiming was relatively easy; we fired them when we reached a point in our 
twenty-degree dive from 1,200 feet where our cannon and machine guns harmonised. 
This could be detennined by the splashes in the water. Early in our dive the splashes were 
all around the ship. As we got closer, the splashes converged until they all met at 700 
feet, the point of harmonisation, and when we fired the rockets, they would automatically 
straddle the ship. Only if our aim of the cannon and machine guns was off or the aircraft 
was skidding, were we likely to miss. So in our own right we did damage to ships and we 
still cleared the way for the torpedo-carrying BeaufIghters to sneak under. We found that 
our strafing efforts almost silenced anti-aircraft fue altogether. 104 
The following account of an actual operation in November shows clearly the 
advantages and disadvantages experienced by strike aircraft on Norwegian operations: 
We were five Beaus armed with rockets, a small enough formation to enter a 
fjord ... we ran into five ships steaming in line ahead into the fjord, two merchant vessels 
escorted by two armed trawlers and a destroyer in the rear. I attacked the leading M.V. 
with cannon and then firing my SAP rockets at 600yd range. Since I had done a beam 
attack I now had to turn to port sharply to avoid the steep sides of the fjord and then the 
second M.V. was dead ahead. I sprayed it with cannon fue and then headed towards the 
open sea, only to pass over the destroyer to exit the fjord. I was quite low and sawall his 
guns blazing and wondered how he missed me. 105 
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Thus it was advisable under some conditions, to have a small strike force, 
certainly to operate in a fjord, although strike aircrews, even off the Dutch coast, would 
tend to watch what was happening to other crews, and if in formation, there was the real 
hazard of collisions in the heat of a battle, and full attention to individual attacks could 
not be given. The sides of a fjord, posed a severe restriction, and if vessels were 
anchored under the cliffs, beam attacks could not be safely attempted, thus with the 
prospect of running the gauntlet from both a line of ships and from batteries in the 
fjords. 
This same squadron, No 404 (RCAF), was to become acutely aware of these 
factors during its disastrous raid in 1945.106 Aircrews on shipping strikes to Norway 
favoured the Obrestadt area where the enemy's ships had to sail in open sea and thus 
lacked the protection of the many small islands round Norway's irregular coast. The 
Beaufighter squadrons found that they 'could use RPs as main weapons and this 
facilitated the use of small formations. A semi-armour-piercing RP could rip as many as 
three plates out of a ship's hull and the 60lb high explosive heads were equivalent to a 
6" shell'. 107 
For the period January to May 1943, 5,151 anti-shipping sorties were flown by 
the RAF Commands, resulting in 572 attacks. Twenty-two ships were sunk for the loss 
of ninety aircraft; thus, four aircraft were lost for every ship sunk. 108 No 18 Group 
controlled the aircraft covering the northern areas, which for anti-shipping sorties, were 
largely off the southern coast of Norway. For that purpose, Slessor had intended 
deploying one squadron of Torbeaus and one anti-flak squadron of Beaufighters at 
Wick, with a similar force at Leuchars. One Torbeau squadron was to be based at Tain, 
which was to be considered to be in reserve for either Iceland or Russia against a 
possible break-out by the Kriegsmarine's heavy warships. 
To organise a strike wing for operations off Norway was much more difficult 
than one for sorties to the Dutch coast. This was because the distances were greater and 
there were no long-range fighters available in 1943 for Coastal Command to serve as 
escorts. Due to the requirements in the Middle East, it had not been possible initially to 
convert the Hampden squadrons to Beaufighters, and Hampdens were less able to 
defend themselves against enemy fighters, and anti-aircraft fire from ships. 
106. op. cit. See also: RCAF Vol. III, p.472-3. 
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Air Marshal Slessor was therefore unable to fonn a second strike wing in 
Scotland as he had intended. For the first five months of 1943, anti-shipping sorties to 
Norway were thus flown by Hampdens of Nos 455, 489 and 144 squadrons. They 
operated in flights of three to five; such as Sir Philip Joubert had earlier anticipated. 
They would have expected to operate at night if there was sufficient moonlight, and in 
the day, when they would have to depend on cloud cover to avoid enemy fighters. 
Unfortunately, forecasts giving cloud cover were not always accurate. To avoid 
detection by RlDF stations or radar, approaches to the Norwegian coast were made at 
low level; some aircraft did, in fact, skim the waves and rocks. 109 
Near the end of 1943, No 16 Group had suggested to Headquarters that 
Wellingtons might be used in conjunction with Beaufighters for shipping strikes off the 
Dutch coast. It would be for a Wellington aircraft equipped with ASV to locate the 
enemy, illuminate with flares and release a 4,OOOlb bomb in the middle of the convoy to 
distract the flak gunners during the approach of the torpedo aircraft. 
This, however, would need careful timing and might result in damage to 
Coastal's own aircraft. The armament officer advocated a 500lb GP bomb, rather than 
4,OOOlb, with a Mark XIV fuse, that was, one that would have detonated in the air at 
100ft altitude. The SASO considered this a 'wildcat scheme' and was at that time 
thinking of No 415 (RCAP) squadron's Wellington Flight that was intended for anti-E-
boat operations. 110 In fact, the proposal was to be followed to some extent with 
Wellingtons being used to provide a rendezvous for strike wings during the day with sea 
markers, or flares during the night. Although the 4,OOOlb, or even the 500lb bomb was 
not used in the manner suggested, 250lb MC (medium case) bombs came to be used in 
1944 by Wellingtons operating individually but against E-boats. 
Sir Sholto Douglas succeeded Sir John Slessor as Air Officer-in-Chief Coastal 
Command in January 1944. By then, although the Gennan U-boat menace was not over, 
the Battle of the Atlantic had been won. Sir Sholto therefore, was able to give more 
attention to anti-shipping operations, and for which he was gaining increasing resources, 
despite the requirements of forces in the Middle East and Far East. Not only was he 
receiving more aircraft, notably Beaufighters, but also improved radar, such as the Mark 
III that had scanners and was more sensitive. 
109. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. III, para.47. See also: RCAF Vol. m, p.452. 
110. Air 15-541 No 16 Group's Anti-ship Operations Apr. 1942-Apr. 1945, p.14. 
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In April, Sir Sholto had to consider and prepare for Operations Neptune and 
Overlord, the Allied invasion of Europe through the Normandy beaches. For Coastal 
Command's role in the invasion of Europe, Sir Sholto issued a directive on 18 April that 
was proved to be a masterly plan in which no possible aspect was overlooked. In 
particular, all squadrons knew precisely what was expected of them to the smallest 
detail. Both the Allies and the enemy were in early 1944 using their forces with some 
reserve in anticipation of an all-out effort that was to follow. Although the Battle of the 
Atlantic had been won, there were still enough U-boats to pose a serious threat to 
invasion forces. Coastal Command's role thus comprised two main tasks; they were, 
anti-submarine warfare, and anti-shipping operations. 111 
The Command in 1944 demonstrated just how flexible it could be in deploying 
its squadrons in respect of both task and location. Thus squadrons and Wings were 
moved north and south according to the conditions that prevailed on the Continent, and 
squadrons that had been on anti-submarine warfare proved their worth in anti-shipping 
operations. Coastal Command enjoyed close co-operation with both Fighter Command 
and the Royal Navy; while some of Bomber Command's attacks on enemy controlled 
ports aided Coastal's anti-shipping operations. 
At the beginning of 1944, the Command had to consider the enemy-controlled 
coastline from the Spanish border up to, typically for shipping strikes, Kristiansund. 
FollOwing the Allies' invasion of Europe, however, there was a progressive move 
northwards to operations off Norway and into the Skagerrak, Kattegat, and the Baltic 
Sea, due to the increasing enemy activity in those areas. 
These latter operations meant that, yet again, the Command needed aircraft of a 
suitable type but also with increased range; and additionally, fighter escorts of sufficient 
range. This was to remain a problem for Sholto Douglas throughout his tenure. 
Although the Strike Wings in 1944 were formed largely with Beaufighters, towards the 
end of the year, they were being increasingly displaced by Mosquitoes. Wellingtons 
Were used for operations against E-boats but additionally acted as pathfinders for the 
Strike Wings. Some Albacores were used in the Dover Straits also against minor naval 
units such as the E-boats. Towards the end of 1944 Halifaxes, which had been deployed 
on anti-submarine operations, were found to be effective in anti-shipping operations in 
the Kattegat and Skagerrak areas due to their long range and useful bomb load. 
liT. Air 15-102 Overlord- The Role ofCoastai Command. See also: RCAF Vol. III, p.464. 
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There was ever the need to provide fighter protection of the Strike Wings and 
Fighter Command showed that it was prepared to co-operate by providing Spitfires on 
the shorter routes to the Dutch coast, and Mustang escorts, for the longer northerly 
strikes, when its other commitments allowed. 
The principle of the Strike Wings had stemmed from the need to saturate the 
enemy's defences of its convoys, while attacking aircraft could launch torpedo or rocket 
projectile attacks. This was achieved by having at least two squadrons, but possibly 
three or four. One of these would be armed with torpedoes (the Torbeaus), the other 
squadrons would be armed with cannon and machine guns to counter anti-aircraft fire. It 
was considered that the force should comprise nine to twelve Torbeaus with fifteen to 
eighteen Beaufighers with cannon, and a ratio of three cannon aircraft to one in attacks 
on escort vessels. For the Torbeaus to attack successfully, the target needed to be in 
Open water of suitable depth, and that requirement imposed limits, effectively excluding 
much of the Norwegian coastline due to the leads, but also off the Dutch coast due to 
the depth of the water. If daylight attacks were made, a fighter escort was necessary, 
unless there was suitable cloud cover. 112 
Due to Coastal Command's shipping offensive, the enemy directed his ships 
from using Rotterdam to Emden and Bremen. There were therefore few targets for the 
North Coates Wing although some enemy shipping continued to sail the Ems-Hook of 
Holland route and this was used mostly at night. 
During the day, enemy convoys sheltered in such ports as Den Helder that was 
well protected by anti-aircraft batteries. Thus at the beginning of 1944 there was a need 
for the Command to develop a system for night attacks and to obtain fighter cover for 
Strike Wing operations over the Ems-Elbe route for enemy shipping. There remained 
the need to attack enemy shipping in the protected harbours also. For these two latter 
requirements, Coastal looked to Fighter and Bomber Commands respectively, for their 
co-operation, and as was to be demonstrated, not in vain, both those Commands were 
prepared to allocate forces for that purpose. 113 
A memo dated 24 February from No 16 Group to the Senior Air Staff Officer, 
(SASO) at Headquarters suggested that No 2 Group might attack Den Helder's shipping 
anchorage. 
li2. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. III, paras.l16-7. 
113. Air 15-773 Vol. III, para.llS. 
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The specific problem for No 16 Group at that time, was that, when a convoy was 
sighted off the Dutch coast by the reconnaissance aircraft, the convoy was either 
stopped or went into Den Helder to avoid strike aircraft which could not be laid on 
before a delay of 3Y2hr. There was time therefore, for an enemy convoy in Den Helder 
to go either, north, out of the range of the Wing's Spitfire escort, or sail south in shallow 
water where torpedoes could not be used. The AOC on No 16 Group ultimately 
contacted the AOC No 2 Group with the latter readily agreeing to attack Den Helder 
whenever free. 114 
The close co-operation with Fighter Command stemmed from the SASO A VM 
Durston who had earlier contacted AM Roderick Hill at HQ ADGB, and who later had 
talks with the AOC No 16 Group, A VM Hopps. Arrangements had been made for 
twelve fighter pilots from Coltishall to undertake a General Reconnaissance course at 
Squires Gate, this to be followed by two more courses. 
Additionally a No 16 Group Intelligence Officer had gone to No 12 Group to 
brief both Controllers and Intelligence Officers; there were also visits by No 16 Group 
Intelligence Officers to No 12 Group's fighter bases at Coltishall and Digby. I 15 
Arrangements had been made also for 45-gallon drop tanks to increase the 
range of Fighter Command's Spitfires that would be operating in support of Coastal's 
Strike Wings. I 16 
By the 3 February 1944 the North Coates Wing comprised three squadrons 
following reinforcement with No 143 joining Nos 254 and 236 squadrons. Indicative of 
the effort for sinking just one minor naval craft (a 90ton R-boat), was the use of the 
whole wing on 21 February using torpedoes and cannon, and losing one Beaufighter in 
a strike off Texel. Again, on 1 March, the whole wing was involved. The strike force 
had included three Beaufighters with 25lb rocket projectiles, nine cannon Beaufighters, 
three Torbeaus, eighteen anti-flak Beaufighters and with a Spitfire escort. 
Despite using their considerable armament, they only damaged a 6,415-ton 
merchant vessel, which was later sunk by a single Wellington from No 415 squadron 
that released three 500lb bombs from 3,500ft to gain a direct hit. This was no mean 
achievement as the bombing was made by moonlight. I 17 
114. Air 15-541 No 16 Group's Anti-shipping Operations, p.14. 
115. Air 15-541 p.78. 
116. Air 15-541 p.78. 
117. C12285 No 415 sqdn's ORBs. Air 15-162 Table F. 
43. A Beaufighter at Davidstow Moor armed wi th rocket projectiles in addition to cannon. In the 
foreground is a 'trolley ac' used to start aircraft engines to save using the aircraft' s batteries. 
44. An attack off the French coast on a 5perrbrecher by Nos 236 and 404 squadrons on 
12 August 1944. The splashes in the foreground are probably due to cannon fire . 
~ ... -..... .. -..... ~ ---
I 
45. An atlack on enemy shipping off the French coast by No 404 squadron in August 1944 ; 
rocket projectiles can be seen fired at the ship. 
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Following the enemy's increasing caution in sailing convoys, there were fewer 
opportunities for daylight attacks which resulted in Coastal Command using a night-
time procedure, the 'Gilbey' operation. For this a lone Wellington flew on night patrols 
over the enemy's convoy route using radar. On gaining contact, either with radar or 
visually, a report would be transmitted to base. Meanwhile a strike force of Beau fighters 
armed with torpedoes or rocket projectiles would have been sent to patrol a line to 
seawards of the Wellington's patrol. Alternatively, the strike force would take off 
immediately the sighting report was received. 
In the former case, the Wellington would release a 'Drem' circle of sea markers 
ten miles from the convoy at 600 to the enemy's seaward bow, to serve as a rendezvous 
point for the Beaufighters that would contact the Wellington as they arrived. When 
sufficient numbers had reported, the Wellington would close the convoy and illuminate 
the ships by releasing flares for the Beaufighters to attack. 118 
This was truly a dangerous occupation for the Wellington crew, and meant 
considerable work under hostile conditions. They, nevertheless, rated the Beaufighters' 
task more hazardous, while the Beaufighter crews gave that credit to the Wellingtons. 119 
An actual example of this procedure occurred on 3 March when a Wellington of No 415 
squadron was airborne from North Coates armed with thirty-six flares. On locating an 
enemy merchant vessel escorted by three minelayers, the Wellington signalled base. 
When all the aircraft from No 254 squadron reported contact, the Wellington released 
twenty-four flares, despite suffering light and heavy flak. The attack resulted in the 
sinking of a Swedish vessel of 1,878 tons off Borkum. 120 
On 29 March two German merchant vessels were sunk by No 16 Group's strike 
wing off the island of Juist, that is, near the Elbe estuary, and in daylight. This was 
important, as it showed the enemy that Coastal Command threatened his Ems-Elbe 
route. This strike, however, had only been possible due to fighter cover provided by two 
squadrons of Mustangs that had the necessary range, but were not always available due 
to other commitments. Only one Beaufighter was lost. 121 
What should have been a major anti-shipping success on the night of 30/31 
March resulted only in damage to a 13,882-ton liner. It was thought to be returning 
technicians to Germany that had been working on the battleship Tirpitz. 
118. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches Vol. III, para.l30. RCAF Vol. III, pp.461-2. 
119. The author's experience at RAF Langham 1944-45. 
120. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945 Table F. C12285 No 415 sqdn's ORBs. 
12l. Air 15-162 TableF. Air 15-773 Vo1.III, para.13l. 
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Although a considerable strike force was used, it was only partly successful due to the 
fact that the torpedoes used had been set too deep and they passed right under the 
vessel. Of the enemy fighter opposition in that attack, one of the Beaufighter pilots aptly 
commented: 'We never had time to experience fear, we were too busy'. 122 
The Command must have learnt a lesson from this, as in April one of the strike 
squadrons involved in this attack, No 404, was given training in the use of 500lb 
medium case bombs, although as one of the Beaufighter pilots stated, ' ... but we had no 
bombsight' .123 Even if a suitable bombsight had been available for Beaufighters, their 
navigators were already overloaded with radio and a rear gun, in addition to their 
essential navigation equipment. Earlier, squadrons such as No 407 and No 415 had 
shown just how effective bombs could be against shipping, even from medium heights, 
and in November 1944 Bomber Command demonstrated just how effective bombing 
could be even against a heavily armoured battleship such as the Tirpitz, albeit using 
12,000lb bombs. 124 
During Overlord, anti-shipping operations for No 18 Group had lapsed, but in 
September they opened again with sweeps between Alesund and Kristiansand claiming 
in that month, eight ships sunk and two damaged, all off the Norwegian coast. By then 
two of the squadrons involved, Nos 235 and 248, had re-equipped with Mosquitoes. 125 
As had occurred in the Dutch operations, so also on the Norwegian coast. The 
enemy ships sheltered in anchorages during the day, and sailed by night in an attempt to 
avoid attacks from the air. This meant that the strike squadrons needed to fly the 200 
miles from Scottish bases to arrive off the Norwegian coast by first light, before the 
enemy ships had gained cover. 
The tactics that had been developed by No 16 Group were applied by No 18 
Group using the 'Drem' and 'Gilbey' procedures. Intensive shipping operations had 
begun on 9 September with strike aircraft on sorties from Banff. This work was 
obviously considered of considerable importance as the squadrons were visited by the 
AOC of No 18 Group and the AOC-in-Chief of the Command, Sir Sholto Douglas. 
122. Symons, J., letter to the author. C12269 No 404 sqdn's ORBs. 
123. Symons, J.,letterto the author. RCAF Vol. ill, p.419. 
124. Roskill, S.W., Vol. ill.2, p.l68. 
125. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945 Table F. 
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The initial armed reconnaissance from Stavanger southwards to Kristiansand 
was abandoned due to heavy rain and low cloud; the weather for Coastal's aircrew was 
ever the worst enemy. The degree of effort against relatively few ships is questionable. 
Thus on 14 September forty-three aircraft patrolled from Egero to Kristiansund. Of 
note, was the sighting of a convoy of Swedish ships, that was not attacked, as they were 
all taken to be wholly neutral. 126 Later, an enemy convoy of three merchant vessels 
with three escorts was attacked, but only one escort was sunk and one merchantman 
damaged. 127 
Following a Coastal Command letter dated 16 October, it was suggested by No 
18 Group, that the strike squadrons Nos 455, 489, 494, 404 and 144 should move to 
Dallachy, and with a detachment of four aircraft from No 524 squadron. At Banff, there 
should be Nos 235, 248,143 and 333 squadrons. The reason for the latter deployment 
was that for the Mosquito aircraft, which were constructed of plywood; there was the 
protection of 'blister' hangars. 128 There were the possible additional advantages of ease 
of maintenance by having similar aircraft at the same base, and with aircraft of similar 
performance during take off for sorties. 
The need for increasing the range of the Tsetse Mosquitoes, (Mosquitoes armed 
with 6-pounder cannon), and those armed with rocket projectiles, was also raised at an 
Headquarters conference. The matter was to be taken up with De Havilland, the 
manufacturers, with factors considered, being drop tanks, (to increase the range), and 
the rails for ~ocket projectiles that might affect the aircraft's aerodynamics. 129 
One of No 404's pilots had already mentioned the lack of a bomb-sight in 
Beaufighters, and this point was also raised by the AOC of No 18 Group with the 
suggestion that half a squadron might be withdrawn from operations at a time to train on 
the Mark XIV bomb-sight. 130 
With the European war in late 1944 directed increasingly to the northern areas; 
for anti-shipping operations, there was a need to cover the Kattegat and Skagerrak 
areas. 131 
126. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches Vol. IV, para.20S. 
127. Air 15-162 Table F, names a number of Swedish ships sunk. 
12S. C12269 No 404 sqdn's ORBs. Air 15-162 Table F. 
129. Air 15-361 C-in-C's meetings 9.11.44, 16.11.44, 7.12.44. 
130. Air 15-391 p.1S0. Air 15- 361 meeting 30.11.44. RCAP Vol. III, p.419. 
131. Air 15-391 Anti-shipping Operations - Norway and Kattegat, p.l 5 1. 
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The two Halifax squadrons based at Stomoway had the range to reach landfall 
at Kristiansand at the entrance to the Skagerrak and with still another 350 nautical 
miles range available for an anti-shipping patrol. 132 Their first success was claimed by 
No 502 squadron on the night of 12/13 October when a German merchant vessel of 
8,000 tons was damaged. 133 From then on until the end of 1944, those Halifax 
squadrons sank four more ships and damaged five others. The efforts of those Halifax 
aircraft were more than justified by the results. 
They were in sharp contrast to the operations of the strike wings, that were 
using so many aircraft against relatively small targets and with limited success. 134 
Although the Scottish bases were within No 18 Group, and Langham under No 16 
Group's control, the Command was flexible in deploying the anti-shipping forces, as I 
was to appreciate the following year when sent on detachment to DaUachy from 
Langham. When there was an awareness of much enemy shipping in the Stadtlandet 
area, No 18 Group sent a letter on 9 December to Headquarters suggesting that more 
attention should be given to the Stadtlandet-Kristiansund section of the Norwegian west 
coast. 
It was added that Sumburgh in the Shetlands would need to be used due to the 
greater distance to Kristiansund from the mainland. Sumburgh, however, experienced 
weather that could change very rapidly with strong winds. Nevertheless, a detachment 
of fifteen to twenty Beaufighters from Dallachy was suggested. 
During the latter part of 1944, anti-shipping operations were concentrated in 
the north under No 18 Group, due to the enemy depending increasingly on Norway. 
Sir Sholto's strategy was not only to destroy the enemy's ships, but also to disrupt his 
supply lines. This was achieved by Sir Sholto extending his operations over as wide an 
area as possible. 400 miles of the Norwegian coastline was in range of the Beaufighters 
from Kristiansund in the north to Kristiansand in the south. 
For the northern section of this coastline, Rover patrols of six or mne 
Beaufighters with rocket projectiles and six or nine Beaufighters with cannon were laid 
on. These forces were employed where the enemy's ships could take cover in the leads. 
132. Air 15-391 p.2. No 18 Group's comment on C-in-C's letter dated 16.10.44 .. 
133. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Table F. 
134. Air 15-162 Table F. See also: RCAF Vol. III, pp.470-474. 
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In the more southern section of the coast where the ships were in open water, the strike 
wings could be used but preceded by outriders that would report the position of the 
enemy it had located. 135 
For these northerly operations, the Command was successfully using as many as 
ten squadrons including those of the Halifaxes that were covering the Kattegat and 
Skagerrak areas. The tactics adopted by the Halifax aircraft were to undertake a radar 
search at 100-200ft altitudes, but for attacks, to climb to 4,000ft and using a Mark XIV 
bombsight, release 500lb medium case bombs with a short delay fuse. By operating at 
night, Halifax casualties were reduced, and losses then, were largely due to night 
fighters. 
Traffic of merchant shipping had been considerably reduced off the Dutch coast, 
and the two Wellington squadrons based at Langham, were largely devoted to anti-E-
boat operations, but from time to time, providing support for the strike squadrons, at 
both North Coates and Dallachy. 
During the whole of 1944, Coastal Command controlled aircraft were credited 
with sinking 170 ships totalling 183,192 tons, and damaging another thirty-nine ships. 
Most of those sunk were off the Norwegian coast. These successes had been at the cost 
of 165 aircraft lost. 136 Thus the ratio had been reduced to less than one aircraft lost for 
one ship sunk. 
In the last four to five months of the war in Europe, Coastal Command's anti-
shipping operations were directed towards two main areas. They were, off the Dutch 
coast, typically from the ScheIdt to the Frisian Islands, and in the North, off the 
Norwegian coast from Kristiansund down to Kristiansand. The ScheIdt was an Allied 
supply route, while Norway was becoming an escape route for the enemy. 
With the Halifax squadrons, and also long-range Mustang fighters becoming 
available to provide cover for the Strike Wings, operations in the north were extending 
more and more eastwards to cover the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea. This latter aspect 
became increasingly important as the enemy attempted to return troops from Norway to 
Germany via ships from Oslo to Denmark. In the southern North Sea, the E-boat 
menace remained, and additionally the enemy's use of midget submarines, Seehund and 
Biber. 
135. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, paras.148-51. 
136. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Tables E and H. 
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There were developments in Coastal's anti-shipping forces with more squadrons 
converting from Beaufighters to Mosquitoes, and improved Marks of Halifaxes and 
Wellingtons going to squadrons. Development and trials of weapons and equipment, 
including rocket projectiles, bombs, bombsights and cannon continued. A limiting 
factor in this respect was the number of man-hours required to achieve some 
modifications to aircraft after they had left the factories. Sir Sholto's keenness in 
endeavouring to equip his squadrons with the latest marks of radar, notably with Mark 
Ins, or later, was to prove its worth. 
This was because with such apparatus, it was possible to co-operate with the 
Navy's surface vessels in giving direct bearings of the enemy to them. Earlier, some 
anti-submarine squadrons had been taken off that task to undertake anti-shipping 
operations; near the end of hostilities, there was a need to revert to the task of ASW 
certainly towards the Seehunds. In the winter 1944-1945 much attention was given by 
Coastal Command to the anti-shipping operations off Norway and in the Kattegat. 137 
Bases being used for Norwegian operations were Dallachy, Banff, Peterhead and 
Frazerburgh. 
There was a strike wing of Beaufighters at Dallachy, one with Mosquitoes at 
Banff, and at Peterhead and Frazerburgh there were support squadrons of Mustang 
fighters and Air-Sea-Rescue aircraft respectively. 
There had been heavy falls of snow along the east coast of both Scotland and 
England, and at Dallachy 160 officers and men from No 404 squadron worked in shifts 
to clear the runway. 
Despite hail, snow and high winds, a strike by twenty-one aircraft on 8 January 
sank two ships off Norway. On the 1 February I was one of a number of aircrew from 
No 524 squadron at Langham sent on detachment to Dallachy to co-operate with the 
Beaufighter squadrons. On 9 February while on the airfield near our Wellington, I 
witnessed the return of the Strike Wing's survivors from attacks on shipping in F0Tde 
fjord. About a dozen Beaufighters flopped down like a flock of wounded ducks, and 
later in the Mess, I saw some of the crews with their battledress battle-scarred It all 
appeared so much like a Hollywood film, but this was not fiction. One of the survivors 
gave me this account: 
137. Air 15-391 Coastal Command's Anti-shipping Operations, Norway and Kattegat, pp.61-180. 
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We crossed the coast south of the fjord with orders to await the report of the 
two outriders. They ... reported [wrongly], no targets in the expected anchorages. The 
basic plan of the strike wing was to commence the attack from the, land to seaward, but as 
the main force proceeded over Fmde fjord there was flak from the ships and shore 
batteries opened fire. This resulted in a change of plans. The main force had to make a 
large'S' turn to position for the attack. This prolonged manoeuvre between the steep 
sides of the fjord, the extra time required to organise into position, gave the German 
fighters from Bergen sufficient time to join the affray. 138 
The original plan to attack from inland towards the sea would have meant no change in 
direction after the attack, and they could have escaped directly. The large number of 
aircraft in the strike was an obvious disadvantage in the confines of a fjord, and 
invariably, aircrew would be watching not only for the enemy, but also what was 
happening to others in their flight, and it was not unknown for friendly aircraft to 
collide. The desirability of using a small number of aircraft on such occasions was 
touched upon by Sir Philip Joubert in 1942.139 
My correspondent, FltlLt Flynn, who was in this strike, blamed the outriders for 
failing to report. The official Australian historian blames none, but states that the leader, 
Milson, cancelled the original plan 'because of the position of larger targets'. 140 
That was the crux of the matter; the 'larger targets', which in this case included a 
Narvik destroyer anchored near the cliffs of the fjord, thus presented a very difficult 
target due to that position. The Australian version states that the destroyer and two naval 
auxiliary vessels were damaged, but they do not appear in Coastal's official list of 
successes. 141 Nine Beaufighters were lost in this strike, six to AA fire, and three to 
enemy fighters. 
No 404 (RCAP) squadron lost six out of its eleven aircraft that had been 
deployed; it was their 'Black Friday'. This episode may be compared with a Bomber 
Command operation at that time, when out of 1,020 sorties, seventeen aircraft were lost, 
(1.7%) in contrast to No 404's loss of 54%. 142 
138. Flynn, P., Letter to the author. C12269 No 404 sqdn's ORBs. RCAF Vol. III, pp.472-3. 
139. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches Vol. II, para. I. 
140. Herrington, 1., Air Power Over Europe 1944-1945, Canberra, 1963, p.382. 
141. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Table F. 
142. Middlebrook, M., The Bomber Command War Diaries 1939-1945, Harmondsworth, 1987, p.662; 
C12269 No 404 sqdn's. ORBs. RCAF Vol. III, pp.472-3 
Goulter, C.J.M.,A Forgotten Offensive, London, 1995, pp.254-5. 
46. F0rde fj ord , 61 °29'N 05°39' Eon 9 February 1945 when the Dallachy Strike Wing lost a 
number of aircraft including six out of eleven from No 404 squadron. An enemy ship is in the 
foreground close to the shore. 
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The disastrous strike on 9 February resulted in repercussions at the Command's 
headquarters and on 2 March, the senior Air Staff Officer, A VM Ellwood, wrote to the 
Air Officer Commanding No 16 Group, A VM F.L. Hopps, remarking that 'Simpson 
gave priority to the enemy destroyer', and suggested that tankers were more important. 
He wrote also to A VM S.P. Simpson at No 18 Group HQ concerning the, ' ... recent 
rather expensive Beaufighter strike against the destroyer some 10 days or a fortnight 
ago' .143 The Admiralty wrote to Sir Sholto Douglas giving a revised priority list for 
shipping strikes that was modified from what had previously applied. 
Surfaced V-boats came first, tankers third, and vessels such as destroyers and 
other escort vessels, sixth. 144 U-boats were a greater threat than destroyers to Allied 
ships and without tankers to provide oil, they would have been useless. By April 1945, 
the situation in the north was changing rapidly. Coastal Command's sorties were being 
extended further eastwards, but at the same time. the enemy was able to provide strong 
cover to his shipping by means of modem single-engined fighters, including FW190s 
and Me 1 09s in considerable numbers. 
The Command signalled the Air Ministry on 20 April that the enemy's fighters 
had on two occasions prevented the Command's aircraft from reaching their target areas 
and requested that five of the enemy's air bases from Bergen to Kristiansand should be 
bombed. This request was, however, refused, as the Air Ministry considered that other 
bases would be used. 145 On 24 April Fighter Command wrote to the DCAS at the Air 
Ministry, Bomber Command, and Coastal Command, following an Air Ministry 
proposal to reinforce Mustang fighters at Peterhead. 
Fighter Command considered that two squadrons of fighters for Coastal 
Command was 'definitely below the safe minimum due to deeper strikes into the 
Skagerrak' and the 'aggressive enemy fighter force in Norway and still in Denmark.' 
Fighter Command recommended two more Mustang squadrons to support Coastal 
leaving twelve squadrons to escort Bomber Command's sorties. 146 
During 1945 No 18 Group sank sixty-seven ships and damaged thirty-two 
others; aircraft controlled by No16 Group sank thirty-seven vessels, including twenty-
three midget submarines, and damaged four more vessels. 
143. Air 15-391 p.101 Plans for anti-shipping forces, winter 1944-45, Norway and Kattegat. 
144. Air 15-391 p.102 Letter 26.2.45.from HQCC to No 18 Group. 
145. Air 15-391 p.60. 
146. Air 15-391 p.56. 
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It may be said that the additional fighters recommended, and that all the total 
effort at that time, was justified. This was because it was believed that the enemy might 
well have made a stand in Norway, while further south, there was still the need to 
protect the Allied supply lines to the Continent. 
In the first week of May, even the Wellingtons of Nos 524 and 612 squadrons 
were operating off the north Gennan coast, at the mouth of the Weser and in Kiel Bay. 
No 612 squadron recorded on 3 May: 
Allied land successes in North West Europe presage an early end to Gennan 
resistance. Coastal Command's recces today showed a wholesale evacuation of Nazi 
forces northwards in the Baltic Sea. In consequence, the squadron tonight assisted in the 
C d' d ~. .' th . shi 147 omman s tremen ous OuenSlve agamst ese evacuatlOn ps. 
No 612 squadron had four Wellingtons operating off the east coast of Denmark and 
'All made attacks and radar operators reported that their screens were covered with 
contacts,.148 That Wellingtons, lacking in defensive armament and speed, could operate 
in an area where earlier, even Mosquito fighters were considered to need cover by 
Mustang fighters, showed how the situation had changed. 
The only limiting factor for the Wellingtons at this time would have been the 
number of bombs carried. In contrast to the Wellington operations of Nos 524 and 612 
squadrons that on 3 and 4 May sank two ships and damaged two others, a strike force 
on 2 May fonned from five squadrons of Beaufighters and Mosquitoes sank only one 
minesweeper. It was surely questionable whether such large forces were necessary. I 
was on leave at this time, and when hostilities ceased, telephoned No 524 squadron's 
adjutant asking if I needed to return. 'Yes' was the response. It was thought that the 
enemy might attempt more hostile action in Norway, and in fact, Coastal Command HQ 
signalled Nos 16 and 18 Groups on 5 May requiring No 524 squadron to move from 
Langham to W,ick, with the possibility of co-operating with the Royal Navy's MTBs off 
the Norwegian coast. 149 
147. Air 27-2114 No 612 sqdn's ORBs. 
148. Air 27-2114 No 612 sqdn's ORBs. 
149. Air 15-391 Plans for Anti-shipping Operations, Winter 1944-45, Norway and Kattegat, p.4l. 
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The Blockade -Runners 
The French Biscay ports served Germany not only for its U-boats and surface 
warships but also for merchant vessels engaged in blockade running. The ships used 
were of about 6,000 to 10,000 tons, were fast, with speeds of about 17 knots, and were 
heavily armed against possible attacks by aircraft. They used the cover of darkness and 
the Spanish coast and were not easy targets. One route was to and from the Far East, 
while a comparatively minor second route was from Bilbao along the coast of Spain to 
Bayonne taking iron ore. Cargoes from the Far East would include rubber, edible oils 
and special ores. Return cargoes to the Far East would include machinery and 
specialised war materials. 150 
Because of the distances involved of about 400 miles, it was difficult for Coastal 
Command to devote aircraft specifically to intercept these blockade-runners in the Bay 
of Biscay. It would have been impracticable for the Command to lay-on regular patrols 
to counter these blockade-runners, due to the lack of aircraft, and not infrequently, it 
was left for the aircraft on anti-submarine patrols over the Bay, to report these ships. 
During 1942 four of these blockade-runners were damaged in attacks by No 19 Group 
aircraft that included a Liberator, Wellington, Whitley and Sunderlands. 
Because it was only such aircraft as the Sunderland that had the range to reach 
the Spanish coast, Sir Philip Joubert wrote to the First Sea Lord with the object of 
obtaining naval co-operation, and on 14 September had a meeting with the Minister of 
Economic Warfare. Sir Philip suggested that there should be a naval patrol of surface 
craft or submarines off Finisterre. This was agreed and submarine patrols were laid on 
in the area bounded by 44°40'N to the north, and the Spanish coast to the south between 
05°30'W and 09°00'W. 
Coastal Command laid on patrols for reconnaissance rather than strikes that 
should locate any surface vessel in or approaching the submarine's area during daylight. 
They were to fulfil Coastal Command Operational Instruction dated 9 October 1942.151 
When aircraft with insufficient range or endurance were used, an unfair load was 
placed on the crews. This was exemplified on 1 November 1942 when Hampdens of 
No 415 squadron were required to fly over the Bay of Biscay to attack two enemy 
merchant vessels that had been reported. On returning to base, one of the Hampdens 
crashed into a petrol dump and burst into flames. 
150. Air 15-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. III, para. 41. 
151. Air 15-773 Vol. IT, para.2IS. 
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One of the survivors gave a detailed report stating that it was 'beyond their 
maximum range deep in the Bay of Biscay' and that the pilot was 'near exhaustion from 
the strain of flying in formation' .152 That would have been for many hours at low level 
and at a low speed to save fuel. This meant that the aircraft controls would be less 
responsive, making it even more difficult to maintain formation. The survivor's report 
was enough for the squadron to take seriously, and trials were undertaken to arrive at 
what could be accepted for that type of aircraft. 
Hazards for these lone reconnaissance aircraft were not only the anti-aircraft 
fire that the blockade-runners were able to use, but also the real prospect of being 
attacked by flights of Ju88s that flew over the Bay to protect the German U-boats. For 
the aircraft that were used to attempt a reconnaissance of the Spanish coast, they might 
well have suffered anti-aircraft fire from shore batteries. 
At the beginning of 1943 the enemy had a number of destroyers based in French 
ports and these were used, not only to escort U-boats entering or leaving port, but also 
in a similar way for blockade runners. In April, despite still being largely concerned 
with anti-U-boat operations, Air Marshal Slessor wrote to the Vice Chief of Naval Staff 
asking for a ruling on the question of priorities. It ultimately resulted in a scheme 
'Sombrero' which required anti-submarine squadrons to be briefed for them to 
recognise a possible blockade-runner. 153 
In my own experience, however, aircrews would invariably report all shipping, 
and if not escorted by Allied naval vessels, would probably photograph any ship sailing 
alone. Such a routine procedure, as it was, is evident in many operational records. If 
there had been intelligence reports of a likely arrival or departure of a blockade-runner, 
crews would have expected to be briefed accordingly. 
No 19 Group covered the Biscay area and the South Western Approaches and, in 
1943, they had available some long-range aircraft including Halifaxes and Liberators, in 
addition to those of shorter range, Wellingtons. Of those aircraft, the Halifaxes had been 
equipped with medium-altitude bombsights that had been intended for use with a 600lb 
'depth bomb' against U-boats. This bombsight could have been used, however, to attack 
blockade-runners. The Liberators were being armed with both bombs and rocket 
projectiles, and were effective against ships, in addition to U-boats. 154 
152. C12285 No 415 sqdn's ORBs, 1944-45. 
153. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, para.42. 
154. Air IS-773 Vol. N, para.42 
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The actual successes achieved by Coastal Command aircraft in 1943 against 
blockade -runners, reflect these improvements in the Command's forces. Thus on 10 
April the 6,240-ton Himalaya was damaged by a combined force of Hampdens and 
Wellingtons. While in August, Halifaxes of No 502 squadron sank a German auxiliary 
on the Bay. 
During the summer of 1943 there was a lull in the enemy's blockade running, 
due no doubt to the lack of night cover. It re-opened with the 6,344-ton blockade-
runner Pietro Orsedo being sunk by Nos 248 and 254 squadrons' Beaufighters on the 
18 December. A Liberator from No 311 (Czech) squadron attacked the 2,729-ton 
Alsterufer on 27 December with rocket projectiles and bombs, setting it on fire. 
It had previously been sighted and shadowed by Sunderlands of No 10 squadron 
RAAF which was congratulated later by the AOC No 19 Group who stated: 'This 
highly successful operation was largely made possible by consistent accuracy of 
positions given in sighting reports' . 155 
The combined success of both Coastal Command aircraft and the Navy's ships 
had resulted, not only in the sinking of the blockade runner, but also three enemy 
destroyers being sunk by HM Ships and others damaged. The Admiralty did prove 
rather lax in this respect, even with regard to giving the positions of the Navy's 
submarines, seemingly for security reasons, but with potentially serious results as I was 
to experience. 156 In the event of an intelligence report of any enemy movements, it was 
customary to have aircraft on stand-by, if not a whole squadron, depending on the report 
given. 157 According to Captain Roskill, it was found, ' ... that interception by surface 
warships working in close co-operation with the aircraft was the only sure way of 
bringing the blockade runners finally to book'. 158 
The Alsterufer episode had shown, however, that a single aircraft with suitable 
armament was quite capable of sinking a merchant ship. Certainly, however, there was a 
bonus at that time for the Navy to engage the enemy destroyers intended as escorts and 
to sink three of them. The AOC of No 19 Group stressed the essential need for accurate 
navigation in reporting positions of the enemy, and that credit went to No 10 squadron 
RAAF. 
155. BatT, K., Maritime is No. 10, Netley, S. Australia, 1983, p.324. 
Herington, 1., Air War Against Germany and Italy1939-1945, Canberra, 1962, p.626. 
156. A No 48 squadron Hudson narrowly avoided attacking a Royal Navy submarine in 1943. 
157. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.42; and the author's experience. 
158. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1956, Vol. II, p.410. See also: Goulter, C.J.M., p.153. 
Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1960, Vol. III. 1, pp.73-5. 
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Roskill sums up the three years of Germany's blockade-running in which it lost 
twenty ships, with fifteen sunk or captured by surface vessels or scuttled; two sunk by 
its own U-boats, one exploded in harbour, and two were sunk by RAF aircraft. That two 
were sunk by U-boats, demonstrated the constant problem at sea, the identification of 
friend or foe. In the case of the blockade-runners, it was even more difficult, as such 
ships went out of the way to cause confusion, by raising flags of different nationality, 
altering the name of the ships, and possibly modifying the superstructure. 
Twenty-one blockade-runners had left France in those three years for the Far 
East with 69,300 tons of cargo, but only fifteen arrived with 57,000 tons. From the Far 
East, thirty-five ships sailed with 257,770 tons of cargo and sixteen arrived in France 
with 111,490 tons. Most of Germany's successes in blockade running were achieved 
before British counter-measures had been properly organised. 159 Here it could be 
added: 'Before Coastal Command had adequate resources.' Roskill continues: 'Only by 
the use of aircraft and surface ships in close conjunction was it possible to achieve 
a high proportion of successful interceptions' .160 For the conditions that prevailed in 
the Bay of Biscay at that time, and with the forces then available to Coastal Command 
for that purpose, one must agree with Captain Roskill. 
Conclusions 
Coastal Command had no aircraft designed specifically for shipping strikes apart 
from the Bristol Beaufort, and those were posted to the Middle East. All the others were 
modified civil aircraft, bombers or fighters. 
Armament for attacks were varied in the light of squadron experience, but with 
250lb bombs appearing as one of the most useful against merchant shipping, but to be 
followed additionally by rocket projectiles. Torpedoes were seen to be of limited value, 
particularly within the areas over which Coastal Command was operating. 
Tactics were developed at squadron level that Commanders at Group or 
Coastal's Headquarters came to accept. In 1942, however, there was a major change, 
made at Headquarters, with orders to cease low-level attacks that were to be replaced by 
attacks at medium level. This was due to serious losses that had been suffered. The 
result was to reduce losses, but also the successes. Serious losses were nevertheless to 
be experienced as late as February 1945. 
159. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1960, Vol. Ill. 1, p.75. 
160. Roskill, S.W., Vol. Ill. 1, p.75. 
See also: Saunders, H., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. III, pp.70-71. 
Slessor, 1., The Central Blue, London, 1956, pp.477, 539-56. 
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The Strike Wings that were intended to overwhelm all enemy opposition never 
achieved that to the full, as the enemy was prepared to use strong air forces to protect 
his shipping. In addition to sinking ships, the strike wings did, however, tie down much 
of the enemy's forces. Nevertheless, it is questionable if using four or five squadrons 
including fighter escorts was justified by the results. 
If one accepts the serious losses of aircraft and aircrews, the Command's 
campaign against enemy-controlled merchant shipping was justified. 876 aircraft were 
lost on anti-shipping operations of all types, but it is likely that most of those losses 
were against strongly escorted merchant vessels. If is reasonable to assume that about 
three aircrew personnel were casualties for every aircraft lost, this gives casualties of 
3,404 aircrew. Bombing Bremen was infinitely safer. 
Nevertheless, aircraft under Coastal Command control were credited with 
sinking 366 enemy vessels, totalling 512,330 tons, and damaging 134 other vessels, 
totalling 513,454 tons. 161 Thus, not only were over a million tons of shipping put out of 
action, but other enemy forces, both aircraft and escort vessels had been required to 
Counter Coastal Command's offensive. 
161. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record 1939-1945, Table F. 
6. Anti-Shipping Operations 
Part 2 Warships 
Heayy Warships 
On 4 June 1940 the German battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau with the 
heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers sailed from Kiel to attack British 
naval units at Harstad. HMS Glorious was sunk, but HMS Acasta torpedoed the 
Scharnhorst, which then sailed with Gneisenau to Trondheim. This was the prelude to 
the first major shipping strike by Coastal Command. On 11 June twelve Hudsons from 
No 269 squadron attacked ships in Trondheim harbour and claimed hits on two cruisers. 
The Hudsons carried only three 250lb bombs each and such armament would have been 
useless against heavily armoured ships such as Scharnhorst. They had to contend with 
not only heavy anti-aircraft fire from the ships but suffer also attacks by single-engined 
fighters; it is remarkable that they lost only two aircraft. 1 
That brief description shows how lacking Coastal Command was in both aircraft 
and armament for an important target. Under the conditions which then prevailed in 
Trondheim fjord, what should have been used were two squadrons of heavy bombers of 
high cruising speed, capable of releasing bombs of say 4,000lb rather than 250lb. With 
bombsights to ensure accuracy from medium height or greater, and to counter enemy 
fighters, two squadrons of long-range fighters such as Mustangs. None of these forces 
were available to the Command. 2 
Even towards the end of the war, however, priority was given to other forces for 
such as the Mustang fighters. The enemy would have been warned by a guard ship at 
the entrance to the fjord, time enough for their fighters to be ready. The one 
'concession' for this strike force was that there was some limited cloud cover.3 
1. Air 15-773 C-in-C' s Despatches, Vol. II, para. 17 . 
2. The first Mustangs reached Britain Oct.l941. Thetford, O. Aircrajtofthe RAF Since 1918,London, 
1979, p.217. 
3. Air 27-1565 No 269 sqdn's ORBs, 1941-5. 
48. An arti st' s impression of the attack on the battl e crui ser Scharnhorst by Hudsons of Nos 224 and 
233 squadrons on 2 1 June 1940 off southern Norway. The painting is authentic apart from the enemy 
fighters being omitted. The attack was led by S/Ldr Feeny who was shot down in fl ames. 
49. The Catalina of No 209 squadron which, captained by PIO Dennis Briggs, 
made the crucial sighting of the battl eship Bismark on 26 May 1941 . 
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In June 1940, the Command still had no effective torpedo strike force, but even if 
such had been available, it is questionable whether it could have made a successful 
attack after entering a long fjord such as at Trondheim~ this was because the key 
element for such an attack would be surprise, and that would have been negated by 
guard ships. They would have lost the advantage of altitude, and would have been 
'sitting ducks' for shore batteries. 
There were further attacks on Scharnhorst by Hudsons from Nos 224, 233 and 
269 squadrons later, when the battle cruiser was sailing off Utsire escorted by 
destroyers and covered by about fifty enemy fighters. No 42 squadron's Beauforts were 
permitted also to attack using 500lb bombs despite possible trouble with their engines. 
Sir Frederick Bowhill accepted these risks as did the aircrews because of the 
importance of the target; it ever prevailed in Coastal Command.4 On 6 April 1941 F /0 
K.Campbell captain of a Beaufort of No 22 squadron, torpedoed the 37,000 ton battle-
cruiser Gneisenau at Brest. This strike, I submit, was the most important one ever made 
by Coastal Command aircraft. This was not because the battle-cruiser was put out of 
action for months, but that the enemy's Rheinilbung, (Rhine operation) was thwarted to 
a considerable degree. The Kriegsmarine had intended that the Gneisenau should sail 
with the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen on a North Atlantic 
foray, and that combined force in the Atlantic would have necessitated a very heavy 
escort for all allied convoys. On 13 June a combined force of Nos 22 and 42 squadrons 
torpedoed the 15,206-ton pocket-battleship Lillzow off south-west Norway despite 
heavy anti-aircraft fire and the ship's fighter escort. It was left to the enemy to 
acknowledge the courage of the Beaufort crews that made their attacks with 'superb 
dash'.s The Lillzow had been damaged by Coastal Command's torpedoes and was out 
of commission until January 1942.6 Some officers in Coastal Command may have 
questioned the desirability of keeping two such squadrons, to some extent on standby, 
waiting for potential targets. 
While Germany still had a powerful surface fleet against which the bombs 
available to Coastal Command were useless, there was surely justification for units 
specialising in torpedo attacks that could not be learned in a day and for which Bomber 
Command was prepared to accede, was a task for Coastal Command. 7 
4. Air 15-773 Vol. 1, paras.20-22. 
O'Neil~ H., G/Capt letter to the author. 
5. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1956, Vol. II, p.485. 
6. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record, Table F. Roskill, S.W., Vol. II, p.484. 
7. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para.lSI. 
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By November the new battleship Tirpitz was at Trondheim, pocket battleships 
were in the Baltic, while the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau with the heavy 
cruiser Prinz Eugen were at Brest.8 
While the Royal Navy throughout the war had to cover the 'seven seas', the 
Kriegsmarine could devote all its resources against British merchant vessels, its orders 
were ever to concentrate on British trade vessels and to avoid if possible, major fleet 
battles. 9 For Coastal Command, not only was it required to provide regular 
reconnaissance to cover movements of the enemy's warships, but also to have probably 
at least one squadron on standby in case a strike was required. 
Even with the regular reconnaissance squadrons, there was ever in my experience, 
at least one aircraft with a complete crew on standby, ready to take off at about five 
minutes notice, but with nothing positive to do meanwhile; the most unloved task for 
alrcrew. 
The aircraft situation for Coastal Command was so stretched at this time that for 
reconnaissance, nine long-range Hudsons were taken from the other squadrons to form a 
special Flight attached to No 220 squadron at Wick. By such means they should have 
been able to cover the Skagerrak and the Norwegian coast as far north as Trondheim, 
but one would have expected them to operate from Sumburgh in the Shetlands, due to 
the shorter distance from Norway, or at least re-fuel there. 
It appears likely that No 220 was selected for this task, not only because they were 
at Wick, but because of their experience and obvious aptitude on Norwegian trips. They 
were to prove to be one ofthe foremost squadrons in anti-shipping operations. 
For a strike force at that time, the situation was no better; after two squadrons had 
been re-armed with Beaufighters, they were posted overseas. Nevertheless, there was an 
obvious need for a strike force in the north to cover the Norwegian and Skagerrak areas; 
similarly in the south, a strike force was required against the three major surface 
warships at Brest. For the few Beaufort strike aircraft available there was limited ASV. 
By the end of 1941 Sir Philip had only two Beaufort squadrons up to strength, Nos 42 
and 86. I recall meeting some of their aircrew at St.Eval at the time of the Channel Dash 
in February 1942. 
8. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para. 170. Air 51-359 C-in-C's 58th, 60th and 83rd meetings. 
9. M-Rechberg, B. von, Battleship Bismarck. London, 1984, p.51. 
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Another Beaufort squadron, No 22, and which had proved its worth in the 
Command, was to be posted overseas.1O At the beginning of 1942 Coastal Command 
was required to undertake offensive operations against enemy merchant vessels, the 
smaller naval units including destroyers and E-boats, and to be prepared to strike 
against major enemy warships. The latter included the battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen at Brest, while at Trondheim was the 
new battleship Tirpitz. 11 
The Channel Dash 
The German battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were located by a PRU 
aircraft at Brest on 28 March 1941 and by June of that year were joined by the heavy 
cruiser Prinz Eugen.12 They posed a serious threat to Britain's trade routes and on 29 
April 1941 a plan had been made by the Admiralty in conjunction with the Air Ministry. 
It was coded 'Operation Fuller' and the Air Officers-in- Chief of Bomber, Fighter and 
Coastal Commands were so informed. 
The Operation was based in the belief that the three warships would sail up the 
English Channel to German ports and with their departure so timed that they would 
negotiate the Straits of Dover at night. 13 
No provision was made for the possible alternative of the ships sailing through the 
Straits in daylight. This aspect was important as any torpedo attack against such vessels 
could more safely be attempted under cover of darkness. 
The British expected the three warships to be heavily protected by a screen of 
surface craft such as destroyers and E-boats in addition to a fighter aircraft 'umbrella' 
cover by the Luftwaffe. The Admiralty'S appreciation was given with remarkable 
accuracy in this respect. 
The only forces that the Admiralty was prepared to deploy against such a 
powerful fleet, however, were two flotillas of motor torpedo boats and six destroyers of 
the 1914-18 era. I4 Bomber Command was expected to provide about 250 aircraft 
although ultimately only a 100 were to be available. 15 
10. Air 15-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. II, paras. 170-5. 
11. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para. 181. 
12. Air 15-773 Vol. II, paras.243-45. 
13. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para.248. 
14. Robertson, T., The Channel Dash, London, 1958, p.44. 
15. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1956, Vol. II, p.153. 
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Fighter Command was required to give cover to torpedo aircraft of both the Fleet 
Air Arm and Coastal Command, also to escort Coastal's Hudsons that were to be used 
to attract the anti-aircraft fire away from the torpedo bombers. For such cover, Fighter 
Command had 550 aircraft in the south. 16 
Coastal's Hudsons were required also to serve in reconnaissance off the French 
coast. On 3 February 1942 the Admiralty briefed the Naval Staff Officers from Bomber, 
Coastal and Fighter Commands giving a new appreciation and the order 'Executive 
Fuller' was issued to all three Commands. Bomber Command, which had had its aircraft 
on standby, was by the 10 February holding the 100 aircraft at four hour's notice. 
Fighter Command was to be responsible for the co-ordination of fighter cover, 
effectively under No 11 Group's control. Coastal Command had only three squadrons of 
strike aircraft, the torpedo Beauforts of Nos 42, 86 and 217 ; No 42 squadron was, 
however, at Leuchars to cover against a possible break out of the battleship Tirpitz 
which was in Trondheim fjord; No 86 squadron was at st. Eval, Cornwall and No 217 at 
Thomey Island near Portsmouth. Of Coastal's Hudson squadrons the only two to take 
an active part in Operation Fuller were No 407 (RCAF) to attract anti-aircraft fire away 
from torpedo aircraft and No 224 to undertake reconnaissance from St. Eva!. 
Sir Philip Joubert, on the 8 February gave his own appreciation to both Bomber 
and Fighter Commands. He must have based this on the state of the tides, the phases of 
the moon, and photo-reconnaissance reports. Joubert expected the German fleet to make 
its dash between 10 and 15 February, and on the 11 February photo-reconnaissance 
showed that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were out of dock and that there 
were six destroyers with them. I? 
Patrols by No 224 squadron had been laid on to cover the exit of these vessels but 
at critical times their radar was obviously jammed, although some official accounts 
suggest that the radar was faulty. Such might have been the case for one aircraft, but I 
consider that a powerful jamming signal might well have overloaded the ASV. An air 
raid on Brest by Bomber Command delayed the German fleet's departure but the ships 
sailed at 2245hrs on 11 February. The Royal Navy's provision to be aware of the 
breakout of the enemy's ships was to have an agent at Brest to give immediate 
intelligence by radio. 
16. Roskill, S.W., Vol. II, p.l53. 
17. Air-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. fl, paras.251,253. 
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Additionally a submarine, HMS Sea/ion, was deployed off Brest. Due to German 
thoroughness, the agent was unable to pass a sentry to send a radio signal. At a crucial 
time also, HMS Sealion withdrew to charge its batteries. 
Thus the first two lines for intelligence were lost. One might ask, 'Why only one 
submarine?' Would it not have been prudent to have at least a second one as standby, 
and bearing in mind the nature of three prime targets for torpedoes from submarines, 
why not have a line of such craft, such as Germany appeared ever ready to deploy? If it 
were said that it was too dangerous; surely no more than a U-boat entering Scapa Flow? 
A standby submarine might then have justified the Navy not being prepared to use its 
own capital ships against a powerful enemy. 
Detection of the breakout was now dependent, not only on Coastal's Hudsons but 
also Fighter Command's Spitfires that made patrols across the Channel and likewise, 
the Swordfish sorties of the Fleet Air Arm across the Straits of Dover. Additionally, 
however, Fighter Command had stations to detect aircraft, and there were shore 
batteries with radar to detect shipping. Fighter Command did in fact gain plots of the 
enemy's fighter umbrella at 0845hrs on the 12 February and its aircraft did sight the 
enemy's battle cruisers and heavy cruiser at 1040hrs. Only belated action was taken 
however. 
Positive actions were taken by both the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command. 
L/Cmdr Esmonde led six Swordfish torpedo aircraft with some fighter escort against the 
ships but all six Swordfish were shot down; Esmonde was awarded a posthumous VC. 
Out of Coastal's thirty-six strike aircraft, fourteen were at Leuchars and they flew south 
via Coltishall and attempted operations in conjunction with No 407 squadron's 
Hudsons, but due to very low visibility given in yards, contact was lost. The Hudsons 
led by SlLdr Anderson and FlO Cowperthwaite were well aware that they were on a 
sacrificial mission with 250lb bombs that were completely useless against heavily 
armoured warships, but, nevertheless, it was believed that they reached the Prinz Eugen. 
Both were shot down. IS From No 217 squadron PIO Carson led Beauforts that attacked 
the battle cruisers from as close as 1,000 yards with torpedoes, and they were followed 
by two more No 217 squadron Beauforts, but none of the results were seen. 
18. Abbott, K., Gathering of Demons, Perth, Onto 1987, p.131. C12273 No 407sqdn's ORBs. 
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The weather was given as 8/1 Oths to 10/1 Oths cloud with base as low as 400ft 
and there were rain showers. 19 Thus flying conditions could hardly have been worse. 
British coastal batteries had been nullified due to the enemy's very effective jamming of 
radar such as was suffered by No 224 squadron's Hudsons. 
Of the Navy's meagre forces that were deployed, four motor torpedo boats from 
Dover released torpedoes from outside the enemy's screen, thus at long range and 
presumably at no recognised target. The motor torpedo boats from Ramsgate returned to 
port without making any attack. The six destroyers from Harwich of the 1914-18 era 
were able to release some torpedoes but all were avoided by the enemy. 20 The briefing 
of those destroyers was such that according to the Navy's own intelligence report, they 
had sailed not knowing what armament they were expected to use.21 
Bomber Command could not hope to do any damage to heavily armoured ships, 
as to penetrate the decks with armour piercing bombs they would need to release them 
from say 7,000ft or more altitude and with cloud base as low as 400ft that was out of the 
question. Furthermore, they were not trained in attacking a target such as a heavily 
armed warship travelling at 27 knots and which was able to manoeuvre. What other 
forces should one expect during the period of the afternoon of the 12 February to the 
morning of the 13 February and in the wide area of the northern North Sea? There was 
surely enough time for the Navy to have at least one capital ship that could oUtrange the 
llin guns of the German battle-cruisers, as the Royal Navy's battleships had guns of 
calibre from 14 to 16in.22 
The Navy had been prepared to withdraw cover from convoys to attack Bismarck 
and had the opportunity well in advance of February 1942 to have at least one battleship 
available. 
The only effective weapons used against the battle cruisers were mines laid by the 
RAF. Sir Arthur Harris states that those mines were laid by his Command, but the 
official history questions that claim. 23 
19. Abbott, K., p. 13 1. Richards, D.,RAF 1939-1945, London, 1953, Vol. I, p.371. 
20. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1960, Vol. II, p.157. 
21. Seen by the author at RAP Wick, 1942. 
22. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1954, Vol. I, p.577. 
23. Harris, A., Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, p.68. Richards, D., Vol. I, p.373. 
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The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill was well aware of public opinion with 
people shocked that enemy ships could pass British shores unmolested, furthermore, he 
needed to be ready to answer questions in Parliament. Churchill therefore ordered, as 
he stated: 'To allay complaints an official enquiry was held'.24 This was held by 
Mr Justice Bucknill, but included Service representatives, and I was aware at the time, 
of aircrew from No 224 squadron being required to attend. In respect of Coastal 
Command's involvement, the enquiry stated that it would have been prudent for an 
additional reconnaissance following apparent failure of the Command's ASV. 
Captain Roskill, in the official naval history stated: 'The main cause of failure to 
do more damage to the German ships was that they were at sea for twelve hours, four of 
them in daylight before they were discovered, and it was undoubtedly the failure of our 
air patrols, which brought this about'.25 What of the two Naval sources that failed to 
report the movement of the ships? They should have been the first to inform, namely, 
the agent at Brest, and HMS Sealion. The Navy had made no attempt to fill the gap left 
by that submarine as would surely have been 'prudent'. It would not have made the 
slightest difference if the third line of intelligence, Coastal's aircraft, had reported after 
the other two had failed. 
In fact it was an 'air patrol' that gave the first sighting. The naval forces provided 
to attack the battle cruisers demonstrated quite obviously that they were incapable of 
doing any damage, however much time they were allowed. The Admiralty as Roskill 
stated: ' ... realised that a few destroyers, motor torpedo boats and torpedo boats were 
unlikely to do more than inflict some underwater damage,.26 
Even after passing the Straits of Dover, there would still have been many hours 
for the Navy to use a battleship against the battle cruisers particularly as they had been 
crippled by mines laid by the RAF. The prime error made by the Admiralty was in their 
appreciation to make no provision for the enemy's forces traversing the Straits of Dover 
during daylight, as would have been prudent, in addition to taking for granted that the 
enemy would use the dark hours. They had thereby nullified the chance of successful 
torpedo attacks by the meagre light forces in addition to those of the Fleet Air Arm and 
Coastal's torpedo aircraft. 
24. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War, London, 1977, Vol. IV, p.110. 
25. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1956, Vol. II, p.159. 
26. Roskill, S.W., Vol. IL p.152. 
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Dr Goulter states that 'The Command as a whole was acutely embarrassed when it 
was held primarily responsible for the Channel Dash incident'. 27 She does, not, 
however, give the reason or source for that statement. Goulter states also, that the 
squadrons at the beginning of 1942 'Suffered from low morale,.28 From 10 February 
onwards I met up with aircrew from at least two of the strike squadrons in addition to 
my own (No 224); I neither saw nor heard any sign whatever of low morale; rather was 
it otherwise. Evidence of high, rather than low morale, is to be seen in the operational 
records. 29 
Sir Arthur Harris acknowledges that the 'weather was too bad for any successful 
bombing attack' and that ' ... minelaying [was] a most effective weapon against the 
enemy's shipping'. 30 Sir John Slessor acknowledges the enemy's' ... operatIonal use of 
the weather ... undercover of a front of which they must have known the timing and 
movement to a nicety ... ,.31 Sir Philip Joubert sums up the Channel Dash with: 
It is doubtful whether the forces employed to attack the Gennan squadron were 
sufficient to cripple the battlecruisers, even if we had received immediate knowledge of 
their departure from Brest. A night attack by surface vessels might have been more 
successful, but the numbers available at that time in the Channel were very small. As it 
was, on 12 February the attack had to be made by day, when the best prospect of 
crippling the ships lay with the bombers and torpedo bombers apart from the possibility 
of damage by mines. Owing to the very low cloud base the bombers were of very little 
use and the only effective striking force was the torpedo bombers. 32 
For successful attacks by torpedo bombers, however,. surprise was essential and the 
enemy expected attacks. Furthermore, with very low visibility, they could not have 
hoped to have aimed accurately, even should they have been able to break through a 
powerful screen of E-boats and destroyers, and lacking in cover by other aircraft to 
counter both AA fire and fighters. For Kim Abbott, one of No 407 squadron's pilots, 
'The fault lay in questionable planning, lack of preparation, and extremely poor 
leadership, not sea power'. 33 By' sea power', he must have thought of the Royal 
Navy's heavy units that were available. 
27. Goulter, C.J.M., The Forgotten Offensive, London, 1995, p.161. 
28. Goulter, C.J.M., p.161. 
29. ORBs: Air 27-1793 No 407 sqdn; Air 27-471 No 48 sqdn; Air 27-1387 No 224 sqdn; 
Air 27-1365 No 220 sqdn. 
30. Harris, A., Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, pp.68-9. 
31. Slessor, J., The Central Blue, London, 1956, pp.379-380. 
32. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.2SI. 
33. Abbott, K.,A Gathering of Demons, Perth, Ont., 1987, p.133. 
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In referring to 'leadership', Abbott was thinking of the higher command, not 
his own squadron, far from it. Rather does he rightly refer to those natural leaders, 
S/Ldr Anderson and FlO Cowperthwaite as exceptional, lost as they were, near the 
Prinz Eugen. Their final sorties may be compared with the Navy's VC, L/Cmdr 
Esmonde, but tactically, there were differences, Esmonde had a lethal weapon and had 
some fighter cover, Anderson and Cowperthwaite had neither. Abbott in his account, 
readily acknowledges the valour of Esmonde, but regrets that his own squadron 
(No 407), lacked any recognition. 34 Winston Churchill in his war memoirs shows a 
general reluctance to criticise either personnel or forces and that policy prevailed in his 
account of the Channel Dash.35 
The Luftwaffe officer, Adolf Galland, who organised the fighter umbrella to cover 
the enemy's ships stated: 
The Vice-Admiral commanding the Dover station had received additional MTBs 
and Swordfish torpedo carriers. During the previous days British aircraft dropped 1,100 
magnetic mines between the Frisian Islands and Brest. It cannot, therefore, be said that 
the British Command was completely taken by surprise ... the British Command showed 
amazingly little ability to improvise ... this operation was accomplished within range of 
the [British] Home Fleet. 36 
I consider that the Admiralty had no serious intention of stopping the Scharnhorst, 
Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen from sailing up the Channel, as demonstrated by the 
meagre forces it deployed. It was apparent that British forces lacked co-ordination and 
no satisfactory plan had been made, (in sharp contrast to, for example, the Torch 
operation). The fault lay, not with individual forces, but with the Admiralty whose duty 
it was surely, to counter the movement of an enemy fleet. It would have made no 
difference whatsoever, if Coastal's reconnaissance had given earlier reports; they did, 
however, serve as a scapegoat for the naval historian, Captain Roskill to justify the 
Admiralty's indifference. 37 
The enemy had again shown that in moving its heavy warships, it was able to 
choose weather conditions that provided excellent cover and nullified any counter 
moves by the British. 
34. Abbott, K., Gathering of Demons, Perth,Ont. 1987, p.131. 
35. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War, London, 1977, Vol. IV, p.102. 
36. Galland, A., The First and the Last, London, 1970, pp.152, 165, 167. 
37. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1956, Vol. II, p.159. 
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As Robertson stated: 'This cleverly executed plan was to be largely responsible 
for the delays in the British attacks'; and,'The Channel Dash remains a monument to 
muddled leadership' .38 For the enemy it was a 'tactical victory but a strategic defeat'. 39 
Of the three heavy warships, Gneisenau never went to sea again, Scharnhorst was 
sunk in the Battle of North Cape in December 1943, and Prinz Eugen was to be attacked 
again by Coastal Command in 1942 but not effectively.40 
The advantages that followed from the ships leaving Brest, were that for the RAF, 
Bomber Command had 40% of its effort which had been devoted to bombing ships in 
Brest was now able to direct that effort towards Germany. For Coastal Command, its 
aircraft that had been on regular reconnaissance covering those ships were now free to 
concentrate on anti-submarine warfare, thus in the case of my own squadron, No 224, 
we were posted from St. Eval to Limavady to undertake North Atlantic sorties. 
The strike squadrons were moved to northern bases such as Wick and Leuchars as 
it was still necessary to counter possible movements by the battleship Tirpitz in addition 
to those by Prinz Eugen and Scharnhorst. There remained also Coastal's requirement 
to cover the convoys to and from Russia. 
For Coastal's Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Sir Philip Joubert, the Channel 
Dash episode had demonstrated his shortage of strike aircraft, and his lack of other 
aircraft to cover the strikes. The Prinz Eugen was located in Trondheim roads with an 
escort of four destroyers on 16 May. A second potential target, the pocket battleship 
Lutzow, also with a four-destroyer escort was seen in the Kattegat but steaming 
northwards at 15 knots. Just before midnight on 16 May six Hampdens were sent to 
mine the Haugesund area and reconnaissance on 17 May reported enemy warships in 
positions 59°43'N 05°25'E, 59°40'N 05°35'E, and later at 58°30'N 05°35'E. 
From these positions it was estimated that enemy warships would pass Lister 
Light in southern Norway on 17 May between 1900-2000hrs. Off Lister Light the ships 
would be sailing in open waters and thus where attacks were possible with both bombs 
and torpedoes. A total force of twenty-seven Beauforts, six Blenheim fighters, eight 
Beaufighters and thirteen Hudsons was deployed. 
38. Robertson, T., The Channel Dash, London, 1958, pp.58, 191. 
39. Robertson, T., p.191, quoting Admiral Raeder. 
40. Roskill, S.W., Vol. IL p.398. 
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The term 'fighter' for the Blenheims was a mIsnomer, as they lacked the 
firepower even of the Hudsons. Nevertheless, they were to attack the enemy fighters 
that were rightly expected to oppose any attack on shipping. Additionally the 
Blenheims were expected to make dummy torpedo attacks to confuse the enemy. 
The limited number of Beau fighters was to counter anti-aircraft fire and attack the 
destroyers with cannon. In the first wave of twelve Beauforts, their three leaders were 
shot down. In a second wave, four more Beauforts were lost. For successful torpedo 
attacks where the enemy had fighter cover, in this case from Stavanger, surprise was 
essential, and that had not been achieved. Again, the Admiralty was not prepared to risk 
units of the Home Fleet off the enemy-controlled coast; thus it was a task for Coastal 
Command aircrew and with quite inadequate aircraft and armament. A combined 
Operational Instruction was, however, prepared which made provision for fighter 
cover. 41 This was essential for any daylight strikes off the Norwegian coast due to the 
enemy's strong fighter forces based there. There remained also Coastal's requirement to 
cover the convoys to and from Russia. 
By late summer, major enemy naval units were based at Narvik including the 
battleship Tirpitz, the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and the heavy cruiser Admiral 
Hipper. They thus posed a threat to British convoys to or from Russia, and when at that 
time, two were scheduled, namely PQ 18 and QP 14. To give cover against such ships a 
detachment of Hampden torpedo bombers from Nos 144 and 455 squadrons was flown 
from Sumburgh in the Shetlands. 
Twenty-three arrived at Vaenga. Additionally, a detachment of Catalinas from No 
210 squadron also flew to Russia where the whole of Coastal's forces were under the 
command of Group Captain F. L. Hopps who had earlier served at Wick as Station 
Commander. 
Hitler w".s not prepared to risk his major fleet units at sea, wishing instead to keep 
them to protect Norway; attacks on the convoys were then left to U-boats and the 
Luftwaffe's aircraft. 
The outcome for Coastal Command was that the aircraft were left in Russia for 
the Russians, including some PRU Spitfires and for the Command's personnel to return 
to the United Kingdom by sea.42 
41. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. II, para.l83. 
42. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para. 242. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1956, Vol. II, p.278. 
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Comments made by aircrew that served in Russia, reflect an indifferent attitude in 
respect of the help given to the Russians and at great cost to the British, particularly of 
the merchant seamen. Post war, Coastal's aircrews that served in Russia however, were 
awarded Russian decorations. 
Leaving aircraft in Russia may have given the impression of Coastal being well 
equipped but it was not so. Its few squadrons were intended to cover the whole of the 
enemy-controlled coastline, from possibly, Trondheim in Norway down to the Spanish 
frontier. Because the enemy still had major warships such as the battleship Tirpitz in 
Norway, it was necessary for the Command to have a strike force based in the north at 
Leuchars, Wick or Sumburgh to counter any breakout by such potential raiders to the 
Atlantic or against the Russian convoys. Furthermore, strike aircraft were required to 
operate over the Bay of Biscay against blockade- runners, and also to cover the Spanish 
coastline from Bilbao to French ports due to the traffic of iron ore along that route. 
As a Strike Wing was intended to comprise at least three strike squadrons, the 
forces available were obviously quite inadequate. There remained, also, ever the need, 
from May 1940 onwards, for strike forces to operate against the German E-boats. 
My only notable trip to Norway was to seek the battleship Tirpitz and the heavy 
cruiser Admiral Hipper that were thought to be in Trondheim fjord on 6 June 1942. We 
must have been chosen because we had the best navigator on the squadron, and accurate 
navigation was paramount for a potential shipping strike. 
This sortie must have been rated of some importance as it was the only time that 
the Station Commander came into the operations room to check, in addition to the 
pilot and navigator, that I personally was fully briefed, although I was then only 
a Sgt. Wop/AG (Wireless Operator/Air Gunner). Our safety was dependent on cloud 
cover, but on reaching Trondheim fjord we found none, and in a trip of 7Ythr in that 
northern latitude, there were only three hours of darkness. We were challenged by the 
guard ship at the entrance to the fjord, and it must have reported our presence to the 
Luftwaffe, as on return to the operations room, the controller asked me if I had seen any 
enemy aircraft as three fighters were looking for us. 
If we had sighted either the battleship or the heavy cruiser, I doubt if we would 
have escaped. Although we had cut short our trip down the fjord, it was far enough to 
make an escape rather difficult. 
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A single battleship docked in Norway was enough to require considerable effort 
on the part of Coastal Command because of the possibility of it breaking out into the 
Atlantic. Furthermore, it meant that convoys to Russia, needed naval escorts capable of 
dealing with a modem battleship that was superior to any single ship of the Royal Navy. 
The need for extremely accurate navigation was essential, as also reliable wrr 
signals; with at least one strike squadron on standby and armed, they would have had 
little reserve in fuel to start looking for the target rather than flying direct to its position. 
This necessity became apparent for the strike wings that came later. The checks made 
by the Station Commander at that briefing were typical of that officer (then G/Capt 
Hopps). He checked also the records of the link trainer, as all aircrew, and not just 
pilots, were expected to be able to handle an aircraft. In fact, to stand in, for all the other 
aircrew categories as necessary.43 All aircrew, likewise, were expected to study 
intelligence reports in the operations room. 
In 1943, when armaments were being considered for the strike squadrons; they 
were to include, torpedoes, bombs and rocket projectiles, in addition to the 
Beaufighters' cannon. Equipment that was added included ASV aerials, plates for the 
installation of rocket projectiles and dive brakes. Collectively, these additions, could 
result in the speed of Beau fighters being reduced by as much as 17 knots.44 
Sir Philip had intended increasing his anti-shipping operations in the stretch of 
open water south of Stavanger to Lister and including the Skagerrak. That was in 
October, but the need for reconnaissance against a possible break out of Germany's 
major fleet units meant that there were just not enough aircraft for both those tasks. 
At the time of Operation Overlord, Germany still had available for operations, 90-
100 E-boats, 135 R-boats, twenty to twenty-five destroyers, and thirty-five torpedo 
boats; in addition to about 200 U-boats and 150 W-boats (midget submarines). The 
possibility of a breakout into the Atlantic by heavy warships had also to be considered.45 
Although it was thought that the main threat to the Allies' forces would be from 
U-boats attempting to enter the Bristol, St.George's and English Channels, an enemy 
offensive was expected using destroyers and other light surface craft against Allied 
convoys and Sir Sholto Douglas laid on anti-shipping operations for dusk and dawn and 
during the night. 
43. Spotswood, D., MRAF, letter to the author. 
44. Air 15-46 Aircraft Operational Requirements Policy, Ju1.1939-Jun.1943. 12.2.43. 
45. Air 15-102 Overlord - The Role of Coastal Command, para.33. 
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These were to be flown largely by Nos 16 and 19 Groups, although the main task 
for No 19 Group was considered to be anti-submarine warfare. 46 
For No 16 Group's prime task of anti-shipping operations, it had strike wings at 
North Coates and Langham; while a Flight of No 415's Albacores with Fleet Air Arm 
Swordfish was at Manston. On anti-ship reconnaissance from Leuchars was a Flight of 
No 333's Mosquitoes. The anti-shipping tactics were those already given, they were: at 
night the Albacores and Swordfish could be controlled by Nos 10 and 11 Groups with 
their DIF systems. Wellingtons would undertake reconnaissance sorties and could be 
used when required by No 16 and 19 Groups and in co-operation with light surface 
forces and/or Beaufighters. The dawn and dusk sorties were against light surface craft 
when leaving harbour at dusk or returning at dawn and were to be' flown by 
Beaufighters. 
The Home Fleet was responsible for countering any attempt by the enemy's heavy 
warships to break out. No 18 Group was to lay on reconnaissance sorties to cover such a 
possibility.47 Coastal Command was specific in the armament for its anti-shipping 
forces in Overlord. Against E and R-boats, cannon were to be used, with bombs being 
of only secondary use. It was appreciated that if rocket projectiles were used at night, 
the first launch of a pair would obscure the target, and therefore, it would be to either 
use just one pair, or the complete salvo. 
Bombs were favoured against ships, but with the first choice being the medium 
case (MC) type due to their high charge/weight ratio and with good fragmentation. In 
fact, this type came to be used against E-boats in the winter of 1944-45. Trials had 
already shown that MC bombs were the best compromise for attacks on E-boats as it 
was found that the fragmentation area for two 500lb and two 250lb MC bombs was 
between 75-1 OOyd diameter. 
Against destroyers in Overlord, rocket projectiles and bombs were to be used, but 
with cannon serving as anti-flak. The most notable decision was that torpedoes were not 
to be used. This decision, although not so stated, probably stemmed from the likelihood 
of Allied surface forces being available to use gunfire in support, and perhaps also, the 
critical nature of releasing torpedoes when friendly vessels were likely to be present. 
46. Air 15-102 Overlord - The Role of Coastal Command, paras.8,14,15. 
47. Air 15-102 paras. 8, 14,15. 
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In the event of Wellingtons on reconnaissance sighting enemy destroyers, they 
were to transmit so that the Royal Navy's destroyers could home on to the scene. 
Furthermore, torpedoes were hardly an economic way of attacking small surface craft 
that were likely to predominate in the hostile areas. As a back-up to the armaments 
mentioned, depth charges were to be available on all the operational bases, as an 
alternative to the use ofMC bombs. 
The Command's directive stated that the armament of E-boats included two 
20mm cannon and two machine guns, although the E-boats that I was later to see at 
Felixstowe had just one cannon in the stem, in addition to two torpedo tubes. A flotilla 
of such craft was, nevertheless, a force to be respected. 
The preferred form of attack at the time of Overlord, was to release MC bombs 
from an altitude of at least 1,OOOft, and those tactics were to prevail in the following 
winter.48 Against the midget submarines (W-boats), Me bombs could again be used, 
but if fused to detonate at 25ft depth with a 14sec delay fuse. These craft were to 
continue operating over the North Sea, long after the Overlord landings such as the 
operational records of Nos 612 and 524 squadrons were to show.49 
A prime need for the Allies in Operation Overlord was to capture a port although 
the improvised harbours were to prove their worth. The Americans gained Cherbourg 
on 26 June and the Canadians captured Antwerp on 4 September. The latter, however, 
was covered by the enemy on Wa1cheren Island and it was 26 November before the first 
Allied ship reached Antwerp.50 It was a task throughout for the Command's aircraft to 
cover the flanks of the Allies' convoy routes to whatever ports were used. 
The enemy sank only eleven of the Allies' minor vessels~ for, as Donitz states: 
'Since March 1944 our ships had been constantly detected by radar as soon as they left 
harbour and had found themselves very swiftly exposed to sea and air attack'. 51 
Captain Roskill refers to the success of the Wellingtons and specifically the 
Beaufighters of Nos 143 and 236 squadrons sinking E and R-boats. 52 
48. Air 15-102 paras.46-48. Author's experience. 
49. ORBs: Air 27-1997 No 524 sqdn; Air 27-2114 No 612 sqdn. 
50. Eisenhower, D.D., Crusade in Europe, New York, 1968, p.278. 
Cunningham, Viscount,A Sailor's Odyssey, London, 1951, p.609. 
51. Donitz, K., Memoirs, London, 2000, p.395. 
52. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1961, Vol. III.2, p.58. 
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The Command's involvement in operation Overlord had resulted in three new 
developments during that period. In fact, from 8 to 29 June No 16 Group's aircraft sank 
nine small naval vessels, one of3,500 tons, plus a merchant vessel of 7,900 tons. No19 
Group's aircraft, in the same period, damaged three of the enemy's destroyers, each of 
3-4,000 tons and sank a naval auxiliary vesse1. 53 
They were the use of combined Wings for strikes on enemy anchorages; the object 
being for a large force to provide saturating fire power, in contrast to using a small 
force, which it was considered, would result in 'costly failure,.54 This belief may be 
questioned however. It had already been demonstrated that just one Hudson aircraft, 
armed with only four 250lb bombs could cause devastation, and return to base 
unscathed. 55 
A second development was with Mosquitoes that had initially been used as long-
range fighters from Cornwall, but had proved to be increasingly successful in attacking 
ships in the Bay of Biscay. Later, Mosquitoes were displacing Beaufighters as 
squadrons re-armed for operations over Norway. 
A third change was for the Halifax squadrons, Nos 58 and 502, that had operated 
successfully against U-boats, were now to be used for anti-shipping operations off 
Norway and in the Kattegat and Skagerrak areas. By August, they were based at 
Stornoway for that purpose. 56 
The two latter developments indicated what ever applied for Coastal Command. 
That was contending with the 'cast offs' of Fighter and Bomber Commands, albeit 
using such aircraft with considerable success. Of all the aircraft being used by Coastal 
against shipping in 1944, none had been designed specifically for that purpose; those 
machines were Wellingtons and Halifaxes from Bomber Command, and Beaufighters 
and Mosquitoes intended for Fighter Command. There was, however, a flight of 
Albacores, intended for the Fleet Air Arm. Even for the Halifaxes and Mosquitoes, 
there were limitations in their availability, as, earlier in 1944, it was reported that there 
would be insufficient for Nos 58 and 502 squadrons to operate Halifaxes much after 
September. In respect of Mosquitoes; after five had gone to Bircham Newton, it was 
reported 'absolutely the last to be available to Coastal Command'. 57 
53. Air 15-162 Coastal Command's War Record, 1939-1945, Table F. 
54. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, para. 139. 
55. Taylor, C., No 407 sqdn at Den Helder, 18.9.42. 
56. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para. 139. 
57. Air 15-282 Aircraft Situation, Coastal Command Conferences, Dec. 1943-Mar. 1945. 
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E-Boats 
These approximated to the Royal Navy's motor torpedo boats (MTBs) but with 
two important advantages over the MTBs; they were powered by Diesel engines, and 
they were much faster. The Diesel engines used oil rather than highly inflammable 
petrol. The speed which my crew estimated, when we first sighted a flotilla of E-boats 
was 40-45 knots; this was based on the tremendous wake which E-boats could produce. 
It was, in fact, their wakes that enabled us to sight them easily in moonlight, rather than 
the vessels that were relatively small. 
The first recorded attack on E-boats by Coastal Command aircraft was by a Battle 
Flight of No 48 squadron's Ansons on the 20 May 1940 against eight or nine E-boats 
off the Dutch coast, near Texel. The Ansons used 100lb bombs and machine guns. A 
direct hit on an E-boat with a 100lb bomb would certainly at least have seriously 
damaged it, and machine-gun fire would have cleared the decks. In that attack, No 48 
squadron lost one aircraft and another was damaged. The E-boats that I was able to 
inspect at Felixstowe in 1945 had just one small cannon in the stem, but the German 
gunners, as I had experienced earlier, were remarkably adept in gunnery. 
From May 1940 up to May 1945, the German E-boats operating from the Dutch 
coast were able to cross the North Sea to attack British shipping using torpedoes (they 
had two tubes, one to port, one to starboard on the deck); alternatively they were used 
for minelaying. Because of their speed, manoeuvrability and small size, E-boats were 
extremely difficult to attack, and sailing as a flotilla, their combined anti-aircraft fire 
was certainly a factor to consider. Coastal Command later developed tactics and 
weapons to counter this menace. 58 The Command came to use a number of types of 
aircraft against E-boats including Ansons, Hudsons, Beaufighters, Albacores, 
Wellingtons, and the Fleet Air Arm's Swordfish. 
On 19 February a conference to consider anti-E-boat measures was held at Coastal 
Command's Headquarters. The outcome was for No16 Group to introduce offensive 
patrols on 1 March. They were to be between 53°10'N and 52°N as cross-over patrols to 
locate E-boats and report their position, course and speed. It would then be for the 
reconnaissance aircraft to shadow the E-boats and to await a wrr signal to illuminate 
the enemy with flares for an attack by other aircraft or naval surface vessels. 
58.Air 15-773 Vol. II, paras.S7,63,64. Author's experience in No 524 squadron. 
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As already stated for other strikes, accurate navigation was essential, and at this 
time, ASV beacons were to aid the reconnaissance aircraft. Later, however, certainly in 
the winter of 1944-45, GEE became available for Coastal's North Sea patrols. 59 
The tactics adopted against E-boats were similar in some ways to what followed 
with the Strike Wings of Beau fighters using a pathfinder aircraft, such as a Wellington 
that had better facilities for navigation than a Beaufighter. In early 1942, however, anti-
E-boat operations were undertaken by the-maid-of-all-work, the Hudson. Hudsons flew 
the patrols between 10 March and 16 April, operating from North Coates and Bircham 
Newton, although no enemy contacts were achieved. Some attempt had been made also, 
to use fighter aircraft armed with cannon in January and February. 
Although E-boats could have been sunk by cannon, their speed and 
manoeuvrability made them difficult targets for such weapons. The fighter operations 
nevertheless proved enough to stop the E-boats attempting daylight operations.60 
A feature of the British anti-E-boat operations was the use of shore-based radar stations 
that could plot the arrival of the enemy. As was the case with U-boats, however, weak 
spots in the British defences were probed. Thus on 7 July E-boats sank six ships in 
Lyme Bay where RDF stations were limited.61 
In 1942, both the Royal Navy and Coastal Command were increasingly on the 
offensive against E-boats. The E-boats obviously favoured operations from Dutch ports 
such as Ijmuiden although on occasions they were located off Texel as I was later to 
appreciate. They also used the French port of Cherbourg. 
While the Navy was able to deploy more light surface craft against E-boats in 
1942, Coastal Command remained stretched to the limit in respect of both aircrews and 
aircraft. It was not until 1944 that the Command had suitable numbers of aircraft that 
could be devoted to anti-E-boat operations with squadrons such as Nos 612, 524 and 
also No 415 (RCAF). Meanwhile the light surface forces of the Navy had to contend 
with an enemy that ever posed a difficult target and a serious hazard to Allied 
shipping. 62 In September 1944, the enemy was withdrawing from north-eastern France 
and much of Belgium, which resulted in Channel ports being evacuated of merchant 
vessels and naval auxiliaries, but thirteen E-boats withdrew from Boulogne to 
Rotterdam and Ijmuiden on 4 September.63 
59. GEE- similar to radar but using ground station signals in conjunction with a special chart. 
60. RoskiU, S.W., Vol. II, p.l62. Air 15-773 Vol. II, paras.299-304. 
61. Roskill, S.W., Vol. II, p.l63. Air 15-773 Vol. II, para.305. 
62. ORBs: Air 27-2114 No 612 sqdn; Air 27-1997 No 524 sqdn; C12285 No 415 sqdn. 
63. Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, London, 1961, Vol. III.2, p.138. 
50. A Wellington of No 6 12 squadron with the housing for the scanner o f a later mark 
of A SV /radar visible in the nose. [n the latter months of the war No 6 12 was 
operating aga inst E-boats off the Dutch coast, and additionally was sighting 
German midget submarines. 
5 [ . German E- boats which operated from the Dutch and also the Norwegian coasts in 
1944 - 1945. Nos 41 5, 524 and 6 12 squadrons were directly involved in countering 
their attacks against British shipping along England 's east coast and the English Channel. 
234 
I was involved with those E-boats later on 30 November as I flew on a cross-over 
patrol off Ijmuiden looking for E-boats to attack.64 Those few E-boats based in Dutch 
ports were reinforced, making the numbers up to twenty, and E-boats and the midget 
submarines such as the Seehunds were to engage two squadrons of No16 Group's 
Wellingtons (Nos 524 and 612), until the end ofhostilities.65 
When posted to No 524 squadron at RAF Langham on 14 November 1944, I was 
asked: 'Have you a car? - We have so many here unclaimed'. Another officer with 
whom I had been posted, I met only once subsequently; his time must have been short. 
Later I became aware of empty bed spaces in the Nissen huts that served as 
accommodation. No 524 squadron was involved mainly in anti-E-boat operations off 
the Dutch coast, which during the long winter nights were very active. After some 
practice flights my first operational sortie was a cross-over patrol off Ijmuiden, a port 
favoured by E-boats. The other requirement of the Wellington squadrons was to 
co-operate with the strike wings, and on 28 November I was detached to North Coates 
for practice on a 'Gilbey' operation. 
The AOC-in-Chief, Sir Sholto Douglas was obviously imbued with the need for 
more training for his anti-shipping squadrons, and my flying with No 524 squadron 
during December included a course on Mark III radar. E-boat successes achieved by the 
Wellington squadrons are not included in the Command's record due to the decision to 
omit shipping of very low tonnage. There can be no certainty, therefore, of what they 
achieved, and aircrew were ever reluctant to make claims, when there was some doubt. 
On the 19 January 1945 a conference was held at Chatham to consider ways of 
improving co-operation between the Navy's surface craft and Coastal's aircraft in 
operations against the enemy's E-boats. The Navy's MTBs were already under the 
control of a frigate that could communicate with aircraft by VHFIRT and it was decided 
to have some MTBs also fitted with VHFIRT. 
There were trials undertaken with a Wellington flown by W/Cmdr Knott of No 
524 squadron on 17 March which proved successful. It was found that the Wellington, 
using Mark III radar, that is, with a rotating radar scanner, could detect the relative 
positions of both the enemy and the Navy's forces up to thirteen miles on the same trace 
and thus give a direct bearing of the enemy to the Navy. 
64. The author's log-book. 
65. Roskill, S.W., Vol. Ill.2, p.139. 
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A new procedure was adopted along these lines, 'Dictator', which came into effect on 
29 March.66 Sholto Douglas gives the weapons used by Wellington against E-boats, 
namely, medium case bombs with air-burst pistols, having only a harassing effect and 
were not decisive. At least three squadrons, however, operating Wellingtons, Nos 415, 
612 and 524, were all able to claim successes using bombs, albeit with some serious 
losses.67 Sir Sholto considered 20mm cannon to be the most effective weapon against 
E-boats, but it could only be used successfully at night under ideal conditions. Only 
once, in a number of sorties over the North Sea, can I recall the conditions being 'ideal', 
and Wellingtons were not armed with cannon.68 
A VM Hopps, the AOC of No 16 Group, reviewed the anti-shipping operations off 
the Dutch coast in a letter dated 23 January to the SASO A VM A.Ellwood. Hopps 
intended extending his sorties further east using 'Gilbey', as by then he had sufficient 
Wellingtons for both 'Gilbey' and 'Drem' procedures and when nights were down to 
ten hours. He considered those procedures would be profitable off Borkum and 
Wangerooge areas to force the enemy to sail before dusk when he could be attacked, or 
after dawn, when the Drem system would allow a Wing to strike. Against E-boats, he 
considered it important on a clear night, for aircraft to fly from Den Helder to the Hook 
of Holland before darkness to catch any E-boats that started early, and for weapons, 
cannon and bombs were essential in a general anti-E-boat plan. 
Certainly, with good visibility, there was much to be said for using cannon, with 
more shells available than bombs that could be carried; and cannon could be aimed 
immediately on making a sighting. Hopps suggested that there should be attacks on 
anchorages such as Den Helder but acknowledged that it was 'hazardous' and only 
justified when suitable targets were there. He did not accept that it was 'too dangerous', 
given that there was suitable fighter cover. His suggested tactics were for fighters to 
release bombs against ships a minute before the Strike Wings arrived, and then to attack 
the flak positions. These tactics could probably have served, given that complete 
surprise was achieved; thus to have the raid over before enemy fighters appeared on the 
scene. There would have been the complication, in any case, of the need for very 
accurate timing. With the large forces intended, that would not have been easy. 
66. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, paras.218-223. Air 27-1997 No 524 sqdn's ORB. 
67. ORBs: Air 27-1997 No 524 sqdn; Air 27-2114 No 612 sqdn; C12285 No 415 sqdn. 
68. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.226. 
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In fact, Den Helder had been attacked on 17 January by thirty Beaufighters, but six were 
shot down by anti-aircraft fire, for just one small patrol vessel being Sunk.69 During 
briefings at Langham, I came to expect the warning of not getting too close to either 
Den Helder or Texel, due to the anti-aircraft batteries~ I cannot recall being warned that 
Ijmuiden had 50% more AA than Den Helder, although Ijmuiden was often the area 
which Wellingtons were required to patrol. 
The friendly co-operation that ever appears between Fighter and Coastal 
Command is apparent in A VM Hopps' letter, as he intended discussing the matter with 
the AOC of No 12 Group of Fighter Command. In respect of the Dutch coast, A VM 
Hopps was prepared to: ' ... run recces whenever weather permits, and if there are 
enough aircraft not to prejudice other Wing activities,.7o The response from the SASO 
at Coastal's Headquarters was that an attack on Den Helder was' ... bound to be a costly 
affair' 71 and the AOC-in-C Coastal Command did not wish to take a decision until he 
had heard A VM Hopps' views. 
In addition to E-boats, the enemy was using a number of midget submarines in 
1945. Although there were three types, probably the most important was the Seehund 
that had a range of 275 nautical miles at 5 knots, and three days endurance with 
sixty-seventy hours submerged. They were able to take two torpedoes or mines, and, 
as was the case with E-boats, posed a threat to shipping off the east coast of England 
and to Allied convoys sailing to the ScheIdt. 
One of the other types of midget submarine, the Biber, with its more limited 
range, was being used to operate off the ScheIdt, and with its sailings geared to coincide 
with the tides at high water. In January it had been reported that there were already over 
100 midget submarines, in addition to fifty E-boats and that a continuous 
reconnaissance was required off the Dutch coast. 
It was 8.dded that in the face of enemy fighters, it was unwise for Wellingtons to 
be used.72 Coastal Command's patrols were therefore laid on to cover the wider area of 
the Seehund and other patrols off the Dutch coast for the Bibers.73 
69. Air 15-541 No 16 Group's Anti-shipping Operations, Apr.1942-Feb.1945, p.53. 
70. Air 15-541 p.53. 
71. Air 15-541 p.53. 
72. Air 15-541 memo 14.1.45. p.55. 
73. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, para.235. 
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Additional forces were used to counter the midget submarines in April including 
Wellingtons from No 407 (RCAF) squadron at Langham and the FAA squadron No 882 
at Manston. In a review of the situation made up to 28 April, it was found that after the 
17 April, day sightings had almost ceased. 74 
No 612 squadron, which had been operating against E-boats, and with 
considerable success, reported on 13 April that it was undertaking searches for midget 
submarines, and that other squadrons operating Mosquitoes, Beaufighters and 
Swordfish, had already sunk a large number. 75 
In the last four to five months of the war, No 16 Group's aircraft had flown 1,191 
sorties against enemy midget submarines, making eighty sightings, and sixty-four 
attacks. The Navy's forces had made a similar number of sightings and attacks, but with 
greater success. These efforts could be set against thirty-two Allied ships sunk or 
damaged. 76 
No 524 squadron's flying detail was changed in January, and the crew with which 
I would have flown, was seen to go down in flames off the Frisian Islands on 13 
January. On the 29 January I was one of a crew of seven off Texel. It was one of those 
rare occasions when visibility was good and with moonlight, which, not only made the 
wake ofE-boats visible, but also must have been clearly silhouetted our Wellington. We 
attacked five E-boats with medium case bombs fused to explode in mid-air. We suffered 
only one shell-hit that passed right through the tailplane before exploding. It 
demonstrated an advantage of fabric covering rather than metal; as almost certainly, the 
enemy's shells were designed to encounter some resistance. It meant that our rear 
gunner escaped any wounding, and that the aircraft was not seriously damaged. 
Base was under fog on return, and the controller demonstrated his concern for 
aircrew by providing us with a tot of rum. He was a former solicitor; a profession that 
Sir Philip considered provided good controllers.77 
Controllers served as a direct link between aircrew on operations and the 
administration, and an important one in sounding the attitude of aircrews. The controller 
at Langham, had earlier served at Wick, where he always appeared to be on duty. 
74. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, paras.242-5. 
75. Air 27-2114 No 612 sqdn's ORB. 
76. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.249. 
77. Air 15-359 C-in-C's 21st meeting, 1.8.4l. 
238 
On the night of 14 March, we were on an anti-E-boat patrol off Ijmuiden, 
although we were also expected to report the launching of V2 rockets that were being 
directed towards South East England. In only two more attacks on enemy shipping; on 
23 March we sighted three minesweepers in position 53°48'N 07°01 'E. After instructions 
from base an attack was made, but the results were not seen. My final involvement in an 
attack was on 6 April after E-boats were sighted off Ijmuiden. Although there was 
action in these sorties, they all appeared somewhat mundane, albeit, not quite 'routine'; 
we considered the sorties of the Beaufighters much more hazardous. 
There was much to be said for using single aircraft such as Wellingtons and 
Albacores against the flotillas of E-boats that were severely harassed, if not sunk or 
damaged. The loss of one aircraft, albeit with perhaps a crew of seven, could be justified 
on that account, and certainly so, if just one ship was saved from mines or torpedoes. 
Most aircrew adopted a fatalistic, and truly philosophic outlook. In action, one would be 
too busy to be fearful, but still concerned about how others in a crew were coping. 
Conclusions 
Anti-shipping operations by Coastal Command had begun in August 1939 with 
reconnaissance over the North Sea against the likely outbreak of surface raiders. That 
possibility prevailed certainly up until November 1944 when the battleship Tirpitz 
capsized after bomb hits. The Command had initially been limited in respect of 
offensive operations due to the wishes of the French. 
With the capitulation of France, and the German occupation of Norway, there 
were progressive modifications in Britain's anti-shipping policy, but with some initial 
constraints on what, where and when Coastal's aircraft might attack. The first 
acknowledged success was by a Hudson of No 233 squadron of No 18 Group on 29 
April 1940; the first for No 16 Group was also gained by a Hudson but operating off 
Terschelling on 3 September 1940. Those two attacks represented what were to remain 
the two main areas for Coastal's anti-shipping offensive; namely, the Norwegian and 
Dutch coasts. 
The first success for No 19 Group proved to be unique. It was on 6 April 1941 
When FlO Kenneth Campbell, of No 22 squadron torpedoed the battle cruiser Gneisenau 
at Brest putting the ship out of action for months. FlO Campbell was awarded a 
posthumous VC. 
Armament used ranged from bombs, (typically 250Ib), cannon, rocket projectiles,· 
torpedoes, and even depth charges. 
239 
Throughout the war there were progressive developments in weapons, tactics, 
strategy and aids such as ASV/radar. 
Ever lacking, it appears, were effective bombsights, and limited availability of 
radio altimeters, due possibly, to labour shortages and priorities. With the capitulation 
of France, and the German occupation of Norway, there were progressive modifications 
in Britain's anti-shipping policy, but with still some initial constraints on what, where 
and when Coastal's aircraft might attack. 
The first acknowledged success was by a Hudson of No 233 squadron of No 18 
Group on 29 April 1940; the first for No 16 Group was also gained by a Hudson but 
operating off Terschelling on 3 September 1940. 
The only aircraft under Coastal's control, used in anti-shipping operations, and 
designed for the purpose, were the Beauforts that were sent to the Middle East, and 
those of the Fleet Air Arm. All the others were modified air-liners, bombers or fighters. 
A major change in tactics was in the summer of 1942 when 'mast height' bombing was 
changed to medium altitude due to the heavy losses that, for example, for No 407 
squadron in one strike, was 54%. 
A development in strategy was the formation of the strike wings, composed 
typically of three squadrons, and with another squadron or more, of single-engined 
fighters as cover from Fighter Command. Despite serious losses, morale remained high 
amongst the strike squadrons, and for example, when No 407 was taken off shipping 
strikes, the aircrew were demoralised! The chain of command from the Air Ministry 
down to individual aircrew remained remarkably flexible, this appeared particularly so 
when Sir Philip Joubert was AOC-in-C of Coastal Command, and who, on occasions 
briefed or conversed with individual aircrew. Co-operation prevailed with both the 
Admiralty and Fighter Command, and Bomber Command came to accept the necessity 
for co-operation. 
During the whole of the war, aircraft controlled by Coastal Command sank 366 
vessels totalling 512,370 tons, and damaged 134 others totalling 513,454 tons. These 
Successes were against a loss of 876 aircraft including 101 lost in the few months of 
1945. Thus, despite Coastal's apparent superiority in forces in the remaining months of 
the war, shipping strikes remained ever dangerous. 
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As Sir Sholto Douglas stated: 'The work done by the strike WIngs was 
outstandingly successful; but their casualties in carrying it out were heavier than in any 
other flying done by the Royal Air Force during the last six months of the war,.78 
The effect of Coastal's shipping offensive in the Norwegian area had resulted in a 
drop from 8,500,000 tons of cargo in and out of Norway in 1944, to less than 500,000 
tons/annum by 28 February 1945. The other effect would have been to tie down many 
of the enemy's forces in protecting his ever-diminishing shipping against Coastal's 
offensive.79 
In 1940 Coastal Command lost twenty-seven aircraft for every enemy ship sunk, 
but in 1945, the ratio was one for one. The efficiency of the shipping offensive had 
obviously improved. This was due to a number of factors; there were better trained and 
experienced crews devoted to that specific task. 
Armament had improved with the use of rocket projectiles and cannon, which at 
one stage were intended to cover for torpedo attacks, but, nevertheless, in their own 
right, were able to sink ships and counter flak at the same time. 
Despite the success of a torpedo against the battle-cruiser Gneisenau, I question if 
torpedoes were suitable weapons against most of the shipping encountered by the 
Command, which were mainly less than 6,000 tons and without armour plating, thus 
vulnerable to rocket projectiles that were equivalent to a 6in shell. 
The use of bombs against ships were shown to be effective by Coastal 
Command's Hudsons in low altitude attacks, by Bomber Command against Tirpitz from 
essentially high altitude, and most famously by the USN in the Midway battle. Much 
more attention might have been given to the development of bombing attacks In 
conjunction with bombsight development. 
A part of the Command's anti-shipping offensive was minelaying, which for 
Coastal terminated in 1943. Its usefulness was best demonstrated at the time of the 
Channel Dash; mines struck by the two battle cruisers were the only effective weapons. 
The many types of aircraft used in shipping strikes with success, demonstrated 
that the type was not a crucial factor. 
78. Douglas, Lord, Years of Command, London, 1966, pp.273-4. 
79. Air 15-391 Anti-shipping Operations, Norway and Kattegat, 1944-45, p.30. 
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The 'mast height' attacks had certainly resulted in serious losses, and yet No 220 
squadron, which had suffered in that respect, had demonstrated in October 1941, that 
just one squadron armed with aircraft each armed with four 250lb bombs could sink and 
damage ships without loss to themselves and at almost ground level. 
There was much to be said for night attacks and not necessarily with flares to 
illuminate. What remained important, however, was not so much the ~ of aircraft, but 
its range. 
I consider that the concept of a Strike Wing with a close fighter escort was wrong. 
The fighters were 'tied' to the main force, when they might have more effectively 
devoted their attention to enemy fighter bases near the Strike Wing's target. A large 
strike force of typically three squadrons was restricted in manoeuvres just by its own 
numbers. Both these aspects were touched upon by Sir Philip Joubert and Sir Sholto 
Douglas. 
The latter had asked for attacks on enemy fighter bases, albeit by bombers; - he 
was refused. Sir Philip had intimated at the time of the conception of Strike Wings, that 
there were occasions when just three or five aircraft were more suited for some 
operations. The disastrous strike on 9 February 1945 clearly demonstrated these points. 
Coastal Command's shipping offensive from 1940 to 1945 seriously disrupted the 
enemy's trade with Norway and required the enemy to use considerable resources to 
counter that offensive. If one accepts the serious losses of aircraft and aircrews that 
resulted, then that offensive was fully justified by the results. 
Epilogue 
There are now memorials to the aircrews lost in the North Coates Wing at 
Cleethorpes; and those of the Dallachy Wing at Dallachy. The latter is constructed of 
rocks from the countries of the various aircrews who became casualties. In Norway, 
there are memorials to aircrews lost there. Dr Goulter gives the title of her thesis on the 
Command's anti-shipping campaign as 'A Forgotten Offensive '. I consider that it has 
never really been known. 
7. 'Cinderella' Units 
Three additional tasks given to Coastal Command were photo-reconnaissance, 
meteorological flights and Air-Sea-Rescue. The work of the squadrons and flights on 
such sorties was probably more important for Bomber Command's operations than for 
Coastal's. The Photo-Reconnaissance aircraft were able to provide intelligence of 
potential bombing targets, and if required, the results of any bombing. The 
Meteorological Flights provided data that enabled weather conditions to be forecast for 
possible bombing raids. The Air-Sea-Rescue service of Coastal Command would expect 
to rescue the bomber crews that had ditched. Those three services lacked the glamour of 
Fighter and Bomber Command, but not the dangers and strain for their aircrews. 
Air - Sea - Rescue 
In 1938 there was awareness that in the event of war many of the RAF operations 
would be over the North Sea and therefore with the prospect of some crews having to 
ditch. On 28 February 1939 at an Air Ministry conference it was decided that the 
organisation of high speed launches (HSLs), should be under Coastal Command's 
control. Arrangements were made for a chain of HSLs for rescues to be located round 
the coasts of Britain from Wick in the north, down the east coast, and along the southern 
coast to Pembroke Dock. 1 
During the Battle of Britain there were serious losses of aircrews and on 22 
August the Deputy Chief of Air Staff held a meeting at the Air Ministry. The outcome 
was for a local rescue service to be organised by the Vice-Admiral, Dover, with Fighter 
.' 
Command, using RAF HSLs, naval craft, and Lysander (Army Co-operation) aircraft. 
While the RAF would be responsible for air searches, the Navy would organise all the 
surface craft. 2 
Initially, the Battle of Britain pilots had only life-jackets (known as Mae Wests), 
should they ditch. These could be inflated manually through a tube, or by activating a 
CO2 bottle; the latter could cause problems in making one's exit if used prematurely. 
1. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. I, paras.255-6. 
2. Air 15-773 Vol. I, paras.255-6 
52. An airborne life-boat with its sail raised (although it was provided with engine power). 
Airborne life-boats were first designed to be fitted to Hudsons of No 279 squadron. 
53. A Warwick with a life-boat. 
Such aircraft were used late in the war to support the strike wings on their sorties. 
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A further addition to the Mae West was a fluorescene block to mark the position 
of the airman when ditched. Individual 'K' Type dinghies were to be provided that 
could be clipped to parachute harness. 
There remained the need to provide additional survival gear after a ditching, and 
this became a matter for individuals at some stations to improvise with the materials 
available on stations. 
One of those was the 'Thornaby Bag' - a parachute bag containing kapok to 
keep it afloat, and with tins of food etc. The 'Bircham Barrel' - devised from cardboard 
containers that had contained bomb fins. The Bircham Barrel was used to contain 
distress signals, food, etc. There was a third improvisation, the 'Lindholme Gear' or 
'Lindholme Dinghy' which came to be generally accepted. It was devised by Group 
Captain Waring at Lindholme, and comprised a string of five containers, one with an 
eight-man rubber dinghy, the other four with various items such as food, signals, 
clothing etc. 
There was much to be said for this emergency equipment. Not infrequently, 
even after an aircraft had ditched safely, the aircraft dinghy might explode due to excess 
pressure from the CO2 bottle, or be tom, or drift away, or lacking in room for all the 
crew. The Lindholme Gear was officially accepted and to be produced commercially. 
From No 279 squadron's records, the first of the ASR squadrons, the Lindholme Gear 
was frequently and successfully used.3 
A meeting was held on 14 January 1941 to consider the expansion and 
improvement of the rescue service and was to result in the appointment of a Director of 
Sea Rescue Services with Air rank and with a naval captain as Deputy Director. They 
were to have officers at each of the Area Combined Headquarters (ACHQ) of Nos 15, 
16, 18 and 19 Groups of Coastal Command. At that time, however, there was a lack of 
suitable marine craft to cover the increasing needs of the rescue service and in February, 
representations were made to the Air MiniStry.4 
During the period February to August 1941 only 444 airmen were saved out of 
about 1,200 who had ditched.5 In 1943, however, the success rate had not improved 
with 1,684 saved out of 5,466 presumed lost at sea, with percentages of 37% and 31% 
respectively.6 
3. Air 27-1609 No 279 sqdn's ORBs (1941-43). 
4. Air 15-773 C-in-C'sDespatches, Vol. I, para.276. 
5. Saunders, H, RA.F 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. II, p.88. 
6. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.256. 
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The reasons for so many being lost could be attributed to a number of factors. 
Under very cold conditions, men could die in just a few minutes. How well the crew 
had prepared themselves for ditching in respect of making their exits, collecting 
emergency equipment etc. Some aircraft were well provided with exits, such as the 
Hudson with five for a crew of four, others less so. Paramount would be how well the 
pilot was able to ditch according to sea conditions, and if their ditching had been 
reported by whatever means, with ideally the position given. 
These aspects were obviously outside the control of the rescue service, although 
attempts would be made to take bearings from any signals from a distressed aircraft. If 
reported, it could be taken that every effort would be made to affect a rescue. Some 
squadrons would immediately undertake their own search. 
During a staff meeting at the Command's headquarters on 8 August 1941, it was 
stated that the Sea Rescue Service was to be 'quite considerably increased' and that all 
administration would be under Coastal Command. 7 By November it was decided to 
form four squadrons for Air-Sea-Rescue and for them to be equipped with Hudsons. 
This was at a time when the Command was being depleted of both aircraft and aircrews 
due to postings to the Middle East. 
To form the first ASR squadron, aircraft were taken from other squadrons, 
and likewise, aircrews were provided by existing squadrons. 8 When a second ASR 
squadron was being formed, it had to be disbanded as there were only enough aircraft 
for the first one (No 279).9 
The first ASR squadron was formed at Bircham Newton on 16 November 1941. 
Although it had an establishment of twenty Hudsons, only seventeen had been received 
by 1 December. One of the first lectures for its Wop/AGs (Wireless operator/Air 
Gunners) was not on the subject of ASR but on gunnery. This was to be fully justified, 
as on rescue. missions they had to contend with attacks by enemy fighters, including 
JU88s, Me109s and FW190s. It was significant also, that they flew with side guns in 
addition to forward and rear guns. to 
There was an awareness of the need to provide better survival equipment for those 
Who had ditched far from Britain's shores. 
7. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Meeting,251h 8.8.41. 
S. Air 15-359 Meeting, 6Sth 1.1l.41. Air 27-1609 No 279 sqdn's ORB. 
9. Air 15-359 Meetings, Slst 100th 27.1l.4l. 27.12.4l. 
10. Air 27-1609 No 279 sqdn's ORB. 
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In September 1941, Group Captain Waring who had devised the Lindholme Gear; 
worked in conjunction with a naval officer, Lt.Robb, RNVR, and a yachting enthusiast, 
Uffa Fox. This was to produce an airborne lifeboat that could be dropped using three 
parachutes. No aircraft was designed to take a lifeboat, rather was the Hudson modified. 
The prototype was dropped on 11 December 1942 but the parachutes had failed to 
open. II 
The airborne lifeboat was first taken operationally on 17 February 1943. The 
modifications to the aircraft, however, had made navigation difficult, and heavy fuel 
consumption resulted in the operation having to be cut short. The all-up weight of the 
lifeboat with a maximum of 1700lb meant that the Hudson was overloaded, particularly 
with the additional armament being taken. The lifeboat also, would have affected the 
flying characteristics and made landing difficult due to limited ground clearance and 
greater weight. 
Although not so stated in the squadron's records, crews must have studied the 
necessary requirements for success, and on 5 May 1943 that was achieved. An airborne 
lifeboat was released to fall only 30ft from a ditched crew. They boarded the lifeboat, 
started the engines, and when out of petrol, hoisted the sail. They were met by an RAF 
launch.I2 Another drop in July, although less successful, indicated the operating 
conditions of releasing the lifeboat from 700ft and at a speed of 140 knots. The 
relatively high speed for such a purpose was probably due to the need for a higher 
cruising speed because of the greater load, and also to ensure more positive control of 
the aircraft. 
The ASR rescue crews needed to be rescued themselves on occasions; this was 
due to weather conditions and a hostile enemy. The crews did not begin as specialists 
but became so with service on the squadrons. Their first Commanding Officer, Group 
Captain P. Lynham, had in fact, earlier served on shipping strikes. In a letter to The 
Times, he quotes from an official account: 'the squadron was directly responsible for the 
successful rescue of 55 members of aircrew.' Lynham added: 'Not one of those rescued 
had taken more than three or four minutes to get into his dinghy and most ditchings 
were at night' .13 
II. Lynham, P., Goff, F., and Whittaker, D., (all ex No 279 sqdn), letters to the author. 
12. Air 27-1609 No 279 squadron's ORB. 
13. The Times 20.8.97. 
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Group Captain Lynham mentioned also whistles that became standard issue to 
aircrew in 1941. They were worn near the collar of one's battledress, for immediate use 
to attract attention. Another means of attracting attention was the use of a mirror or any 
reflector, and at least one crew was located after 3Y2 days by such means. 14 
By November 1943, two other ASR squadrons, Nos 280 and 281 were using 
Warwick aircraft. These also were adapted to accept an airborne lifeboat but of greater 
length than was possible for the Hudson. 
As the ASR service was concentrated on the east coast, on 26 January 1944, it 
was stated that the Air Ministry was prepared to agree to the formation of a fourth 
squadron for the west. At that time, however, many of the Warwicks being received by 
Nos 280 and 281 had needed to be returned to the contractors for modifications, while 
the Command was still expected to provide for overseas services. IS 
Sir Sholto Douglas must have been concerned at the 'Make do and Mend' that 
was prevailing in the ASR service as on 14 February he asked staff to contact the Air 
Ministry for a new directive in respect of ASR. About that time there was some beg and 
borrowing of Hudsons and the supply ofWarwicks. He must have been conscious also, 
of the need to prepare for the intended Operation Overlord. 
There was a conference at Coastal's headquarters on 29 March when ASR 
arrangements were considered. It was chaired by Sir Sholto but the Air Ministry was 
represented. 16 
There was an obvious need for ASR arrangements to be made before Overlord, 
and for the deployment of squadrons and marine craft to be decided by May 1944.17 
The final deployment of the HSLs was for them to range from Plymouth, round the 
south coast and northwards along the east coast to Felixstowe. 18 
On 30 August, Sir Sholto Douglas held another conference to discuss ASR 
arrangements. 19 This was due to the changes in the war situation that was then shifting 
northwards towards Norway but away from Biscay. The Air Ministry agreed his 
recommendations on 26 October.2o 
14. Wells, D., FlO, letter to the author. C12295 No 422 sqdn's ORB, 1943. 
15. Air 15-360 C-in-C's Meeting, 26.1.44. 
16. Air 15-360 Meetings, 14.2.44.2.3.44.20.3.44. 27.3.44. 
17. Air 15-360 Meeting, 27.3.44. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.259. 
18. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, para.260. 
19. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.268. 
20. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para. 270. 
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As was the case for other tasks, Coastal's ASR service suffered problems of 
supply and modifications to equipment and to aircraft, as for example, the shortage of 
Warwick aircraft had held up the re-equipping of No 279 squadron.21 Other aircraft 
such as Hurricanes and Sea Otters that would have been used for short-range operations 
were not available. 22 There was a shortage of airborne lifeboats and squadrons were 
expected to avoid jettisoning them if at all possible.23 
The Air Ministry proposed on 9 November that the short-range ASR service, that 
was, up to forty miles from Britain's coasts, should be undertaken by Coastal 
Command, in place of Fighter Command whose responsibility it had been. Sir Sholto 
agreed, as for the Channel area, enemy fighters were no longer a problem and it was 
expedient to use aircraft such as the Sea Otter amphibians that were then coming into 
service. They could serve for both search and rescue, albeit to pick up only a few 
ditched airmen due to limited space in the aircraft. 
The AOC-in-Chiefs suggestions were approved on 15 February 1945, and 
Coastal Command, in conjunction with the Naval C-in-C became responsible for the co-
ordination of all ASR operations around the British Isles, and also Coastal's other areas 
of Iceland, Gibraltar and the Azores. 
The Command was also prepared to assist the Tactical Air Force in its ASR 
operations from the Continent.24 Although the Command, in conjunction with the 
Royal Navy, had set up an ASR organisation; it had been for individuals such as Group 
Captain Waring to devise life-saving equipment such as the Lindholme Gear and the 
airborne lifeboat. 
No aircraft were specifically designed for ASR; rather was it a case of modifying 
existing machines that had been intended for other purposes such as the Hudson and 
Warwick. An ASR school was set up, but it was for aircrews on squadrons such as the 
pioneer unit, No 279 to learn and adapt by experience. The operational records of such 
units show that they were just as likely to be attacked by enemy fighters, although their 
sorties were those of mercy missions. 
Crucial factors for aircrews to be saved from the sea were; that the pilot should be 
able to ditch the aircraft without 'nosing in'; that the crews could exit quickly, and that 
they should be able to board a dinghy with the minimum of delay. 
21. Air 15-360 Meetings, 5.6.44. 9.10.44. 30.l0.44. 
22. Air 15-360 Meeting, 6.11.44. 
23. Air 15-360 Meeting 20.3.45. 
24. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, paras.274 -5. 
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Thereafter, it was essential that their position should be known, and that they 
should be picked up before succumbing to exposure; their one essential intake need, 
was water. 
Photographic Reconnaissance 
In 1938 Sidney Cotton, an Australian aeronautical engineer was flying an aircraft 
on behalf of British Intelligence over Germany, ostensibly as a businessman, but with 
his aircraft equipped with RAF cameras. The RAF had at that time, some difficulty in 
taking a series of photographs from the air due to the high altitudes and the cameras 
froze as a result of condensation. Cotton overcame the problems by being prepared to 
fly at lower altitudes and ensuring that a current of air from the aircraft flowed over the 
cameras. He began work at Heston on 23 September 1939 after being approached by the 
Air Ministry, and used a spare hangar for his 'No 2 Camouflage Unit' as it was known. 
Cotton used two of his own aircraft but was allotted Bristol Blenheims to adapt and two 
Spitfires. The Unit came under the control of the new Photograph Development Unit 
(PDU) at Heston in October 1939.25 
Cotton gave first priority to the taking of photographs of high quality and did not 
wish his aircraft to be involved in aerial combat. Thus, to fly over enemy territory with 
reasonable safety, it was essential that the aircraft used could outpace the enemy. The 
Blenheims in France were too slow and had suffered casualties and Spitfires were the 
preferred aircraft. By removing all armament and smoothing the fuselage, the speed of 
the aircraft was increased. The disadvantage of a one-man fighter aircraft was the 
difficulty of navigating over long flights in bad weather. Cotton therefore requested 
Hudsons that were heated and provided good facilities for the crews who were thus able 
to concentrate on their tasks. His plan was for a Hudson to fly out along the proposed 
Spitfire route and radio back if the weather was unsatisfactory. 
By the end of February 1940, some excellent pictures had been taken including 
some of Wilhelmshaven and the battleship Tirpitz. Winston Churchill, as then First 
Lord of the Admiralty, on seeing these photographs, stated that if the Air Ministry did 
not take over Cotton's Unit, then the Admiralty would do SO.26 
On 4 June 1940, FlO R. G. M. Walker from No 224 squadron, but dressed as a 
civilian, flew a Lockheed 14, G-AGAR from Britain, with the intention of being abroad 
on photo-reconnaissance for three weeks, and accordingly took his own ground crew. 
25. Air 15-773 Vol. I, para.205. 
26. Hendrie, A., Lockheed Hudson in WW2, Shrewsbury, 1999, p.90. 
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With the capitulation of France, and Italy's entrance into the war, Walker's 
aircraft became stranded in the Middle East. This was the beginning of what came to be 
known as No 2 Photo-Reconnaissance Unit, in the Middle East. The Lockheed 14 
received its original RAP serial No N7364, and together with another Hudson that had 
flown out with some Hurricanes, became based at Heliopolis to cover the Middle East 
from Malta to Aden and Greece to Khartoum. 
At Heston on 10 February 1940, No 212 became the first photo-reconnaissance 
squadron, but on 10 June there was a conference at the Air Ministry. It was then decided 
that the Photographic Development Unit at Heston and the Photographic Development 
Interpretation Unit at Wembley, were to be under the control of Headquarters Coastal 
Command with effect from 18 June. 
They were to be re-named 'Photographic-Reconnaissance-Unit'(pRU), and 
'Photographic-Interpretation-Unit' (PIU) respectively.27 
Sir Frederick Bowhill issued an Operational Instruction in July. The PRU was to 
provide photographs and interpretations as required for the Combined Intelligence 
Committee of the Air Ministry, Admiralty, War Office and RAF Commands. The PIU 
was to be administered by the PRU but under the direct control of Headquarters, Coastal 
Command, and there would be a liaison officer at headquarters to deal with both units. 
Four operational PRU flights were formed, each equipped with three medium and one 
long-range Spitfire, one Hudson and one Tiger Moth. One flight was detached in the 
south-west at St. Eval, and another flight at Wick in the north-east. 
When stationed at RAF, Wick in 1942, I saw one of the PRU's Spitfires. It was 
devoid of armament and camouflaged duck-egg blue. Over Norway, it would have been 
solely dependent on having greater speed than the enemy's fighters, and yet vulnerable 
to AA batteries. 
For much of the war, it was a case of the Luftwaffe and the RAP endeavouring to 
increase the speed of their fighters perhaps just a few knots more than the enemy's, for 
such as the Mel09s and the Spitfires, - the difference of life or death for one or the 
other. Without armament, the one advantage the Spitfire had in combat that was, flying 
in tight circles, would have been nullified?8 By the nature ofPRU operations also, they 
would have been lacking in cloud cover. At RAF Sumburgh in 1942, I saw in the 
operations room, some of the PRU's work. 
27. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. I, paras.204, 206, 208. 
28. Spitfire pilots in conversation with the author. 
250 
It included a photograph of the battleship Tirpitz, which was so detailed, that a line of 
the crew's washing could be seen on the deck! 
By the end of July 1940, the Command had available for photo-reconnaissance, 
eight medium range Spitfires, which with an extra 30 gallons, had a safe range of 750 
miles at 30,000ft and 300mph speed, three long-range Spitfires of 1,100 miles range, 
and two with 1,300 miles range. 
There were two Spitfires for training purposes, one Blenheim, two Wellingtons, 
some Hudsons, and DH Moths, and a Lockheed XII, the latter had probably been 
Sidney Cotton's aircraft.29 
With the enemy's occupation of much of the Continent, many intelligence sources 
were cut off, and photo-reconnaissance became increasingly important. Initially, the 
emphasis was on covering enemy occupied ports, but to be followed by the need to 
photograph enemy air bases. For that purpose, the Air Ministry, on 20 July 1940 
approved an additional flight of six medium range Spitfires plus two in reserve. 
An increase in the establishment of both the Photo-Reconnaissance Unit and the 
Photo-Reconnaissance Interpretation Unit was agreed during a conference at the Air 
Ministry on 2 October 1940. It was also decided that a Deputy Directorate 
(photography) should be established at the Air Ministry to look after photographic 
interests and its future planning. Bomber Command, it was decided, should be 
responsible for its own interpretation of its bomb damage to targets. 
Following this conference at the Air Ministry, Sir Frederick Bowhill held his own 
staff meeting to consider the future organisation of Photo-Reconnaissance. He 
recommended to the Air Ministry that the PRU should move from Heston to Benson. 
The reasons for this move were the lack of runways and a hangar at Heston and also the 
unfavourable weather conditions that prevailed there. Benson was still near London, and 
the Headquarters of both Bomber and Coastal Commands. There was a further 
conference at the Air Ministry on 18 October 1940, when, although Cranfield was also 
considered as a possible base for the PRU, it was decided that Benson should be used, 
with the PRU as a lodger unit at what was then a Bomber base. This decision was to 
take effect from 4 January 1942 and the Unit would be under Coastal's contro1.30 
29. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. I, paras.214-6. 
30. Air 15-773 Vol. I, paras.226-232. 
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There was a further development in November at the Air Ministry. It had been 
proposed that a Central Interpretation Unit, (Clli) should be formed. This was due to 
the increasing demands made by the War Office, Admiralty and the Intelligence staffs 
of the various Ministries. 
It was decided that it should be under the Assistant Chief of Air Staff through the 
Deputy Director of Photography but under Coastal Command's control for discipline, 
accounts, stores and accommodation. 
This unit was to move from Wembley to Medmenham in April 1941. In that 
month, Sir Frederick opposed a decision to centralise the control of the PRU and the 
matter was considered by the Chiefs of Staff in May. This resulted in a communication 
dated 7 June that in accordance with the Defence Committee (Operations), Nos 1 and 3 
PRUs were to be amalgamated and to be under the operational and administrative 
control of Coastal Command with effect from 16 June 1941. 
Demands for photo-reconnaissance from Bomber Command, Fighter Command 
and the Admiralty should go to Coastal's headquarters, but requests from other 
Departments to the Assistant Director of Intelligence (Photography) who would deal 
also with requests intended for the Central Interpretation Unit.3! 
By this time, photo-reconnaissance had become the prime means for gaining 
intelligence on the Continent, and in 1941 there were four sorties per day. By January 
1942 a new camera was introduced with a magazine for 500 exposures and with a scale 
of 1 in 10,000 at 30,000ft altitude.32 
Sir Frederick had relinquished Command in June 1941 to be succeeded by Sir 
Philip Joubert as AOC-in-Chief. By then most of the 'spade work' of organising an 
efficient photo-reconnaissance service had been accomplished. It was due to Sir 
Frederick that Benson was adopted as the main base for PRU operations and that 
Coastal had operational control over the units. 
Much was expected of individual aircrew and aircrews; and on 10 April 1942, at 
one of Sir Philip Joubert's staff meetings, a report on the number of crashes in No 2 
PRU was discussed. It was considered that the crashes were due to pilot fatigue, and 
that the remedy should be for pilots to be 'broken in' to undertake longer and longer 
flights! It was considered also, that it would be 'a lever for [the Command] getting its 
own PRU going quickly'. 33 
31. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. I, paras.239-244. 
32. Richards, D.,RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. II, p.86. 
33. Air 15-359 C-in-C'sMeeting, 150th 10.4.42. 
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The Sunderland squadrons had been well aware of this problem and had alleviated 
it by endeavouring to provide three pilots for each sortie.34 
On 19 October 1942, five squadrons were formed at Benson; Nos 540, 541, 542, 
543 and 544. No 540 was equipped with Mosquitoes, Nos 541, 542 and 543 with 
Spitfires, while No 544 had initially, Ansons and Wellingtons but with a flight of 
Spitfires at Gibraltar. 35 
The number of personnel (RAF and WAAF), by the end of 1942 exceeded 1,000, 
and the output for that year included about one and a half million photographs and about 
five and half thousand reports. 36 
Sir Philip was succeeded by Air Marshal John Slessor in February 1943 and at the 
end of that year, Slessor outlined the work of the Command in 'Coastal Command 
Review'. He referred to the five PRU squadrons, which by then were within No 106 
Wing; which, in that year had flown over 3,000 sorties, and of those, 75% had been 
productive with operational negatives totalling 470,000. His tribute was: 
The enormous extent to which we rely on this Wing for our knowledge of every aspect 
of the enemy's activity, is perhaps not generally realised; the science, not only of air 
photography but of interpretation, has made enormous strides in the last four years and 
the intelligence staffs would be blind without the courage and skill of the pilots and 
ground personnel of No 106 Wing. 37 
Slessor added that photo-reconnaissance was important for the planning of bomber 
raids, in gaining intelligence of the enemy's shipping movements off the Dutch coast 
and in the Bay of Biscay. He concluded: ' ... on no occasion has any Allied Commander 
ever had to go short of information required from visual or photographic 
reconnaissance,.37 
Out of the hundreds of staff conferences held by the Air Officers Commanding-in-
Chief at Coastal Command's headquarters, only about two dozen give a mention of 
photo-reconnaissance. 38 
It is apparent, that the Commanders just found that the system worked efficiently, 
and what appears so often in some operational records; they were considered 'routine', 
despite enemy activity and often unfavourable weather conditions. 
34. Craven, R., AM, to the author. 
35. Rawlings, 1.D.R., Coastal Support & Special Squadrons, London, 1982, pp.231-4. 
36. Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. n, p.87. 
37. Slessor, 1., Coastal Command Review, Dec.1943. The Central Blue, London, 1956, pp.478-9. 
38. Air 15-359 Ju1.1941-Apr.1942. Air 15-360 Nov. 1943-Dec. 1944. Air 15-361 Jan.-May 1945. 
C-in-C's Meetings. 
54. A Halifax of No 518 squadron off Tiree in the Inner Hebrides. 
No 518 was one of the meteorological squadrons that were devoted to such work. 
55. A Wellington fitted with coil s through which a current of electri city was passed providing 
a magnetic fi eld that was used to detonate German-laid magnetic mines. This was one of 
the tasks allocated to Coastal Command . 
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Lord Douglas gives a brief tribute to the five PRU squadrons at Benson, with: 
, ... all of them devoting their time to this work which could be, on occasions, as 
uncomfortable as any other type of flying' .39 
During the war years, the Press would from time to time publish photographs 
taken by the Royal Air Force. Perhaps one of the first was of Heligoland taken by a No 
224 squadron Hudson on 21 September 1939.1t gained a headline, 'Heligoland as Seen 
on a Daring British Flight', but in the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post dated January 
27 1940. The newspaper had marked in the gun emplacements and AA batteries, and 
refers to Heligoland being 'heavily fortified' .40 
Meteorological Flights 
As early as 1925 'weather climbs' were undertaken by the Royal Air Force, but 
in 1936 Bristol 'Bulldogs' of the Station Flight at Aldergrove were flying high altitude 
meteorological sorties. The Service began forming Meteorological Flights and numbers 
were being assigned to them. 
At the outbreak of war, the weather reports from shipping had to be discontinued 
due to them giving their positions to the enemy in radio transmissions. At that time 
there was an increasing need for accurate weather reports that were essential for 
Bomber Command. 
The weather climbs were being undertaken by out-dated Gloster Gauntlets and 
Gladiators; the latter, in fact, were to continue their vertical climbs, typically to 24,000 
feet throughout the war, for which they proved very suitable. 41 Subsequently, Spitfires 
and Hurricanes were also used for the vertical flights, with the advantage that Spitfires 
were able to reach the higher altitudes. 
In late 1940 Coastal Command authorised the formation of three Long Range 
Met. Flights, Nos 403 at Bircham Newton, No 404 at St. Eval, and No 405 at 
Aldergrove. ,Subsequently, the Flights were re-numbered in the 14-series. Initially, 
Bristol Blenheims were used for the sorties over the Atlantic and North Sea. 
They, however, were obviously unsuited for transmitting weather reports as the wireless 
operator was remote from the navigator, and in 1942 the Blenheims were being 
displaced by Lockheed Hudsons where the navigator, pilot and wireless operator were 
in close contact. 
39. Douglas, Lord, Years of Command, London, 1966, p.25 1. 
40. Womersley, L., W/Cmdr, letter to the author. 
41. Saunders, H, RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. IlL p.77. 
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Additionally, Lockheed Venturas and Handley-Page Hampdens were used, but Hudsons 
became one of the preferred aircraft for meteorological flights throughout the war. 42 
At a Coastal Command staff meeting on 9 August 1941 it was decided to revise 
the administration, and if possible, the status of meteorological flights. Up to that time, 
the sorties were classified as 'non-operational', and which, it was acknowledged was 
, ... unfair as their work in this Command is often hazardous' .43 
It was an important aspect for the aircrews involved as a tour of operations was 
normally fixed according to the type of sortie and the aircraft flown. For example, an 
operational tour on Hudsons became fixed at 500hr, but on flying boats, 800hr. This 
aspect became reviewed also for the PRU squadrons. 
One of the first 'Tannoy' broadcasts I heard at RAF 8t. Eval in February 1942 
was: 'All flying scrubbed, except for the Met. Flight.' No 1404 Met. Flight was at 8t. 
Eval during 1942 and 1943 but with some aircraft detached at Gibraltar. They flew 
down to the Bay of Biscay at 3,000ft. At the extremity of the patrol, readings were 
taken at under 50ft altitude, and then at regular intervals of 1,000ft up to 20,000 to 
22,000ft. The WIT reports were coded by the navigator, and the wireless operator, after 
obtaining a fix of their position, would be transmitting for about two hours. In addition 
to weather hazards, there was that of being in range of enemy fighters when about fifty 
miles from Brest. A wireless operator/Air Gunner (Wop/AG), gave the following 
account of one such trip: 
We turned for home but were unable to get a fix due to the atmospheric conditions 
and had been flying in cloud on met. winds for five hours; we just had to break cloud and 
get a drift or pin-point for navigation to be checked. We began to feel our way down with 
everyone straining to spot the sea. We eventually broke cloud at 250ft into heavy rain, 
over three flak ships which opened fire with machine guns and pom-poms,[cannon].I saw 
tracer coming up then we were clear and vanished into the rain. I reported a bullet hole in 
the tail plane and port engine on fire. We used the extinguisher and the flames died down. 
The inner half of the wing was blazing with the flames coming almost to the tail. In 
the fuselage was a mass of flame with the • chutes burning; the observer used a fire 
extinguisher which had no effect. 
42. Air 15-361 C-in-C's Meetings, 15.7.44. 29.3.45. 
43. Air 15-359 C-in-C's Meeting, 9.8.41. 
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The bomb bay which contained petrol tanks was on fire and flames were coming up 
through the bomb inspection covers. We crash-landed on the beach at Cameret in 
F· . 44 mlsterre. 
By 'met. winds' was meant the speed and direction of winds given to the crew when 
they were briefed. Severe atmospheric conditions prevented the wireless operator from 
either taking a series of radio bearings from transmitting stations, or calling up a station 
to give the crew their position after taking bearings from the aircraft's own 
transmissions 
A Meteorological Observers' Section was set up in September 1942, but it was to 
be in April 1945 before an 'M' brevet for this aircrew category became available.45 
An amalgamation of the flights 1401· and 1403 became No 1401 Flight at Bircham 
Newton; at Wick, 1406 amalgamated with 1408 as No 1406 Flight, and 1402 with 1405 
formed No 1402 Flight at Aldergrove. No 1404 Flight at St. Eval replaced its Blenheims 
with Hudsons in late 1941, but in 1943 was operating Hampdens. 
On 11 August 1943 this flight was reclassified as No 517 squadron. It continued 
to operate in the South Western Approaches and in addition to Met. Flights, served also 
in anti-submarine operations. In 1943 No 517 and No 518 squadrons were converting to 
Halifax aircraft. These had the advantage for 'horizontal' sorties, of greater range and 
were able to fly out 700 miles over the Atlantic, although they became equipped with 
drop tanks. 
From the minutes of the conferences held periodically by the Commanders-in-
Chief at Coastal's headquarters, the Halifaxes were not without problems. These were 
related to the type of engine fitted to the aircraft, the drop tanks, and the addition of 
depth charges to be used in the event of sighting a U-boat. 
Sir Sholto Douglas made a special mention of the Halifax aircraft because of the 
difficuIties,~hich occurred through attempting long flights at the instigation of the 
meteorological section at the Air Ministry. At first the nose of the aircraft had to be 
modified to accommodate the meteorological observer, and that initially had to be done 
on the squadrons. It was found also, that if one engine failed in the first four hours, the 
Halifax could not maintain height. 46 The number of overload tanks had therefore to be 
reduced, and thus limit the range. 
44. Winfield, E. No 1404 Met. FIt., letter to the author. 
45. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.280. 
46. Air 15-773 C-in-C's Despatches, Vol. IV, para.280. 
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It had to be overcome partly by using drop tanks. It was finally resolved by having 
Mark III Halifax aircraft, which were powered by Bristol Hercules engines. 
There was the question also, of just how to fly the sortie. Thus at a conference on 
4 November 1944, there was a request for a different mark of Merlin engines to be 
fitted, and the question of the rate of climb and descent to be decided. At a conference 
on 3 February 1945 it was decided that meteorological aircraft could jettison their depth 
charges at the end of the outward flight before the ascent commenced. The reason for 
this was obviously to lighten the load of the aircraft, particularly before it attempted to 
climb. It would have been logical for the aircraft to traverse the outer route at 
comparatively low altitude while it still had almost a fun load of fuel, but it remained 
necessary to climb to report conditions in the higher altitudes. 
By September 1944 the Meteorological Committee in considering aircraft to 
replace Hudsons and Halifaxes agreed to Warwicks being used to re-equip the Met. 
squadrons, but due to delays in their availability, decided that Halifax Mark Ills should 
serve for routine reconnaissance, and for vertical flights, Spitfires and Hurricanes would 
be standardized.47 Nevertheless, in 1944, No 520 squadron came to operate Halifaxes, 
Hudsons, Gladiators, Spitfires and Hurricanes. No 521 squadron, in addition to 
Hudsons, Venturas and Spitfires, operated Flying Fortresses. 
It was customary for Coastal Command squadrons engaged in such as anti-
submarine operations to give, additionally a weather report. Those reports, however, 
would not have been transmitted while the aircraft was on anti-submarine operations, 
but given at the time of de-briefing in the operations room. 
Those meteorological units (flights or squadrons), however, which were 
ostensibly fully engaged in transmitting weather reports, were on occasions, sighting 
U-boats. It was decided therefore, that the Met. Flights should be armed, additionally 
with depth charges, and out of thirty-six sightings, eleven attacks were made. They, on 
occasions also, sighted enemy aircraft, and at least one Met. aircraft claimed to have 
shot down one of the enemies.48 In addition to the meteorological units in the United 
Kingdom, some were deployed in Iceland, Gibraltar and the Azores. All came under 
Coastal Command's jurisdiction. 
47. Air 15-773 Vol. IV, para.282. 
48. Saunders, H, RAF 1939-1945, London, 1954, Vol. III. p.77. 
257 
In 'Coastal Command Review' dated December 1943, Air Marshal Slessor 
referred to the meteorological squadrons doing 'yeoman service' for all the British and 
Allied forces operating from the United Kingdom, and of the units being the 'Cinderella 
of the Air Force' for reasons that included shortage of aircraft. 
None of the aircraft used for meteorological work had been specifically designed 
for the task, rather were they modifications of bombers, fighters and civil aircraft. 
Slessor mentioned the shortage of aircraft being 'put right' with Halifaxes and 
Venturas~ but there were problems with the Halifaxes; and the Venturas were to prove 
less satisfactory than their forebears - the Hudsons. He mentioned also, the 'veteran 
Gladiator' which was used as late as 1945 but when there was a lack of undercarriages 
for the aircraft. 49 
The post-war tribute ofMRAF Lord Douglas was: 
... it was Coastal's job to keep going some fifty aircraft for the meteorological 
service which, in their probing for information beyond the friendly home shores, was the 
sole source of information for all the weather forecasting used for operations by the Royal 
Air Force, the Royal Navy and the other Services. 50 
Most aircrew in Coastal Command would say that their worst enemy was the weather; it 
was particularly so for the met. units. While those flying east to Germany would expect 
to be told with some degree of accuracy the state of the weather; those in the met units 
flew westwards to find out just what weather was coming to Britain, and, has already 
been stated, when flying was 'scrubbed' for other squadrons due to bad weather, those 
on Met. sorties were required to find just how bad it was. To fly for ten hours under all 
conditions up to 700 miles out over the Atlantic was no mean task; as likewise for those 
pilots in Spitfires who flew up to 40,OOOft for as long as 1 Yzhr. 
The work of the Air-Sea-Rescue, Photo-Reconnaissance and Meteorological Units 
lacked the glamour of Fighter and Bomber squadrons; but their work was vital for the 
successes of others. They were the Cinderellas of a Cinderella command. 
The aircrew involved in these tasks experienced the same hazards of those on 
offensive operations, of bad weather and a hostile enemy; and by the nature of their 
work, a great strain was imposed on the crews, and they suffered serious losses. Their 
crews, none-the-Iess, remained dedicated to their tasks, as was to be shown by their 
records. 
49. Slessor, 1., The Central Blue, London, 1966, p.252. Coastal Command Review, Dec. 1943 
50. Douglas, Lord, Years a/Command, London, 1966, p.252. 
56. Trondheim naval base where the Germans built U-boat pens, in addition to those at French ports. 
57. Bordeaux U-boat base. 
The Gironde provided bases for both German and Italian submarines. 
Coastal Command in Retrospect 
When I asked through various Service publications for opinions of Coastal 
Command, I received a number of responses from former Coastal aircrew. Most looked 
upon the work of the Command in the Battle of the Atlantic as Coastal's prime 
contribution to victory. 
G/Capt J. B. FitzGerald, RAAF, who served with No 500 squadron considered 
WW2 in three phases; the Battle of Britain, The Battle of the Atlantic and the Bomber 
Offensive. He added, however, that in Australia, the Battle of Britain and the Bomber 
Offensive are marked every year, the latter by a number of events; but' ... the Battle of 
the Atlantic never gets a mention.' An officer who served post-war in Fighter 
Command, Air Commodore Mark Tompkins acknowledges 'Coastal Command's vital 
part in the Battle of the Atlantic.' The BBC History Unit belatedly recognised, in 
September 2000, the Battle of the Atlantic as ' ... the dominating factor all through the 
war' [quoting Churchill]; with' ... the first comprehensive history of the Battle of the 
Atlantic on British Television.' The three broadcasts were to include ' ... men from 
Coastal Command.' 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Derek Hodgkinson considered that Coastal was the 
Cinderella in ' ... the main battle of the Atlantic' but that' ... the air war against Germany 
had ... to take precedence in the allotment of long-range aircraft.' FltlLt Bryan Quinlan, 
RCAF writes that the Battle of the Atlantic was ' ... less glamorous when compared to 
either Bomber or Fighter Commands and they made for better public relations. ' 
Most of my correspondents were aware of Coastal Command coming third in 
order of priority for aircraft but appeared ready to accept that. As Sir Derek Hodgkinson 
adds: 'Looking back, I think we did pretty well with what the Air Staff gave us, and do 
not blame them for their priorities. They had very difficult decisions to make, and on the 
whole, they did well. ' 
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In an address given at a Coastal Command Association conference in 1992, 
FltlLt John Cruickshank, VC acknowledged the leadership of Coastal's ' ... great 
Commanders, Bowhill, Joubert de la Ferte, Slessor and Sholto Douglas. Men who could 
inspire us ... ' Inspired leadership prevailed at 'grass roots' level also. 
As a navigator, FltlLt Simmons, in No 143 squadron who was on shipping strikes 
said: 'I was not unhappy, due to having a good pilot, a good CO [of the squadron] and a 
good Station CO.' Simmons adds, however, 'I survived, but 50% of my original fellow 
aircrew were lost.' 
Others, also, comment on the number of casualties. Of the forty-six students on 
W/Cmdr Derek Martin's pre-war flying course, ' ... only two survived the war.' 
FltlLt Gron Edwards who served with No 233 squadron Hudsons was thankful that he 
was not a torpedo pilot with a 17Yz % survival rate for an operational tour. 
The difference between flying in Coastal Command and either Bomber or Fighter 
is recollected by such as F /0 Bob McGill. While Bombers took off as a squadron, for 
most of Coastal's crews it was in a lone aircraft, ' ... and probably not seeing another 
until it landed at base. Coastal Command's enemies were the sea and the weather.' One 
must add to that statement, however, that a number were involved in serious air-to-air 
combats. The Australian, G/Capt FitzGerald ' ... found each sortie a challenging 
assignment, e.g. when we are at PLE on this particular sortie ... I always felt that we 
were making a worthwhile contribution to the war effort.' That attitude was typical of 
most captains; they would attempt to fly to the limit of their endurance, particularly 
when on convoy escort. A Canadian, FltlLt Bryan Quinlan, appeared no less dedicated; 
, ... we were completely absorbed in our day to day operations and existence, wrapped 
up in our crew members and other friends on the squadron. We were happy to acquire 
anything that came our way.' 
Overall, former Coastal Command men were content with their time in the 
Service, and quite accepted that priority was not given to them. Furthermore, there was 
no sense of envy towards the other services. Rather were most Coastal aircrew mindful 
of the tasks undertaken by such as Bomber Command, but in particular, the lot of the 
Mercantile Marine. 
My own feeling, particularly when leaving a convoy at last light, was that we 
would probably soon be back at base, while at any moment, after we had left, a ship 
might well be torpedoed. 
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A pilot who served with No 269 squadron in Iceland, Dr R. Yorston, refers to the 
mutual respect of Coastal Command and the Mercantile Marine, and quoting a member 
of the latter; 'When we see your aircraft we go below to rest.' Yorston adds: 'So it had 
what nowadays would be called "job satisfaction".' Of Coastal Command as the 
Cinderella, Yorston comments - 'Yes', but look how Cinderella finished!' 
Both W /Cmdr Geoffrey Bartlett and W /Cmdr Derek Martin take a philosophic 
view. Bartlett expresses ' ... a general satisfaction with the way Coastal Command dealt 
with [him] personally, and for a broad and deep reverence for the way "it" conducted 
the war.' Bartlett quotes John Terraine; 'The end arrived none too soon in the maritime 
war' and adds that Terraine, rightly, he thinks, believes that ' ... the Atlantic Victory 
never got its proper recognition.' Derek Martin also refers to Terraine's view of Coastal 
Command; post war, Martin was actively involved with an International Youth 
Organisation and of our former enemies he states in retrospect: ' ... the people we were 
trying to kill were very similar to ourselves. Similar background, intelligent, technically 
capable.' One must question, however, that Coastal set out to kill people. It was 
otherwise, to 'kill' V-boats, but not men. 
I still receive a number of letters from both war veterans and from civilian 
researchers concerning crashed aircraft, lost aircrew and the restoration or 
commemoration of former Coastal Command bases such as Carew Cheriton, Thornaby 
and Silloth. Former aircrew of the North Coates Wing, in addition to a memorial at 
Cleethorpes, have shared a Dutch memorial at the formerly notorious Den HelderlTexel 
area. Most exceptional, were letters from two eleven-year old girls at a primary school 
in Wick. Subsequently I received a copy of their project, which is devoted to RAF 
Wick, and of those aircrew who operated from there. 
A pilot who served with Coastal Command post-war, G/Capt D. Cook found that 
, '" the Command was left with few aircraft and modified bombers were pressed into 
service.' I experienced that briefly in 1950 when on detachment to No 210 squadron 
that was then flying former bomber aircraft - Lancasters. G/Capt Cook considered that 
Coastal had been overlooked and gave lines of verse written by SlLdr Tony Spooner. 
They begin: 
'Fighters or Bombers'? his friends used to ask, 
'But when he said "Coastal ", they turned half away. 
They conclude: 
'Fighter or Bomber? his friends used to ask, 
'Coastal' he said, his face a tired mask, 
Though not in the spotlight where others may bask, 
We've a toughjob to do and I'm proud of the task 
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It is due to the efforts of such as the late SlLdr Tony Spooner, DSO, DFC who 
served with Nos 53 and 221 squadrons that, at long last, a National memorial is due 
to be unveiled to Coastal Command in Westminster Abbey on 16 March 2004 by 
HM Queen Elizabeth IT. 
I agree with the views of all those correspondents apart from the two provisos 
made. In what was published during the war about Coastal Command, I was aware at 
the time, of two posters, one depicting No 220' s Hudson raid on Alesund, and the 
'capture' ofU-570 by a Hudson from No 269 squadron. In contrast, on the back page of 
some newspapers in small type was: 'From all these operations two Hudsons of Coastal 
Command failed to return.' Headlines were, however, given to the SS KenSington Court 
rescue. 
When at a Coastal Command OTU during the winter of 1941-42, I was very 
conscious of the effect of good leadership that prevailed there. All the instructors had 
not only flown on operations, but proved exceptional; three of them, later commanded 
squadrons, two were later knighted, and one became Chief of Air Staff 1 On posting to 
No 224 squadron I became aware of the elusive 'squadron spirit' which permeated 
through all the ranks. This was due to leadership, but also, that many squadrons were 
conscious of their history. Some newly-formed units appeared lacking in that spirit. 
The effect of squadron spirit resulted in high morale, exemplified by No 48 in 
early 1943 at Gibraltar, and which was acknowledged by the Command. This factor, 
'squadron Sp!rit' I put above all other aspects that may lead to success. 
It did extend through to the Command, upwards, I believe, rather than 
downwards. Although there could be friendly rivalry, there were also 'sister' squadrons, 
such as Nos 53 with 59, and 206 with 220. The Command itself became something of a 
fraternity that extended through all ranks, and post-war, that is exemplified by the 
formation of a Coastal Command and Maritime Association. 
1. AM Sir Robert Craven, KBE, CB, OBE, DFC. 
W/Cmdr A. de V. Leach, DFC. 
MRAF Sir Denis Spotswood, GCB, CBE, DSO, DFC, FRAeS. 
58. A memorial to No 269 squadron in Selfoss, Iceland , I August 2000. 
No 269 operated Hudsons from Kaldadarnes, Hbfn and Reykjavik for much of the war on 
anti-submarine operations over the North Atlantic, and also undertook 'ice patrols' to warn 
shipping. Their work was hazardous and their conditions most grim. 
59. A memorial to the North Coates Strike Wing erected at Cleethorpes 
on 25 September 1999. 
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An aspect of Coastal Command was the lack of direct orders; it was really 
'England expects' although of course, 'Station Routine Orders' and 'Mayflys' (flying 
details), were always published daily. 
I was fortunate in working through the ranks and aircrew grades by beginning as a 
u/t Observer, followed by training as wireless operator and air gunner, but after a tour of 
operations, remustering to pilotlnavigatorlbomb aimer. While 'on rest' between tours of 
operations, I was able to appreciate the work of ground staff from blacksmiths, cooks, 
instrument repairers, etc in addition to that of the specialist officers. I was lucky in 
having some brief experience of anti-submarine and anti-shipping operations in addition 
to reconnaissance. Those operations were over the North Atlantic, the North Sea, the 
Norwegian Sea and the Mediterranean. Bases used extended from Iceland to North 
Africa. Overall, it was enough to gain some appreciation of the work of Coastal 
Command and other Services. 
Of many recollections, there are those of aircraft coming down in flames, and of 
crashed aircraft at the end of a runway, and the survivors in the Dallachy Wing 
'pancaking' after a raid over Norway. Of other services, FAA Swordfish taking off or 
landing on their carrier which was pitching and tossing in half-a-gale. Convoys 
indicated the vulnerability of merchant vessels, sailing sometimes at only 5 knots, but 
'fast' convoys in the Mediterranean at 17 knots. Above all, I best recall, the Merchant 
Navy captain at a convoy conference in Apri11942 begging: 'Please may we have more 
aircraft?, In common with all other veterans of World War II, I am conscious of having 
survived, and of the many friends who did not. 
Conclusions 
Coastal Command began the war with one squadron of Hudsons and three 
squadrons of Sunderland flying boats. All its other squadrons were equipped with 
out-dated aircraft. It had no effective anti-submarine weapon and its defensive 
armament was limited to 0.303in calibre machine guns. It was thus in no state to 
undertake an offensive against either U-boats or enemy shipping. The American 
Lockheed Hudson provided an invaluable stopgap for the Command, particularly due to 
the very limited production of Sunderland aircraft. 
The German invasion of Norway in April and the capitulation of France in June 
1940 opened the way for Coastal to attack enemy shipping. By then, however, the 
whole of the west European coastline needed to be covered by Coastal in addition to the 
western Mediterranean, the South-Western Approaches and the North-Western 
Approaches. The entry of Italy into the war meant that some Coastal forces had to be 
deployed in the eastern Mediterranean. 
The first successful attacks on enemy merchant shipping were achieved that year 
by the Command. By then, due to the serious shortage of forces, and its heavy 
commitments, some bomber squadrons were transferred to Coastal. 
Although the Command was involved in successful attacks on German U-boats in 
1940, it still lacked a lethal weapon, and could only share successes with the Navy's 
ships. It was to be in 1941 before a modified naval depth charge was being carried by 
both flying boats and Wellington bomber airc.raft that had transferred from Bomber 
Command. Outstanding, that year, however, was the 'capture' of U-570 by No 269 
squadron Hudsons. No less in historical importance was the sighting of the battleship 
Bismarck by' a No 209 squadron Catalina and the attack on the battlecruiser Gneisenau 
by a No 22 squadron Beaufort with a torpedo. 
The desert campaign in North Africa and the entry into the war of Japan and 
America, resulted in Coastal Command being depleted of both aircraft and trained 
crews to postings in the Middle East and the Far East. Furthermore, due to America's 
own commitments in the Pacific, it was reluctant to release such valuable aircraft as the 
Liberator for Coastal Command. 
Instead, one of Coastal's squadrons was deployed off the American Atlantic seaboard to 
assist in anti-submarine operations. 
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By 1941, many aircrews had completed their first tour of operations, and it was 
the Command's policy to use such men as instructors at Coastal's own Operational 
Training Units (OTUs) before flying on a second tour. The German battle cruisers and 
heavy cruiser at Brest had 'tied up' considerable forces from both Bomber and Coastal 
Commands, (although little from the Navy). Following the Channel Dash, Coastal was 
able to deploy some of its squadrons to the west to counter both U-boats and Luftwaffe 
aircraft over the Atlantic. This raised an immediate need for bases in the west with 
runways, and for its limited flying boats, bases with at least some shelter from wild 
weather. 
1942 marked major turning points for Coastal Command in both its anti-
submarine operations and what had become an effective shipping offensive off Norway, 
the Dutch coast, and to a much lesser degree, in the Bay of Biscay. In anti-submarine 
warfare, not only were longer-range aircraft such as Fortresses and Liberators becoming 
available, as they were not required by Bomber Command, but the Leigh Light 
Wellingtons were able to overcome the former British weakness, that was the inability 
to counter night surface attacks by U-boats against which the Navy's Asdic was useless. 
In 1942, 250lb depth charges were available for aircraft such as Hudsons, and in 
Operation Torch, their effectiveness was clearly demonstrated. 
There was a change of policy in the anti-shipping offensive in 1942; that was to 
cease mast height attacks, substituting medium height operations. This was due to the 
heavy losses that had prevailed in low-level operations. Losses were reduced, but also 
the number of ships sunk or damaged. 
EI Alamein was the 'Hinge of Fate' for Churchill in 1942~ but for Coastal 
Command, the turning point was the 24 May 1943 when Admiral Donitz ordered his 
U-boats away from the North Atlantic to 'safer' areas. This was countered by a base for 
Coastal's aircraft in the Azores. U-boats continued to be a threat, however, up to May 
1945 and off the shores of the British Isles. The Mid-Atlantic Gap south of Cape 
Farewell, where U-boats had operated initially out of range of aircraft, had been closed. 
This was due to the use of long-range Liberators, but also the whole-hearted 
co-operation of the Canadians who readily adopted Coastal Command's procedures, as 
also the Americans. 
In 1943 the Beaufighter strike WIngs were operating successfully off the 
Norwegian and Dutch coasts. The intention had been to provide overwhelming forces to 
attack enemy shipping that were heavily defended by flak ships and fighter aircraft. 
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From the results obtained and the losses suffered, it is questionable whether such 
considerable forces were justified, particularly in the Norwegian fjords due to the nature 
of the terrain and the fighter opposition. The great success of No 220 squadron Hudsons 
in October 1941 had demonstrated an effective alternative. 
Strategy and tactics in the U-boat war were varied according to conditions. Air 
Marshal Slessor considered the Bay of Biscay as the 'trunk of the tree' through which 
most U-boats passed. There was justification therefore, in concentrating operations 
there. Over the Atlantic more surface could be covered by having sweeps by aircraft 
along the convoy routes rather than by close escort. In practice, all three strategies were 
used. ASVlRadar was used both to 'swamp' an area when U-boats had detectors for a 
specific wavelength and thus caused U-boats to suffer many alarms. The converse was 
also applied when U-boats lacked detectors for 10cm radar and thus when surprise 
attacks could be achieved. U-boats also, at one stage were prepared to remain surfaced 
to 'fight it out' but it was to be proved a costly tactic for them, and generally U-boats 
opted to submerge when aircraft were detected or sighted. The mere presence of an 
aircraft was thus a deterrent, and at the critical times of first and last light, there was 
much to be said for close escort of convoys; such was the plea of the Merchant Navy 
captains. 
Radar has been considered by some to be the great innovation in World War II. 
Certainly, even the Mark II in aircraft could detect a surfaced submarine, and there were 
many such detections. Nevertheless, often U-boats were sighted, as also ships, visually 
at about the same time as radar detection. The later, Mark III radar was a definite 
improvement, as with a scanner, rather than fixed aerials, and improved sensitivity, 
accurate bearings could be given, and it was free of 'sea returns'. 
Far too little attention was given to the need for a radio altimeter that would give 
the height of the aircraft above sea level rather than to measure air pressure. This was 
because Coastal's aircraft operated at low altitudes and dO\IIl!1 to 50ft for attacks on 
U-boats. Radio altimeters came too late and in too few a number. There is no doubt that 
many aircraft were lost due to using an altimeter that had not been corrected for 
pressure changes. 
Initiative was shown by individuals in Coastal Command by the development of 
such aids as the Leigh Light, and rescue equipment such as the Lindholme dinghy and 
the airborne lifeboat. Initiative was taken also in improving the forward firing armament 
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for attacks on V-boats. Many trials were made at squadron level in the development of 
tactics with cannon, rocket projectiles and torpedoes. 
Against ships, the Command gained only limited success with torpedoes, the 
notable exception being the attack on Gneisenau. Their cost in tenns of aircraft, crews 
and weapons was not justified against merchant vessels. There was limited success with 
acoustic homing torpedoes against V-boats. The foremost weapon against merchant 
vessels was the 250 lb bomb, followed by cannon and rocket projectiles. The RPs were 
also useful against V-boats but the standard weapon for U-boat attacks was the 250 lb 
depth charge. 
In Operation Overlord, the Command demonstrated that it had developed into a 
highly efficient force that was able to counter any threat from the enemy's forces at that 
time. This fact was acknowledged by Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. 
By 1945, the Command was in conflict ,vith the schnorchel-equipped V-boats, but 
it was able to counter them to some extent by direct sightings or radar detections, and 
when submerged, sonobuoys were used, which in principle, were similar to the Navy's 
Asdic. 
For the final wartime Commander, Sir Sholto Douglas, there remained the 
problem that had prevailed throughout the war for Coastal Command, which was the 
lack of suitable aircraft with enough range. 
From operational records it is apparent that the human factors for aircrews were 
the space in the aircraft to do their work, space also for the instruments they had to use 
in sorties of up to eighteen hours and 700 miles out into the Atlantic. 
Too little attention was given to the design of aircraft for human beings, the 
notable exception being the Hudson; the Sunderland had space but lacked effective 
heating. 
Nevertheless, from both operational records, and contact with many personnel of 
all categories, one saw no sign of low morale. In all the squadrons, of those fonned 
from the RFC and the RNAS there was a 'squadron spirit', and obviously so in the 
Auxiliary squadrons. Coastal's aircrews adopted a fatalistic, philosophical attitude; they 
just did the job that was expected of them. 
My theme has been that Coastal Command was the Cinderella out of three RAF 
Commands; the two 'sisters' being Fighter and Bomber that gained precedence, but 
ultimately Coastal Command achieved much despite such odds. 
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Angell, W/Cmdr, M., No 580 squadron; Bartlett, W/Cmdr, G.e.e., AFC, Nos 224 & 
59 squadrons; Baveystock, Flt/Lt, L., No 201 squadron; Bednall, W/Cmdr, D., No 230 
squadron; Bevan-John, G/Capt, D., No 228 squadron; Busbridge, D., Capt, No 224 squadron; 
Campbell, F/O, G., DFC, RCAF, No 162 squadron; Campbell, W/Cmdr, R.I.; Cook, G/Capt, 
OBE,; Craven, AAI Sir Robert, KBE, CB, OBE, DFC, Nos 201,210,228 squadrons; Cremer, 
KlKapt.P.,U-333; De Liefde, Lt.T., RNethNAS; Edwards, Flt1Lt, G., No 233 squadron; 
Fitzgerald, G/Capt, JB., RAAF, No 500 squadron; Flynn, FltlLt, P., DFC, RCAF, No 404 
squadron; Giese, 0., U-405; Green, F/O, J., No 179 squadron; Goff, F., No 259 squadron; 
Greswell, NCmdre, J, No 172 squadron; Hodgkinson, ACM, Sir Derek, KCB, CBE, CB, 
DFC, AFC, No 220 squadron; Hodgkinson, Capt, V, DFC, RAAF, No 10 squadron; Jones, 
FltlLt, J RAAF, No 608 squadron; Johnson, C., MSe, FRAeS. (Lockheed engineer); Lynham, 
G/Capt, P., DSO., No 279 squadron; Marrows, Flt1Lt, D., DFC, RAAF, No 461 squadron; 
McGill, R.; Martin, W/Cmdr, D. OBE, BSe., No 201 squadron; Page, FltILt, C. DFC, RCAF, 
No 404 squadron; Quinlan, B., RCAF; Rackcliff, P., No 580 squadron; Romanes, W/Cmdr, J. 
DFC, No 206 squadron; Shuleman, S/Ldr, DSO, DFC, RCAF, No 404 squadron; Simmons, R., 
No 143 squadron; Skaugstad, Per; Smith, SILdr, A., MRAeS, No 206 squadron; Spooner, 
S/Ldr, T.,DSO, DFC, Nos 53 & 221 squadrons; Stiebler, K/Kapt W., U-461; Symons, FltlLt, 
J., RCAF, No 404 squadron; Taylor, S/Ldr, C., DFC, RCAF, No 407 squadron; Tompkins, 
NCmdre, M.; Troughton, F., HMS Brocklesby; Warren, L., Nos 459 & 38 squadrons; 
Whittaker, D., No 279 squadron; Willis, D.; Winfield, E., No 1404 FIt.; WomersIey, W/Cmdr, 
L., DFC, No 224 squadron; Wood, Capt E., DFC, USN, VP84 USN; Yorston, Dr R., No 269 
squadron; Zestermann, G., U-533 & U-155. 
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Appendix 1 
Coastal Command Commanders 
No 10 Group 
Apr 1918 Wing Commander AW. Bigsworth, C.M.G., D.S.O., AF.C. 






Air Vice-Marshal AV. Vyvyan, C.B., D.S.O. 
Air Vice-Marshal F.R Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O. 
Air Vice-Marshal c.L. Lambe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 
Air Vice-Marshal RH. Clark-Hall, C.M.G., D.S.O. 
Air Vice-Marshal AM. Longmore, C.B., D.S.O. 













Air Marshal Sir Arthur M.Longmore, KC.B., D.S.O. 
Air Marshal P.B. Joubert de la Ferte, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 
Air Marshal Sir Frederick W. Bowhill, KC.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip B.Joubert de la Ferte, 
KC.B.,C.M.G.,D.S.O. 
Air Marshal J.C. Slessor, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, KC.B., M.C., D.F.C. 
Air Marshal Sir Leonard H. Slatter, KB.E., C.B., D.S.C., D.F.C. 
Air Marshal lW. Baker, C.B., M.C., D.F.C. 
Air Marshal C.RSteele, C.B., D.F.C. 
Air Marshal AC. Stevens, C.B. 
Air Marshal Sir John N. Boothman, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., AF.C. 
Air Marshal Sir Bryan V. Reynolds, K.c.B., C.B.E. 
Appendix 2 
Summary of Planned Expansion Programmes ofR.A.F., 1934-1936 
Home Defence Home Defence Other Home Units Other Home Units Overseas Overseas aircraft FAA I st line aircraft 
squadrons aircraft squadrons 
Squadron Establishment as at 1st 42 484 9 
April 1934 
As approved in July 1934 75 884 9 
As approved in May 1935 112 1,386 11 
As approved in February 107(a) 1,568 17 
1936 
(a) 30 fighter squadrons of 14 aircraft each in place of 12 aircraft 
(b) Plus any additional requirements for new construction 
aircraft squadrons 
75 25 253 150 
76 27 292 213 (b) 
126 27 292 213 (b) 
128 37 444 504 
[Based on Table No. 16 from Grand Strategy VoU by N.H.Gibbs] 















Coastal Command- Order of Battle 
10 September 1939 
Base Squadron 
Mount Batten 204 
Pembroke Dock 210 
Pembroke Dock 228 
WarmweIl 217 (part) 
Aldergrove 502 
Carew Cheriton 217 (part) 
Bircham Newton 42 
Bircham Newton 206 
Thomey Island 22 
Thomey Island 48 (part) 
Detling 500 
Detling 48 (part) 
Guernsey 48 (part) 



































Aircraft in Service with Coastal Command 10 September 1939 
Aircraft Sqdn. Estab. Economical 80% range & Bomb load Gun Armament 
I.E. I.R. true speed at endurance in with normal (AlI.303s) 
2000 ft. still air tankage 
Anson 18 6 114 knots 510 sea miles 2- 100 lb Ix fixed VGO 
25gals!hr 4.5 hours 1 rear Lewis in 
manual turret 
Vildebeest 12 4 82 knots 370 sea miles 8- 100 lb or Ix fixed VGO 
26 gals/hr 4.3 hours 4 -250 lb or 1 rear Le"vis on 
2- 500 lb or rocking pillar 
1- 18" torp. 
Hudson 18 6 165 knots 990 sea miles 10 - 100 lb or 2 fixed fwd 
71 gals/hr 6 hours 4 - 250 lb Browning;2 
rearinB&P 
turret 
London 6 2 86 knots 450 sea miles 8 - 250 lb or 1 Lewis in nose 
55 gals !hr. 5.2 hours 4 - 500 lb 1 Lewis in 
centre, 1 rear 
Lewis, all on 
ring mounts 
Stranraer 6 2 92 knots 660 sea miles 4 - 250 lb or M " 
55 gals/hr 7.2 hours 2 - 500 lb 
Sunderland 6 2 l37 knots 1,700 sea miles 8 - 250 lb or 1 front VGO 
l30 gals/hr. 12.4 hours 4 - 500 lb 2 centre VGOs 
4 Brownings in 
F -N rear turret 
Establishment, Strength and Average Daily Availability During September 1939 
Squadrons Establishment Reserve Strength Average daily 
No.of Availability 
6 f.b. sqdns. 36 12 59 21 
13 OR sqdns. 206 70 239 150 
Totals 242 82 298 171 
Group 
No 15 Plymouth 
No 16 Chatham 
Appendix 5 
Coastal Command - Order of Battle 
1 November 1940 
Base Squadron Aircraft 
St.Eval 217 AnsonlBeaufort 
St.Eval 236 (part) Blenheim fighter 
St.Eval B FltPRU Spitfire/Hudson 
Mount Batten 10 RAAF (part) Sunderland 
Pembroke Dock 209 (part) Lerwick 
Carew Cheriton 321 Anson 
Aldergrove 502 (part) AnsonlWhidey 
Aldergrove 224 (part) Hudson 
Aldergrove 48 (part) Anson 
Aldergrove 236 (part) Blenheim fighter 
Limavady 502 (part) Whitley 
Hooton Park 48 (part) Anson 
Oban 210 Sunderland 
Oban 10 RAAF (part) Sunderland 
Oban 201 (part) Sunderland 
Stranraer 240 Stranraer 
Stranraer 209 (part) Lerwick 
Port Ellen 48 (part) Anson 
North Coates 22 Beaufort 
North Coates 812 FAA Swordfish 
Bircham Newton 206 (part) Hudson 
Bircham Newton 235 (part) Blenheim fighter 
Bircham Newton 500 (part) Anson 
Detling 500 (part) Anson 
Det1ing 53 BlenheimGR 
Thomey Island 59 BlenheimGR 
Thomey Island 235 (part) Blenheim fighter 
280 
281 
No 18 Pitreavie castle Sullom Voe 201 (part) Sunderland 
Sullom Voe 204 Sunderland 
Sullom Voe 700 FAA (part) Walrus 
Sumburgh 248 Blenheim fighter 
Wick 42 Beaufort 
Wick 269 Hudson 
Wick A Flt PRU Spitftre/Hudson 
Dyce 612 (part) Anson 
Dyce 254 Blenheim fighter 
Leuchars 233 Hudson 
Leuchars 224 (part) Hudson 
Leuchars 320 Hudson (training) 
Thomaby 220 Hudson 
Thomaby 608 AnsonIBotha 
Stomoway 612 (part) Anson 
Iceland Kaldadames 98 Battle 
Gibraltar Gibraltar harbour 202 London 
Additionally, a Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) was at Heston with Spitfires & Hudsons 
E t bl" b sa IS t St men, th dA ren21 an vera ge D 0. A 0. bT dON ally val a I Ity urID2 ovem b 1940 er 
Squadrons I. E. I.R. Serviceable UIS Average 
availability 
7 flying boat sqdns 36 15 33 25 14 
22 GR & fighter sqdns 402 14 366 98 197 
Totals 438 29 399 123 201 
1 1f2 F .A.A. sqdns 12 - 10 2 9 
Totals 450 29 409 125 210 
Group 
No 15 Liverpool 
Iceland 
No 16 Chatham 
Appendix 6 
Coastal Command - Order of Battle 
15 June 1941 
Base Squadron 
Aldergrove 254 





Nutts Comer 120 (forming) 
Lough Erne 209 
Lough Erne 240 
Hooton Park 48 (part) 
Oban 210 
Port Ellen,Islay 48 (part) 
Bowmore, Islay 119 
Kaldadames 98 
Reykjavik 204 
Kaldadames 269 (part) 
Reykjavik 330 (forming) 
North Coates 22 
North Coates 86 
Bircham Newton 206 (part) 
Bircham Newton 248 


























No 16 Chatham Bircham Newton 1403 Met.FIt. BlenheimGR 
Detling 59 (part) BlenheimGR 
Detling 816 FAA (part) Swordfish 
Thomey Island 59 (part) Blenheim GR 
Thomey Island 816 FAA (part) Swordfish 
Thomey Island 404 & 407(forming) Blenheim fighters 
No 18 Pitreavie Sullom Voe 201 (part) Sunderland 
Castle 
Wick 269 (part) Hudspm 
Wick 220 Hudson 
Wick 612 Whitley 
Wick 1406 Met.Flt Spitfire 
Wick CFlightPRU SpitfirelBlenheim 
Invergordon 201 (part) Sunderland 
Dyce 235 (part Blenheim fighter 
Leuchars 42 Beaufort 
Leuchars 320 (Dutch) Hudson! Anson 
Leuchars 114 B.C.(on loan) BlenheimGR 
Thomaby 608 BlenheimGR 
Stomoway 48 (part) Anson 
Hatston 812 FAA Swordfish 
Sumburgh 235 (part) Blenheim fighter 
No 19 Plymouth St.Eval 217 Beaufort 
St.Eval 53 Blenheim GR 
St.Eval 236 (part) Blenheim fighter 
St.Eval 206 (part) Hudson 
St.Eval No. 1404 Met.Flt. BlenheimGR 
St.Eval BFltPRU SpitfirelBlenheim 
Pembroke Dock lORAAF Sunderland 
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No 19 Plymouth Carew Cheriton 236 (part) Blenheim fighter 
No 200 Gibraltar Gibraltar 202 London/Catalina 
West Africa Freetown 95 Sunderland 
West Africa Bathurst 200 Hudson 
Benson No 1 PRU SpitfirelBlenheim 
Establishment, Strength and Average Daily Availability during June 1941 
Squadrons I.E. I.R. Serviceable VIS Average 
Availability 
9 flying boat sqdns 65 7 45 19 17 
26 GR & fighter sqdns 495 25 408 110 281 
Totals 560 32 453 129 298 
2 FAA sqdns 18 - 16 2 7 
Totals 578 32 469 131 305 
Three Met.Flights of total I E5 + 3IR & 2PRU Flights of total IE +4 IR 
NB. No.120 Liberator, No 404 Blenheim,No.407 Hudson, and No.330 Northrop squadrons were 
fonning 






























C tIC oas a om man dA' lrcra ft W t S t b 1939 t J as a~e ep1em er 0 une 1941 I I ' nc USlve 
ASW Convoy EnemyMvs EnemynavaI Air Land Fighter Photo 
escort Strikes! Recce units at sea mining targets protecn. recce 
Strikes! Recce 
1 - - - - 9 - - - 2 
4 2 - - - 2 - - - -
1 - - - - 4 - - - -
1 - - - - 4 - - - -
3 1 - - - 2 - - 2 -
1 3 - - - 1 - - - -
1 1 - - - - - - - -
1 - - - 2 5 1 3 3 -
- 1 - - 4 19 2 13 1 -
- 3 - - 8 17 3 9 3 1 
- 2 1 - 2 20 - 9 2 -
- 1 2 - - 18 1 16 2 5 
- 6 8 - - 5 1 8 - 2 
1 4 10 - 1 15 - 2 - 4 
3 3 5 - - 2 - 9 5 1 
2 1 3 4 - 6 2 10 3 2 
1 6 2 - - 5 1 5 1 1 
1 5 3 2 1 7 2 13 - 2 
4 5 8 3 - 4 - 2 7 2 
4 6 13 8 1 7 2 3 6 2 
2 5 - 4 - 1 - 4 3 3 
2 - 5 4 1 9 2 6 4 2 
33 55 60 25 20 162 17 112 42 29 
Monthly totals: 12,8,5,5; 8,5,2,15,40,44,36,45,30,37,28,33; 22,36,35,52,22,35; 
Grand Total for the period September 1939 - June 1941 inclusive: 555 aircraft. 
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Appendix 8 
Sightings and Attacks on U-boats - September 1939 - June 1941 
Month hrs c/y hrs cly alc lost sighted attack sunk hrs sighted attack sunk 
escort supt onalu other 
tasks 
1939 1,138 839 1 21 18 -- 5,590 6 5 
Sep. 
Oct. 1,396 685 6 5 4 - 2,090 7 7 -
Nov. 1,038 914 1 2 2 - 2,800 3 3 -
Dec. 1,154 1,314 1 3 3 - 2,600 4 4 -
1940 shared 
Jan. 1,025 1,762 4 5 3 U55 2,340 1 1 -
Feb. 1,310 1,762 4 15 11 - 2,080 - - -
Mar. 2,800 2,027 2 7 6 - 2,350 - - -
Apr. 3,318 1,332 1 9 7 - 3,980 7 5 -
May 4,098 1,719 - 5 4 - 5,310 2 2 -
Jun. 3,990 2,117 1 12 12 - 6,570 1 1 -
Jui. 3,356 1,204 1 2 2 shared 7,340 4 4 -
U-26 
Aug. 3,437 1,284 2 8 8 - 5,620 6 6 -
Sep. 3,428 965 4 5 5 - 6,000 1 1 -
Oct. 2,337 928 2 4 4 - 4,350 5 4 -
Noy 1,790 869 7 2 2 - 4,670 2 0 -
Dec. 1,443 702 3 3 3 - 4,180 1 0 -
1941 
Jan. 1,445 912 7 1 1 - 2,860 1 1 -
Feb. 1,398 995 6 3 3 - 2,620 1 0 -
Mar 2,079 1,360 9 9 5 - 3,980 - - -
-Apr. 2,221 1,596 8 4 2 - 5,150 4 3 
May 2,017 2,362 7 9 5 - 7,650 4 4 -
Jun. 2,063 2,645 1 20 15 - 6,110 6 3 -








Coastal Command Order of Battle 
15th June 1942 
No 1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit 
No 202 Squadron 
No 233 Squadron (Part) 
No 1 PRU (Part) . 
No 269 Squadron 
No 612 Squadron 
No 330 Squadron (Part) 















No 206 Squadron 
No 1402 Met.Flight 
No 224 Squadron 






No 201 Squadron Sunderland 
No 422 (RCAF)Squadron Catalina 
(Forming) 
No 120 Squadron 
No 220 Squadron 
No 228 Squadron 
No 423 (RCAF) Squadron 
(Forming) 













No 235 Squadron Beaufighter 
No 407 (RCAF) Squadron Hudson 
No 320 (Dutch) Squadron Hudson 
No 1401 Met Flight Hudson/Mosquito/Spitfire/Gladiator 
No 279 Squadron Hudson (Air-Sea-Rescue) 
No 59 Squadron Hudson 
No 415 (RCAF) Squadron Hampden 
No 236 Squadron Beaufighter 
No 233 Squadron (Part) Hudson 
No 489 (RNZAF) Squadron Hampden 
(Forming) 
No 143 Squadron BlenheimIBeaufighter 
No 280 Squadron(Forming) Anson (Air-Sea-Rescue) 







No 254 Squadron 
No 404(RCAF) 
No 144 Squadron(Training) 
No 455(RAAF) Squadron 
(Training) 
'H' Flight PRU 
No 210 Squadron 
No 248 Squadron 
No 608 Squadron 
No 48 Squadron 
No 86 Squadron 
No 1406 Met Flight 
'C' Flight PRU 
















No 19 Group HQ Plymouth 
Mount Batten No 10 Squadron RAAF Sunderland 
No 461 (RAAF) Squadron Sunderland 
(Fonning) 
St.Eval No 502 Squadron Whitley 
No 53 Squadron Hudson 
No 58 Squadron Whitley 
No 1404 Met.Flight Hudson 
'B' Flight PRU SpitfirelBlenheim 
Chivenor No 172 Squadron Wellington (Leigh Light) 
No 51 Squadron B.C.(loan) Whitley 
N 77 Squadron B.C.(loan) Whitley 
Talbenny No 311(Czech)Squadron B.C.(loan) Wellington 
Dale No 304(Polish)Squadron B.C.Loan) Wellington 
Coastal Command's Establishment, Strength and Average Availability June 1942 
Units Establishment Reserve Serviceable U/S Av.Daily 
Availability 
6 Flying Boat Squadrons 48 7 32 22 28 
31 GR & Fighter Sqdns inc. 484 114 356 134 201 
those on loan 
Totals 532 121 388 156 229 
5 Met.Flights 34 17 21 19 15 
No.1 P.R.U. 58 15 59 12 40 
1 A.S.R. Squadron 16 4 12 10 
4 Flying Boat Squadrons 30 6 3 2 non-op 
fonning 
1 Torpedo Squadron 16 4 15 4 non-op 
fonning 








Coastal Command Order of Battle 
15 October 1942 
Nos 540,541,542,543,544 PRU Mosquito/SpitfIre 
SquadronsFlights detached at Leuchars, Wellington! Anson 
St.Eval and Gibraltar 
No 53 Squadron Hudson 
No 202 Squadron . Catalina 
No 233 Squadron Hudson 
No 544 (PRU) Squadron (Part) SpitfIre 
No 269 Squadron Hudson 
No 330 (Norsk) Squadron (Part) Northrop 
No 73 VP Squadron USN Catalina PBY5A 
No 1407 Met Flight Hudson 
No 15 Group H.Q. Liverpool 
Aldergrove No 1402 Met Flight 
Ballykelly . No 120 Squadron 
No 220 Squadron 
LoughEme No 201 Squadron 
No 422 (RCAF) Squadron (forming) 
Benbecu!a No 206 Squadron 
No 279 (ASR) Squadron (part) 
Oban No 228 Squadron 
No 423 (RCAF) Squadron (forming) 
Stomoway No 58 Squadron 
No 16 Group HQ Chatham 
Bircham Newton No 320 (Dutch) Squadron 
No 254 Squadron 
No 811 FAA Squadron (on loan) 
No 812 FAA Squadron (on loan) 


















No 279 ASR Squadron (part) Hudson! Albermarle 
Langham No 280 ASR Squadron Anson 
North Coates No 143 Squadron BlenheimlBeaufighter 
No 236 Squadron Beaufighter 
Thomey Island No 816 FAA Squadron (on loan) Swordfish 
No 819 FAA Squadron (on loan) Swordfish 
No 59 Squadron (converting) Liberator 
No 86 Squadron (converting) Liberator 
No 18 Group HO Pitreavie Castle 
Dyce No 404 (RCAF) Squadron BeaufighterlBlenheim 
Leuchars No 144 Squadron Hampden 
No 455 (RAAF) Squadron Hampden 
No 415 (RCAF) Squadron Hampden 
No 540 PRU Squadron (part) Mosquito 
Woodhaven No 330 (Norge) Squadron (part) Catalina III 
Sullom Voe No 210 Squadron Catalina 
Sumburgh No 48 Squadron Hudson 
Wick No 489 (RNZAF) Squadron Hampden 
No 179 Squadron Wellington (Leigh Light) 
No 612 Squadron Whitley 
No 1406 Met Flight Spitfire/Hudson! Albermarle 
No 19 Group HO Plymouth 
Beaulieu No 224 Squadron Liberator 
Mount Batten No 10 Squadron RAAF Sunderland 
Pembroke Dock No 119 Squadron (re-equipping) Sunderland 
Hamworthy No 461 (RAAF) Squadron Sunderland 
St.Eval No 502 Squadron Whitley 
No 407 (RCAF) Squadron Hudson 
No 10 OTU BC (on loan) Whitley 
No 543 PRU Squadron (part) Spitfire 
No 1404 Met Flight Hudson! Albermarle 
Chivenor No 172 Squadron Wellington (Leigh Leight) 
No 235 Squadron Beaufighter 
Talbenny 
Dale 
No 311 (Czech) Squadron 
No 248 Squadron 




Coastal Command's Establishment, Strength and Availability, October 1942 
Units Establishment Reserve Serviceable 
8 Flying Boat Squadrons inc.1xUSN 72 21 53 
30 OR & Fighter inc.lxBC Sqdn 469 111 343 
Totals 541 132 396 
+4 FAA Sqdns with 36 ale on loan 
5 PRU squadrons 67 16 59 
1 Met.sqdn & 4 Flights 38 19 24 
2 ASR squadrons 32 8 28 
Non-Operational : 
4 Flying boat squadrons fonning or converting of totals I.E 24 + 12 I.R. 
2 OR squadrons converting to Liberators of totals I.E. 18 + 6 I.R. 

















Coastal Command Order of Battle 
15 February 1943 
Benson Nos 540,541,542,543,and 544 squadrons Mosquito-15 
(FIts detached at Leuchars,St.Eval & Gibraltar) Spitfrre-66 Wellington-2 
Gibraltar No 202 Squadron Catalina 1- 12 
Iceland 
No 210 Squadron detachment 
No 48 Squadron 
No 233 Squadron 
No 544 PRU Squadron detachment 
No 179 Squadron 
Kaldadarnes No 269 Squadron 
Reykjavik VP 84 USN 
No 120 Squadron detachment 
No 1407 Metcal FIt 
No 330 (Norge) squadron detachment 
No 15 Group HQ Liverpool 
Aldergrove No 1402 Metcal Flight 
BalIykelly . No 120 Squadron 
No 220 Squadron 
No 280 ASR Squadron detachment 
Lough Erne No 201 Squadron 




No 423(RCAF) Squadron 
No 422(RCAF) Squadron (fonning) 
No 330(Norge) Squadron re-equipping 
No 246 Squadron 
No 206 Squadron 
No 16 Group HQ Chatham 
Bircham Newton No 320 (Dutch) Squadron 
No 407 (RCAF) Squadron 
No 521 Metcal Squadron 
No 279 ASR Squadron 










Northrop - 6+0 
SpitlHudlGlad 9+5 




Sunderland II&III-6+ 3 
Sunderland 1l&1ll-6+ 3 
Sunderland III-6+3 
Sunderland III-6+ 3 
Sunderland II &III-6+3 
Fortress IIA -9+3 
Hudson V&VI -16+4 






Docking No 53 Squadron (Hudson) re-equipping Whitleys V 
North Coates No 143 Squadron Beaufighter II(F)-16+4 
No 236 Squadron Beau.IC& VIC(F)-16+4 
No 254 Squadron Beau. VIC(T IF)-16+4 
Thomey Island No 415 (RCAF) Squadron Hampden(T 1B)-16+4 
No 833 FAA Squadron (on loan) Swordfish 9 
No 836 FAA Squadron (on loan) Swordfish 9 
No 86 Squadron partially operational on VLR Liberator III- 16+4 
No 18 GrouQ HQ Pitreavie Castle 
Leuchars No 144 Squadron Beaufighter 16+4 
No 455 (RAAF) Squadron Hampden TIB-16+4 
No 235 Squadron Beaufighter 16+4 
No 540 PRU Squadrondetachment Mosquito 
Woodhaven No 1477 (Norge) Flight Catalina IB-3+0 
Sullom Voe No 190 Squadron Catalina IB-6+ 3 
Wick No 489 (RNZAF) Squadron Hampden TIB -16+4 
No 612 Squadron re-equipping Whitley/LL Wel.16+4 
No 1406 Metcal Flight SpitfirelHudson- 6+3 
No 19 GrouQ HQ Plymouth 
Beaulieu No 224 Squadron Liberator II,III,& V -9+ 3 
No 405 BC Squadron on loan Halifax 12 
Chivenor No 172 Squadron LL Wel.VIII&XII-16+4 
No 179 Squadron detachment LL Wellingtons 
No 547 Squadron Wellington VIII TIB-6+ 2 
No 59 Squadron FortressIIA -9+3 
No 404 (RCAF) Squadron Beaufighter II (F)-16+4 
Talbenny No 311 (Czech) Squadron Wellington IC-16+2 
Dale No 304 (Polish) Squadron Wellington IC&X-16+2 
St.Eval No 502 Squadron Whitley VII-16+4 
No 10 (B)OTU on loan Whitley -20 
1 stNS US AAC Squadron Liberator- 12 
2nd NS US AAC Squadron Liberator- 12 
No 1404 Metcal Flight HudsN en! Albermarle-4+ 2 
No 543 PRU Squadron detachment Spitfires 
Predannack No 248 Squadron Beaufighter VIC (F)-16+4 
Mountbatten No 10 Squadron RAAF Sunderland II&III-6+3 
Pembroke Dock No 210 Squadron Catalina I,lB & lIA-6+3 
No 119 Squadron 
Hamworthy No 461(RAAF) Squadron 
Holmesley South No 58 Squadron 
Sunderland II & III-6+3 
Sunderland II & III-6+3 
Whitley/Halifax 9+3 
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Coastal Command's Establishment, Strength and Average Daily Availability, 15 February 1943 
Establishment Strength Non-op- U/S 
12 1jz Flying boat Sqdns inc. one USN Sqdn 126 118 69 
18 ASW GR Sqdns. inc.2 BC & 2 USAAC Sqdns 304 293 132 
13 AS, GR & LR fighter Squadrons 238 260 115 
Total: 43 1f2 squadrons fully operational 668 671 316 
5 PRU Squadrons 91 85 31 
1 Metcal Sqdn & 4 Flights 68 49 15 
2 ASR Squadrons 40 34 8 
To the above must be added 6 squadrons, altogether or partially out of the line :-
No 422 (RCAF) Squadron forming with 6+3 Sunderlands 
No 53 Squadron re-equipping from Hudsons to 16+3Whitleys 
No 58 Squadron re-equipping from Whitleys to 9+3 Halifaxes 
No 407 (RCAF) Squadron re-equipping from Hudsons to 16+4 LL Wellingtons. 
No 502 Squadron re-equipping from Whitleys to 9+3 Halifaxes 











Coastal Command Order of Battle, Establishment, Strength and Availability 
1 March 1943 
No 15 Group Estab. Strength Availability Remarks 
Ballykelly 
No 120 -VLR Lib. 1& IIA 16+4 14 11 Det.in Iceland 
No 220 -Fortress 1 & II 9+3 13 4 
Benbecula 
No 206 -Fortress I & II 9+3 14 5 
Castle Archdale 
No 201 Sunderland III III 6+3 11 4 
No 228 Sunderland III III 6+3 8 2 
No 423 Sunderland III III 6+3 9 3 
Oban 
No 422 Sunderland III 6+3 9 4 
No 330 Sunderland III 6+3 5 Nil Fonning 
Bowmore 
No 246 Sunderland III III 6+3 9 3 
No 16 Group 
Thomey Island 
No 86 - VLR Lib. IlIA 16+4 17 12 
No 415-Hampden I Torp. 16+4 17 12 
No 833-Swordfish FAA 9 9 7 On loan 
No 836-Swordfish FAA 9 9 6 On loan 
Bircham Newton 
No 320 -Hudson V & VI 16+4 13 9 To re-equip Mk XI 
No 53 - WhitleyslLibs. 16+4 21 3 Re-equipping 
North Coates 
No 143-Bfter II 16+4 20 9 To re-eQuip Mk XI 
No 236-Bftr ICI VI 16+4 21 3 Re-equipping 
No 254-Bftr VI (Torp) 16+4 22 14 To re-equip Mk X 
No 18 Group 
Sullom Voe 
No 190- Catalina IB 6+3 9 4 
Wick 
No 489 Hampden I 16+4 25 15 
No 612-WhitleylLL WeI. 16+4 18 9 Re-equipping 
No 407-Wellington I & II 16+4 20 9 To re-eQuip LL 
Leuchars 
No 144-Bftr VIC-Torp 16+4 20 16 
No 235-Bftr VIC-fir 16+4 20 14 
No 455-Hamp. I -Torp. 16+4 20 12 To re-equip 
Woodhaven 
No 1477 FIt. (Norge) Cat. IS 3+0 2 1 Special Duties 
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Coastal Command Order of Battle 1 March 1943 (Continued) 
No 19 Group Estab. Strength Available Remarks 
Mount Batten 
No 10(RAAF)-Sund. II & III 6+3 9 4 
Pembroke Dock 
No 119-Sunderland II & III 6+3 10 5 
No 210 -Catalina IB 6+3 4 3 Half at Gibraltar 
Hamworthy 
No 461-Sunderland II & III 6+3 9 4 
Chivenor 
No 172-LL Well. VIII & XU 16+4 20 7 
No 547-Well.VIII-Torp. 6+2 10 Nil Training at Tain 
No 59-Fortress IIA 9+3 10 7 
No 404 Beaufighter II-fu 16+4 19 5 To re-equip to Mk: XIC 
Talbenny 
No 311(Czech) Well.IC 16+4 17 12 To re-equip to Mk: X 
Dale 
No 304(Polish) Well.IC 16+4 19 9 To re-equip to Mk: X 
St.Eval 
Nos 1 & 2 USAAF Lib. 24 13 10 On loan-left 5.3.43. 
No 10(B)0.T.U.Whitley 26 20 15 On Loan 
No 502-Halifax II 9+3 12 1 Non-op until March 
Predannock 
No 248-Beaufighter VI-fu 16+4 20 14 
Exeter 
No 834-F AA-Swordfish 9 9 6 On loan 
Holmsley South 
No 58-Halifax II 9+3 11 2 Non-op until March 
Beaulieu 
No 224-Liberator II, III, & V 9+3 6 2 
Iceland 
Reykjavik 
No 120 det. VLR Liberators - 7 3 
No 330 det.Northrops - 9 4 
VP84 USN PBY5As 12 12 8 On loan 
Kaldadames 
No 269- Hudson III 20+4 23 16 
Gibraltar 
New Camp 
No 202 - Catalina IB 12+0 15 10 
No 210 - Catalina IB - 7 5 
North Front 
No 48- Hudson VI 16+4 23 17 
No 233-Hudson III 16+4 20 12 
Coastal Command 513+145 637 323 
squadrons- 42+ one Fit 
Squadrons on loan- 7 89 71 52 
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Coastal Command Order of Battle 1 March 1943 (Continued) 
Photo-Reconnaissance Estab. Strength Available Remarks 
Benson 
No 540-MoSQuito-Mks var. 18+4 22 10 Det. At Leuchars 
No 541-Spitfires-Mks var. 14+4 14 9 
No 542-Spitfrres-Mks var. 14+4 22 15 
No 543-Spitfrres-Mks var. 14+4 16 10 Det. At St.Eval 
No 544-Spitfrres,Anson and 7+2 9 6 Det. At Gibraltar 
Wellingtons 
Air -Sea- Rescue 
Bircham Newton 
No 279- Hudson III 16+4 12 7 
No 280- Anson I 16+4 22 17 
Meteoroloeical 
Bircham Newton 




No 1402 Flt.-Hampden, 9+5 14 8 
Gladiator, Spitfire 
St.Eval 
No 1404 FIt. -Hampden, 4+2 9 5 
Hudson 
Wick 
No 1406 Flt.-Hampden, 6+3 9 2 
Spitfire 
Iceland 




Coastal Command Order of Battle, Establishment, Strength and Availability 
1 January 1944 
Group Estab. Strength Available Remarks 
NolS 
Ballykelly 
No 86 - VLR Liberator V & lIlA 15 18 4 
No 59 - VLR Liberator V 15 14 7 
Castle Archdale 
No 201- Sunderland III 12 12 4 
No 422 - Sunderland III 12 12 3 
No 423 - Sunderland III 12 11 3 
No16 
Bircham Newton 
No 415 - Albacore,Wellington XIII 10, 15 10, 14 5,8 Albacores on detachments at 
Manston & Thomey Island 
North Coates 
No 236 - Beaufighter X - RP 20 18 12 
No 254 - Beaufighter X- Torp. 20 18 12 
Thomey Island 
No 547 - Liberator V 15 12 Nil Re-equipping 
No18 
Leuchars 
No 333 - Mosquito VI FIt 6 5 2 
No 455 - Beaufighter X - RP 20 16 Nil Training & re-equipping 
No 489 - Deaufighter X - Torp. 20 21 Nil Training & re-equipping 
Wick 
No 144 - Beaufighter X - Torp 20 21 10 
No 404 - Beaufighter X - RP 20 20 4 
No 618 - Mosquito IV - Special op. 20 14 Nil Non- operational 
No 1693 FIt - Anson 6 5 2 
Woodhaven 
No 333 - Catalina IB FIt. 3 2 1 
SuBorn Voe 
No 190 - LL Catalina IB & IV 12 13 2 Withdrawing to re-form as 210 
No 330 - Sunderland II & III 12 13 3 
No19 
Mount Batten 
No 10 RAAF - Sunderland II & III 12 13 4 
Pembroke Dock 
No 228 - Sunderland III 12 11 5 
No 461- Sunderland III 12 11 4 
Chivenor 
No 172 - LL Wellington XIV 15 15 1 Det. In Azores 
No 407 - LL Wellington XII & XIV 15 15 6 
No 612 - LL Wellington XIV 15 15 4 
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Group 
No 19 (Continued) 
Estab. Strength Available Remarks 
St.Eval 
No 224 - LL Liberator V 15 13 3 1 ale with RP 
Dunkeswell 
No 103 USN - Liberator 12 11 6 On loan 
No 105 USN - Liberator 12 12 7 On loan 
No 110 USN - Liberator 12 12 7 On loan 
St.Davids 
No 58 - Halifax II 15 16 6 
No 502 - Halifax II 15 14 4 
Beaulieu 
No 311 - Liberator V 15 12 8 10 ale with RP 
No 53 - VLR LL Liberator V 15 16 7 1 ale with RP 
Predannaek 
No 304 - LL Wellington XIV 15 15 5 
-Beaufighter X fighters 20 11 9 Re-equipping to Mos. VI 
No 248 - Mosquito XVIII - 6 pdr 2 2 1 
Portreath 
No 143 - Beaufighter XIC - firs 20 18 12 
No 235 - Beauftghter X firs & XIC 20 19 7 
Iceland 
Reyl\javik 
No 120 -VLR Liberator I, III & V 15 18 4 All Mk V ale with LL 
Gibraltar 
No 202 - LL Catalina IB & IV 12 12 9 
No 48 -Hudson II1,IIIA & VI RP 20 20 10 
No 233-Hudson III & IlIA (RP) 20 17 3 Det. In Azores 
No 179-LL Wellington XIV 15 14 5 
Azores (No.247 Group) 
Lagens 
No 206 - Fortress II & IIA 15 16 4 
No 220 - Fortress II & IIA 15 16 5 
No 233 - Hudson III & lIlA (RP) - - 8 Det.from Gibraltar 
No 172 - LL Wellington XIV - - 2 Det.from Chivenor 
CoastalCommand Squadrons -40 630 598 218 
+ 1 Flight; Squadrons on loan-3 36 35 20 
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Air Sea Rescue Estab. Strength Available Remarks 
Bircham Newton 
No 279 - Hudson III,v & VI 20 16 7 
Thomaby 
No 280 - Warwick I 20 21 4 
No 281 - Warwick I 20 16 Nil 
Iceland 
No 269 - Hudson III Flight 2 2 2 
Meteorolo2ical 
St.Davids 
No 517 - Halifax V 23 8 - Re-equipping 
Tiree 
No 518 - Halifax V 14 15 2 
Wick 
No 519-Ventura V & Gladiator 17 15 4 
Bircham Newton 
No 521-Ventura V & Gladiator 9 8 2 
Aldergrove 
No 1402 Flt.-Glasdiator,Spitfire 8 7 5 
Iceland 
No 1407 Flt.- Ventura V 6 - - Re-equipping 
Gibraltar 
No 520-IIalifax V & Gladiator 9 1 - Re-equipping 
Photo2raphic-Reconnaissance 
Benson 
No 540 -Mosquito II 20 18 10 Det. At Leuchars 
No 541 - Spitfire II & XIII 20 22 16 Det.at St.Eval & Gibraltar 
No 542 - Spitfire IV,XI & XIII 20 21 13 
No 544 - Mosquito IX 20 17 11 
Appendix 14 
Distribution as between Anti-U-Boat and Anti- Shipping Operations 
1 March 1945 
I Anti- U- Boat T Anti-Shipping 
Group Squadrons U.E. Strength Available Squadrons 
No 15 59,120,304,201,202,423, 172,815 112 111 53 None 
No 16 810,822 24 26 19 119,612,236,254,813, half 524 
No18 206,547,224,210,330,86,311, half 105 116 42 143,235,248, 144,404,455,489, 
1693, half333 58,502. half524, half333 
No 19 14,36,407,228,10,422,461,179. 103, 187 180 114 None 
105,107, 110, 112, half 63 
Iceland 53, 162 30 35 15 None 
Gibraltar 22,458 35 33 23 None 
Azores 220,144 27 24 11 None 
Battle Line 37YJ squadrons 520 525 277 J 5 YJ squadrons 
I 
U.E. Strength Available 
- - -
95 95 60 








Coastal Command Order of Battle, Establishment, Strength and Availability 
1 April 1945 
Group, Bases and Squadrons Estab. Strength Available 
No 15 Group 
Ballykelly 
No 59 - VLR Liberator V & VIII 15 15 13 
No 120 - LL Liberator VIII 15 15 11 
Benbecula 
No 36 - LL Wellington XIV 15 15 10 
Castle Archdale 
No 201 - Sunderland III 12 10 5 
No 423 - Sunderland III & V 12 13 7 
No 202 - LL Catalina IV A 16 16 7 
Limavady 
No 172- LL Wellington XIV 15 13 7 
Total in No. J 5 Group - 7 RAF Squadrons 100 97 59 
No 16 Group 
Thomey Island (under No. 19 Group 
control) 
No 810 F.A.A.-Barracuda 12 10 10 
No 822 F.A.A.-Barracuda 12 11 10 
Langham 
No 612- Wellington XIV Mk VIA radar 15 15 11 
No 524- Wellington XIV Mk IlIA radar 20 17 9 
North Coates 
No 236 - Beaufighter X -RP 20 18 14 
No 254- Beaufighter X - RP 20 21 11 
No 254- Mos.XVIII - Tsetse-6 pounder 4 4 4 
Knocke, North Belgium 
No 119-Swordfish III 15 15 11 
Total in No. 16 Group-5 R.A.F. + 2 F.A.A. 118 111 80 
Sqdns 
No 18 Group 
Banff 
No 143 -Mosquito VI - RP 20 18 16 
No 235 - Mosquito VI - RP 20 20 14 
No 248- Mosquito VI - RP 20 22 18 
No 333(Norge) Fit - Mosquito VI - RP 10 9 7 
Dallachy 
No 144 -Beau fighter X - RP 20 19 12 
No 455 RAAF -Beaufighter X - RP 20 22 13 
No 489 RNZAF -Beau fighter X - Torp. 20 20 11 
No 404 RCAF - re-anning to Mosquitos 
Leuchars 
No 206 - LL Liberator VIII 15 15 4 
No 547 - LL Liberator VI 15 14 6 
Milltown 
No 224 - LL Liberator VIII 15 17 8 
Group, Bases and Squadrons Estab. Strength Available 
Stomoway. 
304 
No 58 - Halifax II & III 15 15 6 
No 502 - Halifax II & III 15 15 7 
Sullom Voe (No. 18 GrouJlcontinued) Estab. Strength Available 
No 210 - LL Catalina IV A 12 10 4 
No 330 (Norge) Sunderland III 9 8 2 
Tain 
No 86 LL Liberator VIII 15 15 8 
No 311 Czech - LL Liberator VI 15 15 8 
Woodhaven 
No 333 (Norge) Flight -Catalina IVA 3 3 -
Sumburgh 
No 1693 Flight - Anson 6 7 5 
Total in No. 18 Group - 16% RA.F. 265 264 149 
Squadrons 
No 19 Group 
Chivenor 
No 14 - LL Wellington XIV 15 16 11 
No 407 - RCAF - LL Wellington XIV 15 14 10 
No 459 - RAAF - LL Wellington non-op. 
Dunkeswell 
No. 103 - USN Liberator 15 15 13 
No 105 - USN Liberator 15 14 13 
No 110 - USN Liberator 15 15 14 
Mount Batten 
No 10 RAAF - Sunderland III 12 15 8 
Pembroke Dock 
No 228 - Sunderland III 12 15 9 
No 422 RCAF - Sunderland III 12 11 9 
No 461 RAAF - Sunderland III & V 12 16 8 
St.Eval 
No 179 - LL Warwick V 15 12 6 
No 304 - LL Wellington XIV 15 15 11 
Upottery 
No 107 - USN - Liberator 15 13 11 
No 112- USN - Liberator 15 15 14 
VP63 USN det, MAD PBY5A 4 4 3 




No 53- LL Liberator VIII 15 15 5 
No 162 R.C.A.F. Cansos (Catalina III 15 13 5 
amphib) 
Total in leeland- 1 RA.F. + 1 RCAF 30 28 10 
Squadron 
Gibraltar 
No 458 RAAF - LL Wellington XIV 15 16 11 
No 22 SAAF - Ventura V 20 18 13 
Group, Bases and Squadrons Eslab Slrellglh Available 
Total in Gibraltar- 1 RAF + 1 SAAF 35 34 24 
Azores 
Lagens 
No 220 - LL Liberator VI 15 15 10 
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No 114 - USN - LL Liberator 15 14 11 
Total in the Azores- 1 RA.F + 1 US.N 30 29 21 
Phot01!raphic -Reconnaissance 
Benson 
No 540 -Mosquitoes VI,IX,XVI 20 21 14 
No 541 - Spitfires X,XI,XIX; Mustang III 23 19 14 
No 542 - Spitfires X,XI, & XIX 20 21 19 
No 544 - Mosquitoes VI,XVI Det. At 20 18 13 
Leuchars 
Total Photo-Reconnaissance - 4 squadrons 83 79 60 
Air - Sea - Rescue 
Tiree 
No 281- Warwick,Sea Otter Det.at Limavady 18 20 5 
Beccles 
No 278- Walrus,Sea Otter,Det. At Hawkinge 16 14 9 
No 280 - Wanvick 24 26 10 
Banff 
No 279- Warwick,Hurricane; 28 35 15 
Det. At Wick Leuchars and Thomabv 
St.Eval 
No 282- Warwick. Sea Otter 18 19 11 
Lagens,Azores 
No 269 -Warwick,Martlett,Spitfrre.Anson 17 17 9 
Combined A.S.R. and Meteorolo.u;ical Fits 
Total A.S.R. - 6 Squadrons 121 131 59 
Meteorological Fliehts 
Tiree 
No 518- Halifax V 22 24 7 
Ballyhalbert 
No 1402 Flt.- Spitfire VII, Hurricane IIC 9 8 6 
Langham 
No 521 - Fortress II, Hurriance IIC 9 9 8 
Skitten 
No 519 - Fortress II, Spitfire VII 15 14 6 
Brawdv 
No 517 - Halifax V 13 15 4 
Reykjavik, Iceland 
No 251 - Fortress II, Hudson III 12 14 7 
Gibraltar 
No 520- Halifax V,Hudson, Hurricane 13 11 5 















Summary of Coastal Command 
1 April 1945 
Estab. Strength Available Number of Squadrons 
100 97 59 7 RA.F. 
118 111 80 5 RA.F. + 2 F.A.A. 
265 264· 149 161'2 RA.F. 
187 185 138 8 RA.F. + 5Y2 U.S.N. 
30 28 10 2 RA.F. 
35 34 24 1 R.A.F. + 1 S.A.A.F. 
30 29 21 1 RA.F. + 1 U.S.N. 
765 748 481 41ih RA.F. + 2 F.A.A. + 
6ih U.S.N. = 50 
83 79 60 4 Squadrons 
121 131 9 6 Squadrons 
93 95 43 6Y2 Squadrons 
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Appendix 17 
Coastal Command 1 April 1945 
Distribution as between Anti-U-boat and Anti-Shipping 
Anti - U- Boat Anti- Shipping 
Group Squadrons Estab. Strength Available Squadrons Estab. Strength Available 
No 15 59,120,36,201,202,423,172 100 97 59 None - - -
No 16 810,822 24 21 20 119,612,236,254,524 94 90 60 
No18 206,547,224,210,330,86,311, half 133, 105 104 45 143,235,248,58,502, 160 160 104 
half 1693 half 333 
No 19 14,407,228,10,422,461,179,304,103,105, 187 185 138 None - - -
107,110,112, half 63 
Iceland 53, 162 30 28 10 None - - -
Gibraltar 22,458 35 34 24 None - - -
Azores 220, 114 30 29 21 None - - -




U-boats Sunk by Coastal Command Controlled Aircraft 
Number of V-boats Sunk Outright No.of V-boats sunk shared 
with Naval Forces 
Group By Coastal By U.S. ale By By Coastal By U.S. ale 
Commandalc underCC Canadian Command underCC 
control EAC ale ale control 
underCC 
control 
No 15 31 German - - 5 German -
No16 5 German - - - -
No 18 39 Gennan - - 2Gennan 
No 19 53 Gennan 9Gennan - 6 Gennan 1 Gennan 
1 Italian 
Iceland 9 Gennan 1 Gennan 1 German 
Gibrall.ar 13 Gelman - - 5 Gelman 2 Getman 
3 Italian 1 Italian 
Azores 5 German - - 1 German 
Totals 166 German 18 Gennan 1 Gennan 20 German 3 Gennan 
4 Italian 1 Italian 
Grand 18SGerman 23 German 
Totals 4 Italian 1 Italian 
U-boats Damaged by Coastal Command Controlled Aircraft 
No. of V-boats Damaged By: 
Group Coastal Command Bomber or Fighter American aircraft under 
Aircraft Command aircraft Coastal Command Control 
under CC Control 
No15 16 Gennan - -
No18 24 German - -
No19 44 Gennan 7 German 2 German 
4 Italian 
Iceland 10 Gennan - 3 German 
Azores 1 German -
Totals J05German 7 German 5 German 
4 Italian 
Command 117 German 
Totals 4 Italian 




Enemy Controlled Ships Sunk or Damaged by Coastal Command 
Controlled Aircraft 
No 16 GrOU) No 18 GrOU) No 19 GrOU) 
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Sunk Damaged Sunk Damaged Sunk Damaged 
1940 2/2,860 8/32,176 4/2,701 6/15,486 Nil Nil 
1941 9/23,374 3/15,042 16/19,659 15/29,685 3/8,932 2/39,640 
1942 13/27,139 5/17,559 8/27,343 6/16,075 5/942 9/48,478 
1943 18/41,944 2/19,093 10/33,083 2/1,785 4/9,732 116,240 
1944 99/80,105 6/15,449 42/68,308 29/98,110 29/34,779 4113,699 
1945 37/14,686 4/24444 67/116743 32/120,493 Nil Nil 
TotalNo. 178 28 ,147 90 41 16 
Ships 
Total 190,108 123,763 267,337 281,634 54,385 108,057 
Tonnaf!e 
Total No. of Ships Sunk by Coastal Command Controlled Aircraft- 366 
Total Tonnage- 512,330 
Total No. of Ships Damaged by Coastal Command Controlled Aircraft- 134 
Total Tonnage- 513,454 
Mines Laid by Coastal Command Controlled Aircraft 
Year No 15 Group No 16 Group No 18 Group No 19 Group Yearly Totals 
1940 3 396+ 288 13 - 412+ 288 
1941 - 110 16 224 350 
1942 - 141 6 - 147 
1943 - 27 - - 27 
War Totals 3 674 + 288 35 224 936 + 288 
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Appendix 20 
Coastal Command Controlled Aircraft Lost During World War II 
. n - u manne 'perations 1 0 Anti S b 0 
Group Year War 
Total 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
15 4 20 34 24 20 19 3 124 
16 3 7 1 - - 2 2 15 
18 2 11 25 19 8 21 10 96 
19 - - 17 117 179 90 9 412 
Iceland - - 2 12 6 8 1 29 
Gibraltar - - 4 28 16 7 1 56 
Azores - - - - 4 4 1 9 
Yearly 9 38 83 200 233 151 27 741 
Total 





1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
15 - 19 4 - - - - 23 
16 10 88 63 79 49 88 20 397 
18 9 63 63 59 42 50 81 358 
19 - - 38 26 7 27 - 98 
Yearly 19 161 168 164 98 165 101 876 
Total 





1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
15 - 1 - - - - - I 
16 - 9 14 8 4 - - 35 
18 - - 2 - - - - 2 
19 - - 4 - - - - 4 
Yearly - 10 20 8 4 - - 42 
Total 
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Coastal Command Aircraft Lost During World War II (Continued) 





1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
15 - 5 8 - - - - 13 
16 - 5 6 3 - - - 14 
18 - 11 8 6 - - - 25 
19 - - 15 8 3 - - 26 
Yearly - 21 37 17 3 - - 78 
Total 




1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
15 - 14 14 2 - - - 30 
16 - 53 17 2 - - - 72 
18 - 12 2 - - - - 14 
19 - 10 3 - - - 13 
Yearly - 79 43 7 - - - 129 
Total 
6.Aircraft Lost on Photo- Reconnaissance 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 War 
Total 
2 15 31 51 46 40 9 194 
Coastal Command's Annual Aircraft Losses 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 War 
Total 
30 324 382 447 384 356 137 2.060 
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Appendix 21 
Coastal Command Casualties 
3 September 1939 to 8 May 1945 
Killed Missing Prisoner of War Wounded 
Flying Battle 
Aircrew 5,863 128 (125) 478 (477) 986 
Groundcrew 159 3 (3) 5 (5) 49 
6,022 131 (128) 483 (482) 1,035 
Flying Accident 
Aircrew 2,261 10 (8) 17 (17) 1,049 
Groundcrew 182 - 3 (3) 120 
2,443 10 (8) 20 (20 1,169 
Ground Battle 
Aircrew 18 - 3 (3) 20 
Groundcrew 135 - 10 (10) 172 
153 - 13 (13) 192 
Ground 
Aircrew 38 - - 31 
Groundcrew 218 - - 174 
Totals 
Aircrew 8,180 138 (133) 498 (497) 2,086 
Groundcrew 694 3 (3) 18 (18) 515 
Grand Totals 8.874 141(36) 516 (515) 2,601 
The above figures are inclusive of Dominion and Allied personnel at R.A.F. posting disposal 
and include amendments up to 31 st May 1947. The figures in brackets represent those included 
in the adjacent totals, who at the date of amendment had been reported safe. Personnel 
previously reported missing or prisoner of war and subsequently killed are included as killed. 
In addition to the above figures there were 23 aircrew and 224 ground stafl'(total247), who 
died of natural causes. [From Air 15-162 Table I] 
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